

Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station

After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Exercise Date – April 11, 2017

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program

FEMA

Published June 19, 2017

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Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Published June 19, 2017

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On April 11, 2017, a full-scale Plume Exposure Pathway exercise was demonstrated and evaluated for the 10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Generating Station by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region III. The previous full-scale exercise at this site was evaluated on April 14, 2015.

Out-of-Sequence demonstrations were conducted on February 6th & 8th, 2017, March 7, 2017, and April 8th & 12th, 2017. The purpose of the Exercise and Out-of-Sequence demonstrations was to assess the capabilities of State, counties, and local jurisdictions to implement Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) and procedures to protect the property and lives of residents and transients in the event of an emergency at TMI. The findings in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluation team, with final determinations made by the FEMA, Region III Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chairperson, and approved by FEMA Headquarters. These reports are provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and participating States. State and local governments utilize the findings contained in these reports for the purposes of planning, training, and improving emergency preparedness.

The evaluation of this Exercise determined that there were no Level 1 Findings, one (1) Level 2 Finding, successfully re-demonstrated, and two (2) Plan Issues (PI). A Level 1 Finding is defined by the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual as follows: "An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a determination that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)." A Level 2 Finding is defined as: "An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety." Finally, a Planning Issue is: "An observed or identified inadequacy in the ORO's emergency plan/implementing procedures, rather than that of the ORO's performance."

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the (5) risk jurisdictions of Cumberland, Dauphin, Lancaster, Lebanon and York, counties; the three (3) support counties, Adams, Franklin and Schuylkill; and the eleven (11) Commonwealth of Pennsylvania participating municipalities. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during the exercise

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name
Plume 2017-04-11

Type of Exercise
Plume

Exercise Date
April 11, 2017

Program
Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Scenario Type
Minimal Release

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

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1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station exercise:

State Jurisdictions

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

- Pennsylvania Department of Aging
- Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture
- Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development
- Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources
- Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
- Pennsylvania Department of Education
- Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection
- Pennsylvania Department of General Services
- Pennsylvania Department of Health
- Pennsylvania Department of Human Services
- Pennsylvania Department of Military and Veteran Affairs
- Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare
- Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
- Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
- Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission
- Pennsylvania Game Commission
- Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
- Pennsylvania National Guard, 193rd Special Operations Wing
- Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
- Pennsylvania State Police
- Pennsylvania Secretary of Public Information
- Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission

Risk Jurisdictions

Cumberland County

- Cumberland County Department of Public Safety
- Cumberland County Special Hazards Operations Team
- Lower Allen Township Department of Public Safety
- New Cumberland Borough
- Shippensburg University
- Shippensburg Fire Department
- West Shore Bureau of Fire

Dauphin County

- Dauphin County Department of Public Safety
- Dauphin County Information Technology / GIS
- Dauphin County Mental Health and Intellectual Disabilities
- Dauphin County Amateur Radio Operators
- Hospital Association of Pennsylvania
- Dauphin County District Attorney's Office Criminal Investigation Division
- Dauphin County Hazardous Material Response Team
- PA National Guard 193rd Special Operations Wing
- American Red Cross Susquehanna Valley
- NDC4 Regional EMA
- Dauphin County Ag / Penn State Extension
- Halifax Area School District
- Halifax Fire Department
- Harrisburg City Fire Department
- Harrisburg City Mayor's Office
- Harrisburg City Police Department
- Harrisburg City Public Works Department
- Highspire Borough Council
- Highspire Borough Emergency Operations Center
- Highspire Borough Highway Department
- Highspire Borough Mayor
- Highspire Borough Police Department
- Hospital Association of Pennsylvania
- Lower Paxton Township Emergency Management Agency
- Lower Paxton Township Police Department, including the Public Safety Director
- Lower Paxton Township Fire and Rescue Services, including EMS
- Lower Paxton Public Works Resources Services
- Lower Paxton Township Department of Transportation
- Lower Paxton Township Radiological Protection Services
- Millersburg Area School District
- Upper Dauphin Area School District
- Williams Valley School District

Lancaster County

- Lancaster County Amateur Radio
- Lancaster County Clerk's Office
- Lancaster County Commissioners
- Lancaster County Communications Center
- Lancaster County Emergency Management Agency
- Lancaster County External Affairs/PIO

- Lancaster County GIS Division
- Lancaster County Hazardous Material Emergency Response Team
- Lancaster County Public Safety Training Center (ESF 4)
- Lancaster County Radiological Officer
- Lancaster County VOAD
- Drumore Township
- East Donegal Township Manager
- East Donegal Township Supervisor
- East Hempfield Emergency Services
- Franklin and Marshall College

Lebanon County

- Annville-Cleona Fire Department
- Campbelltown Volunteer Fire Company
- Lawn Fire Company
- Lawn Fire Company EMS
- Lebanon County Amateur Radio
- Lebanon County Commissioners
- Lebanon County Communications Center
- Lebanon County Emergency Management Agency
- Lebanon County PIO
- Lebanon County Hazardous Materials and Special Operations Response Team
- Lebanon County Radiological Officer
- Lebanon County Sheriff's Office
- Life Lion EMS
- Palmyra Area School District
- South Londonderry Township Police Department
- Western Lebanon County Regional Emergency Management Agency

York County

- York County EMA Staff
- York Adams Disaster, Crisis, Outreach and Referral Team
- York Adams Transportation Authority
- York ARES RACES Skywarn
- York City Bureau of Health
- York County 911
- York County Commissioners
- York County Department of Emergency Services
- York County HazMat Team
- York County Human Services
- York County Office of Emergency Management
- York County Parks and Recreation

- York County Penn State Extension
- York County Sheriff's Office
- USDA Farm Service Agency – York
- Wellspan York Hospital
- Hanover Hospital
- Memorial Hospital
- Pennsylvania State Police – Loganville Barracks
- American Red Cross of Central PA
- Monaghan Township Volunteer Fire Company
- Glen Rock Hose and Ladder
- Dover Township Volunteer Fire Department
- Dover Township Emergency Management
- Fairview Township Emergency Management
- Fairview Township Fire Department
- Northeastern Area Emergency Management
- Northeastern EMS
- Northeastern Regional Police Department
- Northern Regional Police Department
- York Area Emergency Management
- York Area United Fire and Rescue
- Warrington Township
- Northern York County Emergency Management
- Eastern York County Emergency Management
- Goldsboro Borough Emergency Management
- Newberry Area Regional Emergency Management
- Northeastern School District
- Central York School District
- West Shore School District
- Dover Area School District
- Eastern York School District
- Northern York County School District

Support Jurisdictions

Adams County

- Adams County Emergency Operations Center

Franklin County

- Franklin County Commissioners
- Franklin County Administrators
- Franklin County Department of Emergency Services
- Franklin County Emergency Management Coordinator
- Franklin County Emergency Operations Center

- Franklin County Risk Management
- Franklin County Information Technology Services
- Franklin County Human Resources
- Franklin County Geographic Information Systems
- American Red Cross of Central Pennsylvania
- Franklin County Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)
- Girl Scout Troop #80855
- Greene Township Emergency Management Coordinator
- Guilford Township Emergency Management Coordinator
- Medic 100 - Holy Spirit Emergency Medical Services
- New Franklin Volunteer Fire Company
- Orrstown Borough Emergency Management Coordinator
- Pennsylvania State Police - Chambersburg Barracks
- Southampton Township Emergency Management Coordinator
- St Thomas Township Volunteer Fire and Rescue

Schuylkill County

- Schuylkill County Emergency Operations Center

SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume the lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities were conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees. FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

A. Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures developed by State and local governments;

B. Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises conducted by State and local governments;

C. Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated December 7, 2015 (Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 57, March 24, 2016); and

D. Coordinating the activities of the following Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

- U.S. Department of Commerce,
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
- U.S. Department of Energy,
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
- U.S. Department of Transportation,
- U.S. Department of Agriculture,
- U.S. Department of the Interior, and
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Representatives of these agencies serve on the Region III Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. A REP Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise was conducted during the week of April 10, 2017, to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station (TMI). The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results

and findings on the performance of the off-site response organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency. The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluation team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region III RAC Chairperson and approved by FEMA Headquarters.

These reports are provided to the NRC and participating States. State and local governments utilize the findings contained in these reports for the purposes of planning, training, and improving emergency response capabilities.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in the following:

- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, "November 1980;

- Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual, January 2016;

Section 1 of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents the "Exercise Planning Team" and the "Participating Organizations."

Section 2, of this report entitled "Exercise Design Summary", and includes the "Exercise Purpose and Design", "Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities", and the "Scenario Summary".

Section 3 of this report, entitled "Analysis of Capabilities", presents detailed "Exercise Evaluation and Results" information on the demonstration for each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issue-only format (Criteria Evaluation Summaries). This section also contains:

The appendices, present supplementary information:

Appendix A – Exercise Timeline. A table that depicts the times when an event or notifications were noted at participating agencies and locations.

Appendix B – Exercise Evaluators and Team leaders. A table listing the evaluator names, organizations, and responsibilities of the evaluators and management.

Appendix C – Acronyms and Abbreviations. An alphabetized table defining the formal names used in this report.

Appendix D – Extent of Play Agreement

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities

The objectives of the 2017 Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station (TMI) Plume Exercise were to demonstrate the capabilities of State and local emergency management agencies to mobilize emergency management and emergency response personnel, to activate emergency

operations centers and support facilities, and to protect the health, lives, and property of the citizens residing within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

To demonstrate the ability to communicate between multiple levels of government and provide timely, accurate, and sufficiently detailed information to the public, the emergency management agencies use a variety of resources, including radios, telephones, the Internet, the media, the Emergency Alert System (EAS), and the utility Alert and Notification System (ANS) Sirens. All of these communication resources were employed and evaluated. The EAS and ANS were simulated and media information was prepared but not actually released.

An essential capability of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP) is to evacuate, monitor and decontaminate, if necessary, and provide temporary care and shelter to displaced residents from the EPZ. The ability of the risk/support counties to mobilize personnel and resources to establish reception, monitoring and decontamination, and mass care centers was demonstrated.

The protection of school children is also a vital mission of the REPP. School districts and selected schools demonstrated the capability to communicate and coordinate the collection, evacuation, transportation and shelter of students attending schools within the EPZ. Provisions for students who live within the EPZ, but attend school outside were also evaluated.

2.3 Scenario Summary

DHS/FEMA Region III Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station 2017 Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise – April 11, 2017.

Meteorological conditions are wind direction from 305 degrees with a wind speed of 8 miles per hour (mph) and a "C" stability class. The wind direction varies throughout the exercise from 305 to 315 degrees.

At 1624, TMI declared a Notification of an Unusual Event Emergency based on reactor coolant system leak.

At 1655, the Shift Manager declared an Alert Emergency based on inability to shut the reactor down.

At 1818, the Station Emergency Director declared a Site Area Emergency based on Loss of Containment barrier.

At 1909, a General Emergency was declared based on loss of two fission product barriers.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) and the Pennsylvania Department of Health and county and local agencies implemented protective response strategies based on recommendations from utility representatives and State dose/accident assessment teams.

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluations of all jurisdictions and locations that participated in the April 11, 2017, biennial Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise, and the Out of Sequence Exercise evaluations conducted on February 6th & 8th, 2017, March 7, 2017, and April 8th & 12th, 2017. The exercise was conducted to demonstrate the ability of the Offsite Response Organizations of State and local government to protect the health and safety of the public in the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone surrounding the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of the Exercise Evaluation Area Criteria contained in the REP Exercise Evaluation Methodology. Detailed information on the exercise evaluation area criteria and the Extent of Play Agreement can be found in the Exercise Plan.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The matrix presented in Table 3.1, on the following pages, presents the status of the exercise evaluation area criteria from the REP Program Manual that was scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise evaluation area criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of the criteria is indicated by the use of the following letters:

(D) Demonstrated Strength: an observed action, behavior, procedure, and/or practice that is worthy of special notice and positive recognition, Note: this is already a common practice that many Regions employ when identifying demonstrated strengths.

(L1) Level 1 Finding: an observed or identified inadequacy or organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a determination that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).

(L2) Level 2 Finding: an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety.

(P) Plan Issue: an observed or identified inadequacy in the offsite response organizations' (OROs) emergency plan/implementation procedures, rather than that of the ORO's performance.

(N) Not Demonstrated: term applied to the status of a REP exercise Evaluation Area Criterion indicating that the ORO, for a justifiable reason, did not demonstrate the Evaluation Area Criterion, as required in the extent-of-play agreement or at the two-year or eight-year interval required in the FEMA REP Program Manual.

(M) Met: The jurisdiction or functional entity performed all activities under the Demonstration Criterion to the level required in the Extent-of-Play Agreement, with no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings assessed under that criterion in the current exercise and no unresolved prior Level 2 Findings.

Tables 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation

Table 3.1a - Exercise Evaluation by Classification

Date: 4/11/2017 Site: Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station			
Location Abbreviation	Criteria Title	Criteria	Classification
LeCo EWMDS AUHFD	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	P
YCDTEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1	L2
YCRMDSSCHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	P

Table 3.1b – Exercise Evaluation – Criteria Met

Date: 4/11/2017 Site: Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station		
Location Abbreviation	Criteria Title	Criteria
ACEOC	Mobilization	1a1
ACEOC	Facilities	1b1
ACEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
ACEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
ACEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
ACEOC	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
BRP R3V	Mobilization	1a1
BRP R3V	Communications Equipment	1d1
BRP R3V	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
BRP R3V	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
BRP R3V	Field Team Management	4a2
CuCo EOC	Mobilization	1a1
CuCo EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
CuCo EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CuCo EOC	PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	2c1
CuCo EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
CuCo EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
CuCo EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CuCo EOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
CuCo EOC	Activation of the Prompt Alert & Notification System	5a1
CuCo EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
CuCo EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
CuCo EOC	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
CuCo EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
CuCo EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CuCo EWMDS WSBFS#13	Direction and Control	1c1
CuCo EWMDS WSBFS#13	Communications Equipment	1d1
CuCo EWMDS WSBFS#13	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CuCo EWMDS WSBFS#13	Monitoring/Decontamination of Emergency Workers/Equipment/Vehicles	6b1
CuCoLATBuRA	Mobilization	1a1

CuCoLATBuRA	Communications Equipment	1d1
CuCoLATBuRA	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CuCoLATBuRA	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CuCoLATBuRA	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
CuCoLATEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
CuCoLATEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
CuCoLATEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CuCoLATEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
CuCoLATEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
CuCoLATEOC	Mobilization	1a1
CuCoLATEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
CuCoLATEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
CuCoLATEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CuCoLATEOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
CuCoLATEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CuCoLATwpTACP	Communications Equipment	1d1
CuCoLATwpTACP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CuCoLATwpTACP	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CuCoLATwpTACP	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
CuCoMCCSU	Communications Equipment	1d1
CuCoMCCSU	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CuCoMCCSU	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
CuCoRMDCSU	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CuCoRMDCSU	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CuCoRMDCSU	Direction and Control	1c1
CuCoRMDCSU	Facilities	1b1
CuCoRMDCSU	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
DaCoCDEHS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoCDSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoCDSDSMS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoCDSDTCE	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoDTHIE	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoDTSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoDTSDHMS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCo EOC	PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	2c1
DaCo EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
DaCo EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
DaCo EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
DaCo EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
DaCo EOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
DaCo EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
DaCo EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCo EOC	Activation of the Prompt Alert & Notification System	5a1
DaCo EOC	Mobilization	1a1

DaCo EOC	Facilities	1b1
DaCo EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
DaCo EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
DaCo EOC	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
DaCo EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
DaCoHCtyEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
DaCoHCtyEOC	Mobilization	1a1
DaCoHCtyEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
DaCoHCtyEOC	Facilities	1b1
DaCoHCtyEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoHCtyEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
DaCoHCtyEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
DaCoHCtyEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
DaCoHCtyEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
DaCoHCtyEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
DaCoHCtyEOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
DaCoHCtyEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
DaCoHSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoHSDHHS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoHSDSS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoHsprBEOC	Mobilization	1a1
DaCoHsprBEOC	Facilities	1b1
DaCoHsprBEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoHsprBEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
DaCoHsprBEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
DaCoHsprBEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
DaCoHsprBEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
DaCoHsprBEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
DaCoHsprBEOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
DaCoHsprBEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
DaCoHsprBEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
DaCoHsprBEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
DaCoLdryTEOC	Facilities	1b1
DaCoLdryTEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
DaCoLdryTEOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
DaCoLdryTEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
DaCoLdryTEOC	Mobilization	1a1
DaCoLdryTEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoLdryTEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
DaCoLdryTEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
DaCoLdryTEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
DaCoLdryTEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
DaCoLdryTEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
DaCoLdryTEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1

DaCoLDSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoLDSDLDH	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoLDSDPB	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoLDSDSHE	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoLPaxTwpBuRA	Mobilization	1a1
DaCoLPaxTwpBuRA	Communications Equipment	1d1
DaCoLPaxTwpBuRA	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
DaCoLPaxTwpBuRA	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
DaCoLPaxTwpBuRA	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
DaCoLPaxTwpTACP	Communications Equipment	1d1
DaCoLPaxTwpTACP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
DaCoLPaxTwpTACP	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
DaCoLPaxTwpTACP	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
DaCoLPxtnTEOC	Mobilization	1a1
DaCoLPxtnTEOC	Facilities	1b1
DaCoLPxtnTEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
DaCoLPxtnTEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
DaCoLPxtnTEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
DaCoLPxtnTEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
DaCoLPxtnTEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
DaCoLPxtnTEOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
DaCoLPxtnTEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
DaCoLPxtnTEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoLPxtnTEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
DaCoLPxtnTEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
DaCoMASD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoMASDMH	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoMCCEFES	Facilities	1b1
DaCoMCCEFES	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
DaCoMCCMMHS	Communications Equipment	1d1
DaCoMCCMMHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
DaCoMCCMMHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
DaCoMCCUDHS	Facilities	1b1
DaCoMCCUDHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
DaCoMCCUDMSESC	Facilities	1b1
DaCoMCCUDMSESC	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
DaCoMHS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoPxtgBEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
DaCoPxtgBEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
DaCoPxtgBEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoPxtgBEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
DaCoPxtgBEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
DaCoPxtgBEOC	Mobilization	1a1
DaCoPxtgBEOC	Facilities	1b1

DaCoPxtgBEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
DaCoPxtgBEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
DaCoPxtgBEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
DaCoPxtgBEOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
DaCoPxtgBEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
DaCoRMDCWVHS	Facilities	1b1
DaCoRMDCWVHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
DaCoRMDCWVHS	Direction and Control	1c1
DaCoRMDCWVHS	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
DaCoRMDCWVHS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
DaCoRMDCWVHS	Communications Equipment	1d1
DaCoSHSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoSHSDSHE	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
DaCoTS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
EJIC	Communications Equipment	1d1
EJIC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
EJIC	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
Exelon EOF	Communications Equipment	1d1
Exelon EOF	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
Exelon EOF	Accident Assessment and PARs for the Emergency Event	2b1
FrCo EOC (S)	Mobilization	1a1
FrCo EOC (S)	Facilities	1b1
FrCo EOC (S)	Direction and Control	1c1
FrCo EOC (S)	Communications Equipment	1d1
FrCo EOC (S)	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
FrCo EOC (S)	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
FrCo MCC CMS	Communications Equipment	1d1
FrCo MCC CMS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
FrCo MCC CMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
FrCoMDCCMS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
FrCoMDCCMS	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
FrCoMDCCMS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
FrCoMDCCMS	Direction and Control	1c1
LaCo DSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
LaCo DSD DHS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
LaCoEASD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
LaCo EASD EAMS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
LaCo EASD EHSES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
LaCoEDglTTACP	Communications Equipment	1d1
LaCoEDglTTACP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LaCoEDglTTACP	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LaCoEDglTTACP	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
LaCoEDgTBuRA	Mobilization	1a1
LaCoEDgTBuRA	Communications Equipment	1d1

LaCoEDgTBuRA	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LaCoEDgTBuRA	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LaCoEDgTBuRA	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
LaCoEDgTEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LaCoEDgTEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
LaCoEDgTEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
LaCoEDgTEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
LaCoEDgTEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
LaCoEDgTEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
LaCoEDgTEOC	Mobilization	1a1
LaCoEDgTEOC	Facilities	1b1
LaCoEDgTEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
LaCoEDgTEOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
LaCoEDgTEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
LaCoEDgTEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LaCoEOC	Mobilization	1a1
LaCoEOC	Facilities	1b1
LaCoEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
LaCoEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LaCoEOC	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
LaCoEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
LaCoEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
LaCoEOC	Activation of the Prompt Alert & Notification System	5a1
LaCoEOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
LaCoEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
LaCoEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LaCoEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
LaCoMCCHHS	Communications Equipment	1d1
LaCoMCCHHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LaCoMCCHHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
LaCoMDCHHS	Direction and Control	1c1
LaCoMDCHHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LaCoMDCHHS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LaCoMDCHHS	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
LaCoPFCEWMDS	Direction and Control	1c1
LaCoPFCEWMDS	Communications Equipment	1d1
LaCoPFCEWMDS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LaCoPFCEWMDS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LaCoPFCEWMDS	Monitoring/Decontamination of Emergency Workers/Equipment/Vehicles	6b1
LaCoRCPCtyMl	Communications Equipment	1d1
LaCoRCPCtyMl	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LaCoRCPCtyMl	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LeCo EOC	Mobilization	1a1
LeCo EOC	Facilities	1b1

LeCo EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LeCo EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
LeCo EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
LeCo EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
LeCo EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LeCo EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
LeCo EOC	PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	2c1
LeCo EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
LeCo EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
LeCo EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
LeCo EOC	Activation of the Prompt Alert & Notification System	5a1
LeCo EOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
LeCo EOC	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
LeCo EWMDS AUHFD	Direction and Control	1c1
LeCo EWMDS AUHFD	Communications Equipment	1d1
LeCo EWMDS AUHFD	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LeCo EWMDS AUHFD	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LeCo EWMDS AUHFD	Monitoring/Decontamination of Emergency Workers/Equipment/Vehicles	6b1
LeCo MCC NLHS	Communications Equipment	1d1
LeCo MCC NLHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
LeCo MCC NLHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LeCoPASD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
LeCoPASDLAES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
LeCoPASDPAM	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
LeCoRMDCLCCTC	Facilities	1b1
LeCoRMDCLCCTC	Direction and Control	1c1
LeCoRMDCLCCTC	Communications Equipment	1d1
LeCoRMDCLCCTC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LeCoRMDCLCCTC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LeCoRMDCLCCTC	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
LeCoSLTEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LeCoSLTEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
LeCoSLTEOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
LeCoSLTEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
LeCoSLTEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
LeCoSLTEOC	Mobilization	1a1
LeCoSLTEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
LeCoSLTEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
LeCoSLTEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LeCoSLTEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
LeCoSLTEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
LeCo SLTwp BuRA	Mobilization	1a1
LeCo SLTwp BuRA	Communications Equipment	1d1
LeCo SLTwp BuRA	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1

LeCo SLTwp BuRA	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LeCo SLTwp BuRA	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
LeCo SLTwp TACP	Communications Equipment	1d1
LeCo SLTwp TACP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LeCo SLTwp TACP	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LeCo SLTwp TACP	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
PAAACCRCCBRP	Mobilization	1a1
PAAACCRCCBRP	Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decisions	2a1
PAAACCRCCBRP	Accident Assessment and PARs for the Emergency Event	2b1
PAAACCRCCBRP	PAD decision-making process and coordination for the General Public	2b2
PAAACCRCCBRP	Communications Equipment	1d1
PAAACCRCCBRP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
PAAACCRCCBRP	Direction and Control	1c1
PACRCC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
PACRCC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
PACRCC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
PACRCC	Activation of the Prompt Alert & Notification System	5a1
PACRCC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
PACRCC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
PACRCC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
PACRCC	Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decisions	2a1
PACRCC	Accident Assessment and PARs for the Emergency Event	2b1
PACRCC	PAD decision-making process and coordination for the General Public	2b2
PACRCC	PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	2c1
PACRCC	Direction and Control	1c1
PACRCC	Communications Equipment	1d1
PACRCC	Mobilization	1a1
PA JIC/RumCon	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
PA JIC/RumCon	Mobilization	1a1
PA JIC/RumCon	Communications Equipment	1d1
PA TACP SPBH	Mobilization	1a1
PA TACP SPBH	Communications Equipment	1d1
PA TACP SPBH	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
PA TACP SPBH	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
PA TACP SPBH	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
PA TACP SPBH	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
ScCo EOC (S)	Facilities	1b1
ScCo EOC (S)	Communications Equipment	1d1
ScCo EOC (S)	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
ScCo EOC (S)	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
ScCo EOC (S)	Mobilization	1a1
ScCo EOC (S)	Direction and Control	1c1
ScCo MCC BMHS	Communications Equipment	1d1
ScCo MCC BMHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1

ScCo MCC BMHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
ScCoMCCBMMS	Facilities	1b1
ScCoMCCBMMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
ScCoMCCDHHLMS	Facilities	1b1
ScCoMCCDHHLMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
ScCoMCCPAHS	Facilities	1b1
ScCoMCCPAHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
ScCoMCCPSSC	Facilities	1b1
ScCoMCCPSSC	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
ScCoMCCSHAMS	Facilities	1b1
ScCoMCCSHAMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
ScCoMCCSHHS	Facilities	1b1
ScCoMCCSHHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
ScCoRMDCBMHS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
ScCoRMDCBMHS	Direction and Control	1c1
ScCoRMDCBMHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
ScCoRMDCBMHS	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
SFMT A SCR	Mobilization	1a1
SFMT A SCR	Communications Equipment	1d1
SFMT A SCR	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
SFMT A SCR	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
SFMT A SCR	Plume Phase Field Measurement, Handling, & Analyses	4a3
SFMT B SCR	Mobilization	1a1
SFMT B SCR	Communications Equipment	1d1
SFMT B SCR	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
SFMT B SCR	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
SFMT B SCR	Plume Phase Field Measurement, Handling, & Analyses	4a3
YCCYSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCCYSDCYM	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCCYSDHE	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCCYSDRE	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCDASD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YC DASD DIS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCDTEOC	Mobilization	1a1
YCDTEOC	Facilities	1b1
YCDTEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
YCDTEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
YCDTEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
YCDTEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
YCDTEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
YCDTEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
YCDTEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
YCDTEOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
YCDTEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1

YCDTEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
YCDTEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCEMDMFD	Direction and Control	1c1
YCEMDMFD	Communications Equipment	1d1
YCEMDMFD	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
YCEMDMFD	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
YCEMDMFD	Monitoring/Decontamination of Emergency Workers/Equipment/Vehicles	6b1
YC EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
YC EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
YC EOC	Mobilization	1a1
YC EOC	Facilities	1b1
YC EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
YC EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
YC EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YC EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
YC EOC	PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	2c1
YC EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
YC EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
YC EOC	Activation of the Prompt Alert & Notification System	5a1
YC EOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
YC EOC	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
YC EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
YCEYSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCEYSDKCE	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCMCCSSC	Communications Equipment	1d1
YCMCCSSC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
YCMCCSSC	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
YCNEAEOC	Mobilization	1a1
YCNEAEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
YCNEAEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
YCNEAEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCNEAEOC	Facilities	1b1
YCNEAEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
YCNEAEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
YCNEAEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
YCNEAEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
YCNEAEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
YCNEAEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
YCNEAEOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
YC NESD SBIS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCNSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCNSDNEM	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCNSDSFI	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCNYCSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2

YCNYCSDNH	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCRMDSSCHS	Direction and Control	1c1
YCRMDSSCHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
YCRMDSSCHS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
YCRMDSSCHS	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
YCSTTACP	Communications Equipment	1d1
YCSTTACP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
YCSTTACP	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
YCSTTACP	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
YCWSSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCWSSDAM	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCWSSDCCH	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCWSSDHES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCWSSDNCM	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCYUEMAEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
YCYUEMAEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
YCYUEMAEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
YCYUEMAEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
YCYUEMAEOC	Facilities	1b1
YCYUEMAEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
YCYUEMAEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
YCYUEMAEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
YCYUEMAEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
YCYUEMAEOC	Mobilization	1a1
YCYUEMAEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
YCYUEMAEOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
YCYUEMASBuRA	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
YCYUEMASBuRA	Mobilization	1a1
YCYUEMASBuRA	Communications Equipment	1d1
YCYUEMASBuRA	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
YCYUEMASBuRA	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

3.3.1 State Jurisdictions

3.3.1.1 PA State Field Monitoring Team A, South Central Region

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the State jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.1.2 PA State Field Monitoring Team B, South Central Region

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the State jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.1.3 Pennsylvania Accident Assessment Center, CRCC-Bureau Rad Protection

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the State jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.1.4 Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the State jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.1.5 Pennsylvania Commonwealth Response Coordination Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the State jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.1.6 Pennsylvania Joint Information Center/Rumor Control

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the State jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.1.7 Pennsylvania State Traffic and Access Control Points, State Police Barracks, Harrisburg

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the State jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.2.1 Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.2 Cumberland County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station, West Shore Borough Fire Station

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.3 Cumberland County Mass Care Center, Shippensburg University

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.4 Cumberland County Reception Center/Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Shippensburg University

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.5 Cumberland County, Lower Allen Township Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.6 Cumberland County, Lower Allen Township Traffic and Access Control

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.7 Cumberland County, Lower Allen Township, Back-up Route Alerting

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.8 Dauphin County Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.9 Dauphin County Mass Care Center, Enders-Fisherville Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.b.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.10 Dauphin County Mass Care Center, Millersburg Middle/High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.11 Dauphin County Mass Care Center, Upper Dauphin High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.b.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.12 Dauphin County Reception Center/Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Williams Valley High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1 3.a.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.13 Dauphin County Technical School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.14 Dauphin County, Central Dauphin School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.15 Dauphin County, Central Dauphin School District, Central Dauphin East High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.16 Dauphin County, Central Dauphin School District, Swatara Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.17 Dauphin County, Central Dauphin School District, Tri Community Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.18 Dauphin County, Derry Township School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.19 Dauphin County, Derry Township School District, Hershey Intermediate Elementary

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.20 Dauphin County, Derry Township School District, Hershey Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.21 Dauphin County, Harrisburg City Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.22 Dauphin County, Harrisburg School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.23 Dauphin County, Harrisburg School District, Harrisburg High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.24 Dauphin County, Harrisburg School District, Scott Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.25 Dauphin County, Highspire Borough Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.26 Dauphin County, Londonderry Township Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.27 Dauphin County, Lower Dauphin School District, South Hanover Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.28 Dauphin County, Lower Dauphin School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.29 Dauphin County, Lower Dauphin School District, Lower Dauphin High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.30 Dauphin County, Lower Dauphin School District, Price School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.31 Dauphin County, Lower Paxton Township Backup Route Alerting

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.32 Dauphin County, Lower Paxton Township Traffic and Access Control

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.33 Dauphin County, Lower Paxton Township Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.34 Dauphin County, Middletown Area School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.35 Dauphin County, Middletown Area School District, Middletown High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.36 Dauphin County, Milton Hershey School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.37 Dauphin County, Paxtang Borough Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.38 Dauphin County, Steelton-Highspire School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.39 Dauphin County, Steelton-Highspire School District, Steelton-Highspire Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.40 Dauphin County Mass Care Center Upper Dauphin MS/ES Complex

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.b.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.41 Lancaster County Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.42 Lancaster County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station, Pioneer Fire Company, Marietta PA

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.43 Lancaster County Mass Care Center, Hempfield High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.44 Lancaster County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Hempfield High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.45 Lancaster County Reception Center, Park City Mall

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.46 Lancaster County, Donegal School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.47 Lancaster County, Donegal School District, Donegal High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.48 Lancaster County, East Donegal Township Back-up Route Alerting

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.49 Lancaster County, East Donegal Township Emergency Operation Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.50 Lancaster County, East Donegal Township Traffic and Access Control, Northwest Regional Police Department

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.51 Lancaster County, Elizabethtown Area School District, East High Street Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.52 Lancaster County, Elizabethtown Area School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.53 Lancaster County, Elizabethtown Area School District, Elizabethtown Area Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.54 Lebanon County Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.55 Lebanon County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station, Annville Union Hose Fire Department

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: ONE

LOCATION: Lebanon County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station, Annville Fire Department

ISSUE NO: 64-17-1e1-P-01

CRITERION: Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

CONDITION: The Hazmat Team Leader at the Lebanon County, Union Hose Fire Company performed a source check on the Ludlum Model 2241-3 survey meter using the Cs-137 source attached on the side of the instrument. He obtained as value that was much less than the reference value of plus or minus 20% on a sticker attached to the side of the meter. He stated that any meter deflection when using a check source indicated a satisfactory source check.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: This was caused by a failure to clearly place acceptance criteria (range of acceptable readings) for a source check on the side of the instrument or in a checklist or procedure that was readily available.

REFERENCE: NUREG H.10 ANSI Standard (N323A-1997), Instrument Tech Manual for the Ludlum Model 2241-3 survey ratemeter.

EFFECT: Without proper procedures, a survey meter could be used when it is not operating properly.

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.56 Lebanon County Mass Care Center, Northern Lebanon Jr./Sr. High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.57 Lebanon County Reception Center/Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Lebanon County Career & Tech Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.58 Lebanon County, Palmyra Area School District

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.59 Lebanon County, Palmyra Area School District, Lingle Avenue Elementary School

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.60 Lebanon County, Palmyra Area School District, Palmyra Area Middle School

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.61 Lebanon County, South Londonderry Township Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.62 Lebanon County, South Londonderry Township Traffic and Access Control

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.63 Lebanon County, South Londonderry Township, Back-Up Route Alerting

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.64 York County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station, Monaghan Township Fire Department

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.65 York County Mass Care Center, Southern School District Complex

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.66 York County Reception Center/Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Southern School District Complex

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

LOCATION: York County Reception Center/Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Southern School District Complex

ISSUE NO: 64-17-1e1-P-02

CRITERION: Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

CONDITION: The Monitoring/Decon Team Leader at the York County, Susquehannock High School performed a source check on the Ludlum Model 2241-3 survey meter using the Cs-137 source attached on the side of the instrument. He obtained as value that was much less than the reference value of plus or minus 20% on a sticker attached to the side of the meter. He stated that any meter deflection when using a check source indicated a satisfactory source check.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: This was caused by a failure to clearly place acceptance criteria (range of acceptable readings) for a source check on the side of the instrument or in a checklist or procedure that was readily available.

REFERENCE: NUREG H.10 ANSI Standard (N323A-1997), Instrument Tech Manual for the Ludlum Model 2241-3 survey ratemeter.

EFFECT: Without proper procedures, a survey meter could be used when it is not operating properly.

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.67 York County, Central York School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.68 York County, Central York School District, Central York Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.69 York County, Central York School District, Hayshire Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.70 York County, Central York School District, Roundtown Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.71 York County, Dover Area School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.72 York County, Dover Area School District, Dover Area Intermediate School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.73 York County, Dover Township Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: ONE

LOCATION: York County, Dover Township Emergency Operations Center

ISSUE NO: 64-17-3a1-L2-01

CRITERION: Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

CONDITION: The Radiological Officer (RO) only issued each Emergency Worker (EW) a Direct Reading Dosimeter (DRD) and sent them into the field without a Permanent Record Dosimeter (PRD) or Potassium Iodide (KI). The Dover Township Radiological Emergency Response Procedures (RERP) states that upon notification of an Alert (or higher Emergency Classification Level (ECL), the equipment will be inventoried and prepared for distribution (reference attachment K of the RERP). Reference K attachment states that each EW will receive (1) Permanent Record Dosimeter (PRD), (1) DRD, and (2) Potassium Iodide (KI) tablets

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Insufficient training of new radiological officer.

REFERENCE: NUREG 0654 Section J.10.e and K.3.a.1.

EFFECT: Emergency Workers could have received unnecessary radiation exposure.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The Radiological Officer re-briefed the Emergency Workers on dosimetry and KI, and each were issued the appropriate equipment consisting of ((1) DRD, (1) PRD and (2) tablets of KI). The Emergency Workers were interviewed and were aware of their exposure limits, logging and recording dosimetry readings, ingestion of KI, and reporting requirements.

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.74 York County, Eastern York School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.75 York County, Eastern York School District, Kreutz Creek Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.76 York County, Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.77 York County, Northeast Area (Mt. Wolf/East Manchester/Manchester/ Conewago Township) Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.78 York County, Northeastern School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.79 York County, Northeastern School District, Northeastern Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.80 York County, Northeastern School District, Shallow Brook Intermediate School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.81 York County, Northeastern School District, Spring Forge Intermediate School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.82 York County, Northern School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.83 York County, Northern School District, Northern Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.84 York County, Springettsbury Township Traffic and Access Control, Springettsbury Police Department

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.85 York County, West Shore School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.86 York County, West Shore School District, Allen Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.87 York County, West Shore School District, Cedar Cliff High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.88 York County, West Shore School District, Highland Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.89 York County, West Shore School District, New Cumberland Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.90 York County, York United EMA Backup Route Alerting

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.91 York County, York United Emergency Management Agency/Manchester Township/Springettsbury Township, Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3 Support Jurisdictions

3.3.3.1 Adams County Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.2 Franklin County Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.3 Franklin County Mass Care Center, Chambersburg Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.4 Franklin County Reception Center/Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Chambersburg Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.5 Schuylkill County Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.6 Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Blue Mountain Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.b.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.7 Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Pottsville Area DHH Lengel Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.b.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.8 Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Penn State Schuylkill Complex

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.b.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.9 Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Pottsville Area High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.b.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.10 Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Schuylkill Haven Area Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.b.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.11 Schuylkill County Mass Care Center, Blue Mountain High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.12 Schuylkill County Mass Care Center, Schuylkill Haven High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.b.1, 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.13 Schuylkill County Reception Center/Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Blue Mountain High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Support jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.4 Private Jurisdictions

3.3.4.1 Exelon Emergency Operations Facility

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Private jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.4.2 Exelon Joint Information Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Private jurisdiction is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and local jurisdictions, except where noted in this report demonstrated knowledge of their Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) and procedures were adequately implemented during the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station Plume exercise evaluated on April 11, 2017.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluators provided analyses of six assessment areas. These analyses resulted in a determination of no Level 1 Findings, (1) One Level 2 Finding, and (2) two New Plan Issues.

"Based on the results of the exercise and a review of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and procedures submitted, FEMA Region III has determined they are adequate (meet the planning and preparedness standards of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, November 1980, as referenced in 44 CFR 350.5) and there is reasonable assurance they can be implemented, as demonstrated during this exercise."

An After Action Implementation Plan (IP) will not be developed as part of this report.

APPENDIX A – EXERCISE TIMELINE

This section contains the Exercise Timeline. A table that depicts the times when an event or notifications were noted at participating agencies and locations.

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received at the Listed Location								
		Commonwealth of PA (CRCC)	PA JIC (CRCC)	PA/AA (BRP)	Exelon JIC/EOF	Cumberland County EOC	Lower Allen Township EOC	Dauphin County EOC	Harrisburg City EOC	Highspire Borough EOC
Unusual Event	1624	1642	1642	1642	Not activated	1644	N/A	1635	N/A	N/A
Alert	1655	1720	1720	1720	1722	1710	1711	1707	1715	1714
Site Area Emergency	1818	1842	1842	1842	1818	1842	1849	1828	1838	1833
General Emergency	1909	1933	1933	1933	1911	1941	1949	1922	1928	1929
Simulated Radiation Release Started	1624/1909	1642	1642	1642	1718	1710	1711	1635	1729	1833
Simulated Radiation Release Terminated	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going
Facility Declared Operational		1700	1700	1700	1700	1730	1722	1724	1723	1723
Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency		1845	1845	1845	1845	1916	1855	1917	N/A	1844
Exercise Terminated		2059	2059	2059	2059	2119	2115	2031	2034	2033
First Precautionary/Protective Actions: Describe										
Livestock on stored feed and Water		1851	1851	1851	1855	1914	1914	1851	1902	1848
10 mile waterway restriction;		1851	1851	1851	1902	1854	1932	1851	1902	1848
10-Mile Rail Restriction		1851	1851	1851	1919	1900	1932	1851	1902	1902
Parks and Rec		-	-	-	-	-	1932			
Siren Sounding		1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905
EAS Message Broadcast		1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908
Second Precautionary/ Protective Actions: Describe		1949	1949	1949	N/A	1959	N/A	1954	1957	2000
Air 5 mile 5000		1946	1946	1946	N/A	1955	N/A	1954	2004	2000
Evac 0-10 miles; 360 Shelter in Place - Hershey Medical Center, Dauphin County Prison, 3 Downwind Nursey Homes		1949	1949	1949	N/A	1959	1959	1954	1957	2000
Siren Sounding		2004	2004	2004	N/A	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004
EAS Message Broadcast		2007	2007	2007	N/A	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007
Decision to take KI: EWs		1949	1949	1949	1959	2001	1959	1954	1959	2000
Decision to take KI: Public		1949	1949	1949	1959	2001	1959	1954	1959	2000

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received at the Listed Location								
		Londonderry Township EOC	Lower Paxton Township EOC	Paxtang Borough EOC	Lancaster County EOC	East Donegal Township EOC	Lebanon County EOC	South Londonderry Township EOC	York County EOC	Dover Township EOC
Unusual Event	1624	N/A	N/A	N/A	1634	N/A	1640	1649	1634	N/A
Alert	1655	1732	1714	1719	1705	1708	1710	1719	1709	1730
Site Area Emergency	1818	1834	1829	1835	1827	1843	1846	1848	1828	1830
General Emergency	1909	1928	1928	1927	1922	1936	1942	1944	1937	1940
Simulated Radiation Release Started	1624/1909	1732	1806	1852	1634	1727	1640	N/A	1909	1940
Simulated Radiation Release Terminated	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going
Facility Declared Operational		1740	1730	1739	1709	1732	1735	1700	1728	1730
Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency		1901	1918	1908	1842	1853	1933	N/A	1842	1909
Exercise Terminated		2031	2033	2030	2039	2021	2105	2030	2112	2050
First Precautionary/Protective Actions: Describe								1908	1851	1916
Livestock on stored feed and Water		1916	1859	1914	1855	1858	1850	N/A	N/A	N/A
10 mile waterway restriction;		1916	1859	1914	N/A	N/A	1850	N/A	1851	1925
10-Mile Rail Restriction		1916	1859	1914	N/A	N/A	1850	N/A	1851	1925
Other Evac Parks									1905	1905
Siren Sounding		1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1908	1905	1905
EAS Message Broadcast		1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908
Second Precautionary/ Protective Actions: Describe		2001	2005	2002	1954	2000	1952	N/A	1954	2023
Air 5 mile 5000		2001	2005	2002	1947	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Other Rec & Evac Farmers		2001	1950					2000	1957	2004
Siren Sounding		2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004
EAS Message Broadcast		2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2006	2007	2007
Decision to take KI: EWs		2001	1959	2002	1954	2000	1952	2000	1954	2023
Decision to take KI: Public		2001	1959	2002	1954	2000	1952	2000	1954	2023

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received at the Listed Location								
		Manchester/ Springettsbury York United EOC	Northeast Area EOC	Adams County EOC	Franklin County EOC	Schuylkill County EOC				
Unusual Event	1624	N/A	N/A	1651	1655	1649				
Alert	1655	1713	1714	1729	1724	1712				
Site Area Emergency	1818	1854	1853	1848	1846	1844				
General Emergency	1909	1940	1939	1942	1926	1930				
Simulated Radiation Release Started	1624/1909	1940	1939	1848	N/A	1624				
Simulated Radiation Release Terminated	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going	On-going				
Facility Declared Operational		1957	1829	1736	1724	1728				
Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency		1905	1908	1856	1850	1852				
Exercise Terminated		2058	2100	2017	N/A	2019				
First Precautionary/Protective Actions: Describe		1915	1938	1859	1848	1850				
Livestock on stored feed and Water		1915	1938	1859	1848	1850				
10 mile waterway restriction;		1925	1927	1859	1848	1850				
10-Mile Rail Restriction		1925	1903	1859	1848	1850				
Other Closed Parks		1925	1903	N/A	N/A	N/A				
Siren Sounding		1905	1905	1905	1905	1905				
EAS Message Broadcast		1908	1908	1908	1908	1908				
Second Precautionary/ Protective Actions: Describe		2023	2023	2004	1951	1950				
Air 5 mile 5000		2039	2039	2004	N/A	1957				
Other Rec Evac Farmers		2004	2004	N/A	N/A	N/A				
Siren Sounding		2004	2004	2004	2004	2004				
EAS Message Broadcast		2007	2007	2007	2007	2007				
Decision to take KI: EWs		2003	2007	2007	N/A	1950				
Decision to take KI: Public		2003	2007	2007	N/A	1950				

APPENDIX B: EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

The following is the list of Evaluators and Team Leaders for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station 2017 Plume Exercise evaluated on April 11, 2017. The following also constitutes the managing staff for the Evaluation:

- Thomas Scardino, DHS/FEMA, Regional Assistance Committee Chairman
- Christopher Nemcheck, DHS/FEMA, Technological Hazards Program Specialist/Site Specialist

DATE: 4/11/2017, SITE: Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station

LOCATION	TEAM LEADER	AGENCY
Adams County Emergency Operations Center	Patricia Gardner	FEMA Region 3
Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Cumberland County Emergency Worker M&D Station, West Shore Borough Fire Station	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Cumberland County Mass Care Center, Shippensburg University	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Cumberland County Reception Center/Mon/Decon Center, Shippensburg University	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Cumberland County, Lower Allen Township Emergency Operations Center	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Cumberland County, Lower Allen Township Traffic and Access Control	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Cumberland County, Lower Allen Township, Back-up Route Alerting	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Mass Care Center Upper Dauphin MS/ES Complex	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Mass care Center, Enders-Fisherville Elementary School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Mass Care Center, Millersburg Middle/High School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Mass Care Center, Upper Dauphin High School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Reception Center/Mon/Decon Center, Williams Valley High School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Technical School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Central Dauphin School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Central Dauphin School District, Central Dauphin East High School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Central Dauphin School District, Swatara Middle School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Central Dauphin School District, Tri Community Elementary School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3

Dauphin County, Derry Township School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Derry Township School District, Hershey Intermediate Elementary	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Derry Township School District, Hershey Middle School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Harrisburg City Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Harrisburg School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Harrisburg School District, Harrisburg High School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Harrisburg School District, Scott School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Highspire Borough Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Londonderry Township Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Lower Dauphin School District, South Hanover Elementary School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Lower Dauphin School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Lower Dauphin School District, Lower Dauphin High School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Lower Dauphin School District, Price Building	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Lower Paxton Township Backup Route Alerting	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Lower Paxton Township Traffic and Access Control	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Lower Paxton Township Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Middletown Area School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Middletown Area School District, Middletown High School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Milton Hershey School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Paxtang Borough Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Steelton-Highspire School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County, Steelton-Highspire School District, Steelton-Highspire Elementary	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Exelon Emergency Operations Facility and Technical Support Center	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Exelon Joint Information Center	John Price	FEMA Region 3
Franklin County Emergency Operations Center	Patricia Gardner	FEMA Region 3
Franklin County Mass Care Center, Chambersburg Middle School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Franklin County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Chambersburg Middle School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County Emergency Operations Center	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County Emergency Worker Mon/Decon Station, Pioneer	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3

Lancaster County Mass Care Center, Hempfield High School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Hempfield High School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County Reception Center, Park City Mall	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County, Donegal School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County, Donegal School District, Donegal High School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County, East Donegal Township Back-up Route Alerting	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County, East Donegal Township Emergency Operation Center	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County, East Donegal Township Traffic and Access Control	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County, Elizabethtown Area School District, East High Street Elementary	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County, Elizabethtown Area School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County, Elizabethtown Area School District, Elizabethtown Area Middle	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lebanon County Emergency Operations Center	Nicholas Buls	FEMA Region 3
Lebanon County Emergency Worker Monitoring & Decontamination Station Annville Union Hose FD	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Lebanon County Mass Care Center, Northern Lebanon High School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Lebanon County Reception Center/Mon/Decon Center, Lebanon Co Career & Tech	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Lebanon County, Palmyra Area School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lebanon County, Palmyra Area School District, Lingle Avenue Elementary School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lebanon County, Palmyra Area School District, Palmyra Area Middle School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lebanon County, South Londonderry Township Emergency Operations Center	Nicholas Buls	FEMA Region 3
Lebanon County, South Londonderry Township Traffic and Access Control	Nicholas Buls	FEMA Region 3
Lebanon County, South Londonderry Township, Back-Up Route Alerting	Nicholas Buls	FEMA Region 3
PA State Field Monitoring Team A, South Central Region	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
PA State Field Monitoring Team B, South Central Region	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Accident Assessment Center, CRCC-Bureau Rad Protection	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Response Coordination Center	John Price	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Joint Information Center/Rumor Control	John Price	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania State Traffic and Access Control Points, State Police Barracks Harr	John Price	FEMA Region 3

Schuylkill County Emergency Operations Center	Patricia Gardner	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Blue Mountain Middle School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center DHH Lengel Middle School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Penn State Schuylkill Complex	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Pottsville Area High School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Schuylkill Haven Area Middle School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center, Blue Mountain High School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center, Schuylkill Haven High School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Reception Center/Mon/Decon Center, Blue Mountain HS	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
York County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station, Monaghan Fi	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
York County Mass Care Center, Southern School Complex	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
York County Reception Center/Mon/Decon Center, Southern School Complex High	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
York County, Central York School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Central York School District, Central York Middle School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Central York School District, Hayshire Elementary School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Central York School District, Roundtown Elementary School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Dover Area School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Dover Area School District, Dover Intermediate School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Dover Township Emergency Operations Center	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
York County, Eastern York School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Eastern York School District, Kreutz Creek Elementary School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Emergency Operations Center	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
York County, Northeast Area EOC (Mount Wolf, Manchester Borough, E Manchester Township	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
York County, Northeastern School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Northeastern School District, Northeastern Middle School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Northeastern School District, Shallow Brook Intermediate School,	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Northeastern School District, Spring Forge Intermediate School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Northern York County School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3

York County, Northern York County School District, Northern Middle School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Springettsbury Township Traffic and Access Control	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
York County, West Shore School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, West Shore School District, Allen Middle School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, West Shore School District, Cedar Cliff High School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, West Shore School District, Highland Elementary School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, West Shore School District, New Cumberland Middle School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, York United EMA, Springettsbury Twp Backup Route Alerting	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
York County, York United Emergency Management Agency/ Manchester Township/ Springettsbury Township Emergency Operations Center	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
Adams County Emergency Operations Center	Patricia Gardner	FEMA Region 3
Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center	Miriam Weston	FEMA Region 2
Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center	Linda Gee	FEMA Region 6
Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center	Larry Broockerd	FEMA HQ
Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Cumberland County Emergency Worker M&D Station, West Shore Borough Fire Station	Larry Broockerd	FEMA HQ
Cumberland County Mass Care Center, Shippensburg University	Bruce Swiren	ICF
Cumberland County Reception Center/Mon/Decon Center, Shippensburg University	Carol D. Shepard	ICF
Cumberland County, Lower Allen Township Emergency Operations Center	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Cumberland County, Lower Allen Township Emergency Operations Center	Gary Goldberg	ICF
Cumberland County, Lower Allen Township Traffic and Access Control	Jon Christiansen	ICF
Cumberland County, Lower Allen Township, Back-up Route Alerting	Gary Bolender	ICF
Dauphin County Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Emergency Operations Center	Brad DeKorte	FEMA Region 6
Dauphin County Emergency Operations Center	Timothy Pflieger	FEMA Region 6
Dauphin County Emergency Operations Center	Matthew Celia	FEMA HQ
Dauphin County Mass Care Center Upper Dauphin MS/ES Complex	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Mass care Center, Enders-Fisherville Elementary School	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Mass Care Center, Millersburg Middle/High School	Clark Duffy	ICF
Dauphin County Mass Care Center, Upper Dauphin High School	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Reception Center/Mon/Decon Center, Williams Valley High School	Nicholas Buls	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Reception Center/Mon/Decon Center, Williams Valley High School	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3
Dauphin County Technical School	Rosemary Samsel	ICF
Dauphin County, Central Dauphin School District	Bruce Swiren	ICF

Dauphin County, Central Dauphin School District, Central Dauphin East High School	Bruce Swiren	ICF
Dauphin County, Central Dauphin School District, Swatara Middle School	Carol D. Shepard	ICF
Dauphin County, Central Dauphin School District, Tri Community Elementary School	Brenda Rembert	ICF
Dauphin County, Derry Township School District	Thomas Reynolds	ICF
Dauphin County, Derry Township School District, Hershey Intermediate Elementary	Thomas Reynolds	ICF
Dauphin County, Derry Township School District, Hershey Middle School	Lynn Steffensen	ICF
Dauphin County, Harrisburg City Emergency Operations Center	Cheryl Weaver	ICF
Dauphin County, Harrisburg City Emergency Operations Center	James Greer	ICF
Dauphin County, Harrisburg School District	Kent Tosch	ICF
Dauphin County, Harrisburg School District, Harrisburg High School	Kent Tosch	ICF
Dauphin County, Harrisburg School District, Scott School	Debra Schneck	ICF
Dauphin County, Highspire Borough Emergency Operations Center	Michael Burriss	ICF
Dauphin County, Highspire Borough Emergency Operations Center	Ronald Bonner	ICF
Dauphin County, Londonderry Township Emergency Operations Center	Brian Clark	ICF
Dauphin County, Londonderry Township Emergency Operations Center	Frank Cordaro	ICF
Dauphin County, Lower Dauphin School District, South Hanover Elementary School	John Zeidler	ICF
Dauphin County, Lower Dauphin School District	Richard Smith	ICF
Dauphin County, Lower Dauphin School District, Lower Dauphin High School	Robert Walker	ICF
Dauphin County, Lower Dauphin School District, Price Building	Richard Smith	ICF
Dauphin County, Lower Paxton Township Backup Route Alerting	Clark Duffy	ICF
Dauphin County, Lower Paxton Township Traffic and Access Control	Mark Dalton	ICF
Dauphin County, Lower Paxton Township Emergency Operations Center	Kevin Malone	FEMA Region 2
Dauphin County, Lower Paxton Township Emergency Operations Center	Rebecca Thomson	ICF
Dauphin County, Middletown Area School District	Mario Vigliani	ICF
Dauphin County, Middletown Area School District, Middletown High School	Mario Vigliani	ICF
Dauphin County, Milton Hershey School	Michael Petullo	ICF
Dauphin County, Paxtang Borough Emergency Operations Center	Robert Duggleby	ICF
Dauphin County, Paxtang Borough Emergency Operations Center	Thomas Gahan	ICF
Dauphin County, Steelton-Highspire School District	Henry Christiansen	ICFI
Dauphin County, Steelton-Highspire School District, Steelton-Highspire Elementary	Henry Christiansen	ICFI
Exelon Emergency Operations Facility and Technical Support Center	John Wills	ICF
Exelon Joint Information Center	Roger Kowieski	ICF
Franklin County Emergency Operations Center	Bill Webb	FEMA Region 10
Franklin County Mass Care Center, Chambersburg Middle School	Thomas Reynolds	ICF
Franklin County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Chambersburg Middle School	Brenda Rembert	ICF
Lancaster County Emergency Operations Center	Barbara Thomas	FEMA Region 1
Lancaster County Emergency Operations Center	John Rice	FEMA Region 1
Lancaster County Emergency Operations Center	Bonnie Sheffield	FEMA Region 8
Lancaster County Emergency Operations Center	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
Lancaster County Emergency Worker Mon/Decon Station, Pioneer	Michael Howe	FEMA HQ

Lancaster County Mass Care Center, Hempfield High School	Lynn Steffensen	ICF
Lancaster County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Hempfield High School	Kent Tosch	ICF
Lancaster County Reception Center, Park City Mall	Lynn Steffensen	ICF
Lancaster County, Donegal School District	Gary Bolender	ICF
Lancaster County, Donegal School District, Donegal High School	Gary Bolender	ICF
Lancaster County, East Donegal Township Back-up Route Alerting	James Hickey	ICF
Lancaster County, East Donegal Township Emergency Operation Center	Carl Wentzell	ICF
Lancaster County, East Donegal Township Emergency Operation Center	Thomas Hegele	ICF
Lancaster County, East Donegal Township Traffic and Access Control	David Stuenkel	ICF
Lancaster County, Elizabethtown Area School District, East High Street Elementary	Robert Lemeshka	ICF
Lancaster County, Elizabethtown Area School District	Jon Christiansen	ICF
Lancaster County, Elizabethtown Area School District, Elizabethtown Area Middle	Jon Christiansen	ICF
Lebanon County Emergency Operations Center	Helen LaForge	FEMA Region 1
Lebanon County Emergency Operations Center	Chris Cammarata	FEMA Region 2
Lebanon County Emergency Operations Center	Nicholas Buls	FEMA Region 3
Lebanon County Emergency Operations Center	Michael Howe	
Lebanon County Emergency Worker Monitoring & Decontamination Station Annville Union Hose FD	Korkean Dulgerian	FEMA Region 2
Lebanon County Mass Care Center, Northern Lebanon High School	Richard Smith	ICF
Lebanon County Reception Center/Mon/Decon Center, Lebanon Co Career & Tech	Debra Schneck	ICF
Lebanon County, Palmyra Area School District	Cheryl Weaver	ICF
Lebanon County, Palmyra Area School District, Lingle Ave Elementary School	James Greer	ICF
Lebanon County, Palmyra Area School District, Palmyra Area Middle School	Cheryl Weaver	ICF
Lebanon County, South Londonderry Township Emergency Operations Center	Nicholas Buls	FEMA Region 3
Lebanon County, South Londonderry Township Emergency Operations Center	Joseph Lischinsky	ICF
Lebanon County, South Londonderry Township Emergency Operations Center	David Kayen	ICF
Lebanon County, South Londonderry Township Traffic and Access Control	Michael Petullo	ICF
Lebanon County, South Londonderry Township, Back-Up Route Alerting	Danny Loomis	ICF
PA State Field Monitoring Team A, South Central Region	Cristina Schulingkamp	BRP
PA State Field Monitoring Team B, South Central Region	Nan Calhoun	FEMA Region 6
Pennsylvania Accident Assessment Center, CRCC-Bureau Rad Protection	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Accident Assessment Center, CRCC-Bureau Rad Protection	Reggie Rodgers	ICF
Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle	Kenneth Wierman	FEMA HQ
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Response Coordination Center	Marcy Campbell	ICF
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Response Coordination Center	Clayton Spangenberg	ICF
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Response Coordination Center	John Price	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Joint Information Center/Rumor Control	Steve Ward	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania State Traffic and Access Control Points, State Police Barracks Harr	Mark Dalton	ICF
Schuylkill County Emergency Operations Center	Kathy Duran	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Blue Mountain Middle School	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center DHH Lengel Middle School	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3

Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Penn State Schuylkill Complex	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Pottsville Area High School	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center Schuylkill Haven Area Middle School	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center, Blue Mountain High School	Mario Vigliani	ICF
Schuylkill County Mass Care Center, Schuylkill Haven High School	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3
Schuylkill County Reception Center/Mon/Decon Center, Blue Mountain HS	Robert Walker	ICF
York County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station, Monaghan Fire Department	Marcy Campbell	ICF
York County Mass Care Center, Southern School Complex	John Wills	ICF
York County Reception/Mon/Decon Center, Southern School Complex	John Zeidler	ICF
York County, Central York School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Central York School District, Central York Middle School	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3
York County, Central York School District, Hayshire Elementary School	Patricia Gardner	FEMA Region 3
York County, Central York School District, Roundtown Elementary School	John Price	FEMA Region 3
York County, Dover Area School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
York County, Dover Area School District, Dover Intermediate School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
York County, Dover Township Emergency Operations Center	LaShawn Halsey	FEMA HQ
York County, Dover Township Emergency Operations Center	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3
York County, Dover Township Emergency Operations Center	Bridget Ahlgrim	ICF
York County, Eastern York School District	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
York County, Eastern York School District, Kreutz Creek Elementary School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
York County, Emergency Operations Center	Taneeka Hollins	FEMA Region 1
York County, Emergency Operations Center	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
York County, Emergency Operations Center	Anthony Defelice	FEMA H!
York County, Emergency Operations Center	Ingrid Pierce	FEMA Region 1
York County, Northeast Area EOC (Mount Wolf, Manchester Borough, E Manchester Township	Henry Christiansen	ICF
York County, Northeast Area EOC (Mount Wolf, Manchester Borough, E Manchester Township	Roy Smith	ICF
York County, Northeastern School District	Ronald Bonner	ICF
York County, Northeastern School District, Northeastern Middle School	Ronald Bonner	ICF
York County, Northeastern School District, Shallow Brook Intermediate School,	Brian Clark	ICF
York County, Northeastern School District, Spring Forge Intermediate School	Michael Burriss	ICF
York County, Northern York County School District	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Northern York County School District, Northern High School	William McDougall	FEMA Region 3
York County, Springettsbury Township Traffic and Access Control	Kevin Reed	ICF
York County, West Shore School District	John Price	FEMA Region 3
York County, West Shore School District, Allen Middle School	Patricia Gardner	FEMA Region 3
York County, West Shore School District, Cedar Cliff High School	John Price	FEMA Region 3
York County, West Shore School District, Highland Elementary School	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
York County, West Shore School District, New Cumberland Middle School	Christopher Nemcheck	FEMA Region 3
York County, York United EMA, Springettsbury Twp Backup Route Alerting	Rufus Mobley	FEMA HQ
York County, York United Emergency Management Agency/ Manchester Township/ Springettsbury Township Emergency Operations Center	Robert Lemeshka	ICF

York County, York United Emergency Management Agency/ Manchester Township/ Springettsbury Township Emergency Operations Center	Rosemary Samsel	ICF

APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

No acronyms and abbreviations added.

Acronym	Meaning
ACP	Access Control Point
ALC	Annual Letter of Certification
ANS	Alert and Notification System
ARC	American Red Cross
ARD	Automatic Ring Down
ARES	Amateur Radio Emergency Services
ATWS	Anticipated Transit Without SCRAM
BRP	Bureau of Radiation Protection
CERT	Community Emergency Response Team
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CRCC	Commonwealth Resource Coordination Center
CST	Civil Support Team
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DRD	Direct Reading Dosimeter
EAL	Emergency Action Level
EAS	Emergency Alert System
ECL	Emergency Classification Level
EMC	Emergency Management Coordinator
EMD	Emergency Management Director
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EOP	Extent of Play
EPT	Exercise Planning Team
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ESF	Emergency Support Function
EW	Emergency Workers
ExPlan	Exercise Plan
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FD	Fire Department
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMT	Field Monitoring Team
FRMAC	Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center
FSE	Full Scale Exercise
FTC	Field Team Coordinator

GE	General Emergency
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GPM	Gallons Per Minute
GPS	Global Positioning System
HAB	Hostile Action Based
HazMat	Hazardous Materials
JIC	Joint Information Center
JPIC	Joint Public Information Center
KI	Potassium Iodide
LCD	Liquid Crystal Display
LOA	Letter of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSEL	Master Scenario Events List
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OOS	Out of Sequence
ORO	Offsite Response Organization
OSD	Optically Stimulated Dosimeter
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PAG	Protective Action Guide
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PAZ	Protective Action Zone
PEMA	Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
PI	Planning Issue
PIO	Public Information Officer
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PRD	Permanent Record Dosimeter
RAC	Regional Assistance Committee
RACES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services
REA	Radiation Emergency Area
REP	Radiological Emergency Plan
REPP	Radiological Response Plans and Procedures
RERP	Radiological Emergency Response Plan
RO	Radiological Officer
SAC	Staging Area Coordinator
SAE	Site Area Emergency
SAIC	Science Applications International Corporation
SAV	Site Assistance Visit
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SEVAN	State Emergency Voice Activation Network

SED	Station Emergency Director
TCP	Traffic Control Point
TEDE	Total Effective Dose Equivalent
TMI	Three Mile Island
UE	Unusual Event (Notification of Unusual Event NUE)
VOAD	Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters

APPENDIX D: EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT

The 2017 Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station Plume Exercise Extent-of-Play was negotiated and agreed upon by FEMA Region III, PEMA, and the Emergency Management Agencies of the Risk Counties.

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

2017 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
2017 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
METHOD OF OPERATION

Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station (TMI)

The facility normally uses off-watch section personnel to participate in the exercise. The plant's simulated events, radiation readings, and emergency classifications will trigger offsite exercise actions. A pre-approved exercise scenario will be used. TMI will notify the Commonwealth Watch and Warning Center and risk counties of emergency classifications.

Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP)

Personnel from the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) will be present and participate in the following aspects of the exercise:
Plume Exercise – Commonwealth Resource Coordination Center
Plume Exercise – Exelon Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Technical Support Center (TSC).

Field Sampling Teams & Command Vehicle

BRP personnel will be evaluated as participants in all areas.
In the event the scenario has no radiological release a report of Background Radiation by the Field Monitoring Team would be considered successful demonstration of the criterion.

PEMA Operations at Commonwealth Resource Coordination Center / PEMA Headquarters

This "Method of Operation" Document includes activities for the Full-Scale Plume Exercise (April 11, 2017), and the "Out-of-Sequence" Activities (April 11 and April 12, 2017).

Plume Exercise – April 11, 2017

PEMA Staff and Agency Representatives (AREPs) from designated state departments / agencies will comprise initial operations at the Commonwealth Resource Coordination Center (CRCC). The CRCC will be evaluated during this exercise.

Plume Exercise – "Out-of-Sequence" Activities – April 11, 2017

The PEMA staff will disseminate exercise-related messages to the participating counties for dissemination to the participating school districts during the morning of April 11, 2017. The CRCC and County EOCs will participate, but will NOT be evaluated during the "Out-of-Sequence" component. PEMA personnel will serve as "observers" at the identified school districts.

"Out-of-Sequence" Activities – April 12, 2017

PEMA personnel will serve as "Observers" at the various field exercise locations during the "Out-of-Sequence" components the exercise. An exercise coordinator will remain in the CRCC. The CRCC and counties will NOT be evaluated during the evening "Out-of-Sequence" component.

PEMA Area Office Operations

The PEMA Area Offices (Hamburg -Eastern Area and Harrisburg – Central Area) will not be activated nor evaluated during this exercise. Selected staff of the Area Offices will serve as Liaison Officers to risk and support Counties as assigned or to the Command Post / Tactical Operations Center – Near Site. Liaison Officers are exercise participants.

Counties Designated to Participate

Plume Phase Exercise April 11, 2017

The five risk counties (Cumberland, Dauphin, Lancaster, Lebanon, and York), in coordination with PEMA, will demonstrate the capability to mobilize appropriate staff, activate their respective EOCs and implement emergency response operations to include sheltering and/or evacuation. County government will provide direction and coordination to risk municipalities. The three support counties (Adams, Franklin, and Schuylkill) will participate in their assigned support roles. Actual sheltering or evacuation of the general public will be simulated.

Local Emergency Management

All affected local municipalities, along with supporting agencies, will participate in the plume exercise. On a rotating basis, local municipalities will be federally evaluated as coordinated by PEMA and their associated county (once per 8 year cycle). They will demonstrate mobilization of staff, activation of their EOC, and implementation of emergency response operations. Some municipalities may be evaluated on Back-up Route Alerting or Traffic and Access Control Point Operations (TCP/ACP). See Attachment A Section 1.A.2, 1.A.3, and 1.A.4 for those locations being federally evaluated.

PEMA Liaison Officers

Liaison officers will be present at the participating risk / support county EOCs, the TMI Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the TMI Joint Information Center (JIC) to provide assistance, guidance, and support. These liaison officers will participate as players in the plume phase exercise on April 11, 2017.

Controllers

A lead controller will be present in the CRCC. Controllers are not players. Controllers will provide pre-approved injects and information to the players, as appropriate, including radiological readings during the monitoring of personnel. Live radioactive sources will not be used. **Exception:** Individuals tasked with the setup of portal monitoring equipment (if used) will use a

standard 1 micro curie Cesium 137 source for the purpose of conducting operational tests. Additionally, appropriate test sources will be available and used to verify the operation of the monitoring/survey instruments per manufacturers' recommendations.

April 11, 2017 School Exercise – The offsite lead controller will provide injects to the CRCC who will provide the exercise injects to the schools via the counties.

April 11, 2017 Plume Exercise – The offsite lead controller will be located in the CRCC and will coordinate the exercise with the onsite lead controller to facilitate the exercise and determine when objectives have been met for termination.

April 12, 2017 Support Exercise – The utility will provide controllers to the decontamination exercise locations.

Other locations will be controlled by PEMA Observers and / or county representatives as applicable.

PEMA Observers

PEMA staff, qualified county emergency management personnel, and/or nuclear power plant personnel will be assigned, as required, to key locations for the purpose of observing, noting response actions and conditions, and recording observations for future use. Observers will not take an active part in the proceedings, but will interact with staff members to the extent necessary to fulfill their observer responsibilities. Coaching of players by observers is not permitted except to provide training to participants awaiting a re-demonstration. (Refer to paragraph XIV)

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Evaluators

Federal evaluators will be present at the risk and support county EOCs, identified risk municipal EOCs, and at appropriate field locations to evaluate player response to the actual and simulated events in the exercise scenario. FEMA will evaluate about one-fourth of the risk municipalities in Risk Counties as identified in this document.

It is agreed that for those agencies / organizations approved for exercise exemption, that full or limited participation is acceptable. However, their level of participation must be sufficient to ensure their respective evaluated partners (i.e. counties or municipalities) have the overall ability to perform their evaluated objectives. If through error or omission by the exempt agency/organization a serious performance issue results which negatively affects the play of the evaluated participant(s), the performance issue will be included in the After Action Report. In some instances, the exempted agency / organization may accept the issue rather than the evaluated participant if the fault lies with the exempted agency / organization not fulfilling their obligation(s) relative to the level of required participation.

Plume Exercise

Out-of-Sequence Period (Morning of April 11, 2017): Federal evaluators will be present at the identified "out-of-sequence" demonstration sites to evaluate the ability of the public schools to respond to an exercise scenario. (Attachment A, Section I.A.1).

Plume Phase Exercise (Evening of April 11, 2017): Federal evaluators will be present at the CRCC and identified risk and support county EOCs to evaluate player response to the actual and simulated events in the exercise scenario. Additionally, one-quarter of the risk municipalities will be federally evaluated. As required, a "floating-evaluator" will be made available for the purpose of evaluating any ORO locations not scheduled to have a federal evaluator, but having a prior issue (Attachment A, Section I.A.2 thru I.A.7).

Out-of-Sequence Period (Morning of April 12, 2017): Federal evaluators will be present at the identified PSP Access Control Point / Traffic Control Point (ACP / TCP) location, as identified in Attachment A, Section I.B.1.

Out-of-Sequence Period (Evening of April 12, 2017): Federal evaluators will be present at participating Reception Centers, Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Stations, Mass Care Shelters, and Monitoring and Decontamination Centers, as identified in Attachment A, Section I.B.2 thru I.B.5.

Other Out-of-Sequence Activities: Federal Evaluators will be present at the Mass Care Walk-Down locations on February 6, 2017 for Schuylkill County locations and on February 8, 2017 for the Dauphin County locations. In addition, an Out-of-Sequence demonstration is scheduled for March 7th for a number of York County School Districts.

Post Plume Exercise

No post-plume phase exercise is scheduled during this evaluation.

Demonstration Windows

In order to provide for more effective demonstrations, as well as to permit the release of volunteers from exercise play at a reasonable hour, periods of time (Demonstration Windows) have been designated during which specified actions will be accomplished / demonstrated. The "demonstration windows" for this exercise are:

Plume Phase Exercise

The federally evaluated out-of-sequence MS-1 hospital demonstrations were held as follows: Good Samaritan Hospital – March 24, 2016, Hanover Hospital – June 23, 2016, Carlisle Regional Medical Center – May 24, 2016, and Gettysburg Hospital – October 12, 2016. Ephrata Hospital is an MS-1 Hospital for both TMI and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station and will demonstrate on October 18, 2017.

The out-of-sequence exercise window for school demonstrations will be from 9:00 – 11:00 a.m. on April 11, 2017 except for locations with alternate demonstration windows Locations are specified within Attachment A, Section I.A.1.

The out-of-sequence demonstration of reception centers, mass care centers, monitoring / decontamination centers and emergency worker stations will be conducted from 7:00 – 9:30 p.m. on April 12, 2017 except for locations with alternate demonstration windows. Locations are specified within Attachment A, Section I.B.2 thru I.B.5.
The out-of-sequence interview of PSP ACPs / TCPs will be from 10:00 a.m. – 12:00 noon on April 12, 2017. Locations are specified within Attachment A, Section I.B.1.

State, County and Municipal EOC operations will be conducted on the evening of April 11, 2017. (Please refer to the Extent of Play Attachment A, Section I.A.2 and I.A.3).

All demonstrations will commence promptly and, barring any complications, not continue beyond the time of the designated demonstration window (Demonstration Tables, Attachment A). Any Municipal TCP demonstrations will occur in conjunction with Municipal EOC operations.

Post Plume Ingestion Exercise

No post-plume phase exercise is scheduled during this evaluation.

Stand-Down

All jurisdictions will request approval on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis prior to stand-down.

Upon completion of all requirements and confirming with the federal evaluator that all evaluation areas have been demonstrated and/or completed, the risk municipality EOCs may request approval from their county EOC to "stand-down."

Support counties may likewise request approval from the Commonwealth Resource Coordination Center to terminate the exercise upon completion of all evaluated objectives.

The risk county EOCs will remain operational until the exercise is officially terminated by the State in consultation with the federal evaluator. The Commonwealth Resource Coordination Center will issue an Exercise Termination Message. If county exercise components are demonstrated and completed portions of the EOC may be able to stand-down.

General Concepts

An emergency plan is drafted to address the generally expected conditions of an emergency. Not everything in the emergency plan may be applicable for a given scenario. The main purpose of an emergency plan is to assemble sufficient expertise and officials so as to properly react to the events as they occur. The responders should not be so tied to a plan that they cannot take actions that are more protective of the public. Therefore, if, by not following the plan, the responders protect the public equally, as well as provided in the plan, it should be noted for possible modification of the plan, but not classified as a negative incident. Furthermore, if, by following the plan there is a failure to protect the public health and safety, it should be noted so that the plan can be modified and the appropriate negative assessment corrected.

Re-demonstrations

Any activity that is not satisfactorily demonstrated may be re-demonstrated by the participants during the exercise, provided it does not negatively interfere with the exercise. Refresher training

may be provided by the players, observers, and/or controllers. Evaluators are not permitted to provide refresher training. Re-demonstrations will be negotiated between the players, observers, controllers, and evaluators. PEMA may advise the RAC Chair prior to initiating any re-demonstrations. It is permissible to extend the demonstration window, within reason, to accommodate the re-demonstration. Activities corrected from a re-demonstration will be so noted.

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
2017 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT

EVALUATION AREA 1
Emergency Operations Management

Sub-element 1.a – Mobilization

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel, and activate and staff emergency facilities.

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, out of sequence evaluation, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensee; verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner, and demonstrate the ability to maintain and staff 24-hour operations. Twenty-four hour operations can be demonstrated during the exercise via rosters or shift changes or otherwise in an actual activation. Local responders and/or Tribal responders must demonstrate the ability to receive and/or initiate notification to the licensees or other respective emergency management organizations of an incident in a timely manner when they receive information from the licensee or alternate sources. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival. Activation of facilities and staff, including those associated with the ICS, must be completed in accordance with ORO plans/procedures. The location and contact information for facilities included in the incident command must be available to all appropriate responding agencies and the NPP after these facilities have been activated.

Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the Extent of Play Agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. This includes the staggered release of resources from an assembly area. Additionally, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations may be used in accordance with the Extent of Play Agreement.

The REP program does not evaluate Incident Command System tactical operations, only coordination among the incident command, the utility, and all appropriate OROs pursuant to plans / procedures.

Initial law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical response to the NPP site may impact the ability to staff REP functions. The ability to identify and request additional resources or

identify compensatory measures must be demonstrated. Exercises must also address the role of mutual aid in the incident, as appropriate. An integral part of the response to an HAB scenario at an NPP may also be within the auspices of the Federal Government (e.g., FBI, NRC, or DHS). Protocols for requesting Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement support must be demonstrated, as appropriate. Any resources must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they can be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Pre-positioning of state emergency personnel (Liaison Officers) at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the Utility Joint Information Center (JIC) and risk and support Counties is appropriate due to the commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. Risk counties / municipalities and support counties will conduct call-outs to demonstrate the mobilization of key personnel. The utility JIC will be evaluated for this drill.

- In all instances, the demonstration of a shift change is **NOT** required. Twenty-four hour staffing will be demonstrated by means of a roster or staffing chart.
- Actual calls (or pager notifications) will be made to the county / municipal EOC personnel for the Plume Phase exercise, April 11, 2017 per plans and procedures.
- All out-of-sequence players will be pre-positioned and equipment will be demonstrated or shown to be in inventory (School District personnel, PSP TCP / ACP, Reception Centers, Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Stations Mass Care / Sheltering Centers and Monitoring and Decontamination Centers).
- Individuals working in state facilities and county EOCs may be pre-positioned for the plume phase.
- Other locations, including Municipal EOCs, will not pre-stage but will wait for notification of the emergency before staffing their duty location.

Sub-element 1.b – Facilities

INTENT

This sub-element derives from NUREG–0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, H.3; G.3.a; J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, SAVs, or by out of sequence evaluations.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate, no less than every eight years, the availability of facilities to support accomplishment of emergency operations. This includes all alternate and backup facilities. Evaluations are typically performed for EOCs and JICs, as well as other facilities such as reception/relocation centers. Some of the areas evaluated within the facilities are adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, access to backup power, and/or alternate facilities if required to support operations. Radio stations, laboratories, initial warning points and hospitals are not evaluated under 1.b.1.

In addition, facilities will be evaluated for this criterion during the first biennial exercise after any new or substantial changes in structure, equipment, or mission that affect key capabilities, as outlined in respective emergency plans/procedures. A substantial change is one that has a direct effect or impact on emergency response operations performed in those facilities. Examples of substantial changes include modifying the size or configuration of an emergency operations center, adding more functions to a center, or changing the equipment available for use in a center.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Municipalities will demonstrate this criteria during each federal evaluation they receive (generally once per 8 year cycle) and counties will demonstrate this criteria once in each 8 year cycle unless new or substantial improvements occur.

Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.
(NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

Leadership personnel must demonstrate the ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort (e.g., keeping staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests). Leadership must demonstrate the ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace / supplement resources (e.g., through MOUs or other agreements) when faced with competing demands for finite resources. Any resources identified through LOA / MOUs must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they may be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

None

Sub-element 1.d – Communications Equipment – N/A

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs establish and operate reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as contiguous governments within the EPZ, Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, EOCs, Incident Command Posts, and FMTs.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion is accomplished initially in a baseline evaluation and subsequently in periodic testing and drills. System familiarity and use must be demonstrated as applicable in biennial and tabletop exercises, or if their use would be required, during an actual event. OROs must demonstrate that a primary system, and at least one backup system for fixed facilities, is fully functional at all times. Communications systems are maintained and tested on a recurring basis throughout the assessment period and system status is available to all operators. Periodic test results and corrective actions are maintained on a real time basis. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed.

Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units are used as needed for transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities, FMTs, and incident command must have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations. OROs must ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. Exercise scenarios may require the failure of a communication system and use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the Extent of Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

The plant will communicate to the risk counties and Commonwealth Watch and Warning Center (CRCC) utilizing the Automatic Ring Down (ARD) Telephone System (primary) and the commercial telephone system (secondary). Risk and support counties will intercommunicate with the CRCC via the commercial telephone system (primary), SEVAN (secondary) and other systems. In the event that the plant is unable to contact the CRCC via the Dedicated Automatic Ring Down Telephone, the Power Plant will contact the CRCC via the commercial telephone system. If the plant cannot contact the CRCC, the Power Plant will contact the Dauphin County EOC and Dauphin County EOC fulfill the role of primary contact until such time as communications with the CRCC can be made.

Risk counties will communicate with their risk municipalities via public safety radio frequencies (EMA Radio), commercial telephone, fax, or Amateur Radio Communications (ARES / RACES) or other available means.

Bureau of Radiation Protection Field Teams will demonstrate two or more forms of communications.

Sub-element 1.e – Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

INTENT

This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which provides that OROs have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.
(NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion is accomplished primarily through a baseline evaluation and subsequent periodic inspections.

A particular facility's equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility's assigned role in the ORO's emergency operations plans. Use of maps and other displays is encouraged. For non-facility based operations, the equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with the assigned operational role. At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones, and signs) must be available, or their availability described.

Specific equipment and supplies that must be demonstrated under this criterion include KI inventories, dosimetry, and monitoring equipment, as follows:

KI: Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by: (1) emergency workers; (2) institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities;

and (3) where stipulated by the plans / procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make KI available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, special weapons and tactics teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans / procedures. The plans / procedures must include the forms to be used for documenting emergency worker ingestion of KI, as well as a mechanism for identifying emergency workers that have declined KI in advance. Consider carefully the placement of emergency workers that have declined KI in advance.

ORO quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at the storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification (ALC) submission, and/or verified during a Site Area Visit (SAV). Available supplies of KI must be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or state laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

Dosimetry: Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers must be available for issuance to all emergency workers who will be dispatched to perform an ORO mission. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make dosimetry available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans / procedures.

Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry must allow an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans / procedures.

Direct-reading dosimeters must be zeroed or operationally checked prior to issuance. The dosimeters must be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced when necessary. Civil Defense Victoreen Model 138s (CD V-138s) (0-200 mR), due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, must be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced when necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

Operational checks and testing of electronic dosimeters must be in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions and be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

Monitoring Instruments: All instruments must be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. Unmodified CDV-700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's recommendation must be calibrated annually. Modified CDV-700 instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration must be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. In addition, instruments being used to measure activity must have a sticker affixed to their sides indicating the effective range of the readings. The range of readings documentation specifies the acceptable range of readings that the meter should indicate when it is response-checked using a standard test source.

For Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs), the instruments must be capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting beta radiation. These instruments must be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection / exposure control of team members and detection of

activity on air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans / procedures. An appropriate radioactive check source must be used to verify proper operational response for each low-range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1R/hr) and for high-range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high-range instrument, a procedure must exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high-range instrument can make useful readings.

In areas where portal monitors are used, the OROs must set up and operationally check the monitor(s). The monitor(s) must conform to the standards set forth in the Contamination Monitoring Standard for a Portal Monitor Used for Emergency Response, FEMA-REP-21 (March 1995) or in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.

Mutual Aid Resources: If the incoming resources arrive with their own equipment (i.e., monitors and/or dosimetry), they will be evaluated by REP Program standards. FEMA will not inventory equipment that is not part of the REP Program. If an agency has a defined role in the REP Plan, they are subject to the planning process and standards, as well as the guidance of the Manual.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Radiological Survey Instruments are calibrated per manufactures recommendations. Support counties do not have DRDs, or KI, but those responsible for reception centers and/or monitoring and decontamination centers will have PRDs. Simulated PRDs may be used for the evaluation.

Neither CDV-700 nor CDV-138 instruments are in use in the area.

Evaluation of KI quantities will be verified using inventory sheets. KI will not be removed from storage locations and boxes / packages will not be opened, however, lot numbers and expiration dates should be visible for inspection. KI questions will be addressed through interviews.

Annual Direct Reading Dosimeter leakage testing verification will be available to the evaluator.

Reception Centers shall be evaluated on their ability to use maps or other documentation to direct evacuating persons to the correct Monitoring / Decontamination Centers and/or Mass Care Centers (as Applicable). If Reception Centers are collocated with Monitoring / Decontamination centers and Mass Care Centers the use of maps or documents to provide direction does not apply.

EVALUATION AREA 2

Protective Action Decision-Making

Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans / procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions.

Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits [that take into consideration Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) or organ-specific limits] identified in the ORO's plans / procedures.

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, C.6; J.10. e, f; K.4)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be assessed concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ must demonstrate a capability to comply with emergency worker exposure limits based on their emergency plans / procedures.

Participating OROs must also demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and the number of emergency workers receiving radiation doses above pre-authorized levels. This would include providing KI and dosimetry in a timely manner to emergency workers dispatched onsite to support plant incident assessment and mitigating actions, in accordance with respective plans / procedures.

As appropriate, OROs must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for emergency workers, based on their plans / procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAGs for KI administration.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Radiological briefings (which may be supported by video) will be provided to address exposure limits, procedures to replace those personnel approaching exposure limits and how permission to exceed limits is obtained from the municipality and county. Emergency workers will also be briefed on when to take KI and on whose authority. Distribution of KI to emergency workers will be simulated. The Commonwealth, under direction of the Department of Health, will authorize use of KI when radiological conditions warrant its use. If the scenario has no potential for a radiological release, the decision on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for emergency workers and the authorization process for emergency workers to exceed pre-authorized levels can be addressed through an interview.

The completion of one "Dosimetry-KI Report Form" will be demonstrated at locations issuing dosimetry.

The decision regarding protective actions and KI is made at the state level and implemented by downstream organizations.

Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) field monitoring and Radiation Rapid Response Vehicle teams will demonstrate emergency worker exposure control as per their procedures.

Sub-element 2.b. – Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) and Decisions (PADs) for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to independently project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PAGs.

OROs must have the capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency. OROs base these choices on PAGs from their plans / procedures or EPA's Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents and other criteria, such as plant conditions, licensee PARs, coordination of PADs with other political jurisdictions (e.g., other affected OROs and incident command), availability of in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations, to include HAB incidents, the threat posed by the specific hostile action, the affiliated response, and the effect of an evacuation on the threat response effort, that create higher than normal risk from general population evacuation.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate PARs are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, I.10 and Supplement 3)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO must demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plans / procedures, to develop PARs for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided by the licensee, as well as field monitoring data, if available. The ORO must also consider any release and meteorological data provided by the licensee.

The ORO must demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs must be appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose must be demonstrated. Projected doses must be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs must be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a pre-arranged format.

When the licensee and ORO projected doses differ by more than a factor of 10, the ORO and licensee must determine the source of the difference by discussing input data and assumptions, using different models, or exploring possible reasons. Resolution of these differences must be incorporated into the PARs if timely and appropriate. The ORO must demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

BRP will validate plant dose projections and coordinate resolution of differences if more than a factor of 10. If the scenario has no radiological release, or potential of a radiological release, the decision-making process used to make PADs can be addressed through an interview.

The decision regarding protective actions and KI is made at the state level and implemented by downstream organizations.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m)

Assessment/Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

OROs must have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs. OROs must demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner appropriate to the incident, based on information from the licensee, assessment of plant status and potential or actual releases, other available information related to the incident, input from appropriate ORO authorities (e.g., incident command), and PARs from the utility and ORO staff. In addition, a subsequent or alternate PAD may be appropriate if various conditions (e.g., an HAB incident, weather, release timing and magnitude) pose undue risk to an evacuation, or if evacuation may disrupt the efforts to respond to a hostile action.

OROs must demonstrate the ability to obtain supplemental resources (e.g., mutual aid) necessary to implement a PAD if local law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical resources are utilized to augment response to the NPP site or other key infrastructure.

Dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. In addition, incident command must provide input regarding considerations for subsequent PARs based on the magnitude of the ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions. The decision-makers must demonstrate the capability to change protective actions based on the combination of all these factors.

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public under offsite plans / procedures, then it must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision-making process must involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff.

If more than one ORO is involved in decision making, all appropriate OROs must communicate and coordinate PADs with each other. In addition, decisions must be coordinated / communicated with incident command. OROs must demonstrate the capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

The Commonwealth, in developing a PAD, will base the decision upon plant recommendation and condition, confirmation and advice of BRP, environmental data, impediments, and other factors that may impact the decision. If the scenario has no radiological release, or potential of a radiological release, the decision-making process used to make PADs or KI decisions can be addressed through an interview.

The decision regarding protective actions (by the Senior State Official) and KI (by the Secretary of the Dept. of Health) is made at the state level and implemented by state agencies and downstream organizations. Decisions are coordinated with the affected counties.

Sub-element 2.c – PAD Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access / Functional Needs

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to determine precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation, sheltering, and use of KI, if applicable, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, schools, licensed daycare centers, mobility-impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals). The focus is on those groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are or potentially will be affected by a radiological release from an NPP.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access / functional needs. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

Usually it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for incidents where there is a high-risk environmental condition or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, factors that must be considered include weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation versus risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In addition, decisions must be coordinated / communicated with the incident command. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the ORO must consider use of KI.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems / districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. Demonstration requires that the OROs actually contact public school systems / districts during the exercise.

In accordance with plans / procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems / districts must demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. The decision-making process, including any preplanned strategies for protective actions for that Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs), must consider the location of students at the time (e.g., whether the students are still at home, en route to school, or at school).

Since other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate host hospitals, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry. Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP program.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

PEMA will provide decision making regarding special populations. Risk counties and/or state agencies will provide by interview or simulation the notification to the special populations regarding the decision.

If the scenario has no radiological release, or potential of a radiological release, the decision-making process used to make PARs can be addressed through an interview.

The decision regarding protective actions and KI is made at the state level and implemented by downstream organizations.

Sub-element 2.d. – Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the means to assess the radiological consequences for the ingestion exposure pathway, relate them to the appropriate PAGs, and make timely, appropriate PADs to mitigate exposure from the pathway.

During an incident at an NPP, a release of radioactive material may contaminate water supplies and agricultural products in the surrounding areas. Any such contamination would likely occur during the plume phase of the incident and, depending on the nature of the release, could impact the ingestion pathway for weeks or years.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate PADs are made based on the ORO's planning criteria. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; D.4; J.9, 11)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a full-scale, functional or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

OROs are expected to take precautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water and food, in accordance with their respective plans / procedures. Often OROs initiate such actions based on criteria related to the facility's ECLs. Such actions may include recommendations to place milk animals on stored feed and use protected water supplies.

The ORO must use its procedures to assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water supplies, such as the development of a sampling plan. The ORO's assessment must include evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially impacted areas; characterization of the releases from the facility; and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs must consider use of agricultural and watershed data within the 50-mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the food and water must then be compared to the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in the ORO's plans / procedures. The plans / procedures contain PAGs based on specific dose commitment criteria or on criteria as recommended by current Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance. Timely and appropriate recommendations must be provided to the ORO decision-makers group for implementation decisions. OROs may also include a comparison of taking or not taking a given action on the resultant ingestion pathway dose commitments.

The ORO must demonstrate timely decisions to minimize radiological impacts from the ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other information. Any such decisions must be communicated and, to the extent practical, coordinated with neighboring OROs. These decisions include tracking agricultural products entering and leaving the EPZ. Demonstration of plans and procedures which use traffic access control points to track agricultural products entering and leaving the EPZ may be conducted through interview.

OROs will use Federal resources, as identified in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NRF and other resources (e.g., compacts or nuclear insurers), as necessary. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other participating resources.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This sub-element will not be demonstrated or evaluated during this exercise. This element was demonstrated during the Post Plume Exercise conducted during the week of March 7, 2011 for the Commonwealth.

Sub-element 2.e. – Radiological Assessment and Decision Making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to make decisions on post-plume phase relocation, reentry, and return of the general public. These decisions are essential for protection of the public from direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe incident at an NPP.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely post-plume phase relocation, reentry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, I.10; J.9; K.3.a; M.1)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

Relocation: OROs must demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and compare these estimates with PAGs; apply decision criteria for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated, but where actual or projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs; and control access to evacuated and restricted areas. OROs will make decisions for relocating members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs. Determination of areas to be restricted must be based on factors such as the mix of radionuclides in deposited materials, calculated exposure rates versus the PAGs, and analyses of vegetation and soil field samples.

Reentry: Decisions must be made on location of control points and policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform specific tasks or missions.

Examples of control procedures are the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; questions regarding an individual's objectives, locations expected to be visited, and associated timeframes; availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; and advice on areas to avoid. Control procedures also include monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; the implementation of decision criteria regarding decontamination; and proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop a strategy for authorized reentry of individuals into the restricted zone(s), based on established decision criteria. OROs must demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security purposes (e.g., police patrols), maintenance of essential services (e.g., fire protection and utilities), and other critical functions. They must demonstrate the capability to use decision-making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone by the public for various reasons, such as to maintain property (e.g., to care for farm animals or secure machinery for storage) or retrieve important possessions. Coordinated policies for access and exposure control must be developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the restricted zone(s). OROs must demonstrate the capability to establish policies for provision of dosimetry to all individuals allowed to reenter the restricted zone(s). The extent to which OROs need to develop policies on reentry will be determined by scenario events.

Return: OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase (i.e., permitting populations that were previously evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an unrestricted basis). OROs must base decisions on environmental data and political boundaries or physical / geological features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary of the restricted area(s) that is based on the relocation PAG.

Other factors that the ORO must consider in decision-making include conditions that permit cancellation of the ECL and relaxation of associated restrictive measures. OROs must base return recommendations on measurements of radiation from ground deposition. OROs must have the capability to identify services and facilities that require restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate-term housing for relocated persons.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This sub-element will not be demonstrated or evaluated during this exercise. This element was demonstrated during the Post Plume Exercise conducted during the week of March 7, 2011 for the Commonwealth.

EVALUATION AREA 3

Protective Action Implementation

Sub-element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; reading of direct-reading dosimetry by emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of the PAGs, and the capability to provide KI for emergency workers, always applying the as low as is reasonably achievable principle as appropriate.

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans / procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e; K.3.a, b; K.4)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of TEDE and maximum exposure limits, for those emergency workers involved in lifesaving activities, contained in the ORO's plans / procedures.

Each emergency worker must have basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plans / procedures. If supplemental resources are used, they must be provided with just-in-time training to ensure basic knowledge of radiation exposure control. Emergency workers must demonstrate procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers must demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker must report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans / procedures. OROs must demonstrate the actions described in the plans / procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, authorize the worker to incur additional exposures, or take other actions. If exercise play does not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators must interview at least two workers to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in case authorization is needed, and at what

exposure levels. Workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission. In such cases, adequate control of exposure can be achieved for all team members using one direct-reading dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers assigned to low-exposure rate fixed facilities (e.g., EOCs and communications center within the EPZ, reception centers, and counting laboratories) may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored using group dosimetry (i.e., direct-reading dosimeters strategically placed in the work area). Each team member must still have his or her own permanent record dosimetry. Individuals authorized by the ORO to reenter an evacuated area during the plume (emergency) phase, must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions.

OROs may have administrative limits lower than EPA-400-R-92-001 dose limits for emergency workers performing various services (e.g., life saving, protection of valuable property, all activities). OROs must ensure that the process used to seek authorization for exceeding dose limits does not negatively impact the capability to respond to an incident where life saving and/or protection of valuable property may require an urgent response.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they did so. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it. Emergency workers must demonstrate basic knowledge of procedures for using KI whether or not the scenario drives the implementation of KI use. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Radiological briefings will be provided to address exposure limits, procedures to replace personnel approaching limits, and how permission to exceed limits is obtained from the municipality and county. Emergency workers will also be briefed on when to take KI and on whose authority. Distribution of KI will be simulated.

OROs should also demonstrate the use of all applicable dosimetry forms. The completion of one "Dosimetry-KI Report Form" will be demonstrated.

At any time, players may ask other players or supervisors to clarify radiological information.

In Pennsylvania, emergency workers outside of the EPZ do not have turn back values.

Evaluation of emergency worker KI quantities will be verified using inventory sheets. KI will not be removed from storage locations and boxes will not be opened. KI questions will be addressed through interviews.

Personnel assigned to operate Monitoring / Decontamination centers and stations are not issued DRDs or KI since the centers / stations are located outside the EPZ. Personnel who may come into contact with contaminated persons, equipment, and vehicles should be issued PRDs. Simulated PRDs with mock serial numbers may be used to simulate issue.

Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, e.g., at counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers, may have individual permanent record dosimeters or they may be monitored by area dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. In Pennsylvania this will be accomplished through the use of an area kit. The area kit process is explained in state, county and municipal plans.

Standard issue of dosimetry and potassium iodide for each category of emergency worker is as follows:

Category A: 1 PRD, 1 DRD, and 1 unit of KI
Category B: 1 PRD and 1 unit of KI (Area Kit includes 2 DRDs)
Category C: 1 PRD

All locations that have dosimetry equipment indicated within their Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP), will make the dosimetry equipment (and KI) available for inspection by the Federal Evaluator. In order to demonstrate an understanding of the use of the dosimetry equipment, KI and associated forms; the location need only remove and distribute / issue a maximum of six (6) units of dosimetry from their inventory. Simulation PRDs with mock serial numbers and simulated KI may be issued. The location will demonstrate filling out a minimum of one (1) Dosimetry / KI Report Form.

Sub-element 3.b – Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the General Public

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide KI for institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plans / procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to institutionalized individuals, providing KI to the general public is an ORO option and must be reflected as such in ORO plans / procedures. Provisions must include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of distributing KI.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, f)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.
OROs must demonstrate the capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in their plans / procedures, to members of the general public. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.

If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information must be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Within Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Department of Health is responsible for distribution of KI to the general public located within the EPZ. Pre-distribution is accomplished on an annual basis. Pennsylvania does not distribute KI at reception centers.

Counties which do not have institutionalized individuals are not evaluated for this criterion.

Sub-element 3.c – Implementation of Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access / Functional Needs

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all persons with disabilities and access / functional needs. The focus is on those persons with disabilities and access / functional needs that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from an NPP.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access / functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (i.e., provide PARs and emergency information and instructions to) persons with disabilities and access / functional needs, including hospitals / medical facilities, nursing homes, correctional facilities, and mobility-impaired and transportation-dependent individuals. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access / functional needs in accordance with plans / procedures.

Contact with persons with disabilities and access / functional needs and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent of Play. Some contacts with transportation providers must be actually contacted, as negotiated in the Extent of Play. All actual and simulated contacts must be logged.

Since other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate host hospitals, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry. Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP program.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Lists of persons with disabilities and access / functional needs including name, address, contact information, and description of need shall be maintained at their respective municipal EOC (based upon residential jurisdiction). Copies of these lists will not be provided to the evaluators; however, evaluators will be allowed to inspect the lists during the exercise.

Evaluators may ask, by interview, about the transportation plans concerning transportation, staging, source of vehicles, radiological protection of the drivers/emergency workers, and routes or assignments of vehicles for transportation dependent individuals and transportation of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. No buses or drivers will be mobilized.

Initial contact, by the county, with special populations (hospitals, nursing homes and county correctional facilities) may be actual. All subsequent calls will be simulated. Actual contacts (up to two per Risk County) will be made with transportation providers per the county. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs / School Officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial or tabletop exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

School systems / districts (these include public and private schools, kindergartens, preschools, and licensed day care) must demonstrate the ability to implement PADs for students. The demonstration must be made as follows: each school system / district within the 10 mile EPZ must demonstrate implementation of protective actions. At least one school per affected system / district must participate in the demonstration. Canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering in place must be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process.

If accomplished through an interview, appropriate school personnel including decision-making officials (e.g., schools' superintendent / principals and transportation director / bus dispatchers), and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) must be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plans / procedures, must be verified.

Officials of the school system(s) must demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

If a school facility has emergency plans as a condition of licensing, those plans may be submitted to FEMA review in place of demonstration or interview pursuant to the ORO's plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent of Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

School students will not be involved during the exercise. Actions and activities associated with the demonstration of Criterion 3.c.2 will be limited to the School District Administration key personnel, evaluated schools, and the applicable county. Evacuation of students will be conducted through an interview process with School District personnel or the building principal. School administration will receive notifications of the incident from the county and will make appropriate decisions for and coordinate the responses of their schools.

Although a bus driver should be available for interview the role of the bus driver may be conducted through an interview with school or transportation officials (or designee) if a bus driver is not available. Actual demonstration of the bus route is not required and will not be demonstrated. Maps or route descriptions will be available for illustration purposes.

Risk county school plans do not require communications between the school and vehicles. Bus drivers are not considered emergency workers and therefore do not require dosimetry.

Private schools, private kindergartens, and day care centers do not participate in REP exercises. However, OROs will be prepared to show evaluators lists of these facilities that they will contact in the event of an emergency in accordance with plans and procedures. Any simulated contacts will be logged.

Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective action plans / procedures, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated / sheltered areas. This sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points, and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, staff assistance visit, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff must demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas, as per the Extent of Play Agreement. These capabilities may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the Extent of Play Agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic), they must demonstrate the capability to contact the state or Federal agencies that have the needed authority, as agreed upon in the Extent of Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

State and Municipal Traffic and Access control will be demonstrated by interview at the applicable Barracks or EOC of jurisdiction and include instruction to staff appropriate for plans and conditions (PAD). The traffic / access control personnel will not be deployed to the traffic / access control point(s). If the designated assignment is a location within the EPZ, a radiological briefing will be provided to the assigned individuals.

Reception Centers shall provide a traffic control plan for the location being evaluated.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, staff assistance visit, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. In demonstrating this capability, the impediment must remain in place during the evacuation such that re-routing of traffic is required, and must result in the decision-making and coordination with the JIC to communicate the alternate route to evacuees leaving the area. Where, due to the specifics of the scenario or jurisdiction, the impediment cannot be located on an evacuation route, it must be located so as to impact the evacuation. Where not possible, actual dispatch of resources need not be physically demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, must be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

County EOCs will demonstrate the ability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation by inject or interview. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as tow trucks, need not be demonstrated; however, simulated contacts will be logged. If the scenario does not lead to evacuation the criteria shall be deemed complete if the ORO can describe to the evaluator the actions they would take to overcome a major traffic impediment during an evacuation and how such actions would be communicated to the public and affected OROs. (Risk counties only)

Sub-element 3.e – Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by current FDA guidance, for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ (i.e., the area within an approximate 50-mile radius of the NPP). This sub-element focuses on those actions required for implementation of protective actions.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.11)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to secure and use current information on the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries, fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing plants, and water supply intake points to implement protective actions within the EPZ. OROs use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear / Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This sub-element will not be demonstrated or evaluated during this exercise. This element was demonstrated during the Post Plume Exercise conducted during the week of March 7, 2011 for the Commonwealth.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, G.1, J.9, 11)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the development of measures and strategies for implementation of ingestion exposure pathway EPZ protective actions by formulating protective action information for the general public and food producers and processors. Demonstration of this criterion includes either pre-distributed public information material in the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ or the capability for rapid reproduction and distribution of appropriate reproduction-ready information and instructions to pre-determined individuals and businesses.

OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control, restrict, or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors. Exercise play must include demonstration of communications and coordination among organizations to implement protective actions. Field play of implementation activities may be simulated. For example, communications and coordination with agencies responsible for enforcing food controls within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ must be demonstrated, but actual communications with food producers and processors may be simulated.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This sub-element will not be demonstrated or evaluated during this exercise. This element was demonstrated during the Post Plume Exercise conducted during the week of March 7, 2011 for the Commonwealth.

Sub-element 3.f – Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement plans, procedures, and decisions for post-plume phase relocation, reentry, and return. Implementation of these decisions is essential for protecting the public from direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe incident at a commercial NPP.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled reentry, relocation, and return of individuals during the post-plume phase are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, E.7; J.10.j; J.12; K.5.b; M.1, 3)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial or tabletop exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Relocation: OROs must demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals located in radiologically contaminated areas who were not previously evacuated. Such individuals must be relocated to an area(s) where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PAGs. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to provide for short- or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in an area(s) that has residual radiation levels above the (first-, second-, and 50-year) PAGs.

Areas of consideration must include the capability of OROs to communicate with other OROs regarding timing of actions, notification of the population of procedures for relocation, and notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be able to return to their homes due to high levels of contamination. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to communicate instructions to the public regarding relocation decisions and intermediate-term housing for relocated persons.

Reentry: OROs must demonstrate the capability to control reentry and exit of individuals who are authorized by the ORO to temporarily reenter the restricted area during the post-plume (i.e., intermediate or late) phase to protect them from unnecessary radiation exposure. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of contamination outside the restricted area(s). Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who

must reenter an evacuated area during the post-emergency phase must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions. Monitoring and decontamination facilities will be established as appropriate.
Examples of control procedures are: (1) assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; (2) questions regarding the individuals' objective(s), location(s) expected to be visited, and associated timeframes; (3) maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; (5) procedures for exit, including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; (6) decision criteria regarding contamination; (7) proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry, and (8) maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

Return: OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs must demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require restoration within a few days, and to identify procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, and schools.

Communication among OROs for relocation, reentry, and return may be simulated. All simulated or actual contacts must be documented. These discussions may be accomplished in a group setting.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear / Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g., compacts or nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This sub-element will not be demonstrated or evaluated during this exercise. This element was demonstrated during the Post Plume Exercise conducted during the week of March 7, 2011 for the Commonwealth.

EVALUATION AREA 4

Field Measurement and Analysis

Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to deploy FMTs with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1 indicate that OROs must have the capability to use FMTs within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In an incident at an NPP, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although incident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an incident, it is important to collect field radiological data to help characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such field measurement efforts.

Criterion 4.a.1: [RESERVED]

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; I.7, 8, 11; J.10.a)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise. Other means may include drills that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to brief FMTs on predicted plume location and direction, plume travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment. During an HAB incident, the Field Team management must keep the incident command informed of field monitoring teams' activities and location. Coordination with FMTs and field monitoring may be demonstrated as out-of-sequence demonstrations, as negotiated in the Extent of Play Agreement.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and support the adequacy of implemented protective actions, or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams must be directed to take measurements at such locations and times as necessary to provide sufficient information to characterize the plume and its impacts.

If the responsibility for obtaining peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee FMTs, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by ORO monitoring teams. If the licensee FMTs do not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all FMTs (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential. OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear / Radiological

Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Field Team control will be performed near the 10 mile EPZ using the DEP Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle (R3V). Field Team control is expected to initially be out-of-sequence with the plume timeline. During the exercise the field teams will be directed to take measurements in locations to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts. In addition to field team measurements, remote detectors will be deployed by the field teams near the expected plume pathway. These detectors will automatically transmit data to the R3V. These detectors will be used to keep field teams dose ALARA. A FEMA Evaluator(s) will meet the R3V and field teams at the South Central Regional Office (located at 909 Elmerton Ave, Harrisburg PA 17110) for initial equipment checks at 1:30 PM on April 11, 2017. In the event the scenario has no radiological release a report of background radiation by the FMT will signify successful demonstration of the criterion.

The Field Teams and R3V will be evaluated during this exercise. **Note that field operations will be controlled from a Field Team Command Post in the building instead of the R3V.**

In order to facilitate those times where the plume comes out late in the exercise, BRP field teams will demonstrate air sampling prior to leaving the meeting location. The field team will verbalize their air sampling actions while in the field and utilize controller data to simulate the counting of the sample and relay the information to the R3V.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12: I.8, 9; J.10.a)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise. Other means may include drills that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

Two or more FMTs must demonstrate the capability to make and report measurements of ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment team, or other appropriate authority. FMTs must also demonstrate the capability to obtain an air sample for measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates, and to provide the appropriate authority with field data pertaining to measurement. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the authority must consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form(s), to a radiological laboratory (ies) must be demonstrated.

OROs must share data in a timely manner with all other appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory (ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear / Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Measurements will be made by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP), in accordance with the BRP Standard Implementing Procedures (IPs). Two mobile monitoring teams from BRP will demonstrate ambient radiation monitoring and radioiodine and particulate sampling. Field teams will be equipped with appropriate dosimetry and KI. Both teams will be evaluated by FEMA. Each team will be directed to monitoring location and perform actual radiation measurements at each location. Measurements may consist of truck installed radiation monitor or hand-held radiation instruments. The field team will demonstrate taking an air sample at the first location where a probe would be dropped, regardless of radiation level. The team will explain by interview the procedures they follow for air sampling. Teams will then take additional simulated air samples as directed at additional locations, if conditions are appropriate for radioiodine sampling and relay information to the R3V. In place of silver zeolite cartridges, charcoal cartridges will be used for the exercise. All measurements will be forwarded to the R3V immediately upon obtaining data. Evaluators will meet the field teams at the South Central Regional Office (located at 909 Elmerton Ave, Harrisburg PA 17110) on April 11, 2017 at 1:30 PM. **Note that field operations will be controlled from a Field Team Command Post in the building instead of the R3V**

Sub-element 4.b – Post-Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude and locations of radiological hazards to determine the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ and to support relocation, reentry, and return decisions. This sub-element focuses on collecting environmental samples for laboratory analyses that are essential for decisions on protecting the public from contaminated food and water and direct radiation from deposited materials.

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams (2 or more) demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision making. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, C.1; I.8; J.11)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

The ORO's FMTs must demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support reentry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available, use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory (ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

The FMTs and/or other sampling personnel must secure ingestion pathway samples from agricultural products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return must be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear / Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This sub-element will not be demonstrated or evaluated during this exercise. This element was demonstrated during the Post Plume Exercise conducted during the week of March 7, 2011 for the Commonwealth.

Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid, and environmental samples to support protective action decision making.

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, C.1, 3; J.11)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

The laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging information, preventing contamination of the laboratory(ies), preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil (e.g., milk), and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

The laboratory (ies) must be appropriately equipped to provide, upon request, timely analyses of media of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions anticipated in the ORO's plans / procedures. The laboratory instrument calibrations must be traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides released in a reactor incident must be as described in the plans / procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (e.g., transuranics or as a result of a terrorist incident) or if warranted by incident circumstances. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.

The laboratory staff must be qualified in radio-analytical techniques and contamination control procedures.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear / Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This sub-element will not be demonstrated or evaluated during this exercise. This element was demonstrated during the Post Plume Exercise conducted during the week of March 7, 2011 for the Commonwealth.

EVALUATION AREA 5

Emergency Notification and Public Information

Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this Sub-element are further discussed in Section V, Part A of this Manual, Alert and Notification Systems.

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current REP guidance. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, OROs must complete system activation for primary alert / notification and disseminate the information / instructions in a timely manner. For exercise purposes, timely is defined as with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message must be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test message(s) is not required. The procedures must be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation. The alert signal activation should be simulated, not performed. Evaluations of EAS broadcast stations may also be accomplished through SAVs.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis must be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system, including verification of provisions for backup power or an alternate station.

The initial message must include at a minimum the following elements:

- Identification of the ORO responsible and the official with authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message;
- Identification of the commercial NPP and a statement that an emergency exists there;
- Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures, calendars, and/or information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency; and

- A closing statement asking that the affected and potentially affected population stay tuned for additional information, or that the population tune to another station for additional information.

If route alerting is demonstrated as a primary method of alert and notification, it must be done in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures and the Extent of Play Agreement. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting in a timely manner (not subject to specific time requirements). At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as negotiated in the Extent of Play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of primary alert and notification included in their plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent of Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has implemented a Statewide EAS Control System in cooperation with the Pennsylvania Association of Broadcasters per the State Emergency Communications Committee and Pennsylvania Emergency Alert System State EAS Plan (September 23, 2010 and revised on November 2, 2011). The State CRCC (PEMA) is the initiating point for the activation of the EAS. Risk counties have the control equipment for activation of sirens. Coordination will occur between the State CRCC and the affected counties with respect to the Alert and Notification System (ANS) Process as to when the sirens and EAS messages will occur. Sirens will be coordinated and the sounding simulated at the appropriate time with the simulated activation of EAS taking place approximately three minutes following the simulated activation of the sirens. Regular broadcasting will not be interrupted on the EAS stations. All subsequent actions to broadcast stations will be simulated. Broadcast of the message(s) or test message(s) is not required and not requested. Counties may elect to provide Subsequent News Bulletins or County Specific EAS messages to their EAS stations.

Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures, ANS activation should be accomplished in a timely manner for primary alerting / notification. This action will not be subject to specific time requirements.

All actions to broadcast stations will be simulated. Systems that use automatic sending technology may be demonstrated by explanation during an interview.

Each evaluated municipality per Risk County will demonstrate, by interview, route alerting of the hearing impaired residents within their jurisdiction. Hearing impaired notification teams will not be deployed.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

If the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s) or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function during the exercise, OROs must demonstrate backup means of alert and notification. Backup means of alert and notification will differ from facility to facility.

Backup alert and notification procedures that would be implemented in multiple stages must be structured such that the population closest to the plant (e.g., within two miles) is alerted and notified first. The populations farther away and downwind of any potential radiological release would be covered sequentially (e.g., two to five miles, followed by downwind five to ten miles, and finally the remaining population as directed by authorities). Topography, population density, existing ORO resources, and timing will be considered in judging the acceptability of backup means of alert and notification.

Although circumstances may not allow this for all situations, FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators attempt to establish backup means that will reach those in the plume exposure EPZ within a reasonable time of failure of the primary alert and notification system, with a recommended goal of 45 minutes. The backup alert message must, at a minimum, include (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

When backup route alerting is demonstrated, **only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated.** All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as negotiated in the Extent of Play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of backup alert and notification included in their plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent of Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Plans specify that route alerting is used as a back up to the sirens. County liaisons will provide a controller inject to the risk counties that a siren has failed. The county will demonstrate contacting one municipal EOC in regards to the failed siren in that municipality. The municipal EOC will then dispatch one route alert team to cover one route alert sector affected by the failed siren. All other routes will be simulated. Route alert teams should finish their route in a reasonable time with a target time of about 45 minutes from time of siren failure.

OROs may utilize IPAWs or other public alerting systems in accordance with their plans but use of such systems will not negate the need to provide for demonstration of route alerting by the ORO.

Criterion 5.a.4: Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

OROs with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report), five to ten miles from the NPP, must demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s). FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators establish means that will reach those in approved exception areas in a timely manner, with a recommended goal of 45 minutes, once the initial decision is made by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an incident. The exception area alert message must, at a minimum, include (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route must be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every eight years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcasted) as negotiated in the Extent of Play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location. For exception areas alerted by aircraft, actual flights will be negotiated in the Extent of Play, but must be demonstrated no less than once every eight years.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

This sub-element will not be demonstrated or evaluated during this exercise. Pennsylvania has no exception areas.

Sub-element 5.b – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to disseminate appropriate emergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions, to the public. In addition, NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1 require OROs to ensure that the capability exists for providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an emergency. NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1 also provide that a system must be available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the "Public Inquiry Hotline."

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, or drills.

The responsible ORO personnel / representatives must demonstrate actions to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Message elements: The ORO must ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials. The emergency information must contain all necessary and applicable instructions (e.g., evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and persons with disabilities and access / functional needs, and public inquiry hotline telephone number) to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided. The ORO must also be prepared to disclose and explain the ECL of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs must demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information must be all-inclusive by including the four items specified under exercise Demonstration Criterion 5.a.1 and previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plans / procedures. OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plans / procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs must demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

Media information: OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and releases must be consistent with PADs and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (e.g., EAS messages and media releases) and media information kits must be available for dissemination to the media.

Public inquiry: OROs must demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls received via the Public Inquiry Hotline. Hotline staff must demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, must be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases.

HAB considerations: The dissemination of information dealing with specific aspects of NPP security capabilities, actual or perceived adversarial (terrorist) force or threat, and tactical law enforcement response must be coordinated / communicated with appropriate security authorities (e.g., law enforcement and NPP security agencies) in accordance with ORO plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner. This will NOT be subject to specific time requirements. One media briefing will be demonstrated in each risk county.

Risk and support counties will receive and handle "Public Inquiry" messages via their individual "Public Inquiry" processes (in compliance with NIMS terminology, Rumor Control is now considered to be "Public Inquiry"). Counties will receive approximately ten public inquiry calls from the State Exercise Cell assigned this responsibility. Counties will be expected to receive and log the calls, identify any trends and take appropriate actions to include follow-up message development, distributions and/or briefings.

The Commonwealth utilizes a virtual JIC in which the Commonwealth and the Utility/Independent Power Producer will run coordinated public information between the Commonwealth CRCC and from the Utility/IPP EOF. The coordination will be demonstrated by interview or simulation through a "Virtual News Conference."

EVALUATION AREA 6

Support Operation / Facilities

Sub-element 6.a – Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, while minimizing contamination of the facility. OROs must also have the capability to identify and register evacuees at reception centers.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4; J.10.h; J.12)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, drills, or SAV.

Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees must be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the Extent of Play Agreement. OROs conducting this demonstration must have one-third of the resources (e.g., monitoring teams / instrumentation / portal monitors) available at the facility (ies) as necessary to monitor 20 percent of the population within a 12-hour period. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Availability of resources can be demonstrated with valid documentation (e.g., MOU / LOA, etc.) reflecting how necessary equipment would be procured for the location. Plans / procedures must indicate provisions for service animals.

Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees must demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain, within about 12 hours, a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20 percent EPZ population planning base. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure. For demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities, a minimum of six evacuees must be monitored per station using equipment and procedures specified in the plans / procedures. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators to determine whether the 12-hour requirement can be met.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to register evacuees upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities. The activities for recording radiological monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination must include establishing a registration record consisting of the evacuee's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination (if any), or as otherwise designated in the plan and/or procedures. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger / action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures. All activities must be based on the plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

Decontamination of evacuees may be simulated and conducted by interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex monitoring must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions must also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any evacuee found to be contaminated, procedures must be discussed concerning handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

Individuals who have completed monitoring (and decontamination, if needed) must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc) indicating that they, and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger / action level or have been placed in a secure area until they can be monitored and decontaminated, if necessary.

In accordance with plans / procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not require confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles secure area or monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and do require confirmation that their vehicle is being held in a secure area or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Radiological monitoring demonstration sites should possess a roster of the monitoring personnel, as well as providing a means by which the mass care reception center or others could verify that the person has been monitored and has been deemed uncontaminated. The radiological monitoring station(s) should be prepared to monitor 20 percent of the risk population within a 12-hour period as allocated to that location. In some cases reception centers, monitoring and decontaminations centers, and/or mass care centers may be collocated.

At each reception center, a minimum of three volunteer evacuees will be processed, briefed, issued the appropriate strip map or directions, and instructed to proceed to a mass care center designated for demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration. A sample of the appropriate strip maps or directions will be made available for the demonstration unless collocated with mass care and monitoring / decontamination. **As negotiated with FEMA, this criterion will be demonstrated but not be evaluated because registration is not done at the reception center.**

One mass care center and one public monitoring / decontamination center will be demonstrated per Support County during the out-of-sequence window. The support counties will provide space at designated mass care centers or reception centers for operation of monitoring / decontamination centers. Schematics of these monitoring / decontamination centers will be available to show the organization within the facility and space management for monitoring and decontamination. Procedures will be demonstrated to evidence the separation of contaminated and non-contaminated (clean) individuals.

At the evacuee monitoring / decontamination center, a minimum of six volunteer evacuees will be monitored (or one volunteer evacuee may be monitored six times). Suitable radiological monitoring instruments will be issued to and demonstrated by the initial monitoring team(s). A monitoring team consists of one monitor and one recorder equipped with one survey instrument. Those individuals found to be free of "contamination", based upon scenario injects, will be directed to the mass care registration point for further processing. **Note:** Actual radiological sources will not be attached to or hidden upon the volunteer evacuees. **Note:** If portal monitors are used, the Portal Monitor Extent of Play described below shall be used.

One of the simulated evacuees, based upon controller injects, will not be able to be decontaminated. Discussions concerning the processing of contaminated personnel will include capabilities and written procedures for showering females separate from males. Showering will be simulated, water will not be used. **Note:** If portal monitors are used, the Portal Monitor Extent of Play described below shall be used.

Monitoring / decontamination centers are not issued DRDs or KI since the centers and stations are outside the EPZ. Category "C" Dosimetry applies. Permanent Record Dosimeters (PRDs) may be simulated.

Radiation readings / contamination data for the evacuees and vehicle will be provided by the controller as appropriate based upon information contained in the scenario package. Set-up of the facility will be performed the same as for an actual emergency with all route markings and contamination control measures in place including step-off pads. Long runs of plastic covered with paper will not be demonstrated, but the materials shall be available and explained. Positioning of a fire apparatus on-site may be simulated if otherwise required.

Participants should be able to describe how vehicles are identified for radiological screening and plans or layouts should show the locations and movements of vehicles.

Water from decontamination activities may go directly to a storm drain or other sewer or drain system or area normally designated for wastewater that has been used for bathing or washing of vehicles and or equipment.

Portal Monitor Use: Risk and support counties may, during this exercise, utilize portal monitors to monitor simulated evacuees and/or emergency workers. The monitoring / decontamination team requirements will be based on the portal monitor capabilities as applicable based on the procedure / guidelines, and the recommendations of the manufacturer. **Note:** PEMA guidance shall apply.

Sub-element 6.b – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment, inclusive of vehicles.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility / ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, K.5.a, b)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, drills, or SAV.

The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

Specific attention must be given to equipment, including any vehicles that were in contact with contamination. The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles based on trigger / action levels and procedures stated in the ORO plans / procedures. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the 12-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination must be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping, and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles must be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with contaminated individuals must also be checked.

Decontamination of emergency workers may be simulated and conducted via interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex monitoring must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions must also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals where applicable; provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of emergency workers or facilities.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to register emergency workers upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities. The activities for recording radiological monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination must include establishing a registration record consisting of the emergency worker's

name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination (if any), or as otherwise designated in the plan and/or procedures. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written recorders are all acceptable means for registration.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger / action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any emergency workers who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

Decontamination capabilities and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be successfully decontaminated may be simulated and conducted by interview. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

At the emergency worker monitoring / decontamination stations schematics of these monitoring / decontamination stations will be available to show organization and space management. One emergency worker will be monitored, including thyroid screening. Discussions concerning processing of contaminated personnel will include capabilities and written procedures for showering females separate from males. Showering will be simulated, water will not be used. Suitable radiological monitoring instruments will be issued to the initial monitoring team. **Note:** If portal monitors are used, the Portal Monitor Extent of Play described below shall be used.

Emergency worker station personnel will consist of a minimum of one monitor and one recorder and sufficient personnel to demonstrate monitoring of at least one vehicle. The evaluator will request that vehicle decontamination procedures be explained after the vehicle (with simulated contamination) has been monitored. One radiological survey meter, will be issued to each vehicle monitoring / decontamination team. One vehicle and/or piece of equipment will not be able to be decontaminated. Simulated radiation contamination data will be included in the scenario package, and injected by a controller. Set-up of the facility will be performed as closely as possible to that for an actual emergency with all route markings in place.

Decontamination capabilities and provisions for vehicles and/or equipment that cannot be decontaminated will be simulated and conducted by interview. Water will NOT be used.

Radiation readings / contamination data for the evacuees and vehicle will be provided by the controller as appropriate based upon information contained in the scenario package. Set-up of the facility will be performed the same as for an actual emergency with all route markings and contamination control measures in place including step-off pads. Long runs of plastic covered with paper will not be demonstrated, but the materials shall be available and explained. Positioning of a fire apparatus on-site may be simulated if otherwise required.

Portal Monitor Use: Risk and support counties may, during this exercise, utilize portal monitors to monitor simulated emergency workers. The monitoring / decontamination team requirements will be based on the portal monitor capabilities as applicable based on the procedure / guidelines, and the recommendations of the manufacturer. **Note:** PEMA guidance shall apply.

Emergency worker monitoring and decontamination station personnel are not issued DRDs or KI since the centers and stations are outside the EPZ. Category "C" Dosimetry applies. PRDs may be simulated.

Water from decontamination activities may go directly to a storm drain or other sewer or drain system or area normally designated for wastewater that has been used for bathing or washing of vehicles and or equipment.

Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires OROs to have the capability to establish relocation centers in host / support jurisdictions. The American Red Cross normally provides congregate care in support of OROs under existing letters of agreement.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, J.10.h, J.12)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, drills, or SAV.

The evaluator must conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with applicable guidance.

For planning purposes, OROs must plan for a sufficient number of congregate care centers in host / support jurisdictions based on their all-hazard sheltering experience and what is historically relevant for that particular area. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this criterion, exercise demonstration expectations must be clearly specified in Extent of Play Agreements.

Congregate care staff must also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees, service animals, and vehicles have been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered before entering the facility.

Individuals arriving at congregate care facilities must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc.) indicating that they, and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been placed in a secure area or monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger / action level.

In accordance with plans / procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not need confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles held in a secure area until they can be monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and does need confirmation that their vehicle is being held in a secure area or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas. This capability may be determined through an interview process.

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility (ies). However, availability of such items must be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Each of the risk or support counties with mass care centers will demonstrate the operation of one mass care center during the out-of-sequence window. Floor plans with flow diagrams of the mass care centers will be available to show organization within the facility and space management during a real emergency. Mass care center locations are listed in the demonstration tables "Demonstration of Mass Care Centers (Attachment A, Section I.B.2)."

Personnel, at a minimum, will consist of one manager and one assistant for each mass care center opened during the out-of-sequence window. The evaluator will expect to see location and quantities of equipment and supplies needed to open the mass care center, as well as a staffing chart by job title for 24-hour staffing. Schematics of these mass care centers will be available, during the demonstration window, to show organization within the facility and space allocation for the registration and sheltering the evacuating public. Necessary signs, directional arrows and forms will be available and used to demonstrate registration, at a minimum, of three evacuees requiring emergency housing. Evacuees will be shown the location where they would be housed in an actual situation. Bedding, cots, food, etc. normally associated with mass care will not be moved to the site, but the sources of those items should be explained to FEMA evaluators. Mass care shelters should be prepared to discuss methods of coordination and communications.

AMERICAN RED CROSS SUPPORT COUNTY CHAPTERS

For all TMI EPZ risk & support counties except for Schuylkill County:

ARC of Central PA

Serving Adams, Bedford, Blair, Centre, Clinton, Cumberland, Dauphin, Franklin, Fulton, Huntingdon, Juniata, Lancaster, Lebanon, Lycoming, Mifflin, Northumberland, Perry, Snyder, Tioga, Union and York Counties)

Chris Weidenhammer
1804 North Sixth Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102
(717) 234-3101
E-mail: Chris.Weidenhammer@redcross.org

For Schuylkill County:

ARC of Eastern PA

(Serving Berks, Bucks, Carbon, Chester, Delaware, Lackawanna, Lehigh, Luzerne, Monroe, Montgomery, Northampton, Pike, Schuylkill, Susquehanna, Wayne and Wyoming Counties)

Leo Pratte
2221 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia PA 19103

Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities with the capability to provide medical services.

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility / ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)

Assessment / Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, or drills. FEMA has determined that these capabilities have been enhanced and consistently demonstrated as adequate; therefore, offsite medical services drills need only be evaluated biennially. FEMA will, at the request of the involved ORO, continue to evaluate the drills on an annual basis. All hospitals listed in the plan as medical services hospitals must be evaluated, with a transportation provider, every 2 years. Additional transportation providers will be rotated through the drills in the 8-year exercise cycle. For ambulance providers who do not participate in an evaluated drill during the two year cycle, training will be provided. This training will be documented in the ALC.

Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts must not delay urgent medical care for the victim. OROs must demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities.

An ambulance must be used for response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended time, OROs may use any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) to transport the victim to the medical facility. It is allowable for an ambulance to demonstrate up to the point of departure for the medical facility and then have a non-specialized vehicle transport the "victim(s)" to the medical facility. This option is used in areas where removing an ambulance from service to drive a great distance (over an hour) for a drill would not be in the best interest of the community.

Normal communications between the ambulance / dispatcher and receiving medical facility must be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for transport to the medical facility, this communication must occur before releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting

radiation monitoring results, if available. In addition, the ambulance crew must demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for such information.

Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport or en route, or may be deferred to the medical facility. Contaminated injured individuals transported to medical facilities are monitored a soon as possible to assure that everyone (ambulance and medical facility) is aware of the medical and radiological status of the individual(s). However, if an ambulance defers monitoring to the medical facility, then the ambulance crew presumes that the patient(s) is contaminated and demonstrate appropriate contamination controls until the patient(s) is monitored. Before using the monitoring instruments, monitoring activities must be completed as they would be in an actual emergency. Appropriate contamination control measures must be demonstrated before and during transport and at the receiving medical facility.

The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Medical facilities are expected to have at least one trained physician and one trained nurse to perform and supervise treatment of contaminated injured individuals. Equipment and supplies must be available for treatment of contaminated injured individuals.

The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual, follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and maintain records of all survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures for collection and analysis of samples and decontamination of the individual must be demonstrated or described to the evaluator. Waste water from decontamination operations must be handled according to facility plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent of Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

NOTE: This sub-element was be evaluated at Good Samaritan Hospital – March 24, 2016, Hanover Hospital – June 23, 2016, Carlisle Regional Medical Center – May 24, 2016, and Gettysburg Hospital – October 12, 2016. Ephrata Hospital is an MS-1 Hospital for both TMI and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station and will demonstrate on October 18, 2017.

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
2017 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
ATTACHMENT A – DEMONSTRATION TABLES

I. Plume Phase Exercise

Activities – April 11, 2017

1. School Districts – Out-of-Sequence Exercise

Risk Public School Districts with schools located within the EPZ and those districts situated outside the EPZ, but with students living within the EPZ, will participate and be evaluated by the Department of Homeland Security. Each identified District Administration Office will be evaluated. When a school system is comprised of multiple buildings (High School, Middle School, Elementary School), the affected buildings (those with students from the EPZ) will be evaluated on a rotational basis to coincide with the eight-year exercise cycle.

Time: 9:00 – 11:00 A.M.

COUNTY	SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOL
Dauphin	Central Dauphin	Central Dauphin East High School Swatara Middle School Tri Community Elementary
	Derry Township	Hershey Intermediate Elementary Hershey Middle School
	Harrisburg	Harrisburg High School Scott School
	Lower Dauphin	Price School Lower Dauphin High School South Hanover Elementary School
	Middletown Area	Middletown Area High School
	Milton Hershey	Milton Hershey School
	Steelton-Highspire	Steelton-Highspire Elementary School
	Dauphin County Technical School	
Lancaster	Donegal	Donegal High School
	Elizabethtown Area	Elizabethtown Middle School East High Street Elementary School
Lebanon	Palmyra Area	Palmyra Middle School Lingle Avenue ES
York	Northeastern	Northeastern Middle School Spring Forge Intermediate Shallow Brook Intermediate

Schools Districts exercising at an alternative time

COUNTY	SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOL	EXERCISE DATE / TIME
York	Central York	Central York Middle School Hayshire Elementary School Roundtown Elementary School	March 7, 2017 Time 9:30 - 11:30 AM
	Dover Area	Dover Area Intermediate	March 7, 2017 Time 1:00 – 3:00 PM
	Eastern	Kreutz Creek Elementary	March 7, 2017 Time 9:30 - 11:30 AM
	Northern	Northern Middle School	March 7, 2017 Time 1:00 – 3:00 PM
	West Shore	Cedar Cliff High School New Cumberland Middle School Allen Middle School Highland Elementary School	March 7, 2017 Time 1:00 – 3:00 PM

Note: These schools will be exercising with exercise injects provided by the county via their EOC or from on-site distribution.

2. County Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) – Plume Phase Exercise (Exercise Window is expected to be 4 PM to 10:30 PM)

Personnel may pre-stage or should be in area awaiting activation.

COUNTY
Adams
Cumberland
Dauphin
Franklin
Lancaster
Lebanon
York
Schuylkill

Municipal Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) – Plume Phase Exercise
(Exercise Window is expected to be 4 PM to 10:30 PM)

Personnel may not pre-stage but should be in the area awaiting activation.

Note: **Bold** is federally evaluated, No Bold is PEMA observed.

RISK COUNTY	MUNICIPALITY
Cumberland	New Cumberland Borough
	Lower Allen Township
Dauphin	Conewago Township
	Derry Township
	Harrisburg City
	Highspire Borough
	Hummelstown Borough
	Londonderry Township
	Lower Paxton Township
	Lower Swatara Township
	Middletown Borough
	Paxtang Borough
	Royalton Borough
	South Hanover Township
	Steelton Borough
	Swatara Township
Lancaster	Conoy Township
	East Donegal Township^
	*Elizabethtown Borough / West Donegal Township/Mount Joy Township
Lebanon	**South Londonderry Township**
York	**Dover Township**
	Fairview Township
	Goldsboro Borough
	*Eastern York County EMA - Hellam Township
	*Newberry Regional EMA -Lewisberry Borough / Newberry Township/York Haven Borough
	***York United EMA –Manchester Township / Springettsbury Township**
	***Northeast Area - Mt. Wolf / E. Manchester / Manchester / Conewago**
	*Northern York EMA - Warrington Township

*Joint EOC ^New Facility

Back-up Route Alerting
Demonstration by one municipality in each risk county
(April 11, 2017 during Plume Phase Exercise)

BACKUP ROUTE ALERTING	
Cumberland	Lower Allen Township
Dauphin	Lower Paxton Township
Lancaster	East Donegal Township
Lebanon	South Londonderry Township
York	York United EMA

Traffic / Access Control Points

Each municipal / regional police force with a TCP assigned in its plan will demonstrate all preparation duties including TCP responsibilities and radiological briefing. Dispatch of persons to the TCP site will not occur during the exercise.

Municipal and county staffs will be prepared to brief the FEMA evaluator on actions to be taken should there be an impediment to evacuation on a designated route. This will be demonstrated during municipal evaluations the evening of April 11, 2017

MUNICIPAL / REGIONAL POLICE FORCES	
Cumberland	Lower Allen PD
Dauphin	Lower Paxton PD
Lancaster	Northwest Regional PD
Lebanon	South Londonderry Township PD
York	Springettsbury PD

Bureau of Radiation Protection

Evaluation of BRP field teams and Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle briefing and equipment check is scheduled to occur out-of-sequence in preparation for the Plume Phase Exercise.

This will be held at the South Central Regional Office.
Time: Out-of-Sequence 1:30 - 3:00 P.M.

Activities - April 12, 2017

Traffic / Access Control Points (Out-of-Sequence)
Time: 10:00 A.M. – 12:00 Noon

The Pennsylvania State Police will brief at the PSP Harrisburg Barracks located at 8000 Bretz Drive Harrisburg, PA 17112. Those attending the briefing will not deploy to ACP / TCP locations.

Reception Centers (Out-of-Sequence)
Time: 7:00 – 9:30 P.M.

COUNTY	Reception Center Location
Adams	**Exempted**
Cumberland	+Shippensburg University
Dauphin	#Williams Valley Jr/Sr HS - **April 8, 2017 0800**
Franklin	+Chambersburg Middle School South
Lancaster	Park City Mall
Lebanon	#Lebanon County Career and Tech Center
Schuylkill	+Blue Mountain HS
York	+Southern SD Complex

+ - Co-located Facility with Mass Care and Monitoring / Decontamination Centers
# - Co-located Facility with Monitoring / Decontamination Center

Public Monitoring / Decontamination Centers (Out-of-Sequence)
Time: 7:00 – 9:30 P.M.

COUNTY	Public Monitoring and Decontamination Location
Adams	**Exempted**
Cumberland	Shippensburg University
Dauphin	Williams Valley Jr/Sr HS – **April 8, 2017 - 0800**
Franklin	Chambersburg Middle School South
Lancaster	Hempfield High School
Lebanon	Lebanon County Career and Tech Center
Schuylkill	Blue Mountain High School
York	Southern SD Complex

Mass Care Centers (Out-of-Sequence)
Time: 7:00 – 9:30 P.M.

County	Mass Care Location
Adams	**Exempted**
Cumberland	Shippensburg University
Dauphin	Millersburg MS/HS
Franklin	Chambersburg Middle School South
Lancaster	Hempfield High School

Lebanon	Northern Lebanon Jr./Sr. High School
Schuylkill	Blue Mountain HS
York	Southern SD Complex

***Note:** The County will be exercising an unevaluated animal care component during the exercise.

Mass Care Centers (Facility Walk Down)

County	Location	Date
Dauphin	Upper Dauphin HS	2/8/2017
	Upper Dauphin MS/ES Complex	2/8/2017
	Enders-Fisherville ES	2/6/2017
Schuylkill	Schuylkill Haven HS	2/6/2017
	Pottsville Area MS	2/6/2017
	Blue Mountain MS	2/6/2017
	Pottsville Area HS	2/6/2017
	Penn State Schuylkill	2/6/2017
	Schuylkill Haven MS	2/6/2017

Emergency Worker Monitoring / Decontamination Stations (Out of Sequence)
Time: Out-of-Sequence 7:00 – 9:30 P.M.

County	Location
Cumberland	West Shore Bureau of Fire - Station #2 - Lemoyne
Dauphin	**Pass**
Lancaster	Marietta FD
Lebanon	Annville Fire Department
York	Monaghan Twp. Fire Department

II. Post Plume Exercise

Not Applicable for this Exercise. The Post-Plume Exercise was last conducted during the week of March 7, 2011 for the Commonwealth.

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
2017 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
ATTACHMENT B – LISTING OF PRIOR ISSUES

Previous Open Issues:

There are no open issues for this exercise.

COUNTY	NUMBER	FACILITY EVALUATED

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