



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
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October 27, 1978

BBS Ltr. #78-1447

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence "Update" Report 77-015/03X-1, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office to update the cause description and final corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence. This event was reported to your office under Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b), conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.

B.B. Stephenson
Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS/de5

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

NAME OF PREPARER J. Wujciga PHONE: X265

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-015/03X-1
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET #050-237

During routine start-up operations, control rod drive (CRD) L-5 was found to uncouple and overtravel when withdrawn to position 48. L-5 was immediately inserted and electrically disarmed. Reactor start-up operations were resumed after it had been determined that the position and core location of the L-5 control rod did not adversely affect core symmetry. At a reactor power level of approximately 30%, L-5 was withdrawn to position 48 and checked for overtravel. The overtravel check proved satisfactory, verifying that CRD L-5 was recoupled and operable. Control rod drive/blade uncoupling incidents had occurred several times in the past.

Symptom and performance evaluations indicated that a loosened CRD inner filter could have caused the blade and drive to uncouple at the fully withdrawn position. Loosening of the filter could have resulted from a combination of improper installation and latching spring fatigue. It was also determined that a loosened filter could not exert sufficient pressure to uncouple the blade except when the drive was fully withdrawn to position 48; upon insertion, the blade and drive automatically recoupled. Because the potential for uncoupling the blade existed only when the drive was fully withdrawn, the safety implications of this event were minimal.

As a precautionary measure, an operating order was issued to ensure that a coupling check was performed whenever drive L-5 was withdrawn to position 48.

On November 30, 1977 CRD L-5 was disassembled and inspected per Control Rod Drive Inspection and Maintenance Procedure DMP 209. To assure a comprehensive inspection a special operating procedure (SOP 216) was prepared and followed.

Upon inspection it was found that the inner filter was unlatched. In addition the distance between the CRD flange and the end of the fully seated uncoupling rod was abnormally long ($173.406 + 0.750$ "). The abnormal length coupled with an unlatched inner filter resulted in the uncoupling of the CRD.

CRD L-5 had been overhauled in January, 1975. Since May, 1975 a 20 to 30 pound pull test on the inner filter has been incorporated in the overhaul and reassembly procedure. Control Rod Drives overhauled and reassembled under this revised procedure have not experienced uncoupling. The revised procedure coupled with improved Quality Control coverage of CRD overhaul and reassembly are believed to be adequate to prevent future similar events.