

Robert J. Franssen
Plant Manager

Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC
769 Salem Boulevard
Berwick, PA 18603
Tel. 570.542.3170 Fax 570.542.1504
robert.franssen@talenenergy.com



DEC 01 2016

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

10 CFR 50.73

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387(388)/2016-022-00
UNIT 1 LICENSE NO. NPF-14
UNIT 2 LICENSE NO. NPF-22
PLA-7544

Docket No. 50-387
50-388

Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-387(388)/2016-022-00. This LER reports an event involving Secondary Containment being declared inoperable due to both doors of an airlock being open at the same time. This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. J. Franssen", written in a cursive style.

R. J. Franssen

Attachment: LER 50-387(388)/2016-022-00

Copy: NRC Region I
Mr. J. E. Greives, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
Ms. T. E. Hood, NRC Project Manager
Mr. M. Shields, PA DEP/BRP



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/>)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1

2. DOCKET NUMBER

05000387

3. PAGE

1 OF 3

4. TITLE

Secondary Containment Breach due to Simultaneous Opening of Airlock Doors

5. EVENT DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
10	04	2016

6. LER NUMBER

YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
2016	- 022	- 00

7. REPORT DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
12	01	2016

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED

FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2	05000388
FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
	05000

9. OPERATING MODE

1

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. POWER LEVEL

100

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(1)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(2)(i)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

LICENSEE CONTACT

Nicole Pagliaro, Licensing Specialist – Nuclear Regulatory Affairs

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

570-542-6578

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

☐ YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)☐ NO

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On October 4, 2016 at approximately 0318, the Operations Shift Manager determined that a breach of Secondary Containment occurred due to a security officer opening door 571O while Airlock Door 813 was propped open. Airlock Door 813 was propped open for ongoing work. Secondary Containment was once again operable at the moment the security officer closed Door 571O. This airlock serves as a secondary containment boundary; as such, having both doors open at the same time results in failure to meet Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 as a result of not satisfying Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.3.

The condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).

The cause of the event was less than adequate adherence to safety postings and barriers, specifically in regards to Secondary Containment boundaries.

Corrective actions included documented coaching of the security officer.

There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
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1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1	05000-387	2016	- 022	- 00

NARRATIVE**CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT**

Unit 1 – Mode 1, approximately 100 percent Rated Thermal Power

Unit 2 – Mode 4, approximately 0 percent Rated Thermal Power

There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On 10/4/2016 at 0059 Susquehanna Security Computer System (SSCS) displayed a door alarm [EIS: ALM] for door 571O [EIS: DR]. The Central Alarm Station (CAS) Operator contacted the security officer responsible for alarm response in that area. CAS advised the officer that the SSCS revealed that no personnel were in the area of DR571O and also advised the officer to contact Radiation Protection (RP) prior to assessing the door due to contaminated area signage on the door.

At 0110hrs the security officer arrived at Door 571O and briefly opened and closed it. SSCS then showed a reset of the alarm status for Door 571O and the cause of the alarm was determined to be air pressure on the door.

At 0230 the CAS Alarm Station Operator received a call from the Unit Supervisor. He stated that an individual on the refuel floor heard the Secondary Containment Airlock buzzer and witnessed Door 571O closing. The Unit Supervisor requested assistance from the CAS in identifying who was in that area during that time frame. CAS advised the Unit Supervisor that a security officer was dispatched to Door 571O during that time frame to assess the door alarm.

At 0318 the Operations Shift Manager determined that a breach of Secondary Containment did occur due to the security officer opening door 571O while Airlock Door 813 [EIS: AL] was propped open. Airlock Door 813 was propped open for ongoing work. Secondary Containment [EIS: VA] was once again operable at the moment the security officer closed Door 571O.

Additional investigation and walk downs concluded that a Caution Tag was in place on Door 571O and states "Keep CLOSED to avoid crosstie of Zone 3 with NO zone".

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The cause of the event was failure to adhere to safety postings and barriers. The responding officer failed to recognize Door 571O as a final boundary for Secondary Containment even with the caution tag on the door.

ANALYSIS/ SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.3 requires that one secondary containment access door in each access opening is closed. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as having both Secondary Containment airlock doors momentarily open simultaneously results in a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident by controlling the release of radioactive material.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

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Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1	05000-387	2016	- 022	- 00

There was no actual safety consequence as a result of this event. Engineering analysis of this event has determined that secondary containment could have performed its safety function of isolating, as assumed in the accident analysis, and also of re-establishing 0.25 in w.g. vacuum (drawdown) within the assumed accident analysis time (10 minutes). Therefore, the subject event did not cause a loss of safety function.

This event will not be counted as a safety system functional failure (SSFF) for the NRC performance indicator based on the Engineering analysis supporting the system's ability to fulfill the safety function.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Corrective actions completed included coaching of the individual involved.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

LER 50-387(388)/2016-021-00, "Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to Airlock Doors Open Due to a Human Performance Error," dated August 17, 2016 (PLA-7515).

LER 50-387(388)/2016-015-00, "Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to Airlock Doors Open Due to a Human Performance Error," dated June 15, 2016 (PLA-7493).

LER 50-387(388)/2016-014-00, "Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to Airlock Doors Open Due to a Human Performance Error," dated June 9, 2016 (PLA-7492).

LER 50-387(388)/2016-013-00, "Unit 1 Secondary Containment Airlock Doors on 676' opened at same time due to personnel error," dated June 9, 2016 (PLA-7492).

LER 50-387(388)/2016-005-00, "Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to Airlock Doors Open Due to Human Performance Error," dated May 16, 2016 (PLA-7466).

LER 50-387(388)/2016-004-00, "Momentary Loss of Secondary Containment due to Both Airlock Doors on Elevation 779 of the Unit 2 Reactor Building being Opened at the Same Time," dated May 10, 2016 (PLA-7467).

LER 50-387(388)/2015-011-00, "Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to an Airlock Door that Had Not Been Properly Latched," dated January 29, 2016 (PLA-7432).

LER 50-388(387)/2015-006-00, "Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to Secondary Containment Boundary Door 104-R Breached," dated September 18, 2015 (PLA-7383).

LER 50-387/2015-004-00, "Secondary Containment Inoperable due Secondary Containment Boundary Door Found Ajar," dated June 25, 2015 (PLA-7353).

LER 50-388/2015-002-00, "Secondary Containment Inoperability Due Failure to Meet Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1," dated May 11, 2015 (PLA-7329).