REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8409060357 DOC.DATE: 84/08/27 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
KOBER,R.W. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
PAULSON,W.A. Operating Reactors Branch 5

SUBJECT: Forwards responses to NRC questions re 840402 application for amend to License DPR-18. Response provides statement whether spent fuel pool liner would be perforated as result of failure of bottom plate welds.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A001D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 2
TITLE: OR Submittal: General Distribution

NOTES:NRR/DL/SEP 1cy. 05000244
OL:09/19/69

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME		COPIES LTTR	COPIES ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME		COPIES LTTR	COPIES ENCL
	NRR ORB5 BC	01	7	7				
INTERNAL:	ADM/LFMB		1	0	ELD/HDS4		1	0
	NRR/DE/MTEB		1	1	NRR/DL DIR		1	1
	NRR/DL/ORAB		1	0	NRR/DSI/METB		1	1
	NRR/DSI/RAB		1	1	REG FILE	04	1	1
	RGN1		1	1				
EXTERNAL:	ACRS	09	6	6	LPDR	03	1	1
	NRC PDR	02	1	1	NSIC	05	1	1
	NTIS		1	1				
NOTES:			1	1				

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 27 ENCL 24

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001

ROGER W. KOBER
VICE PRESIDENT
ELECTRIC & STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 716 546-2700

August 27, 1984

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. Walter A. Paulson, Acting Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 5
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Responses to NRC Staff Questions
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Paulson:

Attached are responses to NRC Staff questions concerning our Application for Amendment to Operating License of April 2, 1984.

Very truly yours,

Roger W. Kober

Roger W. Kober

Attachment

A001
1/1

Question: Your submittal indicates that dropping a fuel assembly within a storage cell could cause the bottom plate welds to fail. Please provide a statement as to whether the spent fuel pool liner would be perforated as a result of this accident.

Response: We have determined the fuel assembly velocity required to perforate the stainless steel liner using methodology developed for tornado missile impact analysis. Using the submerged weight of a fuel assembly dropped from 30 inches above the top of the rack, but neglecting all drag forces due to water or impact with cell walls or bottom plate, the velocity of the fuel assembly on impact is not sufficient to perforate the liner.