Vogtle PEmails

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Southern Nuclear Operating Company

ND-17-0213

Enclosure 1

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4

Request for License Amendment:

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Consolidation

(LAR-17-006)

(This Enclosure consists of 36 pages, including this cover page.)

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Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.98(c) and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) (the "Licensee") hereby requests an amendment to Combined License (COL) Nos. NPF-91 and NPF-92, for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4, respectively.

1. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION

The proposed changes would make non-technical changes to COL Appendix C (and corresponding plant-specific Tier 1) information. The changes consolidate Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC), by combining the associated Design Commitment, Inspection, Tests, Analyses (ITA) and Acceptance Criteria (AC). The proposed changes consolidate ITAAC within the following six ITAAC categories:

- "Reference" ITAAC, which provide a reference to another location, such as a section, subsection, or ITAAC table entry.
- American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Component and Piping ITAAC, which verify the completion of design and construction activities in accordance with ASME Code requirements and the AP1000 licensing basis.
- "Located on the Nuclear Island" ITAAC, which verify the seismic Category I equipment or components are located on the seismic Category I Nuclear Island.
- Equipment Qualification ITAAC, which demonstrate the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function and the Class 1E equipment identified as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions without loss of safety function.
- Motor-Operated and Check Valve Qualification ITAAC, which demonstrate the capability of motor-operated and check valves to operate under their design conditions.
- Instruments and Controls (I&C) and Electrical Functional Arrangement, which perform inspections of as-built systems to verify the as-built system conforms with the functional arrangement, as described in the system-based Design Description.

The requested amendment proposes changes to COL Appendix C information, with corresponding changes to plant-specific DCD Tier 1 information, as appropriate. This enclosure request approval of the license amendment necessary to implement the COL Appendix C changes described below. Enclosure 2 requests the exemption necessary to implement the changes to the plant-specific DCD Tier 1 information.

2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Tier 2 design descriptions are derived from plant design documents. 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section II.D states that Tier 1 design information is "derived from Tier 2 information." However, certain examples have been identified in COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) to contain redundant ITAAC requirements or require completion of duplicative activities that may be completed at the same time. For each of the proposed changes described and evaluated below, COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) changes are proposed to consolidate two or more ITAAC. For each of the ITAAC proposed for consolidation, the associated UFSAR design information is consistent with the current plant design, so no structure, system, or component (SSC), design function, or analysis, as described in the UFSAR, is affected by the proposed changes.

For each Category below, multiple ITAAC are proposed for consolidation to allow a single completion package and ITAAC Closure Notification (ICN) for each consolidated ITAAC.

Category 1 – "Reference" ITAAC

Multiple ITAAC, referred to as "Reference" ITAAC, only provide a reference to other licensing basis document locations, such as an ITAAC section, subsection, or table entry.

COL Appendix C (and plant-specific DCD Tier 1) Subsection 1.2 "General Provisions" states that reference to another ITAAC is an indication that the ITA and AC for that design commitment are satisfied when the referenced ITA are completed and the AC for the referenced sections, subsections, or table entries are satisfied. If a complete section is referenced, this indicates that all the ITA and AC in that section must be met before the referencing design commitment is satisfied.

SNC has identified Reference ITAAC which align with the ITAAC deemed reference by the NRC in "AP1000, Revision 19 ITAAC Matrix", dated February 22, 2012 (ML12094A075) that categorizes the AP1000 ITAAC families

NEI 08-01 (Reference 6.2) , Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.215 (Reference 6.1), Guidance for ITAAC Closure Under 10 CFR Part 52, Section 10.6 provides the following discussion of Reference ITAAC:

> Some design control documents contain "Reference ITAAC," which are ITAAC that have an entry in the "Design Commitment" column in the DCD, but the "Inspections, Tests, Analyses" and "Acceptance Criteria" fields contain only a reference to another ITAAC. Completion of these Reference ITAAC is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC are completed. When referenced ITAAC are completed and the Reference ITAAC is ready to be closed, the licensee should submit an ITAAC Closure Notification that briefly describes the referenced ITAAC, and lists their ITAAC Closure Notification(s) as references.

Based on the above discussions, Reference ITAAC do not require additional ITA to be performed, because the ITA are performed by the referenced ITAAC; however, the process of closing each ITAAC does require the submittal of documentation by the Licensee submitting an ICN to inform the NRC that the referenced ITAAC has been closed. Additional NRC Staff

resources are also required to verify closure of the Reference ITAAC by confirming the referenced ITAAC are closed, thereby increasing regulatory burden with no commensurate benefit to public health and safety.

Reference ITAAC have been in existence since the 1990's when they were originally developed for AP600 Design Certification. Subsequently, the AP600 Reference ITAAC were carried over to the AP1000 Design Certification. The process for closing ITAAC was only defined and finalized in recent years through industry and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) initiatives and regulator's endorsement. Recent application of these processes has identified additional administrative burden associated with ITAAC closure and potential efficiencies to minimize this administrative burden. The ICN for a Reference ITAAC is expected to merely state that other ITAAC (i.e., the referenced ITAAC) have been closed; as such, it is a redundant ICN with no additional ITA performed or verified. Therefore, while elimination of additional ICNs reduces administrative burden on the Licensee and the regulator, this action:

- Does not reduce the scope of ITA that are required to be performed by the ITAAC,
- Does not eliminate the need to perform the required ITA for each impacted system, and
- Does not impact the scope of the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding to be made by the Commission, indicating that the AC in COL Appendix C are met.

COL Appendix C ITAAC 2.3.10.06b (plant-specific Tier 1 Table 2.3.10-4, ITAAC No. 6b) provides the following example of a Reference ITAAC:

Table 2.3.10-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
6.b) Check valves in drain lines to the containment sump limit cross flooding of compartments.	Refer to item 9 in this table.	Refer to item 9 in this table.

The referenced ITAAC (Table 2.3.10-4, item 9) is shown below:

Table 2.3.10-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
9. The check valves identified in Table 2.3.10-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	Exercise testing of the check valves with active safety functions identified in Table 2.3.10-1 will be performed under pre-operational test pressure, temperature and flow conditions.	Each check valve changes position as indicated on Table 2.3.10-1.

In the above excerpt from COL Appendix C ITAAC 2.3.10.06b (plant-specific Tier 1 Table 2.3.10-4, ITAAC No. 6b) both the ITA and AC refer to another ITAAC by stating, "Refer to item 9 in this table." No additional ITA are required by this Reference ITAAC. Inspections performed by, and the completion and closure of ITAAC 2.3.10.09 satisfy this ITAAC. Therefore, ITAAC 2.3.10.06b can be removed from Table 2.3.10-4 and the scope of the ICN submittal because the scope of this Reference ITAAC (2.3.10.06b) is already consolidated into the referenced ITAAC (2.3.10.09).

Licensing Basis Change Descriptions

The Reference ITAAC listed below are proposed to be removed from the associated ITAAC table.

Reference ITAAC Index Number	Reference ITAAC Number	ITAAC Items Referenced in ITA and AC
3	2.1.01.03	Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7
27	2.1.02.07c	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
58	2.1.02.12a.vi	Table 2.1.2-4, item 8.d.i
59	2.1.02.12a.vii	Table 2.1.2-4, item 8.d.ii
60	2.1.02.12a.viii	Table 2.1.2-4, item 8.d.iii
61	2.1.02.12a.ix	Table 2.1.2-4, item 8.d.iv
84	2.1.03.09c	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
104	2.2.01.06c	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
134	2.2.02.06c	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
143	2.2.02.07e.i	Table 2.2.2-3, Item 1
149	2.2.02.08c	Table 2.3.4-2, items 1 and 2
173	2.2.03.07c	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
174	2.2.03.08a	Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7
234	2.2.04.07c	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
237	2.2.04.08b.i	Table 2.2.4-4, item 11
239	2.2.04.08c	Table 2.2.1-3, item 7
242	2.2.04.09b.i	Table 2.4.1-2, Item 2
264	2.2.05.06b	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
279	2.3.01.02	Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7
297	2.3.02.06c	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
298	2.3.02.07a	Table 2.2.1-3, item 7
299	2.3.02.07b	Table 2.3.2-4, item 10b

Reference ITAAC Index Number	Reference ITAAC Number	ITAAC Items Referenced in ITA and AC
300	2.3.02.07c	Table 2.3.2-4, item 10b
329	2.3.04.03	Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7
369	2.3.06.07c	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
370	2.3.06.08a	Table 2.2.1-3, item 7
371	2.3.06.08b	Table 2.3.6-4, item 1
400	2.3.07.06b	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
401	2.3.07.07a	Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7
404	2.3.07.07b.iii	Table 2.3.7-4, item 1
405	2.3.07.07b.iv	Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f
406	2.3.07.07b.v	Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f
407	2.3.07.07b.vi	Table 2.2.2-3, items 8.a and 8.b
441	2.3.10.06a	Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7
442	2.3.10.06b	Table 2.3.10-4, item 9
468	2.3.13.06c	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
469	2.3.13.07	Table 2.2.1-3, item 7
478	2.3.14.02	Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7
482	2.3.15.02	Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7
520	2.5.01.05	Table 3.2-1, item 1
528	2.5.02.05b	Table 3.3-6, items 7.d and 7.e
571	2.5.05.03c	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
583	2.6.01.03b	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
585	2.6.01.04b	Table 2.6.4-1, item 2.a
600	2.6.03.03	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
632	2.6.05.04	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
641	2.6.09.01	Table 3.3-6, item 14
642	2.6.09.03	Table 3.3-6, item 16
643	2.6.09.04	Table 3.3-6, item 17
688	2.7.01.06b	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
689	2.7.01.07	Table 2.7.1-4, item 10.b
690	2.7.01.08a	Table 2.7.1-4, item 12
691	2.7.01.08b	Table 2.7.1-4, item 12
692	2.7.01.08c	Table 2.7.1-4, item 12

Reference ITAAC Index Number	Reference ITAAC Number	ITAAC Items Referenced in ITA and AC
702	2.7.02.02	Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7
708	2.7.03.02a	Table 2.7.3-2, item 3
709	2.7.03.02b	Table 2.7.3-2, item 3
713	2.7.04.02a	Table 2.7.4-2, item 3
714	2.7.04.02b	Table 2.7.4-2, item 3
715	2.7.04.02c	Table 2.7.4-2, item 3
724	2.7.06.02.i	Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7
738	3.1.00.06	Table 2.7.1-4, items 1, 8.a, 8.c, 12, and 13
746	3.2.00.03.i	Subsection 2.7.1
747	3.2.00.03.ii	Subsection 2.2.5
748	3.2.00.03.iii	Subsection 2.6.3
749	3.2.00.03.iv	Subsection 2.6.5
750	3.2.00.03.v	Subsection 2.3.19
753	3.2.00.06.i	Subsection 2.7.1
754	3.2.00.06.ii	Subsection 2.6.5
755	3.2.00.06.iii	Subsection 2.3.19
771	3.3.00.02c	Table 2.2.1-3, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, and 3.b
772	3.3.00.02d	Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a and 4.b
773	3.3.00.02e	Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a, 4.b, and 7
828	3.5.00.03	Table 3.3-6, item 7.d
834	3.6.00.01.i	Table 2.3.10-4, Item 7.a
835	3.6.00.01.ii	Table 3.5-6, Item 1
836	3.6.00.01.iii	Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a, 7.a, and 10
837	3.6.00.01.iv	Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a and 7.a
838	3.6.00.01.v	Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a, 7.a, and 10
839	3.6.00.01.vi	Table 2.3.2-4, Item 13
840	3.6.00.01.vii	Table 2.3.10-4, Item 10

Category 2 – ITAAC Related to ASME Activities

Several ITAAC verify the completion of design and construction activities in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code requirements, as well as additional AP1000 requirements. These ITAAC (hereafter referred to collectively as "ASME" ITAAC in Category 2 of this Enclosure) require completion of the same or a similar processes (e.g., ASME Code Section III Design Reports, ASME Code Section III Data Reports) in order to close each individual ASME ITAAC. The ASME ITAAC are related to some or all of the following:

- Components identified as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
- Piping identified as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
- Pressure boundary welds in components identified as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.
- Pressure boundary welds in piping identified as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.
- Components identified as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
- Piping identified as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.
- Piping for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of functional capability.
- As-built piping designed for Leak Before Break (LBB) meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the piping.

Consolidation of these ASME ITAAC reduces administrative and regulatory burden on the licensee and the regulator by combining multiple closure notifications into a single closure notification that more closely aligns to the technical processes and documentation required by the Vogtle 3&4 COLs for performing ASME code and licensing basis activities and generating the documentation needed to complete and close these ITAAC.

These ITAAC can be consolidated because the supporting documentation is the same for these ITAAC and the scope of inspections, tests and analysis required for each system will not change. Therefore, consolidation of ASME ITAAC in COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1):

- Does not reduce the scope of ITA that are required to be performed by the ASME ITAAC,
- Does not eliminate the need to perform the required ITA for each impacted system, and
- Does not impact the scope of the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding to be made by the Commission, indicating that the AC in COL Appendix C are met.

COL Appendix C Table 2.1.2-4, ITAAC Nos 2.1.02.02a, 2.1.02.02b, 2.1.02.03a, 2.1.02.03b, 2.1.02.04a, 2.1.02.04b, 2.1.02.05b, and 2.1.02.06 (and plant-specific Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, ITAAC Nos. 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b, 5b, and 6) provides an example to illustrate the consolidation of several ASME ITAAC into a single ASME ITAAC.

The current COL Appendix C Table 2.1.2-4 reads as follows:

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
2.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.
2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.
3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
4.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.

Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria		
Design Commitment	**Inspections, Tests, Analyses**	**Acceptance Criteria**
6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.	An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built RCS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.

In this example, the ASME ITAAC are proposed to be consolidated as follows:

Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria		
Design Commitment	**Inspections, Tests, Analyses**	**Acceptance Criteria**
2.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
4.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain its pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.	An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built RCS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.

Licensing Basis Change Descriptions

The ITAAC listed below are ASME ITAAC (required by ASME code or the testing /inspection required by the licensing basis for functional capability ITAAC and LBB ITAAC and included in the same documentation) and are proposed for consolidation.

ITAAC Index Number	ITAAC Number	Consolidate With ITAAC Number (Index Number)
14	2.1.02.02b	2.1.02.02a (13)
15	2.1.02.03a	
16	2.1.02.03b	
17	2.1.02.04a	
18	2.1.02.04b	
22	2.1.02.05b	
23	2.1.02.06	

73	2.1.03.04	2.1.03.02 (72)
74	2.1.03.05	

92	2.2.01.02b	2.2.01.02a (91)
93	2.2.01.03a	
94	2.2.01.03b	
95	2.2.01.04a.i	
97	2.2.01.04b	

121	2.2.02.02b	2.2.02.02a (120)
122	2.2.02.03a	
123	2.2.02.03b	
124	2.2.02.04a	
125	2.2.02.04b	
129	2.2.02.05b	

160	2.2.03.02b	2.2.03.02a (159)
161	2.2.03.03a	
162	2.2.03.03b	
163	2.2.03.04a	
164	2.2.03.04b	
168	2.2.03.05b	
169	2.2.03.06	

ITAAC Index Number	ITAAC Number	Consolidate With ITAAC Number (Index Number)
221	2.2.04.02b	2.2.04.02a (220)
222	2.2.04.03a	
223	2.2.04.03b	
224	2.2.04.04a	
225	2.2.04.04b	
229	2.2.04.05b	
230	2.2.04.06	

254	2.2.05.02b	2.2.05.02a (253)
255	2.2.05.03a	
256	2.2.05.03b	
257	2.2.05.04a	
258	2.2.05.04b	
262	2.2.05.05b	

286	2.3.02.02b	2.3.02.02a (285)
287	2.3.02.03a	
288	2.3.02.03b	
289	2.3.02.04a	
290	2.3.02.04b	

356	2.3.06.02b	2.3.06.02a (355)
357	2.3.06.03a	
358	2.3.06.03b	
359	2.3.06.04a	
360	2.3.06.04b	
364	2.3.06.05b	
365	2.3.06.06	

393	2.3.07.02b	2.3.07.02a (392)
394	2.3.07.03	
395	2.3.07.04	

ITAAC Index Number	ITAAC Number	Consolidate With ITAAC Number (Index Number)
432	2.3.10.02b	2.3.10.02a (431)
433	2.3.10.03a	
434	2.3.10.03b	
435	2.3.10.04a	
436	2.3.10.04b	
440	2.3.10.05b	
460	2.3.13.03	2.3.13.02 (459)
461	2.3.13.04	
679	2.7.01.02b	2.7.01.02a (678)
680	2.7.01.03a	
681	2.7.01.03b	
682	2.7.01.04a	
683	2.7.01.04b	

Category 3 – "Located on the Nuclear Island" ITAAC

Multiple ITAAC are performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. Generally, these include ITAAC for (1) verifying the seismic Category I equipment or components are located on the Nuclear Island, which is a seismic Category I structure, (2) demonstrating the ability of the equipment or components to withstand seismic loads by type testing and/or analysis, (3) verifying the seismic qualification of equipment at its final location is bounded by previous type testing/analysis. Completion of the third type of ITAAC includes an inspection of the equipment at its final location.

The ITAAC Determination Basis described in NEI 08-01 Example D-43 for closure of ITAAC located on the Nuclear Island (referred to as "located-on" ITAAC) is based on performing an inspection to verify equipment location. The inspection includes verification of equipment make/model/serial number and verification of the equipment location (Building, Elevation, Room). The inspection to verify installed component locations is documented in the Equipment Qualification (EQ) As-Built Reconciliation Report.

The companion ITAAC to the located-on ITAAC is NEI 08-01 Example D-45, which confirms that a "report exists and concludes that the as-built components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions." These ITAAC are closed by performing an inspection to confirm the satisfactory installation of the seismically qualified components. The inspection includes verification of equipment make/model/serial number; verification of as-designed equipment mounting orientation, anchorage and clearances; and verification of electrical and other interfaces. The documentation of installed configuration of seismically qualified components includes photographs and/or sketches of equipment/

mounting/interfaces. The verification of installed seismically qualified component configuration is also documented in the Equipment Qualification (EQ) As-built Reconciliation Report.

Instead of closing these ITAAC based on separate walkdowns or early on based on design documentation and the "Released for Construction" drawings (which finalize equipment locations and release the associated documents for installation/construction) and submittal of separate ITAAC Completion Packages, these ITAAC are consolidated with subsequent ITAAC and the required ITA is performed at that time. Therefore, consolidation of the "Located-on the Nuclear Island" ITAAC with subsequent ITAAC:

- Does not reduce the scope of ITA that are required to be performed for the "Located-on the Nuclear Island" ITAAC ,
- Does not eliminate the need to perform the required ITA for each impacted system, and
- Does not impact the scope of the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding to be made by the Commission, indicating that the AC in COL Appendix C are met.

COL Appendix C ITAAC 2.1.02.05a.i (plant-specific Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, item 5.a) provides an example of a "Located-on the Nuclear Island" ITAAC:

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

See Category 4 below for an example of a consolidated ITAAC.

Licensing Basis Change Descriptions

The "Located on Nuclear Island" ITAAC listed below are consolidated with Equipment Qualification ITAAC, described in Category 4.

ITAAC Index Number	ITAAC Number
19	2.1.02.05a.i
75	2.1.03.06.i
98	2.2.01.05.i
126	2.2.02.05a.i
165	2.2.03.05a.i
226	2.2.04.05a.i
259 *	2.2.05.05a.i *
291	2.3.02.05.i
340 *	2.3.05.02.i *
361	2.3.06.05a.i

ITAAC Index Number	ITAAC Number
396 *	2.3.07.05.i *
437 *	2.3.10.05a.i *
450 *	2.3.11.02.i *
462	2.3.13.05.i
522	2.5.02.02.i
565	2.5.05.02.i
579 *	2.6.01.02.i *
597 *	2.6.03.02.i *
684 *	2.7.01.05.i *
823	3.5.00.01.i

The following Located on Nuclear Island ITAAC are consolidated into one since scope of ITAAC 631 also confirms location of light fixtures.

ITAAC Index Number	ITAAC Number	Consolidate With ITAAC Number (Index Number)
630 *	2.6.05.03.i *	2.6.05.03.ii (631) *

* **Note**: In the Licensing Basis Changes Descriptions Table above, changes to any ITAAC that contain an asterisk (*) are only applicable to COL Appendix C. No change to plant-specific Tier 1 is needed because these ITAAC are currently consolidated in the plant-specific Tier 1 ITAAC Tables.

Category 4 – Equipment Qualification ITAAC

Multiple ITAAC (referred to as Equipment Qualification ITAAC) are performed for equipment qualification to demonstrate the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function and the Class 1E equipment being qualified for a

harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions without loss of safety function. In general, these include (1) an ITAAC for verifying the location to be on Nuclear Island (see scope of Category 3), (2) an ITAAC for performance of type seismic and harsh environment testing and/or analysis, and (3) a subsequent ITAAC for verifying the qualification of equipment at its final location is bounded by previous type testing/analysis. Completion of the third type of ITAAC includes inspection of the equipment at its final location and verification that the qualification is bounded by the as-built location and conditions.

NEI 08-01 Example D44 provides the general format for the ICN associated equipment qualification type testing. The principal closure documents used to document completion of these Equipment Qualification ITAAC are Equipment Qualification Data Packages (EQDP) and Equipment Qualification Summary Reports (EQSR) for each seismic Category 1 component.

NEI 08-01 Example D45 provides the general format for the ICNs associated with verifying the as-built condition of the seismic Category I components are bounded by the qualification. These ITAAC also depend on the same documentation (EQDP/EQSR) and include the Equipment Qualification As-built Reconciliation Report confirming the as-built is bounded by the qualification at the final location.

There is no specific example in NEI 08-01 related to closure of harsh environment type testing and/or analysis ITAAC; however, the same set of principal closure documents (EQDP/EQSR) are used.

NEI 08-01 Example D32 provides the general format for the ICNs associated with verifying the as-built condition of the Class 1E equipment qualified for harsh environment are bounded by the qualification. These ITAAC also depend on the same documentation (EQDP/EQSR) and include the Equipment Qualification As-built Reconciliation Report confirming the as-built is bounded by the qualification.

The Equipment Qualification ITAAC can be consolidated because they depend on the same set of documents (i.e., EQDP/EQSR) for closure plus the Equipment Qualification As-built Reconciliation Report.

Consolidation will minimize the number of ITAAC without eliminating or reducing scope of ITAAC, therefore, consolidation of these Equipment Qualification ITAAC:

- Does not reduce the scope of ITA that are required to be performed for the Equipment Qualification ITAAC,
- Does not eliminate the need to perform the required ITA for each impacted system, and
- Does not impact the scope of the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding to be made by the Commission, indicating that the AC in COL Appendix C are met.

COL Appendix C ITAAC 2.1.02.05a and 2.1.02.07.a (plant-specific Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, ITAAC items 5.a and 7.a) provides an example of an Equipment Qualification ITAAC:

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

In this example, the proposed consolidated Equipment Qualification ITAAC (2.1.02.05.a) would read as follows (this consolidation also shows the Located-on consolidated example).

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
	ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
	iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria		
	ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

Licensing Basis Change Descriptions

The Equipment Qualification ITAAC identified below and proposed to be consolidated. This list also includes the "Located on the Nuclear Island" ITAAC identified for consolidation in Category 3 above.

ITAAC Index Number	ITAAC Number	Consolidate With ITAAC Number (Index Number)
20	2.1.02.05a.ii	2.1.02.05a.i (19)
21	2.1.02.05a.iii	
24	2.1.02.07a.i	
25	2.1.02.07a.ii	
76	2.1.03.06.ii	2.1.03.06.i (75)
77	2.1.03.06.iii	
81	2.1.03.09a.i	
82	2.1.03.09a.ii	
99	2.2.01.05.ii	2.2.01.05.i (98)
100	2.2.01.05.iii	
101	2.2.01.06a.i	
102	2.2.01.06a.ii	
106 *	2.2.01.06d.ii *	2.2.01.06d.i (105) *

ITAAC Index Number	ITAAC Number	Consolidate With ITAAC Number (Index Number)
127	2.2.02.05a.ii	2.2.02.05a.i (126)
128	2.2.02.05a.iii	
131	2.2.02.06a.i	
132	2.2.02.06a.ii	
166	2.2.03.05a.ii	2.2.03.05a.i (165)
167	2.2.03.05a.iii	
170	2.2.03.07a.i	
171	2.2.03.07a.ii	
227	2.2.04.05a.ii	2.2.04.05a.i (226)
228	2.2.04.05a.iii	
231	2.2.04.07a.i	
232	2.2.04.07a.ii	
260 *	2.2.05.05a.ii *	2.2.05.05a.i (259) *
261 *	2.2.05.05a.iii *	
292	2.3.02.05.ii	2.3.02.05.i (291)
293	2.3.02.05.iii	
294	2.3.02.06a.i	
295	2.3.02.06a.ii	
341 *	2.3.05.02.ii *	2.3.05.02.i (340) *
342 *	2.3.05.02.iii *	
362	2.3.06.05a.ii	2.3.06.05a.i (361)
363	2.3.06.05a.iii	
366	2.3.06.07a.i	
367	2.3.06.07a.ii	
397 *	2.3.07.05.ii *	2.3.07.05.i (396) *
398 *	2.3.07.05.iii *	
438 *	2.3.10.05a.ii *	2.3.10.05a.i (437) *
439 *	2.3.10.05a.iii *	

ITAAC Index Number	ITAAC Number	Consolidate With ITAAC Number (Index Number)
451 *	2.3.11.02.ii *	2.3.11.02.i (450) *
452 *	2.3.11.02.iii *	
463	2.3.13.05.ii	2.3.13.05.i (462)
464	2.3.13.05.iii	
465	2.3.13.06a.i	
466	2.3.13.06a.ii	
523	2.5.02.02.ii	2.5.02.02.i (522)
524	2.5.02.02.iii	
525	2.5.02.03	
526	2.5.02.04	
566	2.5.05.02.ii	2.5.05.02.i (565)
567	2.5.05.02.iii	
568	2.5.05.03a.i	
569	2.5.05.03a.ii	
580 *	2.6.01.02.ii *	2.6.01.02.i (579) *
581 *	2.6.01.02.iii *	
598 *	2.6.03.02.ii *	2.6.03.02.i (597) *
599 *	2.6.03.02.iii *	
685 *	2.7.01.05.ii *	2.7.01.05.i (684) *
686 *	2.7.01.05.iii *	
824	3.5.00.01.ii	3.5.00.01.i (823)
825	3.5.00.01.iii	
826	3.5.00.02.i	
827	3.5.00.02.ii	

* **Note**: In the Licensing Basis Changes Descriptions Table above, changes to any ITAAC that contain an asterisk (*) are only applicable to COL Appendix C. No change to plant-specific Tier 1 is needed because these ITAAC are currently consolidated in the plant-specific Tier 1 ITAAC Tables.

Category 5 – Valve Qualification ITAAC

Several ITAAC (referred to as Valve Qualification ITAAC) are performed for valve qualification to demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions. These ITAAC require inspection to show that the as-built valves are bounded by the tested conditions and each valve changes position under design conditions.

Similar to the Equipment Qualification ITAAC (Category 4), in order to close these ITAAC, an Equipment Qualification Data Package (EQDP) and an Equipment Qualification Summary Report (EQSR) are generated along with a report demonstrating that as-built conditions are bounded by the testing.

NEI 08-01 Example D47 provides the general format for the ICNs associated with verifying the valve capability type testing. The principal closure documents used to document completion of the valve type testing ITAAC are EQDPs and EQSRs for each valve listed in the impacted table.

NEI 08-01 Example D48 provides the general format for the ICNs associated with verifying the as-built condition of the valves are bounded by the qualification. Closure of these ITAAC depend on the same documentation (EQDP/EQSR) and include the Equipment Qualification As-built Reconciliation Report confirming the as-built is bounded by the qualification at the final location.

The Valve Qualification ITAAC can be consolidated into one since they depend on the same set of documents (i.e., EQDP/EQSR) for closure and any needed as-built verification.

Consolidation will minimize the number of ITAAC without eliminating or reducing scope of ITAAC, therefore, consolidation of the Valve Qualification ITAAC from COL Appendix C:

- Does not reduce the scope of ITA that are required to be performed for the Valve Qualification ITAAC,
- Does not eliminate the need to perform the required ITA for each impacted system, and
- Does not impact the scope of the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding to be made by the Commission, indicating that the AC in COL Appendix C are met.

COL Appendix C Table 2.2.1-3, ITAAC 2.2.01.11a.i and ITAAC 2.2.01.11a.ii (plant-specific Tier 1 Table 2.2.1-3, ITAAC item 11.a) provides an example of a Valve Qualification ITAAC:

Table 2.2.1-3 **Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria**		
Design Commitment	**Inspections, Tests, Analyses**	**Acceptance Criteria**
***	***	***
11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of each valve to operate under design conditions.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.1-1 under design conditions.
11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
***	***	***

In this example, the proposed consolidated Valve Qualification ITAAC (2.2.01.11a.i) would read as follows:

Table 2.2.1-3 **Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria**		
Design Commitment	**Inspections, Tests, Analyses**	**Acceptance Criteria**
***	***	***
11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of each valve to operate under design conditions. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.1-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
***	***	***

In the above example, completion of the ITAAC 2.2.01.11a.ii would use the same EQDP/EQSR used for ITAAC 2.2.01.11a.i in order to demonstrate the as-built is bounded.

Licensing Basis Change Descriptions

ITAAC, listed below, are considered Valve Qualification ITAAC and proposed to be consolidated:

ITAAC Index Number	ITAAC Number	Consolidated ITAAC Number (Index Number)
54 *	2.1.02.12a.ii *	2.1.02.12a.i (53) *
57 *	2.1.02.12a.v *	2.1.02.12a.iv (56) *
115 *	2.2.01.11a.ii *	2.2.01.11a.i (114) *
155 *	2.2.02.11a.ii *	2.2.02.11a.i (154) *
215 *	2.2.03.12a.ii *	2.2.03.12a.i (214) *
249 *	2.2.04.12a.ii *	2.2.04.12a.i (248) *
310 *	2.3.02.11a.ii *	2.3.02.11a.i (309) *
385 *	2.3.06.12a.ii *	2.3.06.12a.i (384) *

* **Note**: In the Licensing Basis Changes Descriptions Table above, changes to any ITAAC that contain an asterisk (*) are only applicable to COL Appendix C. No change to plant-specific Tier 1 is needed because these ITAAC are currently consolidated in the plant-specific Tier 1 ITAAC Tables.

Category 6 - I&C and Electrical Functional Arrangement

Several ITAAC (referred to as "Functional Arrangement" ITAAC) require the performance of inspections of the as-built system to verify the as-built system conforms with the functional arrangement, as described in the Design Description. The Design Description, in general, include a simplistic figure and/or a table of components. The inspection will demonstrate that the components exist with no demonstration of functionality. These systems also include other ITAAC that demonstrate functionality of the system (generally through testing), including the same components identified in the figures and/or tables referenced in the ITAAC. Testing of components and interfaces through functional testing confirms existence of the components. As such, the scope of functional arrangement ITAAC is bounded by the ITAAC demonstrating the functionality. This change affects certain I&C and Electrical Functional Arrangement ITAAC. Only the I&C and Electrical Functional Arrangement ITAAC that have associated functional testing ITAAC have been included in the scope of this change.

The functional testing ITAAC continue to verify functional arrangement of several I&C and Electrical systems, therefore, reliance on the subsequent ITAAC:

- Does not reduce the scope of ITA that are required to be performed for the Functional Arrangement ITAAC,
- Does not eliminate the need to perform the required ITA for each impacted system, and
- Does not impact the scope of the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding to be made by the Commission, indicating that the AC in COL Appendix C are met.

COL Appendix C Table 2.5.1-4, ITAAC No. 505 (ITAAC 2.5.01.01) provides an example of a Functional Arrangement ITAAC:

Table 2.5.1-4 **Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria**		
Design Commitment	**Inspections, Tests, Analyses**	**Acceptance Criteria**
1. The functional arrangement of the DAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built DAS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.

The above Functional Arrangement ITAAC Design Description does not include a figure showing the functional arrangement of the system. The table which is referenced in the Design Description provides the component names and locations. The functionality is demonstrated by testing of other ITAAC within the same system. The testing verifies that each panel performs its intended function including generating the required indications and actuations based on the inputs. Functional testing demonstrate that the required components exist and they are connected in a manner needed to perform the intended function. See below for a list of the ITAAC that demonstrate functional testing of the functional arrangement ITAAC discussed above (ITAAC 2.5.01.01).

Table 2.5.1-4 **Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria**		
Design Commitment	**Inspections, Tests, Analyses**	**Acceptance Criteria**
2.a) The DAS provides an automatic reactor trip on low wide-range steam generator water level, or on low pressurizer water level, or on high hot leg temperature, separate from the PMS.	Electrical power to the PMS equipment will be disconnected and an operational test of the as-built DAS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.	The generator field control relays (contained in the control cabinets for the rod drive motor-generator sets) open after the test signal reaches the specified limit.

Table 2.5.1-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria		
Design Commitment	**Inspections, Tests, Analyses**	**Acceptance Criteria**
2.b) The DAS provides automatic actuation of selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-1, separate from the PMS.	Electrical power to the PMS equipment will be disconnected and an operational test of the as-built DAS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.	Appropriate DAS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit.
2.c) The DAS provides manual initiation of reactor trip, and selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-2, separate from the PMS. These manual initiation functions are implemented in a manner that bypasses the control room multiplexers, if any; the PMS cabinets; and the signal processing equipment of the DAS.	i) Electrical power to the control room multiplexers, if any, and PMS equipment will be disconnected and the outputs from the DAS signal processing equipment will be disabled. While in this configuration, an operational test of the as-built system will be performed using the DAS manual actuation controls.	i) The generator field control relays (contained in the control cabinets for the rod drive motor-generator sets) open after reactor and turbine trip manual initiation controls are actuated.
2.c) The DAS provides manual initiation of reactor trip, and selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-2, separate from the PMS. These manual initiation functions are implemented in a manner that bypasses the control room multiplexers, if any; the PMS cabinets; and the signal processing equipment of the DAS.	ii) Electrical power to the control room multiplexers, if any, and PMS equipment will be disconnected and the outputs from the DAS signal processing equipment will be disabled. While in this configuration, an operational test of the as-built system will be performed using the DAS manual actuation controls.	ii) DAS output signals are generated for the selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-2, after manual initiation controls are actuated.
2.d) The DAS provides MCR displays of selected plant parameters, as identified in Table 2.5.1-3, separate from the PMS.	Electrical power to the PMS equipment will be disconnected and inspection will be performed for retrievability of the selected plant parameters in the MCR.	The selected plant parameters can be retrieved in the MCR.

Licensing Basis Change Descriptions

The Functional Arrangement ITAAC are proposed to be removed from the associated ITAAC table:

ITAAC Index Number	ITAAC Number	ITAAC Demonstrating Functionality	
505	2.5.01.01	506	2.5.01.02a
		507	2.5.01.02b
		508	2.5.01.02c.i
		509	2.5.01.02c.ii
		510	2.5.01.02d
521	2.5.02.01	527	2.5.02.05a
		529	2.5.02.06a.i
		530	2.5.02.06a.ii
		531	2.5.02.06b
		532	2.5.02.06c.i
		533	2.5.02.06c.ii
		539	2.5.02.08a.i
		540	2.5.02.08a.ii
		541	2.5.02.08a.iii
		543	2.5.02.08b.ii
		545	2.5.02.09a
		546	2.5.02.09b
		547	2.5.02.09c
		548	2.5.02.09d
554	2.5.03.01	555	2.5.03.02
592	2.6.02.01	593	2.6.02.02a
		594	2.6.02.02b
		595	2.6.02.02c

ITAAC Index Number	ITAAC Number	ITAAC Demonstrating Functionality	
596	2.6.03.01	601	2.6.03.04a
		603	2.6.03.04c
		604	2.6.03.04d
		605	2.6.03.04e
		606	2.6.03.04f
		607	2.6.03.04g
		608	2.6.03.04h
		609	2.6.03.04i
		876	2.6.03.04j
		610	2.6.03.05a
		611	2.6.03.05b
		612	2.6.03.05c
		613	2.6.03.05d.i
		614	2.6.03.05d.ii
627	2.6.05.01	628	2.6.05.02.i
		633	2.6.05.05.i
		634	2.6.05.05.ii
		635	2.6.05.06.i
		636	2.6.05.06.ii

Overall Technical Evaluation:

The ITAAC described above are being consolidated because the ITA and AC for these ITAAC are duplicative of other ITAAC (e.g., Reference ITAAC), the subject ITAAC could not be closed until completion of a subsequent ITAAC per NEI 08-01 and the NRC staff's position shared in public meetings on timing of ITAAC completion submittals (e.g., ASME Design Reports and Functional Arrangement). In many cases, as described above, the ICNs would contain the same documentation. This was reinforced by NRC staff during public meetings held regarding previously submitted ICNs and Uncompleted ITAAC Notifications (UINs) for VEGP Units 3 and 4. Submittal of ICNs based upon the current COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) information creates additional regulatory burden on the Licensee and the NRC staff. In addition, consolidation and elimination of redundant ITAAC reduces redundant documentation by reducing the number of ICNs and associated processing documentation in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980.

The proposed ITAAC consolidation continues to meet the intent of 10 CFR Part 52 Appendix D and COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) design descriptions, tables and figures and 10 CFR 52.99 for ITTAC closure notification and completion. The ITAAC consolidation also does not make technical changes to the COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) design

descriptions, tables, and figures, because no SSC design function or analysis described in the UFSAR being affected, no defense-in-depth safety function is affected, and no plant-specific ITAAC is technically changed.

COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) information is comprised of the design information and functions subject to verification by the ITAAC closure process. The proposed changes neither affect the ability to meet design criteria or functions, nor involve a decrease in the safety provided by the associated systems. COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) ITAAC information would continue to adequately validate their corresponding UFSAR (Tier 2) design commitments. Accordingly, application of the generic certified design information in Tier 1 as required by 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, in the particular circumstances discussed in this license amendment request is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The proposed changes do not involve an SSC, function or feature used in the prevention or mitigation of accidents or their safety / design analyses. The changes do not affect any SSC accident initiator or initiating sequence of events, or involve any safety-related SSC or function used to mitigate an accident.

The proposed changes do not involve a change to a fission product barrier. The changes do not result in a new failure mode, malfunction or sequence of events that could affect safety. The changes would not allow for a new fission product release path, result in a new fission product barrier failure mode, or create a new sequence of events that would result in significant fuel cladding failures.

The proposed changes do not affect any safety-related equipment, design code limit, safety-related function, safety-related design analysis, safety analysis input or result, or design or safety margin. No safety analysis or design basis acceptance limit or criterion would be challenged or exceeded.

The proposed changes do not involve a technical (design, analysis, function or qualification) change, e.g., there is no change to an associated calculation, design parameter or design requirement. Therefore, the changes would not result in a decrease in plant safety. The proposed changes associated with this license amendment request do not affect the containment, control, channeling, monitoring, processing or releasing of radioactive and non-radioactive materials. No effluent release path is involved. The types and quantities of expected effluents are not changed. Therefore, radioactive or non-radioactive material effluents should not be affected. Plant radiation zones (as described in UFSAR Section 12.3), controls under 10 CFR 20, and expected amounts and types of radioactive materials are not affected by the proposed changes. Therefore, individual and cumulative radiation exposures should not change.

UFSAR Chapter 14, Section 14.3, and NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 14.3, define and describe requirements for ITAAC. Specifically, they identify that the purpose of the ITAAC is to verify that an as-built facility conforms to the approved plant design and applicable regulations. UFSAR Subsection 14.3.2.1 describes the selection criteria for certified design descriptions and ITAAC. The changes proposed by this request do not lessen the degree of conformity nor reduce the scope of the ITAAC as required by the UFSAR or the SRP, because the consolidated ITAAC (ASME, Qualification, and Located-on ITAAC) and bounding ITAAC (Functional Arrangement and Reference ITAAC) continue to meet the ITAAC

selection criteria and provide verification that the as-built facility conforms to the approved plant design and applicable regulations.

The proposed license amendment request consolidates a number of COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) ITAAC and removes the burden of developing a completion package and ICN submittal for the Reference ITAAC. As such, plant radiation zones (addressed in UFSAR Section 12.3) are not affected, and controls under 10 CFR 20 preclude a significant increase in occupational radiation exposure.

Summary

The change consolidates a number ITAAC in COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Tables by relocating or removing multiple ITAAC entries in order to minimize the number of ITAAC completion packages and ICNs. The change is considered administrative in nature since no technical changes are being made, the required inspections, tests and analysis are still been performed and the margin of safety is not reduced.

3. TECHNICAL EVALUATION

Contained within Section 2 of this License Amendment Request.

4. REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

10 CFR 52.98(c) requires NRC approval for any modification to, addition to, or deletion from the terms and conditions of a COL. This activity involves a departure from COL Appendix C information, and a corresponding change to plant-specific Tier 1 information; therefore, this activity requires an amendment to the COL. Accordingly, NRC approval is required prior to making the plant-specific changes in this license amendment request.

4.2 Precedent

No precedent is identified.

4.3 Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

The proposed changes would require non-technical changes to COL Appendix C information. The changes consolidate and relocate Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) and eliminate redundant Inspections, Tests and Analyses (ITA) and Acceptance Criteria (AC) to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process.

An evaluation to determine whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment was completed by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, “Issuance of Amendment,” as discussed below:

4.3.1 Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

The proposed non-technical change to COL Appendix C will consolidate, relocate and eliminate redundant ITAAC in order to improve and create a more efficient process for the ITAAC Closure Notification submittals.. No structure, system, or component (SSC) design or function is affected. No design or safety analysis is affected. The proposed changes do not affect any accident initiating event or component failure, thus the probabilities of the accidents previously evaluated are not affected. No function used to mitigate a radioactive material release and no radioactive material release source term is involved, thus the radiological releases in the accident analyses are not affected.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

4.3.2 Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

The proposed change to COL Appendix C does not affect the design or function of any SSC, but will consolidate, relocate and eliminate redundant ITAAC in order to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process. The proposed changes would not introduce a new failure mode, fault or sequence of events that could result in a radioactive material release.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

4.3.3 Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No

The proposed change to COL Appendix C is to consolidate, relocate and eliminate redundant ITAAC in order to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process is considered non-technical, thus would not affect any design parameter, function or analysis. There would be no change to an existing design

basis, design function, regulatory criterion, or analysis. No safety analysis or design basis acceptance limit/criterion is involved.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

4.4 Conclusions

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, the requested change does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration Determination.

5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The proposed changes would require non-technical changes to COL Appendix C information. The changes consolidate and relocate Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) and eliminate redundant Inspections, Tests and Analyses (ITA) and Acceptance Criteria (AC) to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process.

A review has determined that the anticipated construction and operational effects of the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.21 and 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9), in that:

(i) There is no significant hazards consideration.

As documented in Section 4.3, Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, of this license amendment request, an evaluation was completed to determine whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment." The Significant Hazards Consideration Determination determined that (1) the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; and (3) the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

(ii) There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

The proposed change to COL Appendix C is to consolidate, relocate and eliminate redundant ITAAC in order to create a more efficient process for the ITAAC Closure Notification submittals. The proposed changes are unrelated to any aspect of plant construction or operation that would introduce any change to effluent types (e.g., effluents containing chemicals or biocides, sanitary system effluents, and other effluents), or affect any plant radiological or non-radiological effluent release quantities. Furthermore, the proposed changes do not affect any effluent release path or diminish the functionality of any design or operational features that are credited with controlling the release of effluents during plant operation. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant change in the types or a significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

(iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The proposed change to COL Appendix C is to consolidate, relocate and eliminate redundant ITAAC in order to create a more efficient process for the ITAAC Closure Notification submittals. Plant radiation zones (addressed in UFSAR Section 12.3) are not affected, and controls under 10 CFR 20 preclude a significant increase in occupational radiation exposure. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Based on the above review of the proposed amendment, it has been determined that anticipated construction and operational impacts of the proposed amendment do not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in the individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment of the proposed exemption is not required.

6. REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.215, Revision 2, “Guidance for ITAAC Closure under 10 CFR Part 52”

2. NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected “Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process under 10 CFR Part 52”

Southern Nuclear Operating Company

ND-17-0213

Enclosure 2

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4

Exemption Request:

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Consolidation

(LAR-17-006)

(This Enclosure consists of 7 pages, including this cover page.)

1.0 Purpose

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC), the License, requests a permanent exemption from the provisions of 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, "Design Certification Rule for the AP1000 Design, Scope and Contents," to allow a departure from elements of the certified information in Tier 1 of the generic AP1000 Design Control Document (DCD). The regulation, 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, requires an applicant or licensee referencing Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 to incorporate by reference and comply with the requirements of Appendix D, including certification information in DCD Tier 1. Tier 1 includes ITAAC that must be satisfactorily performed prior to fuel load. The design details to be verified by these ITAAC are specified in the text, tables, and figures that are referenced in each individual ITAAC. The generic Tier 1 information from which an exemption is requested includes the plant-specific Tier 1 information, described below, for each of six categories of changes:

Category 1, Reference ITAAC

The following plant-specific ITAAC items are proposed to be identified as "Not Used" in the identified plant-specific Tier 1 tables, as shown in Enclosure 3 of this letter:

- Tier 1 Table 2.1.1-1, ITAAC Item 3
- Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, ITAAC Items 7.c and 12.a (ITA and AC vi, vii, viii and ix only)
- Tier 1 Table 2.1.3-2, ITAAC Item 9.c
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.1-3, ITAAC Item 6.c
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.2-3, ITAAC Item 6.c
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.2-3, ITAAC Items 7.e (ITA and AC i only) and 8.c
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.3-4, ITAAC Items 7.c and 8.a
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.4-4, ITAAC Items 7.c, 8.b (ITA and AC i), 8.c, 9.b (ITA and AC i only)
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.5-5, ITAAC Item 6.b
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.1-2, ITAAC Item 2
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.2-4, ITAAC Items 6.c, 7.a, 7.b and 7.c
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.4-2, ITAAC Item 3
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.6-4, ITAAC Items 7.c, 8.a and 8.b
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.7-4, ITAAC Items 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b (ITA and AC iii, iv, v and vi only)
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.10-4, ITAAC Items 6.a and 6.b
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.13-3, ITAAC Items 6.c and 7
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.14-2, ITAAC Item 2
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.15-2, ITAAC Item 2
- Tier 1 Table 2.5.1-4, ITAAC Item 5
- Tier 1 Table 2.5.2-8, ITAAC Item 5.b
- Tier 1 Table 2.5.5-2, ITAAC Item 3.c
- Tier 1 Table 2.6.1-4, ITAAC Items 3.b and 4.b
- Tier 1 Table 2.6.3-3, ITAAC Item 3

- Tier 1 Table 2.6.5-1, ITAAC Item 4
- Tier 1 Table 2.6.9-1, ITAAC Items 1, 3 and 4
- Tier 1 Table 2.7.1-4, ITAAC Items 6.b, 7, 8.a, 8.b and 8.c
- Tier 1 Table 2.7.2-2, ITAAC Item 2
- Tier 1 Table 2.7.3-2, ITAAC Items 2.a and 2.b
- Tier 1 Table 2.7.4-2, ITAAC Item 2.a, 2.b and 2.c
- Tier 1 Table 2.7.6-2, ITAAC Item 2 (ITA and AC i only)
- Tier 1 Table 3.1-1, ITAAC Item 6
- Tier 1 Table 3.2-1, ITAAC Items 3 and 6
- Tier 1 Table 3.3-6, ITAAC Items 2.c, 2.d and 2.e
- Tier 1 Table 3.5-6, ITAAC Item 3
- Tier 1 Table 3.6-1, ITAAC Item 1

Category 2, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Component and Piping ITAAC

The plant-specific Tier 1 information proposed to be revised by consolidating the Design Commitments, Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria for the following plant-specific ITAAC items, as described below and as shown in Enclosure 3 of this letter.

The consolidation relocates and combines the following ITAAC into a single ITAAC. The Design Commitments, Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria remain unchanged.

- Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 5.b and 6 are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.1.3-2, Items 3, 4 and 5 are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.1-3, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a (ITA and AC i only), and 4.b are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.2-3, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, and 5.b are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.3-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 5.b and 6 are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.4-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 5.b and 6 are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.5-5, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, and 5.b are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.2-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, and 4.b are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.6-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 5.b and 6 are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.7-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3 and 4 are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.10-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, and 5.b are consolidated in one ITAAC.

- Tier 1 Table 2.3.13-3, Items 2, 3 and 4 are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.7.1-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, and 4.b are consolidated in one ITAAC.

Category 3 – "Located on the Nuclear Island" ITAAC

The plant-specific Tier 1 information proposed to be revised by consolidating the Design Commitments, Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria for the following plant-specific ITAAC items, as described below and as shown in Enclosure 3 of this letter.

The consolidation combines the ITAAC listed below with the remainder of the Equipment Qualification ITAAC in the same ITAAC Table (see Category 4 list below). The Design Commitments, Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria remain unchanged.

- Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, Item 5.a (ITA and AC i)
- Tier 1 Table 2.1.3-2, Item 6 (ITA and AC i)
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.1-3, Item 5 (ITA and AC i)
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.2-3, Item 5.a (ITA and AC i)
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.3-4, Item 5.a (ITA and AC i)
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.4-4, Item 5.a (ITA and AC i)
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.2-4, Item 5 (ITA and AC i)
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.6-4, Item 5.a (ITA and AC i)
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.13-3, Item 5 (ITA and AC i)
- Tier 1 Table 2.5.2-8, Item 2 (ITA and AC i)
- Tier 1 Table 2.5.5-2, Item 2 (ITA and AC i)
- Tier 1 Table 3.5-6, Item 1 (ITA and AC i)

Category 4 – Equipment Qualification ITAAC

The plant-specific Tier 1 information proposed to be revised by consolidating the Design Commitments, Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria for the following plant-specific ITAAC items, as described below and as shown in Enclosure 3 of this letter.

The consolidation relocates and combines the following ITAAC into a single ITAAC. The Design Commitments, Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria remain unchanged.

The consolidation includes the Category 3 ITAAC shown above.

- Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a and 7.a are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.1.3-2, Items 6 and 9.a are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.1-3, Items 5 and 6.a are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.2-3, Items 5.a and 6.a are consolidated in one ITAAC.

- Tier 1 Table 2.2.3-4, Items 5.a and 7.a are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.2.4-4, Items 5.a and 7.a are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.2-4, Items 5 and 6.a are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.6-4, Items 5.a and 7.a are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.3.13-3, Items 5 and 6.a are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.5.2-8, Items 2, 3 and 4 are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 2.5.5-2, Items 2 and 3.a are consolidated in one ITAAC.
- Tier 1 Table 3.5-6, Items 1 and 2 are consolidated in one ITAAC.

Category 5 – Valve Qualification ITAAC

An Exemption is not requested for Category 5 "Valve Qualification ITAAC" since Tier 1 already shows these as consolidated ITAAC.

Category 6 - I&C and Electrical Functional Arrangement
The following plant-specific ITAAC items are proposed to be identified as "Not Used" in the identified plant-specific Tier 1 tables, as shown in Enclosure 3 of this letter:

- Tier 1 Table 2.5.1-4, ITAAC Item 1
- Tier 1 Table 2.5.2-8, ITAAC Item 1
- Tier 1 Table 2.5.3-2, ITAAC Item 1
- Tier 1 Table 2.6.2-1, ITAAC Item 1
- Tier 1 Table 2.6.3-3, ITAAC Item 1
- Tier 1 Table 2.6.5-1, ITAAC Item 1

This request for exemption provides the technical and regulatory basis to demonstrate that 10 CFR 52.63, §52.7, and §50.12 requirements are met and will apply the requirements of 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section VIII.A.4 to allow departures from generic Tier 1 information due to proposed consolidation, relocation and elimination of ITAAC.

2.0 Background

The Licensee is the holder of Combined License Nos. NPF-91 and NPF-92, which authorize construction and operation of two Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 nuclear plants, named Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4, respectively. The proposed changes would consolidate and relocate ITAAC and eliminate redundant Inspections, Tests and Analyses (ITA) and Acceptance Criteria (AC) throughout plant-specific Tier 1.

During preparation and submittal of the ITAAC Closure Notification (ICN), and through feedback by the Commission during review of the ICNs, SNC identified efficiencies to the ICN submittal process. Submittal of ICNs based upon the current plant-specific Tier 1 information creates additional regulatory burden on the Licensee and the NRC staff. The identified efficiencies would consolidate and relocate ITAAC and eliminate redundant ITA and AC to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process. This activity

requests exemption from the Generic DCD Tier 1 tables which support the associated COL Appendix C ITAAC.

An exemption from elements of the AP1000 certified (Tier 1) design information is requested to allow plant-specific departures to be taken from the Tier 1 ITAAC Tables listed in Section 1.0 of this Enclosure.

3.0 Technical Justification of Acceptability

An exemption is requested to depart from AP1000 Generic DCD Tier 1 material in regard to the AP1000 by consolidating and relocating ITAAC and eliminating redundant ITA and AC. Consolidation, relocation and elimination of redundant ITAAC reduces redundant documentation by reducing the number of ICNs because redundant documentation is not submitted. The proposed ITAAC consolidation continues to meet the intent of 10 CFR Part 52 Appendix D and plant-specific Tier 1 design descriptions, tables and figures. The proposed exemption would allow a change to the plant-specific Tier 1 ITAAC information consistent with existing plant-specific DCD Tier 2 information. The proposed changes to the description information presented in plant-specific Tier 1 are at a level of detail that is consistent with the information currently provided therein.

The proposed changes neither adversely impacts the ability to meet the design functions of the SSCs nor involve a significant decrease in the level of safety provided by the structures, systems, or components. Because the proposed consolidations are consistent with plant-specific DCD Tier 2 information and the design, the changes do not affect a structure, system or component. The proposed changes to information in plant-specific DCD Tier 1 continue to provide the detail necessary to implement the corresponding ITAAC.

Detailed technical justification supporting this request for exemption is provided in Section 2 of the associated License Amendment Request in Enclosure 1 of this letter

4.0 Justification of Exemption

10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section VIII.A.4 and 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1) govern the issuance of exemptions from elements of the certified design information for AP1000 nuclear power plants. Since SNC has identified changes to the Tier 1 information related to the structures as a result of further design review activities, an exemption to the certified design information in Tier 1 is needed.

10 CFR 52, Appendix D, and 10 CFR 50.12, §52.7, and §52.63 state that the NRC may grant exemptions from the requirements of the regulations provided six conditions are met: 1) the exemption is authorized by law [§50.12(a)(1)]; 2) the exemption will not present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public [§50.12(a)(1)]; 3) the exemption is consistent with the common defense and security [§50.12(a)(1)]; 4) special circumstances are present [§50.12(a)(2)(ii)]; 5) the special circumstances outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction in standardization caused by the exemption [§52.63(b)(1)]; and 6) the design change will not result in a significant decrease in the level of safety [Part 52, App. D, VIII.A.4].

The requested exemption satisfies the criteria for granting specific exemptions, as described below.

1. This exemption is authorized by law

The NRC has authority under 10 CFR 52.63, §52.7, and §50.12 to grant exemptions from the requirements of NRC regulations. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.12 and §52.7 state that the NRC may grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52 upon a proper showing. No law exists that would preclude the changes covered by this exemption request. Additionally, granting of the proposed exemption does not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations.

Accordingly, this requested exemption is "authorized by law," as required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1).

2. This exemption will not present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public

The proposed exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B would allow changes to elements of the plant-specific DCD Tier 1 to depart from the AP1000 certified (Tier 1) design information. The plant-specific DCD Tier 1 will continue to reflect the approved licensing basis for VEGP Units 3 and 4, and will maintain a consistent level of detail with that which is currently provided elsewhere in Tier 1 of the DCD. Therefore, the affected plant-specific DCD Tier 1 ITAAC will continue to serve its required purpose.

These changes will not impact the ability of the SSCs to perform their design functions. Because the changes will not alter the operation of any plant equipment or systems, these changes do not present an undue risk from existing equipment or systems. These changes do not add any new equipment or system interfaces to the current plant design. The description changes do not introduce any new industrial, chemical, or radiological hazards that would represent a public health or safety risk, nor do they modify or remove any design or operational controls or safeguards that are intended to mitigate any existing on-site hazards. Furthermore, the proposed changes would not allow for a new fission product release path, result in a new fission product barrier failure mode, or create a new sequence of events that would result in significant fuel cladding failures. Accordingly, these changes do not present an undue risk from any new equipment or systems.

Therefore, the requested exemption from 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B would not present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

3. The exemption is consistent with the common defense and security

The requested exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B would allow the Licensee to depart from elements of the plant-specific DCD Tier 1 design information. The requested exemption does not alter the design, function, or operation of any structures or plant equipment that is necessary to maintain a safe and secure status of the plant. The requested exemption has no impact on plant security or safeguards procedures.

Therefore, the requested exemption is consistent with the common defense and security.

4. Special circumstances are present

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) lists six "special circumstances" for which an exemption may be granted. Pursuant to the regulation, it is necessary for one of these special circumstances to be present in order for the NRC to consider granting an exemption request. The requested exemption meets the special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii). That subsection defines special circumstances as when "Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule."

The rule under consideration in this request for exemption is 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, which requires that a licensee referencing the AP1000 Design Certification Rule (10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D) shall incorporate by reference and comply with the requirements of Appendix D, including Tier 1 information. The VEGP Units 3 and 4 COLs reference the AP1000 Design Certification Rule and incorporate by reference the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, including Tier 1 information. The underlying purpose of Appendix D, Section III.B is to describe and define the scope and contents of the AP1000 design certification, and to require compliance with the design certification information in Appendix D.

The proposed changes to consolidate and relocate ITAAC and eliminate redundant ITA and AC maintain the design functions of these systems. This change does not impact the ability of any SSCs to perform their functions or negatively impact safety. Accordingly, this exemption from the certification information will enable the licensee to safely construct and operate the AP1000 facility consistent with the design certified by the NRC in 10 CFR 52, Appendix D.

Therefore, special circumstances are present, because application of the current generic certified design information in Tier 1 as required by 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, in the particular circumstances discussed in this request is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.

5. The special circumstances outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction in standardization caused by the exemption

Based on the non-standard nature of the changes to the plant-specific Tier 1 information in this area and the understanding that these changes are not related to system functions, these changes will not have a negative impact. Nevertheless, if other AP1000 licensees do not elect to request this exemption, the special circumstances continue to outweigh any decrease in safety from the reduction in standardization because the key design functions associated with this request will continue to be maintained. This exemption request and the associated marked-up table demonstrate that there is a minimal change from the generic AP1000 DCD, minimizing the reduction in standardization and consequently the safety impact from the reduction.

Therefore, the special circumstances associated with the requested exemption outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction in standardization caused by the exemption.

6. The design change will not result in a significant decrease in the level of safety.

The proposed exemption would allow changes consolidate and relocate ITAAC and eliminate redundant ITA and AC in plant-specific Tier 1. The consolidation will not impact the functional capabilities of the components identified in the affected ITAAC. Because the consolidation of ITAAC associated with this exemption request will not modify the design or operation of any systems or equipment, there are no new failure modes introduced by these changes and the level of safety provided by the current structures, systems, and components and the systems and equipment contained therein will be unchanged.

Because the proposed changes to the structure, system, or component descriptions will not adversely affect the ability of the structures, systems or components to perform their design functions and the level of safety provided by the structures, systems, and components and the systems and equipment contained therein is unchanged, it is concluded that the description changes associated with proposed exemption will not result in a significant decrease in the level of safety.

5.0 RISK ASSESSMENT

A risk assessment was not determined to be applicable to address the acceptability of this proposal.

6.0 PRECEDENT

None.

7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The Licensee requests a departure from elements of the certified information in Tier 1 of the generic AP1000 DCD. The Licensee has determined that the proposed departure would require a permanent exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, Design Certification Rule for the AP1000 Design, Scope and Contents, with respect to installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, or which changes an inspection or a surveillance requirement; however, the Licensee evaluation of the proposed exemption has determined that the proposed exemption meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Based on the above review of the proposed exemption, the Licensee has determined that the proposed activity does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in the individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed exemption meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR

51.22(b), an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment of the proposed exemption is not required.

Specific details of the environmental considerations supporting this request for exemption are provided in Section 5 of the associated License Amendment Request provided in Enclosure 1 of this letter.

8.0 CONCLUSION

The proposed changes to Tier 1 are necessary to consolidate information in ITAAC Tables in plant-specific DCD Tier 1 to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process. The exemption request meets the requirements of 10 CFR 52.63, "Finality of design certifications," 10 CFR 52.7, "Specific exemptions," 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," and 10 CFR 52 Appendix D, "Design Certification Rule for the AP1000." Specifically, the exemption request meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1) in that the request is authorized by law, presents no undue risk to public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. Furthermore, approval of this request does not result in a significant decrease in the level of safety, satisfies the underlying purpose of the AP1000 Design Certification Rule, and does not present a significant decrease in safety as a result of a reduction in standardization.

9.0 REFERENCES

None.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company

ND-17-0213

Enclosure 3

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4

Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents

(LAR-17-006)

Note:
Added text is shown as bold **Blue Underline**
Deleted text is shown as bold **~~Red Strikethrough~~**
* * * indicates omitted existing text that is not shown.

(Note that the sheet numbers and the total number of sheets for the marked-up Tables provided in this Enclosure may be changed by the incorporation of this and other departures. These changes are considered editorial and do not require evaluation in this submittal.)

(This Enclosure consists of 107pages, including this cover page.)

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.1, Reactor, Subsection 2.1.1, Fuel Handling and Refueling System, Table 2.1.1-1, as shown below:

Table 2.1.1-1
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
3	~~2.1.01.03~~	Not used. ~~3. The FHS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the fuel transfer tube penetrating containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1 3, items 1 and 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1 3, items 1 and 7.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.1, Reactor, Subsection 2.1.2, Reactor Coolant System, Table 2.1.2-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.1.02.12a.i, 2.1.02.12a.ii, 2.1.02.12a.iv and 2.1.02.12a.v in Table 2.1.2-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 12a.i, 12a.ii, 12a.iv and 12a.v in Table 2.1.2-4 is needed.

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
13	2.1.02.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
		6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.	An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built RCS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.
14	~~2.1.02.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.~~	~~The ASME code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.~~
15	~~2.1.02.03a~~	Not used. ~~3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
16	~~2.1.02.03b~~	Not used. ~~3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
17	~~2.1.02.04a~~	Not used. ~~4.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in~~

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		~~retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
18	~~2.1.02.04b~~	Not used. ~~4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
19	2.1.02.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
20	~~2.1.02.05a.ii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~
21	~~2.1.02.05a.iii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
22	~~2.1.02.05b~~	Not used. ~~5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to~~	~~Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built~~	~~A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in~~

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
23	2.1.02.06	Not used. 6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.	An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built RCS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.
24	2.1.02.07a.i	Not used. 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
25	2.1.02.07a.ii	Not used. 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
27	~~2.1.02.07c~~	Not used. ~~7.c) Separation is provided between RCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d).~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d).~~
* * *				
53	2.1.02.12a.i	12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
54	~~2.1.02.12a.ii~~	Not used. ~~12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.~~	~~ii) Iinspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.~~
* * *				
56	2.1.02.12a.iv	12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	iv) Tests or type tests of squib valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.	iv) A test report exists and concludes that each squib valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2-1 under design conditions.

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			v) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.	v) A report exists and concludes that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
57	~~2.1.02.12a.v~~	Not used. ~~12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.~~	~~v) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.~~	~~v) A report exists and concludes that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.~~
58	~~2.1.02.12a.vi~~	Not used. ~~12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.~~	~~vi) See item 8.d.i in this table.~~	~~vi) See item 8.d.i in this table. The ADS stage 1-3 valve flow resistances are verified to be consistent with the ADS stage 1-3 path flow resistances.~~
59	~~2.1.02.12a.vii~~	Not used. ~~12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.~~	~~vii) See item 8.d.ii in this table.~~	~~vii) See item 8.d.ii in this table. The ADS stage 4 valve flow resistances are verified to be consistent with the ADS stage 4 path flow resistances.~~
60	~~2.1.02.12a.viii~~	Not used. ~~12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.~~	~~viii) See item 8.d.iii in this table.~~	~~viii) See item 8.d.iii in this table.~~
61	~~2.1.02.12a.ix~~	Not used. ~~12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.~~	~~ix) See item 8.d.iv in this table.~~	~~ix) See item 8.d.iv in this table.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.1, Reactor, Subsection 2.1.3, Reactor System, Table 2.1.3-2, as shown below:

Table 2.1.3-2
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
72	2.1.03.03	3. The components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III.
		4. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		5. The pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components of the RXS required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
73	~~2.1.03.04~~	Not used. ~~4. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
74	~~2.1.03.05~~	Not used. ~~5. The pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components of the RXS required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies)~~

Table 2.1.3-2
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
				~~conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
75	2.1.03.06.i	6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island .	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		9.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analysis, or a combination of type tests and analysis will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Table 2.1.3-2
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
76	~~2.1.03.06.ii~~	Not used. ~~6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~
77	~~2.1.03.06.iii~~	Not used.~~6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
* * *				
81	~~2.1.03.09a.i~~	Not used. ~~9.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~i) Type tests, analysis, or a combination of type tests and analysis will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.~~	~~i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~
82	~~2.1.03.09a.ii~~	Not used. ~~9.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built~~

Table 2.1.3-2
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		~~qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.~~	~~Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.~~
* * *				
84	~~2.1.03.09c~~	Not used. ~~9.c) Separation is provided between RXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.1, Containment System, Table 2.2.1-3, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.01.06d.i, 2.2.01.06d.ii, 2.2.01.11a.i and 2.2.01.11a.ii in Table 2.2.1-3, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 6d.i, 6d.ii, 11a.i and 11a.ii in Table 2.2.1-3 is needed.

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
91	2.2.01.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.1-1 and 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.		
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.		
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	i) A hydrostatic or pressure test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be tested.	i) A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic or pressure test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
92	~~2.2.01.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.~~	~~The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III.~~
93	~~2.2.01.03a~~	Not used. ~~3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
94	~~2.2.01.03b~~	Not used. ~~3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
95	~~2.2.01.04a.i~~	Not used. ~~4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~i) A hydrostatic or pressure test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be tested.~~	~~i) A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
* * *				
97	~~2.2.01.04b~~	Not used. ~~4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic or pressure test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform~~

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
				~~with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
98	2.2.01.05.i	5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) The as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
99	~~2.2.01.05.ii~~	Not used. ~~5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.~~
100	~~2.2.01.05.iii~~	Not used. ~~5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) The as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
101	~~2.2.01.06a.i~~	Not used. ~~6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.~~	~~i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~
102	~~2.2.01.06a.ii~~	Not used. ~~6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables,~~

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		~~that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~terminations located in a harsh environment.~~	~~and terminations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.~~
* * *				
104	~~2.2.01.06c~~	Not used. ~~6.c) Separation is provided between CNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
105	2.2.01.06d.i	6.d) The non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment. ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
106	~~2.2.01.06d.ii~~	Not used. ~~6.d) The non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh~~

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		~~loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.~~		~~environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.~~
* * *				
114	2.2.01.11a.i	11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of each valve to operate under design conditions. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.1-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
115	~~2.2.01.11a.ii~~	Not used. ~~11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.2, Passive Containment Cooling System, Table 2.2.2-3, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.02.11a.i and 2.2.02.11a.ii in Table 2.2.2-3, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 11a.i and 11a.ii in Table 2.2.2-3 is needed.

Table 2.2.2-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
120	2.2.02.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.2-1 and 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

Table 2.2.2-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.2-1 and 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
		5.b) Each of the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report concluding that the as-built pipelines meet the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
121	~~2.2.02.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.~~	~~The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.~~
122	~~2.2.02.03a~~	Not used. ~~3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
123	~~2.2.02.03b~~	Not used. ~~3.b) Pressure boundary welds in the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~

Table 2.2.2-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
124	~~2.2.02.04a~~	Not used. ~~4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
125	~~2.2.02.04b~~	Not used. ~~4.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	
126	2.2.02.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I components and valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I components will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I components can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) The report exists and concludes that the as-built components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

Table 2.2.2-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E components located in a harsh environment. ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E components and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E components and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
127	~~2.2.02.05a.ii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I components will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I components can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~
128	~~2.2.02.05a.iii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) The report exists and concludes that the as-built components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
129	~~2.2.02.05b~~	Not used. ~~5.b) Each of the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.~~	~~Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report concluding that the as-built pipelines meet the requirements for functional capability.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.~~
* * *				

Table 2.2.2-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
131	~~2.2.02.06a.i~~	Not used. ~~6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~i) Type tests or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E components located in a harsh environment.~~	~~i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~
132	~~2.2.02.06a.ii~~	Not used. ~~6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E components and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E components and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.~~
* * *				
134	~~2.2.02.06c~~	Not used. ~~6.c) Separation is provided between PCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
* * *				
143	~~2.2.02.07e.i~~	Not used. ~~7.e) The PCS provides a flow path for long-term water makeup to the PCCWST.~~	~~i) See item 1 in this table.~~	~~i) See item 1 in this table.~~
* * *				
149	~~2.2.02.08c~~	Not used. ~~8.c) The PCCWST includes a water inventory for the fire protection system.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.3.4-2, items 1 and 2.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.3.4-2, items 1 and 2.~~
* * *				

Table 2.2.2-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
154	2.2.02.11a.i	11.a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the capability of the as-built motor-operated valves bound the tested conditions.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.2-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the capability of the as-built motor-operated valves bound the tested conditions.
155	~~2.2.02.11a.ii~~	Not used. ~~11.a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the capability of the as-built motor-operated valves bound the tested conditions.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the capability of the as-built motor-operated valves bound the tested conditions.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.3, Passive Core Cooling System, Table 2.2.3-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.03.12a.i and 2.2.03.12a.ii in Table 2.2.3-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 12a.i and 12a.ii in Table 2.2.3-4 is needed.

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
159	2.2.03.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.3-1 and 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.3-1 and 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
		6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.	An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built PXS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.
160	~~2.2.03.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.~~	~~The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III.~~
161	~~2.2.03.03a~~	Not used. ~~3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
162	~~2.2.03.03b~~	Not used. ~~3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
163	~~2.2.03.04a~~	Not used. ~~4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
164	~~2.2.03.04b~~	Not used. ~~4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
165	2.2.03.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function. For the PXS containment recirculation and IRWST screens, a report exists and concludes that the screens can withstand seismic dynamic loads and also post-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights.

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions. For the PXS containment recirculation and IRWST screens, a report exists and concludes that the as-built screens including their anchorage are bounded by the seismic loads and also post-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights.
		7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
166	~~2.2.03.05a.ii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function. For the PXS containment recirculation and IRWST screens, a report exists and concludes that the screens can withstand seismic dynamic loads and also post-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights.~~
167	~~2.2.03.05a.iii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions. For the PXS containment recirculation and IRWST screens, a report exists and concludes that the as-built screens including their anchorage are bounded by the seismic loads and also post-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights.~~
168	~~2.2.03.05b~~	Not used. ~~5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.~~	~~Inspection will be performed verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.~~

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
169	~~2.2.03.06~~	Not used. ~~6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.~~	~~Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.~~	~~An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built PXS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.~~
170	~~2.2.03.07a.i~~	Not used. ~~7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.~~	~~i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~
171	~~2.2.03.07a.ii~~	Not used. ~~7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.~~
* * *				
173	~~2.2.03.07c~~	Not used. ~~7.c) Separation is provided between PXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
174	~~2.2.03.08a~~	Not used. ~~8.a) The PXS provides containment isolation of the PXS lines penetrating the containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~
* * *				
214	2.2.03.12a.i	12.a) The squib valves and check valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of squib valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design condition. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each squib valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.3-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
215	~~2.2.03.12a.ii~~	Not used. ~~12.a) The squib valves and check valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.4, Steam Generator System, Table 2.2.4-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.04.12a.i and 2.2.04.12a.ii in Table 2.2.4-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 12a.i and 12a.ii in Table 2.2.4-4 is needed.

Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
220	2.2.04.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.4-1 and 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.4-1 and 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.4-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report concluding that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.4-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
		6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.	An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built SGS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.
221	~~2.2.04.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.~~	~~The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III.~~
222	~~2.2.04.03a~~	Not used. ~~3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
223	~~2.2.04.03b~~	Not used. ~~3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~

Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
224	~~2.2.04.04a~~	Not used. ~~4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
225	~~2.2.04.04b~~	Not used. ~~4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
226	2.2.04.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
227	~~2.2.04.05a.ii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~
228	~~2.2.04.05a.iii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~

Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
229	~~2.2.04.05b~~	Not used. ~~5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.4-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.~~	~~Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report concluding that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.4-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.~~
230	~~2.2.04.06~~	Not used. ~~6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.~~	~~Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.~~	~~An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built SGS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.~~
231	~~2.2.04.07a.i~~	Not used. ~~7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.~~	~~i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~
232	~~2.2.04.07a.ii~~	Not used. ~~7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.~~

Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
234	~~2.2.04.07c~~	Not used. ~~7.c) Separation is provided between SGS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
		* * *		
237	~~2.2.04.08b.i~~	Not used. ~~8.b) During design basis events, the SGS limits steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.~~	~~i) Testing will be performed to confirm isolation of the main feedwater, startup feedwater, blowdown, and main steam lines. See item 11 in this table.~~	~~See item 11 in this table.~~
		* * *		
239	~~2.2.04.08c~~	Not used. ~~8.c) The SGS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the SGS lines penetrating the containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, item 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, item 7.~~
		* * *		
242	~~2.2.04.09b.i~~	Not used. ~~9.b) During shutdown operations, the SGS removes decay heat by delivery of startup feedwater to the steam generator and venting of steam from the steam generators to the atmosphere.~~	~~i) Tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the startup feedwater system to provide feedwater to the steam generators.~~	~~i) See ITAAC Table 2.4.1-2, Item 2.~~
		* * *		
248	2.2.04.12a.i	12.a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.4-1 under design conditions.

Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
249	~~2.2.04.12a.ii~~	Not used. ~~12.a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.5, Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System, Table 2.2.5-5, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.05.05a.i, 2.2.05.05a.ii and 2.2.05.05a.iii in Table 2.2.5-5, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 5a.i, 5a.ii and 5a.iii in Table 2.2.5-5 is needed.

Table 2.2.5-5

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
253	2.2.05.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.5-1 and 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.5-1 and 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.2.5-5

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.5-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.5-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
254	~~2.2.05.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.~~	~~The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III.~~
255	~~2.2.05.03a~~	Not used. ~~3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
256	~~2.2.05.03b~~	Not used. ~~3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
257	~~2.2.05.04a~~	Not used. ~~4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
258	~~2.2.05.04b~~	Not used. ~~4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~

Table 2.2.5-5

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
259	2.2.05.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
260	~~2.2.05.05a.ii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~
261	~~2.2.05.05a.iii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
262	~~2.2.05.05b~~	Not used. ~~5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.5-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.~~	~~Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.5-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.~~

Table 2.2.5-5

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
264	~~2.2.05.06b~~	Not used. ~~6.b) Separation is provided between VES Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.1, Component Cooling Water System, Table 2.3.1-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.1-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
279	~~2.3.01.02~~	Not used. ~~2. The CCS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CCS lines penetrating the containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.2, Chemical and Volume Control System, Table 2.3.2-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.02.11a.i and 2.3.02.11a.ii in Table 2.3.2-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 11a.i and 11a.ii in Table 2.3.2-4 is needed.

Table 2.3.2-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
285	2.3.02.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.2-1 and 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.2-1 and 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.3.2-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
286	~~2.3.02.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.~~	~~The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.~~
287	~~2.3.02.03a~~	Not used. ~~3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
288	~~2.3.02.03b~~	Not used. ~~3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
289	~~2.3.02.04a~~	Not used. ~~4.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
290	~~2.3.02.04b~~	Not used. ~~4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
291	2.3.02.05.i	5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Table 2.3.2-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

Table 2.3.2-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
292	~~2.3.02.05.ii~~	Not used. ~~5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.~~
293	~~2.3.02.05.iii~~	Not used. ~~5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
294	~~2.3.02.06a.i~~	Not used. ~~6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.~~	~~i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~
295	~~2.3.02.06a.ii~~	Not used. ~~6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.~~
* * *				
297	~~2.3.02.06c~~	Not used. ~~6.c) Separation is provided between CVS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~

Table 2.3.2-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
298	~~2.3.02.07a~~	Not used. ~~7.a) The CVS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CVS lines penetrating the containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, item 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, item 7.~~
299	~~2.3.02.07b~~	Not used. ~~7.b) The CVS provides termination of an inadvertent RCS boron dilution by isolating demineralized water from the RCS.~~	~~See item 10b in this table.~~	~~See item 10b in this table.~~
300	~~2.3.02.07c~~	Not used. ~~7.c) The CVS provides isolation of makeup to the RCS.~~	~~See item 10b in this table.~~	~~See item 10b in this table.~~
* * *				
309	2.3.02.11a.i	11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.3.2-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
310	~~2.3.02.11a.ii~~	~~11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.4, Fire Protection System, Table 2.3.4-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.4-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
329	~~2.3.04.03~~	Not used. ~~3. The FPS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the FPS line penetrating the containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.5, Mechanical Handling System, Table 2.3.5-2, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.05.02.i, 2.3.05.02.ii and 2.3.05.02.iii in Table 2.3.5-2, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 2.i, 2ii and 2.iii in Table 2.3.5-2 is needed.

Table 2.3.5-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
340	2.3.05.02.i	2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
341	~~2.3.05.02.ii~~	Not used. ~~2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~

Table 2.3.5-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
342	~~2.3.05.02.iii~~	Not used. ~~2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.6, Normal Residual Heat Removal System, Table 2.3.6-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.06.12a.i and 2.3.06.12a.ii in Table 2.3.6-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 12a.i and 12a.ii in Table 2.3.6-4 is needed.

Table 2.3.6-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
355	2.3.06.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.6-1 and 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

Table 2.3.6-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.6-1 and 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
		5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.3.6-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.3.6-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
		6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.	An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built RNS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.
356	~~2.3.06.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.~~	~~The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III.~~
357	~~2.3.06.03a~~	Not used. ~~3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~

Table 2.3.6-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
358	~~2.3.06.03b~~	Not used. ~~3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
359	~~2.3.06.04a~~	Not used. ~~4.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
360	~~2.3.06.04b~~	Not used. ~~4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
361	2.3.06.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

Table 2.3.6-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
362	~~2.3.06.05a.ii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~

Table 2.3.6-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
363	~~2.3.06.05a.iii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
364	~~2.3.06.05b~~	Not used. ~~5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.3.6-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.~~	~~Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.3.6-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.~~
365	~~2.3.06.06~~	Not used. ~~6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.~~	~~Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.~~	~~An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built RNS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.~~
366	~~2.3.06.07a.i~~	Not used. ~~7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.~~	~~i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~

Table 2.3.6-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
367	~~2.3.06.07a.ii~~	Not used. ~~7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.~~
* * *				
369	~~2.3.06.07c~~	Not used. ~~7.c) Separation is provided between RNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
370	~~2.3.06.08a~~	Not used. ~~8.a) The RNS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the RNS lines penetrating the containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, item 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, item 7.~~
371	~~2.3.06.08b~~	Not used. ~~8.b) The RNS provides a flow path for long-term, post-accident makeup to the RCS.~~	~~See item 1 in this table.~~	~~See item 1 in this table.~~
* * *				
384	2.3.06.12a.i	12.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.3.6-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.

Table 2.3.6-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
385	~~2.3.06.12a.ii~~	Not used. ~~.12.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.7, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System, Table 2.3.7-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.07.05.i, 2.3.07.05.ii and 2.3.07.05.iii in Table 2.3.7-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 5.i, 5.ii and 5.iii in Table 2.3.7-4 is needed.

Table 2.3.7-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
392	2.3.07.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the ASME as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.7-1 and 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		2.b) The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.		
		3. Pressure boundary welds in piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4. The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping lines required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.3.7-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
393	~~2.3.07.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping lines as documented in the ASME design reports.~~	~~The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III.~~
394	~~2.3.07.03~~	Not used. ~~3. Pressure boundary welds in piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
395	~~2.3.07.04~~	Not used. ~~4. The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping lines required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
396	2.3.07.05.i	5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety functions.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

Table 2.3.7-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
397	~~2.3.07.05.ii~~	Not used. ~~5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety functions.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~
398	~~2.3.07.05.iii~~	Not used. ~~5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety functions.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
* * *				
400	~~2.3.07.06b~~	Not used. ~~6.b) Separation is provided between SFS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
401	~~2.3.07.07a~~	Not used. ~~7.a) The SFS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the SFS lines penetrating the containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~
* * *				
404	~~2.3.07.07b.iii~~	Not used. ~~7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.~~	~~iii) A safety-related flow path exists from the cask washdown pit to the spent fuel pool.~~	~~iii) See item 1 of this table.~~
405	~~2.3.07.07b.iv~~	Not used. ~~7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.~~	~~iv) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f for inspection, testing, and acceptance criteria for the makeup water supply from the passive containment cooling system (PCS) water storage tank to the spent fuel pool.~~	~~iv) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f for inspection, testing, and acceptance criteria for the makeup water supply from the PCS water storage tank to the spent fuel pool.~~
406	~~2.3.07.07b.v~~	Not used. ~~7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.~~	~~v) Inspection will be performed to verify that the passive containment cooling system water storage tank includes a sufficient volume of water.~~	~~v) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f for the volume of the passive containment cooling system water storage tank.~~

Table 2.3.7-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
407	~~2.3.07.07b.vi~~	Not used. ~~7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.~~	~~vi) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, items 8.a and 8.b for inspection, testing, and acceptance criteria to verify that the passive containment cooling system ancillary water storage tank includes a sufficient volume of water.~~	~~vi) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, items 8.a and 8.b for inspection, testing, and acceptance criteria for the volume of the passive containment cooling system ancillary water storage tank.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.10, Liquid Radwaste System, Table 2.3.10-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.10.05a.i, 2.3.10.05a.ii and 2.3.10.05a.iii in Table 2.3.10-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 5a.i, 5a.ii and 5a.iii in Table 2.3.10-4 is needed.

Table 2.3.10-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
431	2.3.10.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design report exists for the as built components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.10-1 and 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.10-1 and 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.3.10-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.3.10-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.3.10-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
432	~~2.3.10.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.~~	~~The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III.~~
433	~~2.3.10.03a~~	Not used. ~~3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
434	~~2.3.10.03b~~	Not used. ~~3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
435	~~2.3.10.04a~~	Not used. ~~4.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
436	~~2.3.10.04b~~	Not used. ~~4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~

Table 2.3.10-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
437	2.3.10.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
438	~~2.3.10.05a.ii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~
439	~~2.3.10.05a.iii~~	Not used. ~~5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
440	~~2.3.10.05b~~	Not used. ~~5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.3.10-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.~~	~~Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.3.10-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.~~

Table 2.3.10-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
441	~~2.3.10.06a~~	Not used. ~~6.a) The WLS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the WLS lines penetrating the containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~
442	~~2.3.10.06b~~	Not used. ~~6.b) Check valves in drain lines to the containment sump limit cross flooding of compartments.~~	~~Refer to item 9 in this table.~~	~~Refer to item 9 in this table.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.11, Gaseous Radwaste System, Table 2.3.11-2, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.11.02.i, 2.3.11.02.ii and 2.3.11.02.iii in Table 2.3.11-2, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 2.i, 2.ii and 2.iii in Table 2.3.11-2 is needed.

Table 2.3.11-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
450	2.3.11.02.i	2. The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismically designed equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismically designed equipment can withstand appropriate seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
451	~~2.3.11.02.ii~~	Not used. ~~2. The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismically designed equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismically designed equipment can withstand appropriate seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.~~

Table 2.3.11-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
452	~~2.3.11.02.iii~~	Not used. ~~2. The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.13, Primary Sampling System, Table 2.3.13-3, as shown below:

Table 2.3.13-3

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
459	2.3.13.02	2. The components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III.
		3. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4. The components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
460	~~2.3.13.03~~	Not used. ~~3. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
461	~~2.3.13.04~~	Not used. ~~4. The components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~

Table 2.3.13-3

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
462	2.3.13.05.i	5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.3.13-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of their safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of its safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Table 2.3.13-3

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
463	~~2.3.13.05.ii~~	Not used. ~~5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~
464	~~2.3.13.05.iii~~	Not used. ~~5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
465	~~2.3.13.06a.i~~	Not used. ~~6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of their safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.~~	~~i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of its safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~

Table 2.3.13-3

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
466	~~2.3.13.06a.ii~~	Not used. ~~6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of their safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.~~
* * *				
468	~~2.3.13.06c~~	Not used. ~~6.c) Separation is provided between PSS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E divisions.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
469	~~2.3.13.07~~	Not used. ~~7. The PSS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the PSS lines penetrating the containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, item 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, item 7.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.14, Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System, Table 2.3.14-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.14-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
478	~~2.3.14.02~~	Not used. ~~2. The DWS provides the safety related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the DWS lines penetrating the containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.15, Compressed and Instrument Air System, Table 2.3.15-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.15-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
482	~~2.3.15.02~~	Not used. ~~2. The CAS provides the safety related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the CAS lines penetrating the containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.1, Diverse Actuation System, Table 2.5.1-4, as shown below:

Table 2.5.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
505	~~2.5.01.01~~	Not used. ~~1. The functional arrangement of the DAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.~~	~~The as-built DAS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.~~
* * *				
520	~~2.5.01.05~~	Not used. ~~5. The DAS manual actuation of ADS, IRWST injection, and containment recirculation can be executed correctly and reliably.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.2-1, item 1.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.2-1, item 1.~~

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.2, Protection and Safety Monitoring System, Table 2.5.2-8, as shown below:

Table 2.5.2-8

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
521	~~2.5.02.01~~	Not used. ~~1. The functional arrangement of the PMS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.2.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.~~	~~The as-built PMS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.2.~~
522	2.5.02.02.i	2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

Table 2.5.2-8

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		3. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment.	A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the SWC, EMI, RFI, and ESD conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
		4. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1.	A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
523	~~2.5.02.02.ii~~	Not used. ~~2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~
524	~~2.5.02.02.iii~~	Not used. ~~2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~

Table 2.5.2-8

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
525	~~2.5.02.03~~	Not used. ~~3. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the SWC, EMI, RFI, and ESD conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~
526	~~2.5.02.04~~	Not used. ~~4. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~
* * *				
528	~~2.5.02.05b~~	Not used. ~~5.b) Separation is provided between PMS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, items 7.d and 7.e.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, items 7.d and 7.e.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.3, Plant Control System, Table 2.5.3-2, as shown below:

Table 2.5.3-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
554	~~2.5.03.01~~	Not used. ~~1. The functional arrangement of the PLS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.3.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.~~	~~The as-built PLS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.3.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.5, In-Core Instrumentation System, Table 2.5.5-2, as shown below:

Table 2.5.5-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
565	2.5.05.02.i	2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

Table 2.5.5-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		3.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analysis, or a combination of type tests and analysis will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment. This equipment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
566	~~2.5.05.02.ii~~	Not used. ~~2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.~~
567	~~2.5.05.02.iii~~	Not used. ~~2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~

Table 2.5.5-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
568	~~2.5.05.03a.i~~	Not used. ~~3.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~i) Type tests, analysis, or a combination of type tests and analysis will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.~~	~~i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment. This equipment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~
569	~~2.5.05.03a.ii~~	Not used. ~~3.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.~~
* * *				
571	~~2.5.05.03c~~	Not used. ~~3.c) For cables other than those covered by 3.b, separation is provided between IIS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.1, Main ac Power System, Table 2.6.1-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.6.01.02.i, 2.6.01.02.ii and 2.6.01.02.iii in Table 2.6.1-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 2.i, 2.ii and 2.iii in Table 2.6.1-4 is needed.

Table 2.6.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
579	2.6.01.02.i	2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
580	~~2.6.01.02.ii~~	Not used. ~~2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~

Table 2.6.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
581	~~2.6.01.02.iii~~	Not used. ~~2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
* * *				
583	~~2.6.01.03b~~	Not used. ~~3.b) Separation is provided between ECS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
* * *				
585	~~2.6.01.04b~~	Not used. ~~4.b) The 6900 Vac circuit breakers in switchgear ECS-ES-1 and ECS-ES-2 open after receiving a signal from the onsite standby power load system.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.6.4-1, item 2.a.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.6.4-1, item 2.a.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.2, Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System, Table 2.6.2-1, as shown below:

Table 2.6.2-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
592	~~2.6.02.01~~	Not used. ~~1. The functional arrangement of the EDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.2.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.~~	~~The as-built EDS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.2.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.3, Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System, Table 2.6.3-3, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.6.03.02.i, 2.6.03.02.ii and 2.6.03.02.iii in Table 2.6.3-3, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 2.i, 2.ii and 2.iii in Table 2.6.3-3 is needed.

Table 2.6.3-3

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
596	~~2.6.03.01~~	Not used. ~~1. The functional arrangement of the IDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.3.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.~~	~~The as-built IDS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.3.~~
597	2.6.03.02.i	2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
598	~~2.6.03.02.ii~~	Not used. ~~2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~

Table 2.6.3-3

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
599	~~2.6.03.02.iii~~	Not used. ~~2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
600	~~2.6.03.03~~	Not used. ~~3. Separation is provided between Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System, Table 2.6.5-1, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.6.05.03.i and 2.6.05.03.ii in Table 2.6.5-1, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 3.i and 3.ii in Table 2.6.5-1 is needed.

Table 2.6.5-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
627	~~2.6.05.01~~	Not used. ~~1. The functional arrangement of the ELS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.5.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.~~	~~The as-built ELS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.5.~~
* * *				
630	2.6.05.03.i	3. The lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Analysis of seismic supports will be performed.	i) The lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic supports can withstand seismic design basis loads.
631	~~2.6.05.03.ii~~	Not used. ~~3. The lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports.~~	~~ii) Analysis of seismic supports will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic supports can withstand seismic design basis loads.~~
632	~~2.6.05.04~~	Not used. ~~4. The panel lighting circuits are classified as associated and treated as Class 1E. These lighting circuits are routed with the Divisions B and C Class 1E circuits. Separation is provided between ELS associated divisions and between associated divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.9, Plant Security System, Table 2.6.9-1, as shown below:

Table 2.6.9-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
641	~~2.6.09.01~~	Not used. ~~1. The external walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 14.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 14.~~
* * *				
642	~~2.6.09.03~~	Not used. ~~3. Secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment is located within the vital area.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 16.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 16.~~
643	~~2.6.09.04~~	Not used. ~~4. Vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations upon intrusion into a vital area.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 17.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 17.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System, Table 2.7.1-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.7.01.05.i, 2.7.01.05.ii and 2.7.01.05.iii in Table 2.7.1-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 5.i, 5ii and 5.iii in Table 2.7.1-4 is needed.

Table 2.7.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
678	2.7.01.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Table 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A pressure test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.7.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
679	~~2.7.01.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.~~	~~The ASME code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III.~~
680	~~2.7.01.03a~~	Not used. ~~3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
681	~~2.7.01.03b~~	Not used. ~~3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.~~	~~Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.~~
682	~~2.7.01.04a~~	Not used. ~~4.a) The components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.~~	~~A pressure test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
683	~~2.7.01.04b~~	Not used. ~~4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.~~	~~A pressure test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.~~	~~A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.~~
684	2.7.01.05.i	5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Table 2.7.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
685	~~2.7.01.05.ii~~	Not used. ~~5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~
686	~~2.7.01.05.iii~~	Not used. ~~5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions~~.
* * *				
688	~~2.7.01.06b~~	Not used. ~~6.b) Separation is provided between VBS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.~~
689	~~2.7.01.07~~	Not used. ~~7. The VBS and SDS provide the safety-related function to isolate the pipe that penetrates the MCR pressure boundary.~~	~~See item 10.b in this table.~~	~~See item 10.b in this table.~~
690	~~2.7.01.08a~~	Not used. ~~8.a) The VBS provides cooling to the MCR, CSA, RSR, and Class 1E electrical rooms.~~	~~See item 12 in this table.~~	~~See item 12 in this table.~~

Table 2.7.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
691	~~2.7.01.08b~~	Not used. ~~8.b) The VBS provides ventilation cooling to the Class 1E battery rooms.~~	~~See item 12 in this table.~~	~~See item 12 in this table.~~
692	~~2.7.01.08c~~	Not used. ~~8.c) The VBS maintains MCR and CSA habitability when radioactivity is detected.~~	~~See item 12 in this table.~~	~~See item 12 in this table.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.2, Central Chilled Water System, Table 2.7.2-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.2-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
702	~~2.7.02.02~~	Not used. ~~2. The applicable portions of the VWS provide the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VWS lines penetrating the containment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.3, Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System, Table 2.7.3-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.3-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
708	~~2.7.03.02a~~	Not used. ~~2.a) The VXS provides cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the ZOS operates and chilled water is available.~~	~~See item 3 in this table.~~	~~See item 3 in this table.~~
709	~~2.7.03.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The VXS provides ventilation cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the ZOS operates during a loss of offsite power coincident with loss of chilled water.~~	~~See item 3 in this table.~~	~~See item 3 in this table.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.4, Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System, Table 2.7.4-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.4-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
713	~~2.7.04.02a~~	Not used. ~~2.a) The VZS provides ventilation cooling to the diesel generator rooms when the diesel generators are operating.~~	~~See item 3 in this table.~~	~~See item 3 in this table.~~
714	~~2.7.04.02b~~	Not used. ~~2.b) The VZS provides ventilation cooling to the electrical equipment service modules when the diesel generators are operating.~~	~~See item 3 in this table.~~	~~See item 3 in this table.~~
715	~~2.7.04.02c~~	Not used. ~~2.c) The VZS provides normal heating and ventilation to the diesel oil transfer module enclosure.~~	~~See item 3 in this table.~~	~~See item 3 in this table.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.6, Containment Air Filtration System, Table 2.7.6-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.6-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
724	~~2.7.06.02.i~~	Not used. ~~2. The VFS provides the safety-related functions of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VFS lines penetrating containment and providing vacuum relief for the containment vessel.~~	~~i) See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~	~~i) See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Table 3.1-1, as shown below:

Table 3.1-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
738	~~3.1.00.06~~	Not Used ~~6. The CSA provides a habitable workspace environment.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.7.1-4, items 1, 8.a), 8.c), 12, and 13, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.7.1-4, items 1, 8.a), 8.c), 12, and 13, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.2, Human Factors Engineering, Table 3.2-1, as shown below:

Table 3.2.-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
746	~~3.2.00.03.i~~	Not used. ~~3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.~~	~~i) See subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System.~~	~~i) See subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System.~~
747	~~3.2.00.03.ii~~	Not used. ~~3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.~~	~~ii) See subsection 2.2.5, MCR Emergency Habitability System.~~	~~ii) See subsection 2.2.5, MCR Emergency Habitability System.~~
748	~~3.2.00.03.iii~~	Not used. ~~3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.~~	~~iii) See subsection 2.6.3, Class 1E dc and UPS System.~~	~~iii) See subsection 2.6.3, Class 1E dc and UPS system.~~
749	~~3.2.00.03.iv~~	Not used. ~~3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.~~	~~iv) See subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System.~~	~~iv) See subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System.~~
750	~~3.2.00.03.v~~	Not used. ~~3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.~~	~~v) See subsection 2.3.19, Communication System.~~	~~v) See subsection 2.3.19, Communication System.~~
* * *				
753	~~3.2.00.06.i~~	Not used. ~~6. The RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.~~	~~i) See subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System.~~	~~i) See subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System.~~
754	~~3.2.00.06.ii~~	Not used. ~~6. The RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.~~	~~ii) See subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System.~~	~~ii) See subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System.~~
755	~~3.2.00.06.iii~~	Not used. ~~6. The RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.~~	~~iii) See subsection 2.3.19, Communication System.~~	~~iii) See subsection 2.3.19, Communication System.~~

Table 3.2.-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.3, Buildings, Table 3.3-6, as shown below:

Table 3.3-6

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
771	~~3.3.00.02c~~	Not used. ~~2.c) The containment and its penetrations are designed and constructed to ASME Code Section III, Class MC.(1)~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, and 3.b.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, and 3.b.~~
772	~~3.3.00.02d~~	Not used. ~~2.d) The containment and its penetrations retain their pressure boundary integrity associated with the design pressure.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a and 4.b.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a and 4.b.~~
773	~~3.3.00.02e~~	Not used. ~~2.e) The containment and its penetrations maintain the containment leakage rate less than the maximum allowable leakage rate associated with the peak containment pressure for the design basis accident.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a, 4.b, and 7.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a, 4.b, and 7.~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.5, Radiation Monitoring, Table 3.5-6, as shown below:

Table 3.5-6

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
823	3.5.00.01.i	1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		2. The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being located in a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Table 3.5-6

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
824	~~3.5.00.01.ii~~	Not used. ~~1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~
825	~~3.5.00.01.iii~~	Not used. ~~1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.~~	~~iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~	~~iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.~~
826	~~3.5.00.02.i~~	Not used. ~~2. The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.~~	~~i) A report exists and concludes that Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being located in a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~

Table 3.5-6

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
827	~~3.5.00.02.ii~~	Not used. ~~2. The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.~~	~~ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.~~	~~ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.~~
828	~~3.5.00.03~~	Not used. ~~3. Separation is provided between system Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d).~~	~~See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d).~~
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.6, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection, Table 3.6-1, as shown below:

Table 3.6-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
834	~~3.6.00.01.i~~	Not used. ~~1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.~~	~~See sections:~~ ~~i) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, Item 7.a for the sump level measuring instruments WLS-034 and WLS-035.~~	~~See sections:~~ ~~i) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, Item 7.a for the sump level measuring instruments WLS-034 and WLS-035.~~
835	~~3.6.00.01.ii~~	Not used. ~~1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.~~	~~See sections:~~ ~~ii) See ITAAC Table 3.5-6, Item 1 for the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor PSS-RE027.~~	~~See ITAAC sections:~~ ~~ii) See ITAAC Table 3.5-6, Item 1 for the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor PSS-RE027.~~
836	~~3.6.00.01.iii~~	Not used. ~~1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.~~	~~See sections:~~ ~~iii) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a), 7.a), and 10 for the pressurizer level measuring instruments RCS-195A, RCS-195B, RCS-195C, and RCS-195D.~~	~~See sections:~~ ~~iii) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a), 7.a), and 10 for the pressurizer level measuring instruments RCS-195A, RCS-195B, RCS-195C, and RCS-195D.~~
837	~~3.6.00.01.iv~~	Not used. ~~1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.~~	~~See sections:~~ ~~iv) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a) and 7.a) for the RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments RCS-121A, RCS-121B, RCS-121C, RCS-121D, RCS-122A, RCS-122B, RCS-122C, RCS-122D, RCS-131A, RCS-131B, RCS-131C, RCS-131D, RCS-132A, RCS-132B, RCS-132C, and RCS-132D.~~	~~See sections:~~ ~~iv) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a) and 7.a) for the RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments RCS-121A, RCS-121B, RCS-121C, RCS-121D, RCS-122A, RCS-122B, RCS-122C, RCS-122D, RCS-131A, RCS-131B, RCS-131C, RCS-131D, RCS-132A, RCS-132B, RCS-132C, and RCS-132D.~~

Table 3.6-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
838	~~3.6.00.01.v~~	Not used. ~~1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.~~	~~See sections:~~ ~~v) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a), 7.a), and 10 for the RCS pressure instruments RCS-140A, RCS-140B, RCS-140C, and RCS-140D.~~	~~See sections:~~ ~~v) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a), 7.a), and 10 for the RCS pressure instruments RCS-140A, RCS-140B, RCS-140C, and RCS-140D.~~
839	~~3.6.00.01.vi~~	Not used. ~~1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.~~	~~See sections:~~ ~~vi) See ITAAC Table 2.3.2-4, Item 13 for the letdown and makeup flow instruments CVS-001 and CVS-025.~~	~~See sections:~~ ~~vi) See ITAAC Table 2.3.2-4, Item 13 for the letdown and makeup flow instruments CVS-001 and CVS-025.~~
840	~~3.6.00.01.vii~~	Not used. ~~1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.~~	~~vii) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, Item 10 for the reactor coolant drain tank level instrument WLS-002.~~	~~vii) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, Item 10 for the reactor coolant drain tank level instrument WLS-002.~~

Southern Nuclear Operating Company

ND-17-0213

Enclosure 4

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4

Reviewer's Aid: Clean Pages of the Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents

(LAR-17-006)

(This Enclosure consists of 87 pages, including this cover page.)

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.1, Reactor, Subsection 2.1.1, Fuel Handling and Refueling System, Table 2.1.1-1, as shown below:

Table 2.1.1-1
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
3		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.1, Reactor, Subsection 2.1.2, Reactor Coolant System, Table 2.1.2-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.1.02.12a.i, 2.1.02.12a.ii, 2.1.02.12a.iv and 2.1.02.12a.v in Table 2.1.2-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 12a.i, 12a.ii, 12a.iv and 12a.v in Table 2.1.2-4 is needed.

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
13	2.1.02.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
		6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.	An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built RCS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.
14		Not used.		
15		Not used.		
16		Not used.		
17		Not used.		
18		Not used.		

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
19	2.1.02.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
20		Not used.		
21		Not used.		
22		Not used.		
23		Not used.		
24		Not used.		
25		Not used.		
* * *				
27		Not used.		
* * *				

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
53	2.1.02.12a.i	12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
54		Not used.		
* * *				
56	2.1.02.12a.iv	12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	iv) Tests or type tests of squib valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions. v) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.	iv) A test report exists and concludes that each squib valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2-1 under design conditions. v) A report exists and concludes that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
57		Not used.		
58		Not used.		
59		Not used.		

Table 2.1.2-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
60		Not used.		
61		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.1, Reactor, Subsection 2.1.3, Reactor System, Table 2.1.3-2, as shown below:

Table 2.1.3-2
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
72	2.1.03.03	3. The components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III.
		4. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		5. The pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components of the RXS required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
73		Not used.		
74		Not used.		
75	2.1.03.06.i	6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Table 2.1.3-2
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			.	
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		9.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analysis, or a combination of type tests and analysis will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Table 2.1.3-2
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
76		Not used.		
77		Not used.		
* * *				
81		Not used.		
82		Not used.		
* * *				
84		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.1, Containment System, Table 2.2.1-3, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.01.06d.i, 2.2.01.06d.ii, 2.2.01.11a.i and 2.2.01.11a.ii in Table 2.2.1-3, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 6d.i, 6d.ii, 11a.i and 11a.ii in Table 2.2.1-3 is needed.

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
91	2.2.01.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.1-1 and 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	i) A hydrostatic or pressure test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be tested.	i) A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic or pressure test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
92		Not used.		
93		Not used.		
94		Not used.		
95		Not used.		
* * *				
97		Not used.		
98	2.2.01.05.i	5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) The as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
99		Not used.		
100		Not used.		

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
101		Not used.		
102		Not used.		
* * *				
104		Not used.		
105	2.2.01.06d.i	6.d) The non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment. ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
106		Not used.		

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
114	2.2.01.11a.i	11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of each valve to operate under design conditions. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.1-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
115		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.2, Passive Containment Cooling System, Table 2.2.2-3, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.02.11a.i and 2.2.02.11a.ii in Table 2.2.2-3, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 11a.i and 11a.ii in Table 2.2.2-3 is needed.

Table 2.2.2-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
120	2.2.02.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.2-1 and 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

Table 2.2.2-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.2-1 and 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
		5.b) Each of the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report concluding that the as-built pipelines meet the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
121		Not used.		
122		Not used.		
123		Not used.		
124		Not used.		
125		Not used.		
126	2.2.02.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I components and valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

Table 2.2.2-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I components will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I components can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) The report exists and concludes that the as-built components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E components located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E components and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E components and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
127		Not used.		
128		Not used.		

Table 2.2.2-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
129		Not used.		
		* * *		
131		Not used.		
132		Not used.		
		* * *		
134		Not used.		
		* * *		
143		Not used.		
		* * *		
149		Not used.		
		* * *		
154	2.2.02.11a.i	11.a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the capability of the as-built motor-operated valves bound the tested conditions.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.2-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the capability of the as-built motor-operated valves bound the tested conditions.

Table 2.2.2-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
155		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.3, Passive Core Cooling System, Table 2.2.3-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.03.12a.i and 2.2.03.12a.ii in Table 2.2.3-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 12a.i and 12a.ii in Table 2.2.3-4 is needed.

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
159	2.2.03.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.3-1 and 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.3-1 and 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
		5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
		6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.	An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built PXS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.
160		Not used.		
161		Not used.		
162		Not used.		
163		Not used.		

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
164		Not used.		
165	2.2.03.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function. For the PXS containment recirculation and IRWST screens, a report exists and concludes that the screens can withstand seismic dynamic loads and also post-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions. For the PXS containment recirculation and IRWST screens, a report exists and concludes that the as-built screens including their anchorage are bounded by the seismic loads and also post-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights.

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
166		Not used.		
167		Not used.		
168		Not used.		
169		Not used.		
170		Not used.		
171		Not used.		

Table 2.2.3-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
173		Not used.		
174		Not used.		
* * *				
214	2.2.03.12a.i	12.a) The squib valves and check valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of squib valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design condition. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each squib valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.3-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
215		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.4, Steam Generator System, Table 2.2.4-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.04.12a.i and 2.2.04.12a.ii in Table 2.2.4-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 12a.i and 12a.ii in Table 2.2.4-4 is needed.

Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
220	2.2.04.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.4-1 and 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.4-1 and 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
		5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.4-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report concluding that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.4-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
		6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.	An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built SGS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.
221		Not used.		
222		Not used.		
223		Not used.		

Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
224		Not used.		
225		Not used.		
226	2.2.04.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
227		Not used.		
228		Not used.		
229		Not used.		
230		Not used.		
231		Not used.		
232		Not used.		
* * *				
234		Not used.		
* * *				
237		Not used.		
* * *				

Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
239		Not used.		
* * *				
242		Not used.		
* * *				
248	2.2.04.12a.i	12.a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.4-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
249		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.5, Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System, Table 2.2.5-5, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.05.05a.i, 2.2.05.05a.ii and 2.2.05.05a.iii in Table 2.2.5-5, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 5a.i, 5a.ii and 5a.iii in Table 2.2.5-5 is needed.

Table 2.2.5-5

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
253	2.2.05.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.5-1 and 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

Table 2.2.5-5

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.2.5-1 and 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
		5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.5-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.5-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
254		Not used.		
255		Not used.		
256		Not used.		
257		Not used.		
258		Not used.		
259	2.2.05.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Table 2.2.5-5

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
260		Not used.		
261		Not used.		
262		Not used.		
* * *				
264		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.1, Component Cooling Water System, Table 2.3.1-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.1-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
279		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.2, Chemical and Volume Control System, Table 2.3.2-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.02.11a.i and 2.3.02.11a.ii in Table 2.3.2-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 11a.i and 11a.ii in Table 2.3.2-4 is needed.

Table 2.3.2-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
285	2.3.02.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.2-1 and 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

Table 2.3.2-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.2-1 and 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
286		Not used.		
287		Not used.		
288		Not used.		
289		Not used.		
290		Not used.		
291	2.3.02.05.i	5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.

Table 2.3.2-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
292		Not used.		
293		Not used.		
294		Not used.		

Table 2.3.2-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
295		Not used.		
* * *				
297		Not used.		
298		Not used.		
299		Not used.		
300		Not used.		
* * *				
309	2.3.02.11a.i	11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.3.2-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.
310				
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.4, Fire Protection System, Table 2.3.4-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.4-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
329		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.5, Mechanical Handling System, Table 2.3.5-2, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.05.02.i, 2.3.05.02.ii and 2.3.05.02.iii in Table 2.3.5-2, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 2.i, 2ii and 2.iii in Table 2.3.5-2 is needed.

Table 2.3.5-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
340	2.3.05.02.i	2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
341		Not used.		
342		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.6, Normal Residual Heat Removal System, Table 2.3.6-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.06.12a.i and 2.3.06.12a.ii in Table 2.3.6-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 12a.i and 12a.ii in Table 2.3.6-4 is needed.

Table 2.3.6-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
355	2.3.06.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.6-1 and 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

Table 2.3.6-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.6-1 and 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
		5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.3.6-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.3.6-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
		6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.	An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built RNS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.
356		Not used.		
357		Not used.		
358		Not used.		

Table 2.3.6-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
359		Not used.		
360		Not used.		
361	2.3.06.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Table 2.3.6-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
362		Not used.		
363		Not used.		
364		Not used.		
365		Not used.		
366		Not used.		
367		Not used.		
* * *				
369		Not used.		
370		Not used.		
371		Not used.		
* * *				

Table 2.3.6-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
384	2.3.06.12a.i	12.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.	i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.	i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.3.6-1 under design conditions. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.
385		Not used. .		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.7, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System, Table 2.3.7-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.07.05.i, 2.3.07.05.ii and 2.3.07.05.iii in Table 2.3.7-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 5.i, 5.ii and 5.iii in Table 2.3.7-4 is needed.

Table 2.3.7-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
392	2.3.07.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the ASME as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.7-1 and 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3. Pressure boundary welds in piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4. The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping lines required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
393		Not used.		

Table 2.3.7-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
394		Not used.		
395		Not used.		
396	2.3.07.05.i	5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety functions.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
397		Not used.		
398		Not used.		
* * *				
400		Not used.		
401		Not used.		

Table 2.3.7-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
404		Not used.		
405		Not used.		
406		Not used.		
407		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.10, Liquid Radwaste System, Table 2.3.10-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.10.05a.i, 2.3.10.05a.ii and 2.3.10.05a.iii in Table 2.3.10-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 5a.i, 5a.ii and 5a.iii in Table 2.3.10-4 is needed.

Table 2.3.10-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
431	2.3.10.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design report exists for the as built components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.10-1 and 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

Table 2.3.10-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.10-1 and 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
		5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.3.10-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.	Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.	A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.3.10-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.
432		Not used.		
433		Not used.		
434		Not used.		
435		Not used.		
436		Not used.		
437	2.3.10.05a.i	5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Table 2.3.10-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
438		Not used.		
439		Not used.		
440		Not used.		
441		Not used.		
442		Not used.		

* * *

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.11, Gaseous Radwaste System, Table 2.3.11-2, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.11.02.i, 2.3.11.02.ii and 2.3.11.02.iii in Table 2.3.11-2, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 2.i, 2.ii and 2.iii in Table 2.3.11-2 is needed.

Table 2.3.11-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
450	2.3.11.02.i	2. The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismically designed equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismically designed equipment can withstand appropriate seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
451		Not used.		
452		Not used.		

Table 2.3.11-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.13, Primary Sampling System, Table 2.3.13-3, as shown below:

Table 2.3.13-3

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
459	2.3.13.02	2. The components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III.
		3. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4. The components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.	A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.
460		Not used.		
461		Not used.		
462	2.3.13.05.i	5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.3.13-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Table 2.3.13-3

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of their safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of its safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

Table 2.3.13-3

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
463		Not used.		
464		Not used.		
465		Not used.		
466		Not used.		
* * *				
468		Not used.		
469		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.14, Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System, Table 2.3.14-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.14-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
478		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.15, Compressed and Instrument Air System, Table 2.3.15-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.15-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
482		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.1, Diverse Actuation System, Table 2.5.1-4, as shown below:

Table 2.5.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
505		Not used.		
* * *				
520		Not used.		

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.2, Protection and Safety Monitoring System, Table 2.5.2-8, as shown below:

Table 2.5.2-8

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
521		Not used.		
522	2.5.02.02.i	2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

Table 2.5.2-8

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		3. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment.	A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the SWC, EMI, RFI, and ESD conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
		4. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1.	A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
523		Not used.		
524		Not used.		
525		Not used.		
526		Not used.		
* * *				
528		Not used.		

Table 2.5.2-8

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.3, Plant Control System, Table 2.5.3-2, as shown below:

Table 2.5.3-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
554		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.5, In-Core Instrumentation System, Table 2.5.5-2, as shown below:

Table 2.5.5-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
565	2.5.05.02.i	2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

Table 2.5.5-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		3.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analysis, or a combination of type tests and analysis will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment. This equipment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
566		Not used.		
567		Not used.		
568		Not used.		
569		Not used.		
* * *				
571		Not used.		

Table 2.5.5-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.1, Main ac Power System, Table 2.6.1-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.6.01.02.i, 2.6.01.02.ii and 2.6.01.02.iii in Table 2.6.1-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 2.i, 2.ii and 2.iii in Table 2.6.1-4 is needed.

Table 2.6.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
579	2.6.01.02.i	2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
580		Not used.		
581		Not used.		
* * *				

Table 2.6.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
583		Not used.		
* * *				
585		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.2, Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System, Table 2.6.2-1, as shown below:

Table 2.6.2-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
592		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.3, Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System, Table 2.6.3-3, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.6.03.02.i, 2.6.03.02.ii and 2.6.03.02.iii in Table 2.6.3-3, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 2.i, 2.ii and 2.iii in Table 2.6.3-3 is needed.

Table 2.6.3-3

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
596		Not used.		
597	2.6.03.02.i	2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
598		Not used.		
599		Not used.		
600		Not used.		

Table 2.6.3-3

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System, Table 2.6.5-1, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.6.05.03.i and 2.6.05.03.ii in Table 2.6.5-1, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 3.i and 3.ii in Table 2.6.5-1 is needed.

Table 2.6.5-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
627		Not used.		
* * *				
630	2.6.05.03.i	3. The lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Analysis of seismic supports will be performed.	i) The lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic supports can withstand seismic design basis loads.
631		Not used.		
632		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.9, Plant Security System, Table 2.6.9-1, as shown below:

Table 2.6.9-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
641		Not used.		
* * *				
642		Not used.		
643		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System, Table 2.7.1-4, as shown below:

* Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.7.01.05.i, 2.7.01.05.ii and 2.7.01.05.iii in Table 2.7.1-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 5.i, 5ii and 5.iii in Table 2.7.1-4 is needed.

Table 2.7.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		* * *		
678	2.7.01.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Table 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III.
		3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.
		4.a) The components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.	A pressure test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.	A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

Table 2.7.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
679		Not used.		
680		Not used.		
681		Not used.		
682		Not used.		
683		Not used.		
684	2.7.01.05.i	5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
685		Not used.		
686		Not used.		.

Table 2.7.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
688		Not used.		
689		Not used.		
690		Not used.		
691		Not used.		
692		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.2, Central Chilled Water System, Table 2.7.2-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.2-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
702		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.3, Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System, Table 2.7.3-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.3-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
708		Not used.		
709		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.4, Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System, Table 2.7.4-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.4-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
713		Not used.		
714		Not used.		
715		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.6, Containment Air Filtration System, Table 2.7.6-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.6-2

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
724		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Table 3.1-1, as shown below:

Table 3.1-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
738		Not Used		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.2, Human Factors Engineering, Table 3.2-1, as shown below:

Table 3.2.-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
746		Not used.		
747		Not used.		
748		Not used.		
749		Not used.		
750		Not used.		
* * *				
753		Not used.		
754		Not used.		
755		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.3, Buildings, Table 3.3-6, as shown below:

Table 3.3-6

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
* * *				
771		Not used.		
772		Not used.		
773		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.5, Radiation Monitoring, Table 3.5-6, as shown below:

Table 3.5-6

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
823	3.5.00.01.i	1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.	i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.	i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
			ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
			iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.	iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
		2. The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being located in a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Table 3.5-6

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
824		Not used.		
825		Not used.		
826		Not used.		
827		Not used.		
828		Not used.		
* * *				

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.6, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection, Table 3.6-1, as shown below:

Table 3.6-1

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
834		Not used.		
835		Not used.		
836		Not used.		
837		Not used.		
838		Not used.		
839		Not used.		
840		Not used.		