

Requirements to Consider LOOP in Conjunction with Large LOCA Rulemaking Description

The concept of this potential rule would be to amend the Commission's regulations to eliminate, based upon appropriate risk considerations, the assumption of a coincident loss of offsite power for postulated large-break (low frequency) loss-of-coolant accidents (LB-LOCA) in General Design Criterion (GDC) 35. The proposed rule would provide a voluntary alternative to existing requirements in situations where specified acceptance criteria are satisfied, and also would address a petition for rulemaking submitted by Bob Christie (Performance Technology) (PRM-50-77).

The staff's initial approach was to develop the technical basis for a LOOP-LOCA rule by reviewing the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) topical report, NEDO-33148, "Separation of Loss of Offsite Power from Large Break LOCA" (ML041210900, April 27, 2004). In the March 31, 2003, staff requirements memorandum directing the staff to go forward with a risk-informed rule decoupling LOOP from LOCA (ML030910476), the Commission stated that the rule should consider the risk impacts of a "delayed LOOP and possible double-sequencing of safety functions." During the review of the BWROG topical report, the potential safety impact of a LOCA followed by a delayed LOOP became a major issue. Existing nuclear plants are designed to handle only the simultaneous LOCA and LOOP. The capability of many plants to successfully mitigate upsets causing a delayed LOOP has not been determined.

The BWROG topical report proposed an approach to justify decoupling LOOP from LOCA for LOCAs larger than 10" in diameter. That approach relied on the assumption that a single probability of delayed LOOP could be generically applied to all plants. This assumption conflicts with the resolution of GSI 171, "Engineered Safety Features Failure from LOOP Subsequent to a LOCA," which concluded that the probability of a delayed LOOP will vary significantly for individual plants depending on their design. The staff concluded that the BWROG approach could not be approved without evaluating an individual plant's capability to successfully cope with a delayed LOOP. This staff position resulted in the BWROG concluding that continued development of the topical report was no longer cost effective, and if ultimately approved in the form desired by NRC staff, adoption by licensees would most likely be prohibitively expensive. By letter dated June 12, 2008, the BWROG withdrew the report from further NRC review.

When completed, the final § 50.46a risk-informed ECCS rule would allow licensees to decouple LOOP from LOCA for LOCAs larger than the transition break size (about 11 inches for PWRs and about 21 inches for BWRs). In December 2007, in COMSECY-07-0041 (ML073200076), "Status of Staff Activities on Proposed Rule for Risk-Informed Decoupling of Assumed Loss-of-Offsite Power From Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analyses," the staff indicated its plans to reassess the need for a LOOP-LOCA rule after making final decisions on the BWROG topical report and on the § 50.46a risk-informed ECCS rule.

The BWROG's conclusion that the initial proposed approach to decouple LOOP from LOCA would be prohibitively expensive decreases the likelihood of developing a successful LOOP-LOCA rule. In September of 2009, SECY-09-0140 (ML092151078), "Rulemaking Related to Decoupling an Assumed Loss of Offsite Power from a Loss of Coolant Accident, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 35," provided options for completing the rulemaking and recommended the option to discontinue the rulemaking effort. The staff's recommendation was based on the lack of a fully developed regulatory basis and expenditures of staff time to develop one were not expected to result in a quantifiable safety improvement. In the SRM

related to SECY-09-0140 dated July 12, 2010 (ML101830056), the Commission directed the staff to defer the decision on the rulemaking effort until after the 10 CFR 50.46a rule is implemented.

In SECY-10-0161 dated December 10, 2010 (ML12117A121), "Final Rule: Risk- Informed Changes to Loss-of- Coolant Accident Technical Requirements (10 CFR 50.46a)," the staff provided a draft final risk-informed ECCS rule to the Commission. Subsequently, on April 20, 2012 (ML121500380), the staff requested withdrawal of the § 50.46a final rule from Commission consideration so that the rule could be reconsidered after receiving anticipated regulatory framework direction associated with the Commission's consideration of Recommendation 1, "Regulatory Framework for the 21st Century" of the Fukushima Near-Term task Force report. The Commission approved the withdrawal request in an SRM dated April 26, 2012 (ML12117A121). The staff provided regulatory framework recommendations to the Commission on December 6, 2013, in SECY-13-0132 (ML13277A413), "Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Recommendation for the Disposition of Recommendation 1 of the Near-Term Task Force Report." The Commission's SRM-SECY-13-0132 (ML14139A104) deferred providing regulatory framework direction until after the staff provided its evaluation of the regulatory framework approach recommended in NUREG-2150, "A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework," (April 2012).

The staff's evaluation of NUREG-2150 was provided to the Commission in December 2015. The Commission, via SRM-SECY-15-0168 (ML16069A370), directed the staff to: 1) maintain the existing regulatory framework for the nuclear power reactor safety program area, and 2) refrain from developing an overarching, agency-wide risk management policy statement. The proposed 50.46a rule was not subsequently issued and work on this effort has been discontinued (81 FR 69446). As a result, the staff has started engaging with the industry to determine the need for and interest in the rulemaking to decouple the LOOP assumption from LBLOCA analysis.