



February 23, 2017
RC-17-0009

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir/ Madam:

Subject: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS), UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-395
OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12
CANCELLATION OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 2016-005-00
STEAM PROPAGATION BARRIER DEGRADED DUE TO REMOVAL OF
VENTILATION DUCT ACCESS PANEL FOR SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

Reference 1. Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS), Unit 1 letter to NRC, "Licensee Event Report (LER 2016-005-00), Steam Propagation Barrier Degraded Due to Removal of Ventilation Duct Access Panel for Surveillance Activities."
ADAMS Accession ML16340B359

Reference 2. Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS), Unit 1 letter to NRC, "Licensee Event Report (LER 2016-003-00), Steam Propagation Door Discovered Propped Open." ADAMS Accession ML16319A400

This letter constitutes notification to the NRC of the cancellation of the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) LER 2016-005-00 (Reference 1). The cancellation is consistent with the guidance in "NUREG-1022, Rev 3. Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73", section 5.1.2.

This event was originally considered reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)&(D) as any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

As discussed in Reference 2, LER-2016-003 documented a steam propagation door (DRIB/107) to the Chiller Room for XHX0001C-VU that was propped open on September 13, 2016 without compensatory actions.

As part of the extent of condition evaluation, the station discovered an additional degradation to the steam propagation barriers. Ventilation access panels were found with missing fasteners. While investigating this, on or about October 4, 2016, it was discovered that access panels were removed periodically to conduct surveillance activities, while the plant was at power. Removal of these panels could have resulted in steam entering Environmental Qualification (EQ) mild areas during a postulated high energy line break (HELB). The station reported the event under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)&(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment

of a safety function. The station has since completed an evaluation of the Battery/Battery Charger Rooms, Speed Switchgear Rooms, and the Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms.

The limiting condition involves the removal of a Battery/Chiller Area HVAC exhaust duct fire damper inspection panel. The limiting scenario occurs when the off-service Battery Fan Train is not isolated during the inspections. This system alignment provides a direct path from the IB Harsh Area into the Battery Area. However, even for this limiting scenario, environmental conditions in the Battery Charging Rooms remain close to those experienced during normal operation (i.e., ~85°F, 85% relative humidity), and Battery Room conditions reach ~104°F and 100% relative humidity.


Additionally, environmental conditions in the Battery/Charger, Chiller/Pump, Speed Switchgear and Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms would not have been expected to impact equipment operability.

In summary, a HELB event postulated to occur during the times when fire damper inspection panels were removed would have had a minimal impact on the environmental conditions in the affected rooms. A HELB event would not have impacted the functionality of equipment in the Battery/Battery Charger Rooms, the Chiller Area Rooms, Speed Switchgear Rooms, or the Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms.

Based on the determination that no loss of safety function existed, VCSNS is cancelling LER-2016-005-00.

Should you have any questions, please call Mr. Bruce Thompson at (803) 931 5042.

Very truly yours,



George A. Lippard

BAB/GAL/rp

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