June 2, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18
NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

Subject: Commitments for Resolution of Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Part 21 Issues

On May 21, 2017, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) determined that continued operation of LaSalle County Station (LSCS), Units 1 and 2, was supported based upon the operability determination detailed in Operability Evaluation 17-002 regarding the Anchor Darling Double Disk Gate Valves. It was concluded that the fifteen (15) safety-related valves included in the Motor Operated Valve Program would not experience a similar failure as the stem-disc separation of the HPCS Injection Isolation Valve, 2E22-F004. Valve disassembly and inspection of the Unit 2 HPCS injection isolation valve revealed the wedge pin to be sheared and the valve stem threads damaged, causing the stem to separate from the valve disc.

Details of the damage, cause evaluation, and planned repairs were discussed with the NRC during a conference call on May 25, 2017. During this call, EGC discussed planned actions to resolve the Anchor Darling Double Disc Valve Part 21 issues following completion of repairs and associated testing. Specific commitments were discussed with the NRC to address the efficacy of the repairs. The regulatory commitments contained in this letter are summarized in the attached table.

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Guy V. Ford Jr., at (815) 415-2800.

Respectfully,

William J. Trafton
Site Vice President – LaSalle County Station
Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Attachment: Summary of Regulatory Commitments

cc: Regional Administrator – NRC Region III
    NRC Senior Resident Inspector – LaSalle County Station
ATTACHMENT
Summary of Regulatory Commitments

The following table identifies commitments made by EGC. EGC discussed these commitments with the NRC during a conference call on May 25, 2017.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMITMENT</th>
<th>COMMITTED DATE OR OUTAGE</th>
<th>COMMITMENT TYPE</th>
<th>ONE-TIME ACTION (Yes/No)</th>
<th>PROGRAMMATIC ACTION (Yes/No)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EGC will not perform any unnecessary work on Unit 1 Automatic Depressurization System, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, Residual Heat Removal, and Low Pressure Core Spray systems other than required predefines, surveillance testing, and corrective maintenance.</td>
<td>During the remainder of Unit 1 Cycle 17 operation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EGC will replace the Part 21 applicable parts of the Unit 1 HPCS injection valve 1E22-F004, if Mode 4 is entered.</td>
<td>Forced Outage or L1R17*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGC will replace the Part 21 applicable parts of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 susceptible Part 21 valves in the next refueling outage for each unit.</td>
<td>L1R17* and L2R17*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGC will perform as-found diagnostics on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 susceptible Part 21 valves during the next refueling outage for each unit.</td>
<td>L1R17* and L2R17*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGC will retain relevant parts replaced when Unit 1 and Unit 2 susceptible Part 21 valves are internally inspected. These parts will be kept for a minimum of six months to allow sufficient time for any required failure analysis to be completed.</td>
<td>Six months following completion of L1R17* and L2R17*, respectively</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: L1R17 is scheduled to commence in February 2018, and L2R17 is scheduled to commence in February 2019.*