ATTACHMENT 1 TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 55

TO FACILITY COMBINED LICENSE NO. NPF-94

DOCKET NO. 52-028

Replace the following page of the Facility Combined License No. NPF-94 with the attached revised page(s). The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Facility Combined License No. NPF-94

REMOVE	INSERT
7	7
11	11

Facility Combined License No. NPF-94
Appendix C - Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria

REMOVE	INSERT
C-52	C-52
C-52a	C-52a
C-89	C-89
C-91	C-91
C-98	C-98
C-104	C-104
C-178	C-178
C-252	C-252
C-286	C-286
C-375	C-375
C-402	C-402
C-450	C-450
C-452	C-452
C-453	C-453

(b) SCE&G shall report any violation of a requirement in Section 2.D.(3), Section 2.D.(4), Section 2.D.(5), and Section 2.D.(6) of this license within 24 hours. Initial notification shall be made to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, with written follow up in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

(8) Incorporation

The Technical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan, and ITAAC in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively of this license, as revised through Amendment No. 55, are hereby incorporated into this license.

(9) Technical Specifications

The technical specifications in Appendix A to this license become effective upon a Commission finding that the acceptance criteria in this license (ITAAC) are met in accordance with 10 CFR 52.103(g).

(10) Operational Program Implementation

SCE&G shall implement the programs or portions of programs identified below, on or before the date SCE&G achieves the following milestones.

(a) Environmental Qualification Program implemented before initial fuel load;

(b) Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program implemented before initial criticality;

(c) Preservice Testing Program implemented before initial fuel load;

(d) Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program implemented before initial fuel load;

(e) Fire Protection Program

1. The fire protection measures in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.189 for designated storage building areas (including adjacent fire areas that could affect the storage area) implemented before initial receipt of byproduct or special nuclear materials that are not fuel (excluding exempt quantities as described in 10 CFR 30.18);

2. The fire protection measures in accordance with RG 1.189 for areas containing new fuel (including adjacent areas where a fire could affect the new fuel) implemented before receipt of fuel onsite;

9. The ITP procedures identified in FSAR Section 14.2.3

   a. administrative manual (before the first component test)

   b. preoperational testing (before scheduled performance)

   c. startup testing (before initial fuel load)

(f) Before initial fuel load, SCE&G shall:

1. Update the seismic interaction analysis in AP1000 DCD, Rev. 19, Section 3.7.5.3 to reflect as-built information, which must be based on as-procured data, as well as the as-constructed condition;

2. Reconcile the seismic analyses described in Section 3.7.2 of the AP1000 DCD, Rev. 19, to account for detailed design changes, including, but not limited to, those due to as-procured or as-built changes in component mass, center of gravity, and support configuration based on as-procured equipment information;

3. Calculate the instrumentation uncertainties of the actual plant operating instrumentation to confirm that either the design limit departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) values remain valid or that the safety analysis minimum DNBR bounds the new design limit DNBR values plus DNBR penalties;

4. Update the pressure-temperature (P-T) limits using the pressure temperature limits report (PTLR) methodologies approved in AP1000 DCD, Rev. 19, using the plant-specific material properties or confirm that the reactor vessel material properties meet the specifications of and use the Westinghouse generic PTLR curves;

5. Verify that plant-specific belt line material properties are consistent with the properties given in AP1000 DCD Rev. 19, Section 5.3.3.1 and Tables 5.3-1 and 5.3-3. The verification must include a pressurized thermal shock (PTS) evaluation based on as-procured reactor vessel material data and the projected neutron fluence for the plant design objective. Submit this PTS evaluation report to the Director of NRO, or the Director's designee, in writing, at least 18 months before initial fuel load;

6. Review differences between the as-built plant and the design used as the basis for the AP1000 seismic margin analysis. SCE&G shall perform a verification walkdown to identify differences between the as-built plant and the design. SCE&G shall evaluate any differences and must modify the seismic margin analysis as necessary to account for the plant-specific design and any design

Table 2.1.2-1

Equipment Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/ DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
Second-stage ADS Isolation MOV	RCS-PL-V012B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Third-stage ADS Isolation MOV	RCS-PL-V013A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Third-stage ADS Isolation MOV	RCS-PL-V013B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
Fourth-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V014A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	None	As Is
Fourth-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V014B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	None	As Is
Fourth-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V014C	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	None	As Is
Fourth-stage ADS MOV	RCS-PL-V014D	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	None	As Is
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve	RCS-PL-V150A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Closed / Transfer Open	Closed
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve	RCS-PL-V150B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Closed / Transfer Open	Closed
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve	RCS-PL-V150C	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Closed / Transfer Open	Closed
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve	RCS-PL-V150D	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Closed / Transfer Open	Closed
RCS Hot Leg 1 Flow Sensor	RCS-101A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 1 Flow Sensor	RCS-101B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 1 Flow Sensor	RCS-101C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-

Table 2.1.2-1									
Equipment Name	**Tag No.**	**ASME Code Section III**	**Seismic Cat. I**	**Remotely Operated Valve**	**Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.**	**Safety-Related Display**	**Control PMS/ DAS**	**Active Function**	**Loss of Motive Power Position**
RCS Hot Leg 1 Flow Sensor	RCS-101D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 2 Flow Sensor	RCS-102A	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 2 Flow Sensor	RCS-102B	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 2 Flow Sensor	RCS-102C	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-
RCS Hot Leg 2 Flow Sensor	RCS-102D	-	Yes	-	Yes/Yes	No	-/-	-	-

Table 2.2.1-1 (cont.)									
Equipment Name	**Tag No.**	**ASME Code Section III**	**Seismic Cat. I**	**Remotely Operated Valve**	**Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.**	**Safety-Related Display**	**Control PMS/DAS**	**Active Function**	**Loss of Motive Power Position**
CCS Containment Isolation MOV – Outlet Line IRC	CCS-PL-V207	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Closed	As Is
CCS Containment Isolation MOV – Outlet Line ORC	CCS-PL-V208	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/No	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Closed	As Is
CCS Containment Isolation Relief Valve – Outlet Line IRC	CCS-PL-V220	Yes	Yes	No	-/-	No	-/-	Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open	-
Demineralized Water Supply Containment Isolation Valve ORC	DWS-PL-V244	Yes	Yes	No	-/-	No	-/-	None	-
Demineralized Water Supply Containment Isolation Check Valve IRC	DWS-PL-V245	Yes	Yes	No	-/-	No	-/-	Transfer Closed	-
Fuel Transfer Tube	FHS-FT-01	Yes	Yes	-	-/-	-	-/-	-	-
Fuel Transfer Tube Isolation Valve	FHS-PL-V001	Yes	Yes	-	-/-	-	-/-	Transfer Closed	-
Fire Water Containment Supply Isolation Valve – Outside	FPS-PL-V050	Yes	Yes	No	-/-	No	-/-	None	-
Fire Water Containment Isolation Supply Check Valve – Inside	FPS-PL-V052	Yes	Yes	No	-/-	No	-/-	Transfer Closed	-

Table 2.2.1-1 (cont.)									
Equipment Name	**Tag No.**	**ASME Code Section III**	**Seismic Cat. I**	**Remotely Operated Valve**	**Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.**	**Safety-Related Display**	**Control PMS/DAS**	**Active Function**	**Loss of Motive Power Position**
Vacuum Relief Containment Isolation A MOV – ORC	VFS-PL-V800A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/No	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open	As Is
Vacuum Relief Containment Isolation B MOV – ORC	VFS-PL-V800B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/No	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open	As Is
Vacuum Relief Containment Isolation Check Valve A – IRC	VFS-PL-V803A	Yes	Yes	No	-/-	No	-/-	Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open	-
Vacuum Relief Containment Isolation Check Valve B – IRC	VFS-PL-V803B	Yes	Yes	No	-/-	No	-/-	Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open	-
Fan Coolers Return Containment Isolation Valve – IRC	VWS-PL-V082	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Closed	Closed
Fan Coolers Return Containment Isolation Valve – ORC	VWS-PL-V086	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/No	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Closed	Closed
Fan Coolers Return Containment Isolation Relief Valve – IRC	VWS-PL-V080	Yes	Yes	No	-/-	No	-/-	Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open	-

Table 2.2.1-3
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
				assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.
104	2.2.01.06c	6.c) Separation is provided between CNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.	See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.	See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.
105	2.2.01.06d.i	6.d) The non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.	i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment.	i) A report exists and concludes that the non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.
106	2.2.01.06d.ii	6.d) The non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.	ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment.	ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.
107	2.2.01.07.i	7. The CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere.	i) A containment integrated leak rate test will be performed.	i) The leakage rate from containment for the integrated leak rate test is less than L_a.
108	2.2.01.07.ii	7. The CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere.	ii) Testing will be performed to demonstrate that remotely operated containment isolation valves close within the required response times.	ii) The containment purge isolation valves (VFS-PL-V003, -V004, -V009, and -V010) close within 10 seconds, containment vacuum relief isolation valves (VFS-PL-V800A and -V800B) close within 30 seconds, SGS valves SGS-PL-V040A/B and SGS-PL-V057A/B are covered in subsection 2.2.4, Table 2.2.4-4 (item 11.b.ii)

Table 2.2.2-1

Component Name	Tag No.	ASME Code Section III	Seismic Cat. I	Remotely Operated Valve	Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.	Safety-Related Display	Control PMS/ DAS	Active Function	Loss of Motive Power Position
PCCWST	PCS-MT-01	No	Yes	-	-	-	-	-	-
Water Distribution Bucket	PCS-MT-03	No	Yes	-	-	-	-	-	-
Water Distribution Wiers	PCS-MT-04	No	Yes	-	-	-	-	-	-
PCCWST Isolation Valve	PCS-PL-V001A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/No	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	Open
PCCWST Isolation Valve	PCS-PL-V001B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/No	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	Open
PCCWST Isolation Valve MOV	PCS-PL-V001C	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/No	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/Yes	Transfer Open	As Is
PCCWST Isolation Block MOV	PCS-PL-V002A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/No	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Open	As Is
PCCWST Isolation Block MOV	PCS-PL-V002B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/No	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Open	As Is
PCCWST Isolation Block MOV	PCS-PL-V002C	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/No	Yes (Valve Position)	Yes/No	Transfer Open	As Is
PCS Recirculation Return Isolation Valve	PCS-PL-V023	Yes	Yes	-	-/No	No	-	Transfer Close	-
PCCWST Supply to Fire Protection System Isolation Valve	PCS-PL-V005	Yes	Yes	-	-/No	No	-	Transfer Close	-

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.2.5-5
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
270	2.2.05.07c	7.c) The heat loads within the MCR, the I&C equipment rooms, and the Class 1E dc equipment rooms are within design basis assumptions to limit the heatup of the rooms identified in Table 2.2.5-4.	An analysis will be performed to determine that the heat loads from as-built equipment within the rooms identified in Table 2.2.5-4 are less than or equal to the design basis assumptions.	A report exists and concludes that: the heat loads within rooms identified in Table 2.2.5-4 are less than or equal to the specified values or that an analysis report exists that concludes: – The temperature and humidity in the MCR remain within limits for reliable human performance for the 72-hour period. – The maximum temperature for the 72-hour period for the I&C rooms is less than or equal to 120°F. – The maximum temperature for the 72-hour period for the Class 1E dc equipment rooms is less than or equal to 120°F.
271	2.2.05.07d	7.d) The system provides a passive recirculation flow of MCR air to maintain main control room dose rates below an acceptable level during VES operation.	Testing will be performed to confirm that the required amount of air flow circulates through the MCR passive filtration system.	The air flow rate at the outlet of the MCR passive filtration system is at least 600 cfm greater than the flow measured by VES-003A/B.
272	2.2.05.08	8. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.	Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety-related displays in the MCR.	Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.
273	2.2.05.09a	9.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 to perform their active functions.	Stroke testing will be performed on remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 using the controls in the MCR.	Controls in the MCR operate to cause remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 to perform their active safety functions.
274	2.2.05.09b	9.b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as having PMS control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.	Testing will be performed on remotely operated valves listed in Table 2.2.5-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS.	The remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as having PMS control perform the active safety function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

Table 2.3.10-2			
Line Name	**Line No.**	**ASME Section III**	**Functional Capability Required**
WLS Drain from PXS Compartment A	WLS-PL-L062	Yes	Yes
WLS Drain from PXS Compartment B	WLS-PL-L063	Yes	Yes
WLS Drain from CVS Compartment	WLS-PL-L061	Yes	Yes

Table 2.3.10-3			
Equipment Name	**Tag No.**	**Display**	**Active Function**
WLS Effluent Discharge Isolation Valve	WLS-PL-V223	-	Close
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Level	WLS-JE-LT002	Yes	-
Letdown Flow from CVS to WLS	WLS-JE-FT020	Yes	-

Table 2.3.10-4
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
430	2.3.10.01	1. The functional arrangement of the WLS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.10.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built WLS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.10.
431	2.3.10.02a	2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design report exists for the as built components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III.
432	2.3.10.02b	2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.	The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III.
433	2.3.10.03a	3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.	Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.	A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

Table 2.5.1-3 DAS Sensors and Displays	
Equipment Name	**Tag Number**
Containment Temperature	VCS-053A
Containment Temperature	VCS-053B
Core Exit Temperature	IIS-009
Core Exit Temperature	IIS-013
Core Exit Temperature	IIS-030
Core Exit Temperature	IIS-034
Rod Control Motor Generator Voltage	PLS-001
Rod Control Motor Generator Voltage	PLS-002

Table 2.5.1-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
505	2.5.01.01	1. The functional arrangement of the DAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.	Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.	The as-built DAS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.
506	2.5.01.02a	2.a) The DAS provides an automatic reactor trip on low wide-range steam generator water level, or on low pressurizer water level, or on high hot leg temperature, separate from the PMS.	Electrical power to the PMS equipment will be disconnected and an operational test of the as-built DAS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.	The generator field control relays of the control rod motor-generator sets open after the test signal reaches the specified limit.
507	2.5.01.02b	2.b) The DAS provides automatic actuation of selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-1, separate from the PMS.	Electrical power to the PMS equipment will be disconnected and an operational test of the as-built DAS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.	Appropriate DAS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit.
508	2.5.01.02c.i	2.c) The DAS provides manual initiation of reactor trip, and selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-2, separate from the PMS. These manual initiation functions are implemented in a manner that bypasses the control room multiplexers, if any; the PMS cabinets; and the signal processing equipment of the DAS.	Electrical power to the control room multiplexers, if any, and PMS equipment will be disconnected and the outputs from the DAS signal processing equipment will be disabled. While in this configuration, an operational test of the as-built system will be performed using the DAS manual actuation controls.	i) The generator field control relays of the control rod motor-generator sets open after reactor and turbine trip manual initiation controls are actuated.



Figure 2.7.1-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)
Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System

6. The RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.
7. The HSI resources available at the RSW include the alarm system displays, the plant information system, and the controls.
8. The RSW and the available HSI permit execution of tasks by licensed operators to establish and maintain safe shutdown.
9. The capability to access displays and controls is provided (controls as assigned by the MCR operators) for local control and monitoring from selected locations throughout the plant.

Table 3.2.-1
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

No.	ITAAC No.	Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
739	3.2.00.01a	1. The HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes the following activities: a) HSI Task support verification	a) An evaluation of the implementation of the HSI task support verification will be performed.	a) A report exists and concludes that: Task support verification was conducted in conformance with the implementation plan and includes verification that the information and controls provided by the HSI match the display and control requirements generated by the function-based task analyses and the operational sequence analyses.
740	3.2.00.01b	1. The HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes the following activities: b) HFE design verification	b) An evaluation of the implementation of the HFE design verification will be performed.	b) A report exists and concludes that: HFE design verification was conducted in conformance with the implementation plan and includes verification that the HSI design is consistent with the AP1000 specific design guidelines developed for each HSI resource.

based on their degree of risk significance. The risk-significant components are listed in Table 3.7-1.

The objective of the D-RAP program is to provide reasonable assurance that risk-significant SSCs (Table 3.7-1) are designed such that: (1) assumptions from the risk analysis are utilized, (2) SSCs (Table 3.7-1) when challenged, function in accordance with the assumed reliability, (3) SSCs (Table 3.7-1) whose failure results in a reactor trip, function in accordance with the assumed reliability, and (4) maintenance actions to achieve the assumed reliability are identified.

1. The D-RAP ensures that the design of SSCs within the scope of the reliability assurance program (Table 3.7-1) is consistent with the risk insights and key assumptions (e.g., SSC design, reliability, and availability).

Table 3.7-1
Risk-Significant Components

Equipment Name	Tag No.
Component Cooling Water System (CCS)	
Component Cooling Water Pumps	CCS-MP-01A/B
Containment System (CNS)	
Containment Vessel	CNS-MV-01
Hydrogen Igniters	VLS-EH-1 through -66
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS)	
Makeup Pumps	CVS-MP-01A/B
Makeup Pump Suction and Discharge Check Valves	CVS-PL-V113 CVS-PL-V160A/B
Letdown Discharge Isolation Valves	CVS-PL-V045 CVS-PL-V047
Diverse Actuation System (DAS)	
DAS Processor Cabinets and Control Panel (used to provide automatic and manual actuation)	DAS-JD-001 DAS-JD-002 DAS-JD-003 OCS-JC-20
Auxiliary Building UPS Distribution Panels (provide power to DAS)	EDS2-EA-12, EDS3-EA-14A
Rod Drive MG Sets (generator field control relays)	PLS-MG-01A/B
Containment Isolation Valves Controlled by DAS	CVS-PL-V045, -V047 VFS-PL-V003, -V004, -V009, -V010 WLS-PL-V055, -V057
Main ac Power System (ECS)	

Table 3.7-1 Risk-Significant Components	
Equipment Name	**Tag No.**
250 Vdc 24-Hour Inverters	IDSA-DU-1, IDSB-DU-1, IDSC-DU-1, IDSD-DU-1
Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS)	
Recirculation Pumps	PCS-MP-01A/B
PCCWST Drain Isolation Valves	PCS-PL-V001A/B/C
Plant Control System (PLS)	
PLS Actuation Software (used to provide control functions)	Refer to Table 3.7-2
PLS Actuation Hardware (used to provide control functions)	Refer to Table 3.7-2
Protection and Monitoring System (PMS)	
PMS Actuation Software (used to provide automatic control functions)	Refer to Tables 2.5.2-2 and 2.5.2-3
PMS Actuation Hardware (used to provide automatic control functions)	Refer to Tables 2.5.2-2 and 2.5.2-3
MCR 1E Displays and System Level Controls	OCS-JC-10, -11
Reactor Trip Switchgear	PMS-JD-RTS A01/02, B01/02, C01/02, D01/02
Passive Core Cooling System (PXS)	
IRWST Vents	PXS-MT-03
IRWST Screens	PXS-MY-Y01A/B/C
Containment Recirculation Screens	PXS-MY-Y02A/B
CMT Discharge Isolation Valves	PXS-PL-V014A/B, -V015A/B
CMT Discharge Check Valves	PXS-PL-V016A/B, -V017A/B
Accumulator Discharge Check Valves	PXS-PL-V028A/B, -V029A/B
PRHR HX Control Valves	PXS-PL-V108A/B
Containment Recirculation Squib Valves	PXS-PL-V118A/B, -V120A/B
IRWST Injection Check Valves	PXS-PL-V122A/B, -V124A/B
IRWST Injection Squib Valves	PXS-PL-V123A/B, -V125A/B
IRWST Gutter Bypass Isolation Valves	PXS-PL-V130A/B
Reactor Coolant System (RCS)	
ADS Stage 1/2/3 Valves (MOVs)	RCS-PL-V001A/B, -V011A/B RCS-PL-V002A/B, -V012A/B RCS-PL-V003A/B, -V013A/B
ADS Stage 4 Valves (Squibs)	RCS-PL-V004A/B/C/D

Table 3.7-1 Risk-Significant Components	
Equipment Name	**Tag No.**
Pressurizer Safety Valves	RCS-PL-V005A/B
Reactor Vessel Insulation Water Inlet and Steam Vent Devices	RXS-MN-01
Reactor Cavity Doorway Damper	–
Fuel Assemblies	157 assemblies with tag numbers beginning with RXS-FA
Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS)	
Residual Heat Removal Pumps	RNS-MP-01A/B
RNS Motor-Operated Valves	RNS-PL-V011, -V022, -V023, -V055
RNS Stop Check Valves RNS Check Valves	RNS-PL-V015A/B RNS-PL-V017A/B
RNS Check Valves	RNS-PL-V007A/B, -V013, -V056
Spent Fuel Cooling System (SFS)	
Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps	SFS-MP-01A/B
Steam Generator System (SGS)	
Main Steam Safety Valves	SGS-PL-V030A/B, -V031A/B, -V032A/B, -V033A/B, -V034A/B, -V035A/B
Main Steam Line Isolation Valves	SGS-PL-V040A/B
Main Feedwater Isolation Valves	SGS-PL-V057A/B
Service Water System (SWS)	
Service Water Cooling Tower Fans	SWS-MA-01A/B
Service Water Pumps	SWS-MP-01A/B
Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System (VBS)	
MCR Ancillary Fans	VBS-MA-10A/B
I&C Room B/C Ancillary Fans	VBS-MA-11, -12
Containment Air Filtration System (VFS)	
Containment Purge Isolation Valves	VFS-PL-V003 VFS-PL-V004 VFS-PL-V009 VFS-PL-V010
Chilled Water System (VWS)	
Air Cooled Chiller Pumps	VWS-MP-02, -03