



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION I
2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD.
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713

December 1, 2016

Mr. Eric McCartney
Site Vice President
Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC
c/o Mr. Ken Browne
P.O. Box 300
Seabrook, NH 03874

SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION – PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION
INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2016009

Dear Mr. McCartney:

On October 21, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at Seabrook Station. On that date, the NRC inspection team discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's corrective action program and the station's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the station's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the station's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas also adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available. The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.

E. McCarthy

-2-

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Fred L. Bower III, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-443
License No.: NPF-86

Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000443/2016009
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

E. McCarthy

-2-

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Fred L. Bower III, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-443
License No.: NPF-86

Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000443/2016009
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

DISTRIBUTION w/encl: (via e-mail)

DDorman, RA	RBarkley, DRP	RidsNrrPMSeabrook
DLew, DRA	MDraxton, DRP	Resource
MScott, DRP	RVadella, DRP	RidsNrrDorlLpl1-2
DPelton, DRP	PCataldo, DRP, SRI	Resource
RLorson, DRS	PMeier, DRP, RI	ROPreports Resource
JYerokun, DRS	ACass, DRP, Resident AA	
FBower, DRP	JBowen, RI, OEDO	

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH3\Inspection Reports\Seabrook\2016\PIR Biennial\Seabrook 2016 PIR Report FINAL.docx
ADAMS ML16340A195

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SUNSI Review		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Non-Sensitive <input type="checkbox"/> Sensitive		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Publicly Available <input type="checkbox"/> Non-Publicly Available	
OFFICE	RI/DRP 3	RI/TSAB	RI/DRP 3		
NAME	R. Barkley	M. Ferdas	F. Bower		
DATE	11/14/2016	12/01/2016	12/01/2016		

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No.: 50-443

License No.: NPF-86

Report No.: 05000443/2016009

Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC

Facility: Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1

Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire

Dates: October 3 - 21, 2016

Team Leader: R. Barkley, PE, Senior Project Engineer

Inspectors: S. Elkhiamy, Project Engineer
P. Meier, Resident Inspector
N. Staples, Senior Project Engineer

Approved by: Fred L. Bower, III, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 5000443/2016009 - Biennial Baseline Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution. This NRC team inspection was performed by three regional inspectors, one of whom was from Region II, and the resident inspector. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy, dated August 1, 2016. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.

Problem Identification and Resolution

The inspectors concluded that NextEra was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. NextEra personnel identified problems, entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, and prioritized issues commensurate with their safety significance. In most cases, NextEra appropriately screened issues for operability and reportability, and performed causal analyses that appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also determined that NextEra typically implemented corrective actions to address the problems identified in the corrective action program in a timely manner.

The inspectors concluded that NextEra adequately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience to Seabrook operations. In addition, based on those items selected for review, the inspectors determined that NextEra's self-assessments and audits were thorough.

Based on the interviews the inspectors conducted over the course of the inspection, observations of plant activities, and reviews of individual corrective action program and employee concerns program (ECP) issues, the inspectors did not identify any indications that site personnel were unwilling to raise safety issues nor did they identify any conditions that could have had a negative impact on the site's safety conscious work environment.

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152B – 1 sample)

This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolution (PI&R) as defined by Inspection Procedure 71152. All documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

.1 Assessment of Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the procedures that described NextEra's corrective action program at Seabrook Station. To assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program (CAP), the inspectors reviewed performance in three primary areas: problem identification, prioritization and evaluation of issues, and corrective action implementation. The inspectors compared performance in these areas to the requirements and standards contained in Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," and NextEra procedure PI-AA-104-1000, Condition Reporting. For each of these areas, the inspectors considered risk insights from the station's risk analysis and reviewed condition reports selected across the seven cornerstones of safety in the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). Additionally, the inspectors attended multiple Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) and Management Review Committee (MRC) meetings. The inspectors selected items from the following functional areas for review: engineering, operations, maintenance, emergency preparedness, radiation protection, chemistry, physical security, and oversight programs.

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification

In addition to the items described above, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, a sample of completed corrective and preventative maintenance work orders, completed surveillance test procedures, and periodic trend reports. The inspectors also completed field walkdowns of various systems on site, such as the service water system and station batteries. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports written to document issues identified through internal self-assessments, audits, emergency preparedness drills, and the operating experience program. The inspectors completed this review to verify that NextEra entered conditions adverse to quality into their corrective action program as appropriate.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and prioritization of a sample of condition reports issued since the last NRC Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution inspection completed in October 2014. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports that were assigned lower levels of significance that did not include formal cause evaluations to ensure that they were properly classified. The inspectors' review included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution. The inspectors assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes for the issues and developed appropriate corrective actions to address the identified causes.

Further, the inspectors reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for selected problems to verify these processes adequately addressed equipment operability, reporting of issues to the NRC, and the extent of the issues.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors reviewed NextEra's completed corrective actions through documentation review and, in some cases, field walkdowns to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actions were effective in addressing the broader issues. The inspectors reviewed NextEra's timeliness in implementing corrective actions and effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with selected non-cited violations and findings to verify that NextEra personnel properly evaluated and resolved these issues. In addition, the inspectors expanded the corrective action review to five years to evaluate NextEra actions related to the feedwater system.

b. Assessment

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification

Based on the selected samples, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel in multiple functional areas, the inspectors determined that NextEra identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. NextEra staff at Seabrook initiated over 26,000 condition reports between January 2014 and August 2016. The inspectors observed supervisors at the CARB and MRC meetings appropriately questioning and challenging condition reports to ensure clarification of the issues. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that NextEra trended equipment and programmatic issues, and appropriately identified problems in condition reports. The inspectors verified that conditions adverse to quality identified through this review were entered into the corrective action program as appropriate. Additionally, inspectors concluded that personnel were identifying trends at low levels. In general, inspectors did not identify any issues or concerns that had not been appropriately entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. In response to several questions and minor equipment observations identified by the inspectors during plant walkdowns, NextEra personnel promptly initiated condition reports or removed old deficiency tags for issues that had since been corrected. The team noted the following minor violation of NRC regulations while performing this portion of the inspection:

Use of Unqualified Maintenance Workers on a Safety-Related Valve

During a review of the root cause evaluation (RCE) on the RHR suction valve (RC-V-22) packing leak, the inspectors noted that NextEra brought in a contractor to repack that valve and others during the prior refueling outage. NextEra then had to bring in a subcontractor to assist due to the need for additional labor. However, the employees for this subcontractor were not qualified to perform work on safety-related equipment, such as repacking valve RC-V-22. While they were supposed to be supervised by a qualified worker and only provide labor assistance, they in fact wound up performing key elements of the valve repacking and did so without supervision by a qualified worker.

The valve packing leaked shortly after pressurization and eventually had to be replaced during the March 2016 forced outage initiated for other reasons. The inspectors considered the failure to follow NextEra's procedure governing the qualification and oversight of contract workers (SSMA, Maintenance Manual, Revision 140, "Job Assignments") to be a performance deficiency. Specifically, Seabrook did not ensure that an outside contractor was properly qualified to perform safety significant activities under NextEra's established quality assurance program (NextEra QATR Section A.5 – Personnel Training and Qualification). However, because the leak was small and did not involve the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the inspectors screened the violation in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B and determined that it was of minor significance and not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. NextEra documented this issue in condition reports 02163894, 02164076, and 02164143.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors determined that, in general, NextEra appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. NextEra screened condition reports for operability and reportability, categorized the condition reports by significance, and assigned actions to the appropriate department for evaluation and resolution. The condition report screening process considered human performance issues, radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, adverse trends, and potential impact on the safety conscious work environment.

Based on the sample of condition reports reviewed, the inspectors noted that the guidance provided by NextEra's corrective action program implementing procedures appeared sufficient to ensure consistency in the categorization of issues. Operability and reportability determinations were generally performed when conditions warranted and in most cases, the evaluations supported the conclusion. Causal analyses appropriately considered the extent of condition or problem, generic issues, and previous occurrences of the issue. However, the team did note some observations in NextEra's prioritization and evaluation of the following issues:

Evaluation of the Operability/Functionality of Potentially Degraded Equipment:

The inspectors found three occasions where an issue with operability/functionality was not fully addressed by Operations during the process of characterizing potentially degraded equipment. For example: (1) a packing leak on a steam generator (SG) blowdown valve with a containment isolation function was not listed as technical specification (TS) equipment and safety-related, which would have prompted an additional level of technical review; (2) a reactor coolant pump thermal barrier leak was misclassified; and, (3) the team noted an issue in 2014 (AR 01995793) where indicated service water flow values were found to be 500 GPM apart versus the usual 200 GPM. In the last example, Instrumentation and Controls technicians did a calibration and found one flow instrument was out of calibration, but the team noted that the flow rate found before the calibration was used for a prior surveillance test. Fortunately, the proper engineering evaluation was eventually taken in each of the three cases above, but in the case of the service water (SW) flow instrument, not until after a month lapsed. We noted that Seabrook identified similar screening issues in a June 2016 self-assessment (AR 2097987), but such events continue to occur.

The inspectors determined that the inadequate operability evaluation documentation for these components was a performance deficiency. However, because the first two issues were evaluated in a timely manner, and the proper technical actions taken in all three cases, the inspectors determined that these issues were of minor significance and not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. NextEra documented these issues in condition reports 2160716, 2163674, and 2164244.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse to quality, NextEra identified actions to prevent recurrence. The inspectors concluded that corrective actions to address the sample of NRC non-cited violations and findings since the last problem identification and resolution inspection were timely and effective. The inspectors did observe a weakness in NextEra's resolution of a degraded condition as noted below:

Proper Scheduling of Inservice Test Surveillances

During a review of an apparent cause evaluation (ACE) and a common cause evaluation (CCE) on the untimely completion of inservice testing (IST) surveillances on two service water valves and two safety-related pumps, the team noted that the proposed corrective action for the first instance in May 2015 was not completed. Specifically, the extent of condition review performed for the first overdue surveillance identified other surveillances that could come overdue, but the corrective action did not get a hard schedule date in NextEra's tracking system. When schedule dates were later changed, it allowed the surveillance test on another SW valve to go overdue in February 2016. Two other pump ISTs also went overdue in February 2016. Since this corrective action was not implemented, permitting the problem to recur, the team considered this issue to be a performance deficiency. However, as the components subsequently tested satisfactorily, this violation of NextEra's Condition Reporting Procedure (PI-AA-104-1000, Section 4.9.2.B) was determined to be of minor significance and not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The team also had concerns with two follow-on corrective actions that had either not been reflected in the corresponding fleet procedure, or had yet to be scheduled for completion. This issue was entered into NextEra's CA system as CR 2160543.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with review of industry operating experience to determine whether NextEra appropriately evaluated the operating experience information for applicability to Seabrook and had taken appropriate actions, when warranted. The inspectors also reviewed evaluations of operating experience documents associated with a sample of NRC generic communications to ensure that NextEra adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issues for resolution via their corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors observed various plant activities to determine if the station considered industry operating experience during the performance of routine and infrequently performed activities.

b. Assessment

The inspectors determined that NextEra appropriately considered industry operating experience information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The inspectors determined that operating experience was appropriately applied and lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations and procedures when applicable. The inspectors also observed that industry operating experience was routinely discussed and considered during the conduct of Plan-of-the-Day meetings.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of audits, including the most recent audit of the corrective action program, departmental functional area and quick hit self-assessments, and assessments performed by independent organizations. Inspectors performed these reviews to determine if NextEra entered problems identified through these assessments into the corrective action program, when appropriate, and whether NextEra initiated corrective actions to address identified deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the audits and assessments by comparing audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified observations made during the inspection.

b. Assessment

The inspectors concluded that self-assessments, audits, and other internal NextEra assessments were generally critical and thorough, and in several cases effective in identifying issues. The inspectors observed that NextEra personnel knowledgeable in the subject completed these audits and self-assessments in a methodical manner. NextEra completed these audits and some self-assessments to a sufficient depth to identify issues which were then entered into the corrective action program for evaluation. In general, the station implemented corrective actions associated with the identified issues commensurate with their safety significance.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

During interviews with station personnel, the inspectors assessed the safety conscious work environment at Seabrook. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed personnel to determine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC. The inspectors also interviewed the station ECP coordinator to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employees were aware of the program and its availability with regards to raising safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed selected ECP files to ensure that NextEra entered issues into the corrective action program when appropriate.

b. Assessment

During interviews with individual team members, Seabrook staff expressed a willingness to use the corrective action program to identify plant issues and deficiencies and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues. The inspectors noted that no one interviewed stated that they personally experienced or were aware of a situation in which an individual had been retaliated against for raising a safety issue. All persons interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the corrective action program and the ECP. The 2014 safety culture survey (the most recent available) was also reviewed and it also reflected a willingness of employees to raised safety concerns.

While the site affords employees the opportunity to submit condition reports anonymously, few are actually submitted each year; the team reviewed a number of these as well as the resulting actions taken. Also, the team noted that several condition reports on sensitive subjects were freely submitted by employees who provided their contact information. In addition, NRC allegation activity at Seabrook since the last Problem Identification and Resolution PI&R has remained low. Based on these limited interviews as well as the survey data and a review of the ECP case history since 2014, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable safety conscious work environment and no significant challenges to the free flow of information.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On October 21, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Eric McCartney, Site Vice President, and other members of the Seabrook staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

E. McCartney, Site Vice President
A. Chesno, Performance Improvement Manager
V. Brown, Licensing Analyst
K. Browne, Licensing Manager
C. Ellis, Radiation Protection
S. Folsom, Maintenance Director (acting)
J. Dolan, Maintenance CAPCO
E. Mathews, System Engineer
B. McAllister, Systems Engineering Supervisor
C. Moynihan, Performance Improvement Analyst
A. Downey, System Engineer
J. Klempa, System Engineer
R. Guthrie, System Engineer
R. Schalck, System Engineer
K. Harper, System Engineer
M. Collins, Engineering Director
R. Perry, IST Program Manager
M. Peters, Engineering CAPCO
D. Ritter, Operations Director
T. Smith, Radiation Protection Supervisor
D. Strand, Radiation Protection Manager
J. Tucker, Security Manager
B. Whyte, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent

NRC Personnel

W. Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst, Region I

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened and Closed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 40A2: Problem Identification and Resolution

Audits and Self-Assessments

Department Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture
EP self-assessment audit
Focused Self-Assessment – Fleet Corrective Action Program
Focused Area Self-Assessment -- Radiation Protection Instrumentation Program
Focused Area Self-Assessment – Problem Identification & Resolution
Nuclear Oversight Report – Performance Improvement (SBK# 15-011)

QHSA 2014 Nuclear Projects Measure of Success
 QHSA 2015 Nuclear Projects Measure of Success
 QHSA Ops CAP Measure of Success 2014
 QHSA Ops CAP Measure of Success 2015
 QHSA Security Measures of Success
 Seabrook Daily Quality Summary Reports (CA-related observations 1/1/14 – 8/25/16)
 Self-Assessment has not yielded improvement (AR 02112403)

Condition Reports (* indicates that condition report was generated as a result of this inspection)

1693814	1873391	2004234	2035366	2077820	2108355	2136006
1693855	1921653	2006305	2035686	2077836	2083599	2065230
1697250	1928545	2008404	2036697	2077898	2108372	2139566
1699599	1934008	2011698	2036924	2079522	2109628	2140612
1702556	1938728	2013302	2037260	2081715	2110020	2143155
1703710	1942280	2014116	2045450	2083161	2112244	2144144
1704325	1942717	2014264	2047846	2085253	2114495	2145617
1716908	1944559	2014325	2049737	2086391	2135126	2146624
1756235	1945403	2014638	2062240	2086635	2116310	2154705
1792118	1948973	2014639	2052602	2089549	2115865	2154819
1803271	1957766	2016192	2053991	2091049	2116400	2155786
1803685	1964787	2016225	2075215	2091331	2116923	2156454
1803686	1969397	2016238	2054462	2091426	2117035	2156773
1811526	1988938	2016863	2054590	2091437	2117097	2157869
1815351	1989369	2017379	2059207	2091477	2118148	2158622
1817396	1989420	2022050	2061978	2091480	2125934	2159224
1823598	1990677	2022462	2064300	2097586	2127573	2160716*
1825599	1991284	2023931	2067326	2101826	2128093	2160295*
1832016	1992038	2023961	2070638	2103175	2128468	2160543*
1843442	1994649	2027276	2070872	2103176	2129116	2163894*
1846995	1995588	2150303	2071051	2106893	2129315	2164301*
1847826	1990673	2028739	2072557	2091366	2130510	2164244*
1852329	1995663	2030144	2073964	2107978	2130585	2164143*
1862823	1995793	2030192	2075349	2107980	2134335	2164076*
1862894	2000697	2030450	2075894	2107981	2071671	2163674*
1873383	2000817	2032322	2077337	2107982	2028054	2163481*
						2163388*

Operating Experience

PWR Chemistry Fuel Reliability Guidelines (AR 02050157)
 Formal Benchmarking Report – ALARA (AR 01928545)
 Braidwood & Byron block valve design flaw (AR 02069062)

Procedures

Appendix B Strategic Water Chemistry Plan Primary System, Revision 67
 CP 3.1, Primary Chemistry Control Program, Revision 45
 EN-AA-203-1001, Operability and Functionality Assessment, Revision 22
 EN-AA-203-1100, Engineering Evaluations, Revision 9
 ER-AA-113, IST Program, Revision 0
 ER-AA-113-1000, IST procedure, Revision 1
 FPL-1 Quality Assurance Topical Report, Revision 19
 LX0557.02, 60 Month PM of 480V US Breakers, Revision 20
 MA 3.5, Post Maintenance Test, Revision 19
 MA-AA-204-1000-1000, NAMS PM Requirement Processing, Revision 5
 MA-AA-203-1002, Equipment Repair and Refurbishment, Revision 0
 MA-AA-215, Outage Valve Maintenance Process, Revision 0
 NA-AA-200-1000, Employee Concerns Program, Revision 0
 NA-JB-1006, Source Surveillance of Supplier Activities, Revision 0
 OP-AA-101-1000, Nuclear Fleet Administrative, Revision 11
 OS1090.03, Backup Instrumentation for Category 2 and 3, Revision 6
 OX1416.04, Revision 20, SW Quarterly Pump and Discharge Valve Test, Revision 20
 OX1416.05, SW Cooling Tower Quarterly Pump and Discharge Valve Test, Revision 24
 PEG-04, Building/Structures Surveillance Inspections, Revision 09
 PI-AA-01, Corrective Action Program and Condition Reporting, Revision 4
 PI-AA-101-100, Quick Hit Self-Assessment, Revision 9
 PI-AA-101-1000, Focused Area Self-Assessment, Revision 15
 PI-AA-101-1006, Common Cause Evaluation, Revision 12
 PI-AA-100-1005, Root Cause Analysis, Revision 15
 PI-AA-101-1007, Apparent Cause Evaluation, Revision 16
 PI-AA-100-1008, Condition Evaluation, Revision 9
 PI-AA-101, Assessment and Improvement Programs, Revision 22
 PI-AA-102, Operating Experience Program, Revision 11
 PI-AA-104-1000, Condition Reporting, Revision 11
 PI-AA-207, Trending, Revision 11
 PR-AA-100-1000, Nuclear Contract Management, Revision 9
 QM 4.11, Verifying Qualifications, Revision 10
 SSMA, Maintenance Manual, Revision 153
 TR-AA-100, Fleet Supplemental Personnel Training Requirements, Revision 8
 WM-AA-203-1004, Online Scheduling Process Flow and Description, Revision 1
 WM-AA-203, Online Scheduling Process, Revision 15

Work Orders

94114238	94128551	94129870	9419906	94132975	94132974
94127094	40181308	40235297	40212536	40185529	PM12956
40214004	40213823	94067836	40366150	40366152	40312722
40279910	40464191	40486421	94139510		

Miscellaneous

36180, Structures Monitoring Program, Revision 09
 Contracts 02340179 & 02320469
 Engineering Corrective Action Program Recovery Plan
 Engineering Department CARB Agenda – October 19, 2016
 LTAM Strategy for Service Water
 IST Programs Engineering Task Force
 Listing of Trend CRs since September 2014
 Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Improvement Plan
 MRC Screening Report – August 31, 2016
 NEI Efficiency Bulletin 16-10 – Reduce Cumulative Impact from the Corrective Action Program
 Operator Burdens List (March, June, September and December 2015, March & June 2016)
 Organizational Survey Analysis Report for Seabrook Station – 12/30/2014
 Seabrook NRB Observations #644, #648, #656, #659
 Seabrook Station Self-Evaluation and Trending Report for 2nd Quarter 2016
 Selected ECP Files (confidential)

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMS	Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System
ACE	Apparent Cause Evaluation
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CAPCO	Corrective Action Program Coordinator
CARB	Corrective Action Review Board
CCE	Common Cause Evaluation
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
ECP	Employee Concerns Program
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IST	Inservice Testing
MRC	Management Review Committee
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OA	Other Activities
PARS	Publicly Available Records System
PI&R	Problem Identification and Resolution
RCE	Root Cause Evaluation
ROP	Reactor Oversight Program
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SW	Service water