

REGULATOR INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

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 FACIL: 50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 WHITE, L.D. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 ZIEMANN, D.C. Operating Reactors Branch 2 (Pre 791030)

SUBJECT: Responds to NRC 791023. ltr re containment purging during normal plant operations. Purging done to improve working or environ conditions. Valve openings restricted. Ventilation isolation sys modified requiring valve reset individually.

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 TITLE: Containment Purging

NOTES: ICV: C. HOFMAYER, J. SHAPIKER

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
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LEON D. WHITE, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT

TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 716 546-2700



December 14, 1979

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operations
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Ziemann:

Your letter of October 23, 1979, received on October 31, 1979, requested that Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation commit to an interim position on containment purging. As a guideline, the Staff's interim position was enclosed. The following commitments are made based on the Staff's guidelines:

1. In our letter of January 2, 1979 containment purging was limited to 90 hours per year while the reactor is critical or operating as defined in the R. E. Ginna Technical Specifications. Since purging time is limited, purging will only be done to improve working conditions in containment or improve environmental conditions for equipment. (Examples of improved working conditions would include reducing temperature, humidity, and/or airborne activity to permit efficient performance or to reduce occupational radiation exposures). It should be noted that limiting containment purging to 90 hours per year may result in increased personnel exposure during required Technical Specification surveillances.
- 2.(a) On an interim basis the containment purge valves will be limited to be no more than approximately 50° open while purging. The limit will be achieved by installation of mechanical stops. This valve opening restriction will apply until it can be shown that the critical valve parts will not be damaged by the loads associated with closing against a Design Base Accident Loss of Coolant Accident.

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- (b) The containment ventilation isolation system consists of the four containment purge valves, two containment depressurization valves and two radiation monitor valves. If open, these valves will automatically close on a Safety Injection (SI) signal, high containment activity, manual containment isolation, or manual spray. If the containment ventilation isolation system reset is activated while a high containment activity signal or SI signal is present, these eight valves could be opened and the automatic closure of these valves is blocked until the reset is deactivated. The reset is deactivated when both the SI signal and the high containment activity signals are cleared.

The purpose of the reset on the containment ventilation isolation system is to allow purging of containment in order to limit potential hydrogen concentration buildup following a postulated LOCA when high containment activity and SI signals could be present.

Procedures associated with the activation of the containment ventilation isolation system reset alert the operator that activating the reset blocks automatic closure of the eight valves on an SI signal. If a high containment activity alarm is present, the reset will not be used until the high containment activity alarm has been cleared unless SI has occurred. Since the high containment activity will be cleared prior to activating the reset, the SI signal is uninhibited and operable to initiate valve closure. Therefore, equipment modifications are not necessary.

As part of the TMI Short Term Lessons Learned Item 2.1.4, the containment ventilation isolation system is being modified to require reset of each valve in the system individually, making inadvertent reset highly unlikely. In addition the new reset control matrix will be backlighted to display the reset status of all isolation valves. The operator can glance at the panel to determine reset status at any time. This modification is scheduled for completion during the March 1980 refueling outage.

Very truly yours,



L. D. White, Jr.

