

CHAIRMAN Resource

From: Tom Gurdziel <tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com>
Sent: Sunday, January 15, 2017 6:28 PM
To: CHAIRMAN Resource
Cc: Bridget Frymire
Subject: [External_Sender] U.S. Severe Accident Command, Control, and Communication
Attachments: Senate Committee.docx

Good morning,

Despite having received a reassuring letter from Commissioner Ostendorff on this subject, I feel it necessary at this time to again ask questions about the command, control, and communication pathways to be used here in the United States during a commercial nuclear plant severe accident. I feel that the US NRC has allowed itself to be displaced from any position of importance or authority.

I used to think that the NRC would be informed of a plant problem and its 24 hour a day Operations Center would then provide information and, perhaps, some direction. But, from listening to the Fukushima Steering Committee meetings, it seems things are different. Here is how I understand the process.

I have big trouble at my U.S. commercial nuclear power plant site so I call INPO, who is now the coordinator. INPO decides what to do or, at least, what needs to be sent to my plants. INPO calls AREVA and they, (AREVA), sends both men and equipment as needed. (Do you see any involvement of the US NRC here?)

Presently the US NRC does have a 24 hour a day Operations Center. I called once on a Sunday (football) afternoon to ask the number of torus to drywell vacuum breakers on a specific plant. They would not talk to me since I was not reporting an accident. They did say, however, that I could find that information in the Technical Specifications or FSAR of the plant since it was available on line. Well, I don't think I could have found that information even if I would have looked. I did conclude that they would not be able to find it either. Later, I told a few NRC employees about my experience. They told me that the US NRC Operations Center is there to provide telephone numbers of various organizations. If that is true, (and I got that same explanation from two or more individuals), aren't they just a complete waste of money?

In any event, the US common citizen needs a good estimate of plant damage from the plant operator so that local government can order accurate Protective Actions when there is a severe accident. And, SOMEBODY needs to be able to quickly confirm that the Protective Actions specified are appropriate.

The attached letter is my attempt to find out just who that SOMEBODY is.

Thank you,

Tom Gurdziel



This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.

www.avast.com

9 Twin Orchard Drive
Oswego, NY 13126
January 14, 2017

Senator John Barrasso
Chairman
U.S. Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works
410 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-6175

Dear Senator John Barrasso:

As an investor in a number of U.S. companies who operate commercial nuclear powerplants, I have been particularly interested in Fukushima-related information since the plant destructions there more than 5 years ago. I am writing this letter to ask that you determine the adequacy of one important need for which I do not have sufficient information.

This present need is the (real time) ability to predict release amounts and deposit locations of radioactive material from severe commercial nuclear plant site-wide accidents so that protective actions can be promptly recommended.

Here is the problem. An "external event" like an earthquake can affect ALL plants on one site. Each plant can have two sources of radioactive material. For instance, a 3 unit site can have 6 sources of release: three from reactor vessels and three from spent fuel pools. (I am ignoring the possible existence of an independent spent fuel storage area on that site.)

Does this ability exist in the United States today?

Yours truly,

Thomas Gurdziel
Member, ASME