



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

November 2, 1978

BBS Ltr. #78-1441

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence "Update" Report 77-029/03X1, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office to update the cause description and final corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence. This event was reported to your office under Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b), conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.

B.B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS/deb

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

7811/40203

A002
3/11

UPDATE REPORT:
PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 9/1/77

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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REPORT SOURCE

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60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 66 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

02 During one-half core scram testing, CRD's F-5 & H-7 uncoupled when withdrawn to po-
03 sition 48. Event has little safety significance since uncoupling occurred only at
04 pos. 48 and CRD's retain capability to scram as before uncoupling. Event occurred
05 previously with CRD F-5 as ref in R.O. 50-237/1976-68. CRD's F-5 & H-7 were recoupled
06 according to procedure and recoupling verified by observing no overtravel indication
07 when each CRD was twice withdrawn to position 48.

02		789		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE						COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE			
09				R B		A		F		C R D R V E						Z		Z			
78				910		11		12		13		1418						15		1620	
				EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.									
17		LER:RO REPORT NUMBER		77		029		03		X		1									
21		22		23		24		26		27		28		29		30		31			
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER					
G		Z		Z		Z		0000		Y		Y		N		G080					
33		34		25		36		37		41		42		43		44		47			
18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26					

1 0 An unlatched inner filter and abnormally long uncoupling rod resulted in the un-

1 1 coupling of CRD F-5 and H-7. Drives had been overhauled in Jan. 1975. A pull test

1 2 on inner filter has now been incorporated in the overhaul and reassembly procedure.

1 3 Revised procedure and improved QA coverage believed adequate to prevent future CRD

1 4 uncouplings.

FACILITY STATUS										% POWER										OTHER STATUS										METHOD OF DISCOVERY										DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION									
1	5	E	23	0	6	6	29	NA										B	31	Surveillance Testing																													
ACTIVITY										CONTENT										AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY										LOCATION OF RELEASE																			
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA										NA																																	
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										TYPE										DESCRIPTION																													
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA										7811140203																															
PERSONNEL INJURIES										TYPE										DESCRIPTION																													
1	2	0	0	0	40	NA																																											
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY										TYPE										DESCRIPTION																													
1	3	Z	42	NA																																													
PUBLICITY										TYPE										DESCRIPTION																													
2	0	N	44	NA																																													
ISSUED										DESCRIPTION										NRC USE ONLY																													
2	0																																																

PHONE: X265

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-029/03X-1
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET #050-237-

During routine one-half core scram testing, control rod drives (CRD's) F-5 & H-7 uncoupled and overtraveled when withdrawn to position 48 following testing. This event has little safety significance since uncoupled CRD's still retain the same capability to scram as before uncoupling and uncoupling only occurs at position 48. This event had occurred previously with CRD F-5 on December 12, 1976 (Reportable Occurrence #50-237/1976-68). CRD's F-5 & H-7 were recoupled according to procedure and recoupling verified by observing no overtravel indication when each CRD was twice withdrawn to position 48.

On October 6, 1977 and September 30, 1977 CRDs F-5 and H-7 were disassembled and inspected per control rod drive inspection and maintenance procedure DMP 209. To assure a comprehensive inspection a special operating procedure (SOP 216) was prepared and followed.

Upon inspection it was found that in both cases the inner filter was unlatched. In addition the distance between the CRD flange and the end of the fully seated uncoupling rod on both rods was abnormally long (173.406 + 0.562). The abnormal length coupled with an unlatched inner filter resulted in the uncoupling of the CRD's during normal operating conditions.

As part of the reassembly procedure, C.E.Co. Quality Control personnel performed the inner filter installation and the required 20-30 pound pull test. In Feb., 1978 the Control Rod Drive Inspection and maintenance procedure DMP 209 was changed to permit maintenance personnel to install the inner filter. This change occurred due to existing Management-Union work agreements. However, Quality Control personnel will verify proper installation of the inner filter and continue to conduct the 20-30 pound pull test. The revised procedure coupled with improved Quality Control coverage of CRD overhaul and reassembly are believed to be adequate to prevent future CRD uncouplings.