Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

November 2, 1978

BBS Ltr. #78-1444

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence "Update" Report 77-054/03X-1, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office to update the cause description and final corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence. This event was reported to your office under Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b), conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.

B.B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS/deb

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

7811160122

A002
S 1 1

NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

UPDATE REPORT:
PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 12/2/77

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	LICENSEE CODE	(2)	LICENSE NUMBER	(3)	LICENSE TYPE	(4)	CAT	(5)
0 1	I L D R S 2		0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0		4 1 1 1 1			

CON'T

0 1	REPORT SOURCE	(6)	DOCKET NUMBER	(7)	EVENT DATE	(8)	REPORT DATE	(9)
0 1	L		0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7		1 1 0 2 7 7		1 0 2 7 7 8	

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During Unit 2 refueling outage, control rod drive (CRD) H-5 overtraveled indicating
0 3 uncoupling during functional testing. It was recoupled and coupling verified in ac-
0 4 cordance with T.S.3.3.B.1. CRD uncoupling had minimal safety signficance since it
0 5 occurred only when the rod was withdrawn to position 48. This was the first uncoupling
0 6 of CRD H-5. Several other CRD's have uncoupled in the past. Reportable occurrences:
0 7 50-237/77-14, 15, 22 & 29; 50-237/76-68, 72.
0 8

0 9	SYSTEM CODE (11)	CAUSE CODE (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	COMPONENT CODE (14)	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	VALVE SUBCODE (16)
	R B	A	F	C R D R V E	Z	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
7 7	—	0 5 4	/	0 3	X	—	1

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
G	Z	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	Y	N	G 0 8 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 An unlatched inner filter and abnormally long uncoupling rod resulted in the uncoupling
1 1 of CRD H-5 during functional testing. Drive had been overhauled in Jan. 1975. A pull
1 2 test on the inner filter has now been incorporated in the overhaul and reassembly
1 3 procedure. Revised procedure and improved QA coverage believed to be adequate to
1 4 prevent future similar events.

1 5	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	H (28)	0 0 0 (29)	NA	B (31)	Functional Testing

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

7811160125

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N (44)	NA	

NAME OF PREPARER J. Wujciga PHONE: 465

GPO 917-926

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-054/03X-1
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET #050-237

During Unit 2 refueling outage, control rod drive (CRD) H-5 overtraveled indicating uncoupling when withdrawn to position 48 during functional testing. CRD H-5 was recoupled and coupling verified in accordance with the requirements of T.S.3.3.B.1. CRD uncoupling had minimal safety significance since it occurred only when the rod was withdrawn to position 48. This was the first uncoupling of CRD H-5. Five other CRD's had previously uncoupled since the 1975 Unit 2 refueling outage (reportable occurrences: 50-237/1977-14, 15, 22 & 29; 50-237/1976-68, 72).

On November 9, 1977 CRD H-5 was disassembled and inspected per Control Rod Drive Inspection and Maintenance Procedure DMP 209. To assure a comprehensive inspection a special operating procedure (SOP 216) was prepared and followed.

Upon inspection it was found that the inner filter was unlatched. In addition the distance between the CRD flange and the end of the fully seated uncoupling rod was abnormally long (173.406 + 0.562"). The abnormal length coupled with an unlatched inner filter resulted in the uncoupling of the CRD.

As part of the revised reassembly procedure, C.E.Co. Quality Control personnel performed the inner filter installation and the reduced 20-30 pound pull test. In Feb., 1978 the Control Rod Drive Inspection and Maintenance procedure DMP 209 was further changed to permit Maintenance Personnel to install the inner filter. This change occurred due to previously existing Management-Union work agreements. However, Quality Control Personnel will verify proper installation of the inner filter and continue to conduct the 20-30 pound pull test. The revised procedure coupled with improved Quality Control coverage of CRD overhaul and reassembly are believed to be adequate to prevent future similar events.