




Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

November 2, 1978

BBS Ltr. #78-1444

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence "Update" Report 77-054/03X-1, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office to update the cause description and final corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence. This event was reported to your office under Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b), conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.


B.B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS/deb

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

7811168122

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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REPORT SOURCE

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DOCKET NUMBER

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During Unit 2 refueling outage, control rod drive (CRD) H-5 overtraveled indicating
0 3 | uncoupling during functional testing. It was recoupled and coupling verified in ac-
0 4 | cordance with T.S.3.3.B.1. CRD uncoupling had minimal safety significance since it
0 5 | occurred only when the rod was withdrawn to position 48. This was the first uncoupling
0 6 | of CRD H-5. Several other CRD's have uncoupled in the past. Reportable occurrences:
0 7 | 50-237/77-14, 15, 22 & 29; 50-237/76-68, 72.

013		8		9		90	
SYSTEM CODE				CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE	
R B (11)				A (12)		F (13)	
COMP. SUBCODE				VALVE SUBCODE			
Z (15)				Z (16)			
COMPONENT CODE							
C R D R V E (14)							
SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.				OCCURRENCE CODE			
0 5 4				0 3			
REPORT TYPE				REVISION NO.			
X				1			
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SHUTDOWN METHOD		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	
7 7 (17)		7 7 (18)		Z (21)		Y (23)	
ACTION TAKEN		EFFECT ON PLANT		HOURS		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	
G (19)		Z (20)		0 0 0 0 (22)		N (25)	
FUTURE ACTION		SHUTDOWN METHOD		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	
Z (18)		Z (21)		G 0 8 0 (26)		Y (24)	
33		34		35		36	
37		38		39		40	
41		42		43		44	
45		46		47		48	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 An unlatched inner filter and abnormally long uncoupling rod resulted in the uncoupling
1 1 of CRD H-5 during functional testing. Drive had been overhauled in Jan. 1975. A pull
1 2 test on the inner filter has now been incorporated in the overhaul and reassembly
1 3 procedure. Revised procedure and improved QA coverage believed to be adequate to
1 4 prevent future similar events.

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
1	5	H	22	0	0	0	29	NA	30
ACTIVITY CONTENT		RELEASED OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE		31	
1	5	Z	33	Z	34	NA	35	NA	36
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION		39	
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	7811160125
PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION		41		40	
1	8	0	0	0	40	NA	41	40	
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION		43		42	
1	9	Z	42	NA	43	42		40	
PUBLICITY ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		45		44		45	
2	0	N	44	NA	45	44		45	

PHONE: _____ 465

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-054/03X-1
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET #050-237

During Unit 2 refueling outage, control rod drive (CRD) H-5 overtraveled indicating uncoupling when withdrawn to position 48 during functional testing. CRD H-5 was recoupled and coupling verified in accordance with the requirements of T.S.3.3.B.1. CRD uncoupling had minimal safety significance since it occurred only when the rod was withdrawn to position 48. This was the first uncoupling of CRD H-5. Five other CRD's had previously uncoupled since the 1975 Unit 2 refueling outage (reportable occurrences: 50-237/1977-14, 15, 22 & 29; 50-237/1976-68, 72).

On November 9, 1977 CRD H-5 was disassembled and inspected per Control Rod Drive Inspection and Maintenance Procedure DMP 209. To assure a comprehensive inspection a special operating procedure (SOP 216) was prepared and followed.

Upon inspection it was found that the inner filter was unlatched. In addition the distance between the CRD flange and the end of the fully seated uncoupling rod was abnormally long ($173.406 + 0.562$ "). The abnormal length coupled with an unlatched inner filter resulted in the uncoupling of the CRD.

As part of the revised reassembly procedure, C.E.Co. Quality Control personnel performed the inner filter installation and the reduced 20-30 pound pull test. In Feb., 1978 the Control Rod Drive Inspection and Maintenance procedure DMP 209 was further changed to permit Maintenance Personnel to install the inner filter. This change occurred due to previously existing Management-Union work agreements. However, Quality Control Personnel will verify proper installation of the inner filter and continue to conduct the 20-30 pound pull test. The revised procedure coupled with improved Quality Control coverage of CRD overhaul and reassembly are believed to be adequate to prevent future similar events.