

AGENDA

Title: **JOINT MEETING OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) (Public Meeting)**

Scheduled: **February 23, 2017**
9:30 am – 12:00 pm - Public Meeting

Duration: **Approx. 2.5 hours**

Location: **NRC Headquarters**
One White Flint North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738

Participants:

FERC Chairman and Commissioners:
Acting Chairman Cheryl A. LaFleur
Commissioner Colette D. Honorable

NRC Chairman and Commissioners:
Chairman Kristine L. Svinicki
Commissioner Jeff Baran
Commissioner Stephen G. Burns

FERC Staff

David Huff, Electrical Engineer, Office of Electric Reliability

Christopher MacFarlane, Attorney-Adviser, Office of General Counsel,
Office of General and Administrative Law

Daniel Phillips, Energy Industry Analyst, Office of Electric Reliability

NERC Staff

Mark Lauby, Senior Vice President and Chief Reliability Officer

NRC Staff

Bill Dean, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

James Andersen, Director, Cyber Security Directorate, Office of Nuclear
Security and Incident Response

| <u>Topics</u> | <u>Presentation</u> |
|--|-----------------------|
| Introductions and Opening Statements | 5 mins. |
| <u>Grid Reliability, Protection of Critical Infrastructure Information & Nuclear Power Plants</u> | 1 hr. 40 mins* |
| NERC Mark Lauby , Senior Vice President and Chief Reliability Officer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State of Reliability | 10 mins.* |
| Q&A | 15 mins. |
| FERC David Huff , Electrical Engineer, Office of Electric Reliability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System Restoration and Recovery Plans Report | 25 mins.* |
| Christopher MacFarlane , Attorney-Adviser, Office of General Counsel, Office of General and Administrative Law <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAST ACT – Critical Energy/Electric Infrastructure Information (CEII) | |
| Q&A | 15 mins. |
| NRC Bill Dean , Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nuclear power plant operations: outlook and output • FLEX implementation status | 20 mins.* |
| Q&A | 15 mins.* |
| Break | 5 mins. |
| <u>Cyber Security Regulation</u> | 35 mins.* |
| FERC Daniel Phillips , Energy Industry Analyst, Office of Electric Reliability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changes being considered to the “Critical Infrastructure Protection Standards” | 10 mins.* |
| NRC James Andersen , Director, Cyber Security Directorate, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status of NRC Licensees’ implementation of the Cybersecurity Plans | 10 mins.* |
| Q&A | 15 mins.* |

Discussion – Wrap-Up

5 mins.

*For presentations only and does not include time for Q & A's

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
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY CORPORATION

2016 State of Reliability

Summary of Findings

Mark Lauby, Senior Vice President and Chief Reliability Officer
NERC and FERC Joint Commission Meeting
February 23, 2017

RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY



- **Reduced Protection System Misoperations**

- Total misoperation rate (CY14 to CY15) - 10.4% to 9.4%
- Early 2017 SOR results indicate further improvement in CY16

- **Recommendation**

- Target the top three causes of misoperations
- Focus on education on instantaneous ground overcurrent protection and relay system commissioning tests


- **Aggressive CY17 target(s)**

- Threshold – less than 9%
- (Stretch) Target – less than 8%

- **Improved Severity Risk Index (SRI) - resiliency to severe weather**
 - No 2015 SRI days in the Top 10 (Winter 2014 has two days in the Top 10)
 - Extreme winter weather similar to 2014 in parts of the Eastern Interconnection (see 2015 Winter Review Report)¹
- **Recommendation**
 - Consider performing daily SRI calculations on a Regional basis
 - Investigate the feasibility of correlating performance with weather data


¹http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/ColdWeatherTrainingMaterials/2015_Winter_Review_December_2015_FINAL.pdf

BPS Resiliency to Severe Weather Improved



NERC Annual Daily Severity Risk Index (SRI) Sorted Descending

Risk Profile of Transmission Events



- | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Misoperation 1 | Lightning 7 |
| Failed ac Substation Equipment 2 | Other 8 |
| Power System Condition 3 | Failed AC Circuit Equipment 9 |
| Human Error 4 | Combined Smaller ICC Groups 10 |
| Fire 5 | Weather, Excluding Lightning 11 |
| Contamination 6 | Unknown 12 |
| | Foreign Interference 13 |

- **Reduction in human error initiated outages**

- Automatic Alternating Current (AC) Circuit Outages initiated by Human Error
 - 2015 = 0.028 per circuit
 - 2014 = 0.039 per circuit
 - 2013 = 0.047 per circuit

- **Recommendation**

- Continue HP training and education focus

- **Enhanced CY17 activity**

- NERC and North American Transmission Forum (NATF) to co-sponsor Sixth Annual HP Conference

- **Event Analysis**

- No Category 4 or 5 events
- Only one Category 3 event
- Reduction in total events of Category 2 or higher
- Published 16 Lessons Learned
- Significant number of registered entities that contribute to lessons learned

Key Finding #5: Modeling Improvements

- **Modeling improvements - improved blackout risk assessments**
 - Supports accurate assessment of blackout risk and other threats
 - Deploy of synchrophasor technology for dynamic model verification
 - Develop load models for dynamic studies, such as fault induced delayed voltage recovery (FIDVR)
- **Recommendation**
 - Improve system models using synchrophasors and other technologies

Key Finding #6: Essential Reliability Services (ERS)

- **ERS – Frequency Response (FR)**
 - Eastern Interconnection – Increasing trend but continued withdrawal²
 - Western Interconnection – Inconclusive; Insufficient candidate events
 - ERCOT Interconnection – Increasing trend
 - Québec Interconnection – Slight decreasing trend
- **Measure frequency response with changing resource mix**
- **Monitor the size of resources providing frequency response**

²Withdrawal of primary frequency response is an undesirable characteristic associated with certain generator control systems that negate the primary frequency response prematurely

- **ERS – Voltage Support**

- Impacts of a changing resource mix on voltage support
- Increase in reactive-only generators for voltage support
- Retirement of conventional generators
- Increase in variable energy resources

- **Recommendations**


- Monitor generator reliability that provide voltage support, including low voltage ride-through
- Work with North American Generator Forum (NAGF) to monitor and improve ERS

- **BPS cyber and physical security events**
 - No load loss due to reported cyber security events
 - One physical attack that resulted in loss of approximately 20 MW
 - Increase in global cyber security vulnerabilities and incidents
 - Increase in reportable physical security events
- **Strengthen situational awareness for cyber and physical security**
- **Providing timely and coordinated information to industry**

- Instances of protection system misoperations have decreased
 - Remains a key focus area for improvement
- Improved BPS resiliency to severe weather
 - Weather has biggest impact on grid
- Human error has decreased
 - Industry focus on Human Performance (HP) showing dividends
- No Category 4 or 5 events in 2015
 - Event severity reduced in 2015
- Frequency and voltage remained stable
 - ERS managed during resource changes
- Physical and cyber security maintained under increasing threats
 - Constant vigilance required in both areas

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Questions and Answers



Nuclear Power Plants Operations: Outlook and Output and FLEX Implementation Status

NRC/FERC Joint Commission Meeting
February 23, 2017



Agenda

- William Dean, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- Nuclear Power Plants Operations: Outlook and Outputs and
- FLEX Implementation Status

Nuclear Safety Enhanced by Interagency Agreements


- NRC staff share information with FERC and NERC related to ongoing issues and activities associated with
 - Grid Reliability, Cyber & Physical Security, Dam Safety
- Formal Agreement between the NRC, FERC and NERC to facilitate this goal.
 - Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
 - Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

Current Fleet of Operating Reactors

- 99 Commercial Power Reactors in Operation
- 309,207 MWt (~100,000 MWe)
- 87 Reactors with Renewed Licenses
- 4 Upgrades Under Review/9 Expected

Nuclear Industry 15-Year Performance Trend

Number of Scrams per Year




License Renewal Regulation and Review Process Ensure Plant Safety

- Regulations ensure that passive components perform intended functions.
- License renewal application review:
 - Safety and Environmental Reviews
 - Audit and Inspection Activities
- Reviews and the Reactor Oversight Process ensure plant safety of active and passive components.

Majority of Operating Nuclear Power Reactor Licenses Renewed


License Renewals Granted for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors



Licensed to Operate (99)

🔴 Original License (15) 🟡 License Renewal Granted (84)

Projected Electric Capacity Dependent on License Renewals



As of January 2017

Existing Fleet Approaching 60 Years of Operation

- As of December 2016, 45 units in operation more than 40 years
- Plants will reach 60 years of operation as early as 2029
- If nuclear fleet retires at 60 years, all but two units offline by mid 2053

Significant Progress Preparing for Subsequent License Renewal (SLR)

- Final SLR guidance to be issued 2017
- 1st SLR application in mid-2018
- 2nd SLR application in early 2019
- Ongoing progress to resolve technical issues and implement resolutions.
 - Vessel neutron embrittlement
 - Degradation of vessel internals
 - Concrete degradation
 - Cable aging


Some Factors Affecting the Potential for SLR Applications

- Low-cost of natural gas
- Subsidized wind and solar power
- Clean air subsidies
- Regulated versus deregulated markets
- Requirements imposed by the States

Some Factors Affecting the Potential for SLR Applications

- Location could impact transmission capability
- Number of units
 - Lower unit cost with more units
- Costs to repair/replace major equipment

SLR Applications Expected



Source: NEI 2016

Recent Power Reactors Decommissioning


| Reactor Name | Last year of Operation | Power Output (Mwe) |
|-------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Crystal River 3 - S | 2009 | 860 |
| San Onofre 2 - D | 2012 | 1070 |
| San Onofre 3 - D | 2012 | 1080 |
| Kewaunee - S | 2014 | 566 |
| Vermont Yankee - S | 2014 | 635 |
| Fort Calhoun - S | 2016 | 482 |
| Palisades - P | 2018 | 778 |
| Pilgrim - P | 2019 | 680 |
| Oyster Creek - P | 2019 | 636 |
| Indian Point 2 & 3 - P | 2020 and 2021 | 1020 |
| Diablo Canyon 1 & 2 - P | 2024 and 2025 | 1120 |
| S = SAFSTOR | D = DECON | P = Planned |

Safety Ensured Prior to and During Decommissioning Activities

- NRC continues to ensure safety during the entire decommissioning process
 - Timely reviews of license amendment requests and exemptions
 - Lessons-learned report was issued on October 28, 2016 (ML16085A029)
 - Development of decommissioning rulemaking

Post-Fukushima Safety Enhancements Nearly Complete


- U.S. reactor safety has been enhanced
- FLEX implementation complete at majority of sites
- Draft Final Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events Rule submitted to Commission




Impact of FLEX on the Regulatory Process

- MS/FLEX could provide added safety enhancement beyond the intended use
- NRC team evaluating credit for MS in RIDM
 - Evaluating areas of potential credit
 - Monitoring ongoing applications
- Updating Guidance (when needed)
- Communication

New Reactor Licensing in the U.S.




**ABWR –
1,300 MWe**




**ESBWR –
1,500 MWe**




**AP1000 –
1,110 Mwe**



**US APWR –
1,700 MWe**



**APR1400 –
1,450 MWe**



**NuScale
50 MWe/module**


Four New Reactors Under Construction

| Unit | Power Generation Output (MWe) | Operation |
|------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|
| Vogtle Unit 3 | 1,110 | June 2019* |
| Vogtle Unit 4 | 1,110 | June 2020* |
| VC Summer Unit 2 | 1,110 | April 2020** |
| VC Summer Unit 3 | 1,110 | December 2020** |

*Based on Securities and Exchange Commission filing.

**Based on SCANA press release dated 2/14/17

Eleven Licenses for Light Water Reactors Issued



January 2017

Staff Beginning to Review Small Modular Reactors

- NuScale submitted an application for design certification January 6, 2017.
- NRC docketed an application from TVA for an ESP for two or more SMR modules (up to 800 MWe) at the Clinch River site in December 2016.
- UAMPS plans to apply for a combined license referencing the NuScale design.

Extensive Interest in Advanced Reactor Designs

- Vision and Strategy for non-light water reactor readiness issued.
- Near term implementation action plans issued
- Anticipated applications
 - Pre-application interactions have started
 - Application(s) expected in the next 2 to 4 years

Acronyms

- CDBI – Component Design Basis Inspection
- ESP – Early Site Permit
- FERC – Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
- FLEX – Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies
- IMC – NRC Inspection Manual Chapter
- MS – Mitigating Systems
- NERC – North American Electric Reliability Corporation
- PI&R – Problem Identification and Resolution

Acronyms

- RIDM – Risk-Informed Decision Making
- ROP – Reactor Oversight Process
- SLR – Subsequent License Renewal
- SMR – Small Modular Reactor
- TVA – Tennessee Valley Authority
- UAMPS – Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Washington D.C.



Report on the FERC-NERC-Regional Entity Joint Review of Restoration and Recovery Plans

**Dave Huff
Electrical Engineer
Office of Electric Reliability
February 23, 2017**

2/16/2017

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Disclaimer

This report was prepared by the staff of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in consultation with staff from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation and its Regional Entities. This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.



Objective

- To assess and verify the electric utility industry's bulk power system recovery and restoration planning, and to test the efficacy of related Reliability Standards in maintaining and advancing reliability in that respect.



Joint Staff Review Team Process

- Reviewed plans from representative sample of nine registered entities with significant bulk power system responsibilities
 - Step 1: Gained understanding of plans
 - Step 2: Identified strengths and shortcomings
 - Step 3: Performed assessment of relevant Standards (using results from Steps 1 and 2)
 - Step 4: Formed recommendations to improve reliability



Standards Assessed

- EOP-005-2 - System Restoration from Blackstart Resources
- CIP-008-3 - Cyber Security - Incident Reporting and Response Planning
- CIP-009-3 - Cyber Security - Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets



Findings

- Participants had thorough and highly-detailed system restoration plans
- Participants had extensive cyber security response and recovery plans covering majority of the response and recovery stages



Recommended Changes, Including Considering Standards Changes

- Address restoration plan re-verification, when a system change precipitates need to ensure that the plan steps when implemented, will operate reliably.
- Address restoration plan updating for *all* system modifications that would change plan implementation for an extended period of time.
- Address the transition of operation to Balancing Authority in system restoration training.



Recommended Changes, Including Considering Standards Changes

- Address cyber security response and recovery plan designation of accountability at the cyber asset level.
- Address in response plans, details on types of cyber security events that trigger response.
- Address use of advanced tools and cyber security expertise for cyber event monitoring and response.
- Address inventory assumptions risk in critical cyber asset recovery plans.




Recommended Joint Follow-on Studies

- Planning restoration with loss of SCADA
- Recent blackstart resource changes
- Use of DC facilities in system restoration
- Blackstart testing under anticipated conditions
- Response and recovery plan updating following testing or actual cyber events



FERC-NERC-Regional Entity Joint Review of Restoration and Recovery Plans



[http://www.ferc.gov/media/
news-releases/2016/2016-
1/01-29-16.asp](http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2016/2016-1/01-29-16.asp)

Contact: David Huff
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Division of Compliance
301-665-1603
david.huff@ferc.gov

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Washington D.C.



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Critical Energy/ Electric
Infrastructure Information
(CEII)
Regulations

Christopher MacFarlane
Office of General Counsel
February 23, 2017



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Critical Energy Infrastructure Information Regulations

- Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Commission took steps to protect information that it considered Critical Energy Infrastructure Information.
- On February 21, 2003, FERC issued a final rule amending its regulations to establish a procedures for protecting and accessing Critical Energy Infrastructure Information.



Definition of Critical Energy Infrastructure Information

- Critical Energy Infrastructure Information is defined, by Commission regulation, as specific engineering, vulnerability, or detailed design information about critical infrastructure that:
 - (i) Relates details about the production, generation, transportation, transmission, or distribution of energy;
 - (ii) Could be useful to a person in planning an attack on critical infrastructure;
 - (iii) Is exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552; and
 - (iv) Does not simply give the general location of the critical infrastructure.



The FAST Act

- On December 4, 2015, the President signed the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act into law. The FAST Act added section 215A to the Federal Power Act (FPA) to improve the security and resilience of energy infrastructure in the face of emergencies.
- FPA section 215A(d)(2) required the Commission to promulgate such regulations as necessary to:
 - Establish criteria and procedures to designate information as CEII;
 - Prohibit unauthorized disclosure of CEII;
 - Establish sanctions for employees and certain other individuals who knowingly and willfully make unauthorized disclosures; and
 - Facilitate voluntary sharing of CEII among federal, state, political subdivision and tribal authorities; the ERO; regional entities; owners, operators and users of critical electric infrastructure; and other entities deemed appropriate by the Commission.



Order No. 833

- On November 17, 2016, FERC issued Order No. 833, which amends its CEII Regulations to:
 - Implement the provisions of the FAST Act that pertain to the designation, protection and sharing of CEII; and
 - Integrate the existing Critical Energy Infrastructure Information program with the new requirements of the FAST Act.
- The rule became effective on February 21, 2017.



Critical Electric Infrastructure Information

- Section 215A(a)(3) of the FAST Act defines Critical Electric Infrastructure Information to mean:

[I]nformation related to critical electric infrastructure, or proposed critical electrical infrastructure, generated by or provided to the Commission or other Federal agency other than classified national security information, that is designated as critical electric infrastructure information by the Commission or the Secretary of the Department of Energy pursuant to subsection (d). Such term includes information that qualifies as critical energy infrastructure information under the Commission's regulations.

- Pursuant to section 215A(d)(1) of the FPA: Critical Electric Infrastructure Information is: Exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 and exempt from State Sunshine Laws.



Designating CEII

- FAST Act specifically authorizes FERC and the Department of Energy to designate information as CEII.
- In Order 833, the Commission recognized that other Federal agencies may possess infrastructure information. As such, section 388.113(a), states that:

Nothing in this section limits the ability of any other Federal agency to take all necessary steps to protect information within its custody or control that is necessary to ensure the safety and security of the electric grid. To the extent necessary, such agency may consult with the CEII Coordinator regarding the treatment or designation of such information.



Revised CEII Regulations: Designation of CEII

- Among other revisions, the new CEII regulations provide:
 - Procedures for the public to request CEII treatment of a submission and for the designation of Commission generated documents.
 - The process for the removal of a CEII designation including the notification requirements for documents submitted to the Commission.
 - The administrative appeals process available to challenge CEII designations or disclosures.



Revised CEII Regulations: Accessing CEII

- Additionally, FERC's revised CEII regulations :
 - Detail the process for the public to request access to CEII by submitting a detailed statement of need and executing a non-disclosure agreement.
 - Provide the procedures that implement the FAST Act's provision regarding FERC facilitating voluntary sharing of CEII.
 - Clarified the processes for sharing CEII with certain entities such as owner operators of facilities and Federal Agencies.



Revised CEII Regulations: Duty to Protect CEII

- In addition, the revised CEII regulations include:
 - A duty to protect CEII, which regard among other things, minimum requirements for CEII non-disclosure agreements.
 - Sanctions applicable to officers, employees, or agents of FERC who knowingly and willfully disclose CEII in an unauthorized manner.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Washington D.C.



Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards Update

Daniel Phillips
Energy Industry Analyst
Office of Electric Reliability
February 23, 2017

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2/16/2017

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Recent FERC Orders

In 2016, the Commission issued two Final Rules directing Modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards and the Creation of a new Supply Chain Risk Management Reliability Standard

- Order No. 822
- Order No. 829



FERC Order No. 822

In FERC Order No. 822 the Commission approved revisions to the CIP Reliability Standards and directed NERC to:

1. develop modifications to address the protection of transient electronic devices used at Low Impact BES Cyber Systems
2. develop modifications to require protections for communication network components and data communicated between all bulk electric system Control Centers
3. develop modifications to its definition for Low Impact External Routable Connectivity



FERC Order No. 829

In FERC Order No. 829, the Commission adopted its NOPR proposal and directed NERC to develop a Reliability Standard to address supply chain risk management for industrial control system hardware, software and computing and networking services

1. Software Integrity and Authenticity
2. Vendor Remote Access
3. Information System Planning
4. Vendor Risk Management & Procurement



Industry Progress to Meet FERC Directives

NERC is currently facilitating two Standards Drafting Teams to meet the FERC directives

- CIP Standard Drafting Team intends to file proposed modifications to meet the LERC definition and Transient Device directives by March 31, 2017
- SCRM Standard Drafting Team has balloted an initial proposal to address the Order No. 829 directives in a new Reliability Standard and intends to file its response on or before July 31, 2017



Questions?



Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Washington D.C.



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REGULATORY COMMISSION**

Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards Update

Daniel Phillips
Energy Industry Analyst
Office of Electric Reliability
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
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Questions?





Status of NRC Licensees' Implementation of Cyber Security Plans

NRC/FERC Joint Commission Meeting
February 23, 2017



Agenda

- James Andersen, Director, Division of Physical & Cyber Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security & Incident Response
- Cyber Program Requirements
- Implementation Milestones and Progress
- Looking Beyond Full Implementation

NRC Power Reactor Cyber Security Over 15 years of progress

- 2009: 10 CFR 73.54, Cyber Security Rule
- 2012: Implementation/Oversight of Interim Cyber Security measures
- 2015: 10 CFR 73.77, Cyber Security Event Notification Rule
- 2017: Full implementation of Cyber Security requirements

Continuing FERC/NRC Cooperation

- FERC/NRC discussions on potential regulatory gaps
- Establishment of a “Bright Line”
- Memoranda of Agreement between NRC and FERC, and NRC and NERC

Interim Milestones (1-7) Addressed Significant Threats

- Implemented controls for the most risk significant assets
- Implemented by end of 2012
- Inspections completed 2013-2015

Continued Program Implementation

- Key Lessons Learned for Milestones 1-7
 - Identification of digital assets
 - Selecting security controls
 - Securing portable media and mobile devices
 - Determining the effectiveness of cyber security programs

NRC and Industry Preparing for Full Implementation (Milestone 8)

- Milestone 8 adds additional defense-in-depth
- Tabletops and workshops to exercise specific aspects of the guidance
- Training for NRC inspection staff
- NRC anticipates initiating Milestone 8 inspections in July 2017

Looking Beyond Full Implementation

- NRC staff plans to conduct lessons learned workshops to:
 - Evaluate requirements and guidance documents
 - Discuss inspection team composition, inspection procedures, and inspection periodicity

NRC Updating Cyber Security Roadmap

- Initial Commission Paper June 2012
- Currently updating roadmap
- Evaluating need for cyber security requirements at additional types of NRC licensees
 - Fuel cycle facilities
 - Non-power reactors
 - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
 - Byproduct materials licensees
 - Decommissioning plants

Interactions with other Agencies

- Cyber Security Forum for Independent and Executive Branch Regulators
- Understanding the threat environment, sharing information with:
 - Department of Homeland Security
 - Federal Bureau of Investigation

Interactions with other Agencies

- NRC staff participate in IAEA Expert Consultancy Meetings (CM) on Computer Security Regulation.
Objectives of the CMs:
 - Enhance knowledge and information sharing regarding good practices and lessons learned in developing & implementing computer security regulation

Acronyms

- CDA – Critical Digital Asset
- CM – Consultancy Meeting
- CSP – Cyber Security Plan
- FERC – Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
- IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
- NERC – North American Electric Reliability Corporation