

From: Dipaolo, Eugene
To: amyrosmarin@aol.com
Subject: RE: Re: NRC blast radius for the AIM pipeline, please
Date: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 4:39:00 PM

Dear Ms. Rosmarin,

Thank you for your email of January 16. The NRC is presently working on a response that will answer your questions without divulging security-related information. Some of this information has been previously presented in public forums such as the annual assessment meeting that was held in June of 2016. In order to assure completeness and accuracy of our response, we plan to provide you a response in 30-45 days.

You addressed your January 10, email to Mr. Haagensen. Mr. Haagensen, being the Senior Resident Inspection at Indian Point, has the primary responsibility for implementing the Reactor Oversight Process baseline inspection program as well as other important duties (e.g., plant event response, allegation receipt, management and training of the office's resident inspector staff, etc.). I decided to answer your email to him in order to minimize the impact on the Indian Point Resident Inspector Office's primary duty to provide oversight of the day-to-day operations of Indian Point Units 2 and 3. Also, the regional office has additional resources to interact with experts from NRC Headquarters to best research and provide answers to your questions.

Sincerely,

Gene DiPaolo
 Chief (Acting)
 Division of Reactor Projects, Branch II
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I

W: 610-337-6959
 C: 484-459-9521

From: amyrosmarin@aol.com [mailto:amyrosmarin@aol.com]
Sent: Monday, January 23, 2017 2:27 PM
To: amyrosmarin@aol.com; Dipaolo, Eugene <Eugene.DiPaolo@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>
Cc: sara.levine@mail.house.gov; brian.skretny@mail.house.gov; galefs@assembly.state.ny.us; eewgrassroots@aol.com; svandolsen@gmail.com
Subject: [External_Sender] Re: NRC blast radius for the AIM pipeline, please

Dear Mr. DiPaolo,

On the chance that you put aside my email from January 16, I am resending it.

Given that the questions are quite straightforward and easily answered, we look forward to your quick response. If you cannot answer the questions, perhaps Mr. Haagensen can.

Thank you.

Amy Rosmarin

-----Original Message-----

From: amyrosmarin <amyrosmarin@aol.com>

To: Eugene.DiPaolo <Eugene.DiPaolo@nrc.gov>; Brian.Haagensen <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Cc: sara.levine <sara.levine@mail.house.gov>; brian.skretny <brian.skretny@mail.house.gov>

Sent: Mon, Jan 16, 2017 12:21 pm

Subject: Re: NRC blast radius for the AIM pipeline, please

Dear Mr. DiPaolo,

Thank you for responding to my questions to Mr. Haagensen. I was somewhat surprised to receive the response from you as my email was addressed to Mr. Haagensen, the person most capable of responding to some of the questions asked. Not only is he on site, but from public information Mr. Haagensen appears to have considerably more nuclear experience. An accurate answer to the question about the training of site personnel, for instance, could only be obtained from someone on site, potentially complemented by written communications from Entergy. Since Mr. Haagensen is on site, he may be aware of training that is specific to combating a gas explosion or leak. If he is not aware of any, he could simply ask Entergy, and confirm Entergy's answer with site personnel to determine if the site personnel have received training specific to combating a gas explosion or leak. If it would be useful to Mr. Haagensen, I can provide him the name of an Entergy senior operations person who clearly stated there is no awareness or procedures to combat a gas line malfunction.

Your response indicated some of the information could not be released due to the "sensitive security nature of the information." If one carefully reviews the FSAR it is noted that the details of almost every conceivable accident is reviewed and analyzed and nothing is identified as "sensitive security" including the passage of the gas lines through and around a nuclear site.

Why is the transport of natural gas through and around this nuclear site singled out to be "sensitive security" information? This term is not mentioned or defined within the regulations.

Please provide justification and documentation as to why this information is being withheld.

You did not answer several questions so I will ask again.

Would destruction of the substation/switchyard across the street from Indian Point power plant have "zero effect on Indian Point's safety"?

Yes? No?

Could or would vital or critical components for safe shutdown be impacted by an event of the AIM or existing gas lines?

Yes? No?

Has specific training been provided to plant personnel for gas line leaks, fires and explosions?

Your answer that "Indian Point is required to have a Fire Protection Program where plant operators are trained as a fire brigade to respond to and fight a comprehensive variety of plant fires. Plant procedures are in place which require the call for offsite fire department assistance for numerous situations, including the case if the onsite fire brigade is unable to effectively control or extinguish the fire." does not answer my question.

Has SPECIFIC training been provided to plant personnel FOR GAS LINE LEAKS, FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS?

Yes? No?

Has Spectra provided any training for plant personnel?

Your answer did not answer my question. Let me clarify. I asked if Spectra provided any training for PLANT personnel. Plant personnel refers to Indian Point PLANT personnel.

Has Spectra provided any training for plant personnel?

Yes? No?

Since you won't say what the NRC's blast radius calculation is, please point me to the formula in your directives that the NRC used but that the independent engineers from the NRC, DOE, Union of Concerned Scientists, and Mr. Blanch did not use when they calculated the blast radius of the AIM using the NRC's formulas and assumptions received through FOIA and other public documents.

Thank you,
Amy Rosmarin

-----Original Message-----

From: Dipaolo, Eugene <Eugene.DiPaolo@nrc.gov>

To: amyrosmarin <amyrosmarin@aol.com>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Sent: Tue, Jan 10, 2017 9:20 am

Subject: RE: Re: NRC blast radius for the AIM pipeline, please

Ms Rosmarin,

Good morning. I am writing to you in response to your email to Mr. Brian Haagensen, the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point, on January 9, 2017, with questions regarding the gas pipeline in the vicinity of the Indian Point nuclear units.

The blast radii and resulting impacts to structures at Indian Point cannot be released to the general public because of the sensitive security nature of the information. Analyses have been done which have provided reasonable assurance that in the unlikely event of a failure of the existing gas pipelines, the safe operation of Indian Point will not be impaired.

Indian Point is required to have a Fire Protection Program where plant operators are trained as a fire brigade to respond to and fight a comprehensive variety of plant fires. Plant procedures are in place which require the call for offsite fire department assistance for numerous situations, including the case if the onsite fire brigade is unable to effectively control or extinguish the fire. Regarding the training policies or procedures for Spectra pipeline personnel, we suggest that you contact the U.S. DOT or Spectra Energy, as the NRC does not have regulatory jurisdiction in that matter.

Sincerely,

Gene DiPaolo
Chief (Acting)
Division of Reactor Projects, Branch II

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I

W: 610-337-6959

C: 484-459-9521

From: amyrosmarin@aol.com [<mailto:amyrosmarin@aol.com>]

Sent: Monday, January 09, 2017 3:29 PM

To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Cc: Dipaolo, Eugene <Eugene.DiPaolo@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>

Subject: [External_Sender] Re: NRC blast radius for the AIM pipeline, please

Dear Mr. Haagensen,

As you may be aware, a panel of independent engineering experts have concurred that the blast radius of a pipeline rupture exceeds 4,000 feet and would engulf the entire Indian Point site. Given that Mr. Nappi has said that the pipeline is 1,320 feet from the plant, am I correct in assuming that the NRC calculates that the blast radius would be less than 1,320 feet?

Would destruction of the substation across the street from Indian Point power plant have "zero effect on Indian Point's safety"?

Could or would vital or critical components for safe shutdown be impacted by an event of the AIM or existing gas lines?

Has specific training been provided to plant personnel for gas line leaks, fires and explosions?

Has Spectra provided any training for plant personnel?

Thank you,
Amy Rosmarin

-----Original Message-----

From: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

To: amyrosmarin <amyrosmarin@aol.com>

Cc: Dipaolo, Eugene <Eugene.DiPaolo@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>

Sent: Fri, Jan 6, 2017 8:23 am

Subject: RE: NRC blast radius for the AIM pipeline, please

Ms. Rosmarin,

The blast radii and resulting overpressures and heat fluxes on the structures at Indian Point cannot be released to the general public because of the sensitive security nature of the information. The NRC has concluded through its own independent calculations that a rupture of the pipelines at either an aboveground or underground location would not prevent the safe shutdown of either Indian Point unit.

If you have further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

*Sincerely,
Brian Haagensen
Senior Resident Inspector
Indian Point*

From: amyrosmarin@aol.com [<mailto:amyrosmarin@aol.com>]
Sent: Tuesday, December 27, 2016 11:33 AM
To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>
Subject: [External_Sender] NRC blast radius for the AIM pipeline, please

Dear Mr. Haagensen,

Could you please tell me the blast radius that the NRC calculated for the AIM pipeline at Indian Point.

Thank you.

Amy Rosmarin