




Commonwealth Edison  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R.R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450  
Telephone 815/942-2920

October 31, 1978

BBS Ltr. #78-1438

James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence "Update" Report 76-068/03X-1, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office to update the cause description and final corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence. This event was reported to your office under Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b), conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.

  
B.B. Stephenson  
Station Superintendent  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS/deb

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement  
Director of Management Information & Program Control  
File/NRC

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UPDATE REPORT:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 76-068/03X-1  
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)  
DRESDEN UNIT-2 (ILDRS-2)  
DOCKET #050-237

Following 50% core scram testing, CRD F-5 was found to uncouple and overtravel when withdrawn to position 48. An insertion to position 44 and subsequent withdrawal to position 48 showed the drive to be recoupled. A second scram and withdrawal to position 48 again uncoupled the drive. CRD F-5 was then inserted to position 00 and disarmed. The three symmetrical drives in the remaining quadrants were also fully inserted.

On 12/30/76, an on-site review determined that a loosened inner filter caused the blade and drive to uncouple at position 48. It was also determined that the loosened filter could not exert sufficient pressure to uncouple the blade except when the drive was fully withdrawn to position 48; upon insertion, the blade and drive automatically recoupled. Since the possibility of uncoupling the blade existed only when the drive was withdrawn to position 48, CRD F-5 was then declared operable. As a precautionary measure, an Operating Order was issued to ensure that a coupling check was performed whenever drive F-5 was withdrawn to position 48. Also, if a subsequent uncoupling occurred, immediate action was to be taken to ensure that the drive's status complied with Tech Spec section 3.3.B.1.

As mentioned above, symptom and performance evaluations indicated that a loosened inner filter had caused the blade and drive to uncouple at the fully withdrawn position. Loosening of the filter could have resulted from improper installation and latching spring fatigue.

On October 6, 1977 CRD F-5 was disassembled and inspected per Control Rod Drive Inspection and Maintenance Procedure DMP 209. To assure a comprehensive inspection a special operating procedure (SOP 216) was prepared and followed.

Upon inspection it was found that the inner filter was unlatched. In addition the distance between the CRD flange and the end of the fully seated uncoupling rod was abnormally long ( $173.406 + 0.375$  in.) The abnormal length, coupled with an unlatched inner filter, resulted in the uncoupling of the CRD.

CRD F-5 had been last overhauled in January, 1975. Since May, 1975 a 20 to 30 pound pull test on the inner filter has been incorporated in the overhaul and reassembly procedure. Control Rod Drives overhauled and reassembled under this revised procedure have not experienced uncoupling. The revised procedure, coupled with improved Quality Control Coverage of CRD overhaul and reassembly, are believed to be adequate to prevent future CRD uncoupling.