



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

October 22, 1979

BBS Ltr #79-837

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Reportable Occurrence "Update Report" #79-033/03X-1, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office to supplement Licensee Event Report 79-033/03L-0 concerning the failure of 2C TIP machine to restart. It addresses the fact that the primary containment integrity was not violated because the reactor water temp. was below 212° F and the reactor mode switch was locked in shutdown for re-fueling. This event was reported to you under Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b).

B. B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:lbg

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

DUPLICATE

A002
5/11

7911090518

NOV 6 1979

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Update Report:

Previous Report Date: 5/25/79

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 While performing DOS 1600-7 primary containment isolation valve surveillance, 2C TIP machine failed to retract during Group 2 Isolation test. Since the reactor water temp. was below 212 degrees fahrenheit and the Rx mode switch was locked in shutdown for refueling, Primary containment integrity was not violated and the safety significance was minimal. The failure of the TIP system was the first of its kind.

0 9 SYSTEM CODE (11) S D CAUSE CODE (12) E CAUSE SUBCODE (13) X COMPONENT CODE (14) R E L A Y X COMP. SUBCODE (15) A VALVE SUBCODE (16) Z

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER (21) 7 9 (22) 0 3 3 (23) 0 3 (24) X (25) 1

ACTION TAKEN (33) X (34) Z (35) Z (36) Z (37) 0 0 0 0 (38) Y (39) N (40) N (41) G 0 8 0 (42) 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 When 2C TIP was inserted and the ball valve opened, one of the ball valve limit switches did not make-up, thereby deenergizing the 2C TIP machine control circuitry. The TIP detector was handcranked into its shield. The failure could not be duplicated on several attempts and the surveillance was successfully completed.

1 5 FACILITY STATUS (28) H (29) 0 0 0 (30) N/A (31) B (32) Containment Isolation Surveillance

1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT (33) Z (34) Z (35) NA (36) NA

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES (37) 0 0 0 (38) Z (39) NA

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES (40) 0 0 0 (41) NA

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (42) Z (43) NA

2 0 PUBLICITY (44) N (45) NA

NAME OF PREPARER Shafic Badran

PHONE: Dresden X-265/421

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 79-33/03X-1
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT (ILDRS 2)
DOCKET # 050-237

While performing DOS 1600-7, Primary Containment Isolation Valve Procedure, 2 C TIP Machine failed to retract during the group 2 Isolation portion of the test. As is required during a Group II isolation, any TIP not in the chamber shield is automatically transferred to Manual Reverse mode of operation. When the detector is In-Shield as indicated by the ball limit switch, the ball valve will close. The primary containment integrity was not violated because the reactor water temp. was below 212 degrees fahrenheit with the reactor mode switch locked in shutdown. The safety implications to this event were considered minimal because the unit was shutdown for refueling and in the shutdown mode of operation.

All TIP detectors had been inserted a small amount past the shield for the test. The ball valves opened as designed. However, one of the two ball valve limit switches for "C" TIP detector did not make-up and this de-energized the drive logic, as designed, so that the TIP detector could not be automatically or remote manually driven either forward or reverse, from the control room. The detector remained in its position and failed to withdraw when required via DOS 1600-7.

The TIP detector was handcranked back to the chamber shield to provide the required primary containment isolation. The ball valve limit switch was tested several times after this event, but the same incident could not be re-created.