



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
REGION III  
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LISLE, IL 60532-4352

October 26, 2016

Mr. Robert Coffey  
Site Vice President  
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC  
6610 Nuclear Road  
Two Rivers, WI 54241

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2—NRC INTEGRATED  
INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2016003; 05000301/2016003;  
07200005/20160001

Dear Mr. Coffey:

On September 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. On October 4, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The enclosed report represents the results of this inspection.

The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance. However, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be Severity Level IV in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

In accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public

R. Coffey

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inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

*/RA/*

Jamnes Cameron, Chief  
Branch 4  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301  
License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure:  
IR 05000266/2016003; 05000301/2016003

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-266; 50-301; 72-005  
License No: DPR-24; DPR-27

Report No: 05000266/2016003; 05000301/2016003;  
07200005/2016001

Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Two Rivers, WI

Dates: July 1 through September 30, 2016

Inspectors: K. Barclay, Acting Senior Resident Inspector  
J. Havertape, Acting Resident Inspector  
M. Learn, Reactor Engineer  
G. Edwards, Health Physicist

Approved by: J. Cameron, Chief  
Branch 4  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

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## **SUMMARY**

Inspection Report 05000266/2016003, 05000301/2016003, 07200005/2016001;  
07/01/2016 – 09/30/2016; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2, Integrated Report.

This report covers a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors; announced baseline inspections by regional inspectors; and an inspection by regional inspectors of operational activities associated with an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy, dated February 4, 2015. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," dated July 2016.

### **Licensee-Identified Findings**

A violation of very low safety significance identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This violation and corrective action program tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

## **REPORT DETAILS**

### **Summary of Plant Status**

#### **Unit 1**

The unit operated at or near full power for the inspection period, except for brief power reductions to conduct planned maintenance and surveillance activities.

#### **Unit 2**

The unit operated at or near full power for the inspection period, except for brief power reductions to conduct planned maintenance and surveillance activities.

### **1. REACTOR SAFETY**

#### **Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity**

##### **1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)**

##### **.1 Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns**

##### **a. Inspection Scope**

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems:

- 1P–15A safety injection (SI) pump with the 1P–15B SI pump out of service;
- G–03 emergency diesel generator (EDG) with the G–01 EDG out of service; and
- 2P–53 motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump with 1P–29 turbine driven AFW pump out of service.

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, FSAR, Technical Specification (TS) requirements, outstanding work orders (WOs), condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP) with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted three partial system walkdown samples as defined in IP 71111.04–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

.1 Routine Resident Inspector Tours (71111.05Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas:

- Fire Zone 166; motor control center room – 2B32;
- Fire Zone 237; component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger room;
- Fire Zone 307; EDG Room – G02; and
- Fire Zone 308; EDG Room – G01.

The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition, and implemented adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensee's fire plan.

The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plant's Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plant's ability to respond to a security event.

Using the documents listed in the Attachment to this report, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's CAP.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted four quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in IP 71111.05–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flooding (71111.06)

.1 Internal Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected risk important plant design features and licensee procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal

flooding events. The inspectors reviewed flood analyses and design documents, including the FSAR, engineering calculations, and abnormal operating procedures to identify licensee commitments. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee drawings to identify areas and equipment that may be affected by internal flooding caused by the failure or misalignment of nearby sources of water, such as the fire suppression or the circulating water systems. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's corrective action documents with respect to past flood-related items identified in the corrective action program to verify the adequacy of the corrective actions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following plant area(s) to assess the adequacy of watertight doors and verify drains and sumps were clear of debris and were operable, and that the licensee complied with its commitments:

- turbine building AFW pump room; and
- 'A' train 4.16 kV switchgear room, EDG room – G01, and EDG room – G02.

Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection constituted two internal flooding samples as defined in IP 71111.06–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Annual Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

.1 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's testing of the 1HX–12B CCW heat exchanger to verify that potential deficiencies did not mask the licensee's ability to detect degraded performance, to identify any common cause issues that had the potential to increase risk, and to ensure that the licensee was adequately addressing problems that could result in initiating events that would cause an increase in risk. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's observations as compared against acceptance criteria, the correlation of scheduled testing and the frequency of testing, and the impact of instrument inaccuracies on test results. Inspectors also verified that test acceptance criteria considered differences between test conditions, design conditions, and testing conditions. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this document.

This annual heat sink performance inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71111.07–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.



1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (71111.11)

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Regualification (71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

On August 29, 2016, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plant's simulator during licensed operator regualification training. The inspectors verified that operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance problems, and that training was being conducted in accordance with licensee's training scenario. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:

- licensed operator performance;
- crew's clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
- correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan actions and notifications.

The crew's performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator regualification program simulator sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Observation During Periods of Heightened Activity or Risk (71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

On August 24, 2016, the inspectors observed the Unit 1 Control Room operating crew response during implementation of AOP-2B, Feedwater System Malfunction, following a steam generator level perturbation. This was an activity that required heightened awareness or was related to increased risk.

On September 13, 2016, the inspectors observed control room operations during main feedwater regulating valve control troubleshooting. This was an activity that required heightened awareness or was related to increased risk.

The inspectors evaluated the following areas:

- licensed operator performance;
- crew's clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;

- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms (if applicable);
- correct use and implementation of procedures;
- control board (or equipment) manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan actions and notifications (if applicable).

The performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action expectations, procedural compliance and task completion requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator heightened activity/risk sample as defined in IP 71111.11–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

.1 Routine Quarterly Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk-significant systems:

- K–3B service air compressor; and
- G–05 gas turbine.

The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:

- implementing appropriate work practices;
- identifying and addressing common cause failures;
- scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
- characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
- charging unavailability for performance;
- trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
- ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and
- verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2), or appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).

The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined in IP 71111.12–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

.1 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:

- July 25; reactor protection system testing with K–3A station air compressor failure;
- August 11; K–3B station air compressor and 1DY–04 inverter OOS with turbine driven AFW suction trip testing in-progress;
- August 31; 1P–15 SI pump and DY-0D inverter OOS; and
- September 6; 1P–15 SI pump OOS with reactor protection and engineered safety features red channel testing in-progress and a National Weather Service flood watch in effect.

These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report. These maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control activities constituted four samples as defined in IP 71111.13–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15)

.1 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following issues:

- Unexpected feed regulating valve oscillations on Unit 1;
- Unit 2 2PT-449 pressurizer pressure transmitter drifting;
- AR 02150150; 1T-34A May Require Three Fills in August;
- AR 02152431; Red Tavg Channel (2T-401) on Unit 2 Noisy;
- AR 02154199; Corrosion on Cells 43, 51, 53, and 51 of D-105; and
- AR 02138501; Prompt Operability Determination for Reactor Protection System DANA Amplifier Electrolytic Capacitors.

The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and FSAR to the licensee's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This operability inspection constituted six samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)

.1 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following modification(s):

- EC 286161; 1MS-2017, HX-1B SG Header Main Steam Stop Control Valve Leak Sealant Repair; Revision 1; and
- EC 286224; 1MS-2017, HX-1B SG Header Main Steam Stop Control Valve Bearing Housing Flange Leak Enclosure; Revision 1.

The inspectors reviewed the configuration changes and associated 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation screening against the design basis, the FSAR, and the TS, as applicable, to verify that the modification did not affect the operability or availability of the affected system(s). The inspectors, as applicable, observed ongoing and completed work activities to ensure that the modifications were installed as directed and consistent with the design control documents; the modifications operated as expected; post-modification testing adequately demonstrated continued system operability, availability, and reliability; and that operation of the modifications did not impact the operability of any interfacing systems. As applicable, the inspectors verified that relevant procedure, design, and licensing documents were properly updated. Lastly, the inspectors discussed the plant modification with operations, engineering, and training personnel to ensure that the individuals were aware of how the operation with the plant modification in place could impact overall plant performance. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one temporary modification sample as defined in IP 71111.18–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

.1 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance (PM) activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:

- 2P–11A CCW pump testing after rotating element replacement;
- 1DY–04 yellow channel inverter testing after maintenance;
- Unit 1 1P–2C coolant charging pump testing after internal check valve replacement and signal conditioner replacement;
- K–3A service air compressor testing after motor replacement;
- Unit 2 2P–2B coolant charging pump testing after maintenance; and
- 1SI–889B check valve testing after seat lapping.

These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable): the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers required for test performance were properly removed after test completion); and test documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against TSs, the FSAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the

equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted six post-maintenance testing samples as defined in IP 71111.19–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

.1 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural and TS requirements:

- TS–81; G–01 Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test (Routine); and
- IT 09B; TDAFP Suction from SW MOV Exercise Test (IST).

The inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated records to determine the following:

- did preconditioning occur;
- the effects of the testing were adequately addressed by control room personnel or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
- acceptance criteria were clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and were consistent with the system design basis;
- plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
- as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency was in accordance with TSs, the FSAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;
- measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
- test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
- test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability; tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used;
- test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
- test equipment was removed after testing;
- where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of Mechanical Engineers code, and reference values were consistent with the system design basis;

- where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was declared inoperable;
- where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests, reference setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
- where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;
- prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
- equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the performance of its safety functions; and
- all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and dispositioned in the CAP.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one routine surveillance testing samples and one in-service test sample as defined in IP 71111.22, Sections–02 and–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

.1 Training Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on September 12, 2016, which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee operations crew. This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors' activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crew's performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the scenario package and other documents listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection of the licensee's training evolution with emergency preparedness drill aspects constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.06–06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

## 2. RADIATION SAFETY

### 2RS2 Occupational AS-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls (71124.02)

#### .1 Radiological Work Planning (02.02)

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected three to five work activities of the highest exposure significance or involve work in high dose rate areas.

The inspectors reviewed the radiological work planning as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) evaluations, initial and revised exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation requirements. The inspectors determined if the licensee had reasonably grouped the radiological work into work activities.

The inspectors assessed whether the licensee's planning identified appropriate dose reduction techniques; appropriately considered alternate reduction features; and defined reasonable dose goals. The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee's ALARA assessment had taken into account decreased worker efficiency from use of respiratory protective devices and/or heat stress mitigation equipment. The inspectors determined if the licensee's work planning considered the use of remote technologies and dose reduction insights from industry and plant-specific operating experience. The inspectors assessed whether these ALARA requirements were integrated into work procedure and/or radiation work permit documents.

The inspectors compared the results achieved with the intended dose established in the ALARA planning. The inspectors compared the person-hour estimates provided by work groups to the radiation protection group with the actual work activity time results, and evaluated the accuracy of these time estimates. The inspectors evaluated the reasons for any inconsistencies between intended and actual work activity doses.

The inspectors evaluated whether post-job reviews were conducted to identify lessons learned and entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program.

These inspection activities supplemented those documented in Inspection Report (IR) 05000266/2016001; 05000301/2016001 constituted one complete sample as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71124.02–05.

##### b. Findings

No findings were identified.

#### .2 Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems (02.03)

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed whether the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate were reasonably accurate. The inspectors assessed source term reduction effectiveness and reviewed applicable procedures for estimating exposures from specific work activities.



The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and bases in ALARA work planning documents for selected activities and verified that the licensee has established measures to track, trend, and if necessary to reduce, occupational doses for ongoing work activities.

The inspectors determined whether a dose threshold criteria was established to prompt additional reviews and/or additional ALARA planning and controls and evaluated the licensee's method of adjusting exposure estimates, or re-planning work, when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered. The inspectors determined if adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA principles or if they are just adjusted to account for failures to control the work. The inspectors evaluated whether there was sufficient station management review and approval of adjustments to exposure estimates and that the reasons for the adjustments were justifiable.

The inspectors reviewed selected occasions with inconsistent or incongruent results from the licensee's intended radiological outcomes to determine whether the cause was attributed to a failure to adequately plan work activities, or failure to provide sufficient management oversight of in-plant work activities, or failure to conduct the work activity without significant rework, or failure to implement radiological controls as planned.

These inspection activities supplemented those documented in IR 05000266/2016001; 05000301/2016001 and constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.02–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Problem Identification and Resolution (02.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed self-assessments and/or audits performed of the ALARA Program and determined if these reviews identified problems or areas for improvement.

The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with ALARA planning and controls were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and properly addressed for resolution.

These inspection activities supplemented those documented in IR 05000266/2016001; 05000301/2016001 and constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.02–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

## 2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (71124.06)

### .1 Walkdowns and Observations (02.02)

#### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down select effluent radiation monitoring systems to evaluate whether the monitor configurations aligned with Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) descriptions and to observe the materiel condition of the systems.

The inspectors walked down selected components of the gaseous and liquid discharge systems to evaluate whether equipment configuration and flow paths align with plant documentation and to assess equipment materiel condition. The inspectors also assessed whether there were potential unmonitored release points, building alterations which could impact effluent controls, and ventilation system leakage that communicated directly with the environment.

For equipment or areas associated with the systems selected for review that were not readily accessible, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's materiel condition surveillance records.

The inspectors walked down filtered ventilation systems to assess for conditions such as degraded high-efficiency particulate air/charcoal banks, improper alignment, or system installation issues that would impact the performance or the effluent monitoring capability of the effluent system.

As available, the inspectors observed selected portions of the routine processing and discharge of radioactive gaseous effluent to evaluate whether appropriate treatment equipment was used and the processing activities aligned with discharge permits.

The inspectors determined if the licensee has made significant changes to their effluent release points.

As available, the inspectors observed selected portions of the routine processing and discharging of liquid waste to determine if appropriate effluent treatment equipment was being used and that radioactive liquid waste was being processed and discharged in accordance with procedure requirements and aligned with discharge permits.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71124.06–05.

#### b. Findings

No findings were identified.

### .2 Calibration and Testing Program (02.03)

#### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed calibration and functional tests for select effluent monitors to evaluate whether they were performed consistent with the ODCM. The inspectors assessed whether National Institute of Standards and Technology traceable sources

were used, primary calibration represented the plant nuclide mix, secondary calibrations verified the primary calibration, and calibration encompassed the alarm set points.

The inspectors assessed whether effluent monitor alarm set points were established as provided in the ODCM and procedures.

The inspectors evaluated the basis for changes to effluent monitor alarm set points.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.06–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Sampling and Analyses (02.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed select effluent sampling activities and assessed whether adequate controls had been implemented to ensure representative samples were obtained.

The inspectors reviewed select effluent discharges made with inoperable effluent radiation monitors and assess whether controls were in place to ensure compensatory sampling was performed consistent with the ODCM and that those controls were adequate to prevent the release of unmonitored effluents.

The inspectors determined whether the facility was routinely relying on the use of compensatory sampling in lieu of adequate system maintenance.

The inspectors reviewed the results of the Inter-Laboratory Comparison Program to evaluate the quality of the radioactive effluent sample analyses and assessed whether the Inter-Laboratory Comparison Program included hard-to-detect isotopes as appropriate.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.06–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Instrumentation and Equipment (02.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the methodology used to determine the effluent stack and vent flow rates to determine if the flow rates were consistent with plant documentation, and that differences between assumed and actual stack and vent flow rates did not affect the results of the projected public doses.

The inspectors assessed whether surveillance test results for Technical Specification required ventilation effluent discharge systems met Technical Specification acceptance criteria.

The inspectors assessed calibration and availability for select effluent monitors used for triggering emergency action levels or for determining protective action recommendations.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.06–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Dose Calculations (02.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed significant changes in reported dose values compared to the previous Radiological Effluent Release Report to evaluate the factors which may have resulted in the change.

The inspectors reviewed radioactive liquid and gaseous waste discharge permits to assess whether the projected doses to members of the public were accurate.

Inspectors evaluated the isotopes that are included in the source term to assess whether analysis methods were sufficient to satisfy detectability standards. The review included the current Part 61 analyses to ensure hard-to-detect radionuclides are included in the source term.

The inspectors reviewed changes in the licensee's offsite dose calculations to evaluate whether changes were consistent with the ODCM and Regulatory Guide 1.109. Inspectors reviewed meteorological dispersion and deposition factors used in the ODCM and effluent dose calculations to evaluate whether appropriate factors were being used for public dose calculations.

The inspectors reviewed the latest Land Use Census to assess whether changes have been factored into the dose calculations.

For select radioactive waste discharges, the inspectors evaluated whether the calculated doses were within the Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 50, Appendix I, and Technical Specification dose criteria.

The inspectors reviewed select records of abnormal radioactive waste discharges to ensure the discharge was monitored by the discharge point effluent monitor. Discharges made with inoperable effluent radiation monitors, or unmonitored leakages were reviewed to ensure that an evaluation was made to account for the source term and projected doses to the public.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.06–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.6 Problem Identification and Resolution (02.07)

a. Inspection Scope

Inspectors assessed whether problems associated with the Effluent Monitoring and Control Program were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and were properly addressed for resolution. In addition, they evaluated the appropriateness of the corrective actions for a selected sample of problems documented by the licensee involving radiation monitoring and exposure controls.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.06–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4. **OTHER ACTIVITIES**

**Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security**

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Safety System Functional Failures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the safety system functional failures performance indicator for Units 1 and 2 for the period from the fourth quarter of 2015 to the second quarter of 2016. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99–02, “Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,” Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, and NUREG–1022, “Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73” definitions and guidance, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s operator narrative logs, operability assessments, maintenance rule records, condition reports, event reports and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period of October 2015 through June 2016 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee’s issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two safety system functional failure samples as defined in IP 71151–05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the reactor coolant system specific activity Performance Indicator (PI) for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, for the period from the third quarter 2015 through the second quarter 2016. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, dated August 2013, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's reactor coolant system chemistry samples, technical specification requirements, issue reports, event reports and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Integrated IRs to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. In addition to record reviews, the inspectors observed a chemistry technician obtain and analyze a reactor coolant system sample. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two reactor coolant system specific activity samples as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness PI for the period from the third quarter 2015 through the second quarter 2016. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, dated August 2013, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessment of the PI for occupational radiation safety to determine if the indicator related data was adequately assessed and reported. To assess the adequacy of the licensee's PI data collection and analyses, the inspectors discussed with radiation protection staff the scope and breadth of its data review and the results of those reviews. The inspectors independently reviewed electronic personal dosimetry dose rate and accumulated dose alarms and dose reports and the dose assignments for any intakes that occurred during the time period reviewed to determine if there were potentially unrecognized occurrences. The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of numerous locked high and very-high radiation area entrances to determine the adequacy of the controls in place for these areas. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one occupational exposure control effectiveness sample as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual  
Radiological Effluent Occurrences

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual radiological effluent occurrences PI for the period from the third quarter 2015 through the second quarter 2016. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, dated August 2013, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's issue report database and selected individual reports generated since this indicator was last reviewed to identify any potential occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly calculated effluent releases that may have impacted offsite dose. The inspectors reviewed gaseous effluent summary data and the results of associated offsite dose calculations for selected dates to determine if indicator results were accurately reported. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's methods for quantifying gaseous and liquid effluents and determining effluent dose. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one radiological effluent technical specification/offsite dose calculation manual radiological effluent occurrences sample as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

.1 Routine Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

As discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and adverse trends were identified and addressed. Some minor issues were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as a result of the inspectors' observations; however, they not discussed in this report.

These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000266/2016-02-00: Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On April 2, 2016, at 2:29 a.m., Unit 1 entered Mode 4 from Mode 5 without satisfying all of Technical Specification 3.6.6 Containment Spray and Cooling System Limiting Conditions for Operation as required by LCO Applicability 3.0.4. The licensee recognized the error and, at 3:08 a.m., the affected control switches for the two containment accident recirculation fans were positioned to auto, which restored operability and met the conditions for LCO 3.6.6.

Corrective actions for the event included the immediate restoration of operability for the containment accident recirculation fans, as well as, planned training for operations crews that will cover command and control, implementation of technical specifications, operating experience of the event, and revision to the cold to hot shutdown procedure.

The licensee reported this event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for an operation or condition prohibited by technical specifications. One finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of Technical Specification 3.0.4 was identified and previously documented in Inspection Report 05000266/2016002; 05000301/2016002, Section 1R20 Outage Activities, (ADAMS No. ML16214A128). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This licensee event report (LER) is closed.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000266/2016-03-00: Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On April 1, 2016, the Unit 1 345/13.8kV high voltage station transformer (1X-03) tripped on a differential current relay actuation when the licensee attempted to start a reactor coolant pump motor. An automatic bus transfer occurred, as designed, which maintained power to the Unit 1 4.16kV safeguards buses. The licensee found that a wiring error, which had occurred in April 2013, caused the relay to actuate at values below its design setpoint.

Corrective actions for the event included the immediate restoration of equipment affected by the transformer lockout; correction of the differential relay wiring error; and planned training for contractors on the proper use of plant processes for lifting and landing wires or leads on equipment.

The licensee reported this event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for an operation or condition prohibited by technical specifications. The licensee's evaluation identified that there were three instances over the past three years where the required action completion time for LCO 3.8.1 (AC Sources – Operating) or LCO 3.8.2 (AC Sources – Shutdown) would have been exceeded with the wiring error present. One finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCVs of Technical Specification 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 were identified and previously documented in Inspection



Report 05000266/2016002; 05000301/2016002, Section 1R20 Outage Activities.  
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This LER is closed.

#### 4OA5 Other Activities

##### .1 Operation of an ISFSI at Operating Plants (60855.1)

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed documents, interviewed plant personnel, and performed in-field observations to assess the licensee's performance as it relates to the operation of the ISFSI. The inspectors evaluated whether changes made to the programs and procedures since the last inspection were consistent with the license or Certificate of Compliance, and did not reduce the effectiveness of the program. The inspectors also reviewed whether changes were evaluated in accordance with the requirements stated in 10 CFR 72.212(b), 10 CFR 50.59, and 10 CFR 72.48. The inspectors independently assessed whether dry cask storage activities were performed in a safe manner and in compliance with approved procedures. The inspectors verified that the licensee has identified each fuel assembly placed in the ISFSI, has recorded the parameters and characteristics of each fuel assembly, and has maintained a record of each fuel assembly as a controlled document.

Specifically, the inspectors observed the licensee perform the following activities: remove the transfer cask containing the canister from the spent fuel pool; remove water from the canister; decontaminate the cask; closure weld and non-destructively test the canister; vacuum dry the canister; helium backfill the canister; place the transfer cask on the transfer trailer; move the transfer trailer from the Fuel Handling Building to the ISFSI, and transfer the canister from the transfer cask to the Horizontal Storage Module. The inspectors also reviewed the following documents: periodic radiological surveys, environmental monitoring reports that demonstrate radiological conditions were in accordance with the Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 72.104 limits, and records of fuel assemblies and physical inventories.

A review of corrective action reports written since the last ISFSI inspection indicated that the licensee was effectively identifying and correcting conditions adverse to quality.

###### b. Findings

No findings were identified.

#### 4OA6 Management Meetings

##### .1 Exit Meeting Summary

On October 4, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Coffey, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

## .2 Interim Exit Meetings

Interim exits were conducted for:

- The inspection results for the Radiation Safety Program review with Mr. R. Coffey, Site Vice President, on August 12, 2016, and Mr. D. DeBoer, Plant Manager, on September 15, 2016;
- The inspection results for the ISFSI Program review were held with Mr. R. Coffey, Site Vice President on August 4, 2016, and Mr. R. Clark on September 21, 2016.

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the licensee management and staff. Licensee personnel acknowledged the information presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary. Proprietary material received during the inspection was returned to the licensee.

## 4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low significance (Severity Level IV) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements; it meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation.

- The licensee identified a non-cited violation of very low safety significance of 10 CFR 72.150, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings." Title 10 CFR 72.150, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. The licensee established PBF-5101, "Fuel/Insert/Component Movement Authorization," Revision 17, as the implementing procedure for dry fuel storage fuel loading, an activity affecting quality. Procedure PBF-5101 contains instructions for fuel handlers to move specific fuel assemblies from specific spent fuel pool locations into specific dry shielded canisters (DSCs) and DSC locations.

Contrary to the above, on July 18, 2016, the licensee failed to follow PBF-5101. Specifically, the licensee was utilizing a PBF-5101 labeled for DSC-25 during the loading of DSC-24. This resulted in three fuel assemblies being incorrectly loaded into DSC-24. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program under AR 02144237, dated July 18, 2016, and initiated actions to perform an apparent causal evaluation. The inspectors identified that DSC-24 and DSC-25 have identical design characteristics and therefore there was no actual safety significance to this event.

Consistent with the guidance in Section 2.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, ISFSIs are not subject to the Significance Determination Process and, thus, traditional enforcement will be used for this issue. However, the inspectors determined that the violation significance could be informed by the significance determination process as no similar violations existed in the enforcement policy.

violations examples. The inspectors determined that the violation could be evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Appendix A, Exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions." This resulted in the violation screening as Severity Level IV.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

## **SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION**

### **KEY POINTS OF CONTACT**

#### Licensee

R. Coffey, Site Vice President  
D. DeBoer, Plant General Manager  
S. Aerts, Performance Improvement Manager  
A. Bussiere, Information Technology Project Manager  
R. Clark, Licensing Engineer  
J. Gerondale, Security Supervisor  
B. Gierach, Information Technology Manager  
J. Golding, Inspection Lean and System Engineering Supervisor  
B. Griffin, Communications Specialist  
A. Gustafson, Operations Training General Supervisor  
D. Halverson, Information Technology Specialist  
R. Harrsch, Engineering Director  
R. Hastings Operations Assistant Manager  
R. Higgins, Operations Assistant Manager  
K. Johansen, ODCM Specialist  
K. Locke, Licensing Engineer  
S. Manthei, Licensing Engineer  
M. Millen, Senior Project Manager  
C. Neuser, Site Engineering Manager  
J. Ramski, Outage Manager  
E. Schmidt, Site Engineering Manager  
T. Schneider, Senior Engineer  
R. Seizert, Emergency Preparedness Manager  
B. Smith, ISFSI Project Manager  
G. Strharsky, Site Quality Manager  
R. Webber, Site Operations Director  
R. Welty, Radiation Protection Manager  
P. Wild, Site Engineering Manager  
J. Wilson, Site Maintenance Director  
B. Woyak, Licensing Manager

#### U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

J. Cameron, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4

## **LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED**

### Closed

05000266/2016-002-00	LER	Unit 1 Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (Section 4OA3.1)
05000266/2016-003-00	LER	Unit 1 Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (Section 4OA3.2)

## LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

### 1R04 Equipment Alignment

AR 01718806; Void Found During U1 Sentinel Point Monitoring  
AR 02070392; LI-934 B SI Accumulator Level Indicator Failed Low  
AR 02110468; 2LI-934 2T-34B SI Accumulator Level Indicating Low  
AR 02118717; Grit / Metal Filings Found On/Near 1F-270A Strainer  
AR 02122521; Unit 1 Inside CTMT ECCS UT Finds Void (GAMP)  
AR 02123127; Excessive Hysteresis midscale on 2LI-935 (34B Accumulator Level Indication)  
AR 02143474; Gas Void Found Upstream of 1SI-889B, 1P-15B SI Pump Check Valve  
AR 02146150; SI Level Transmitter Indicating Improperly  
CE 02143474; Condition Evaluation for Gas Void Found Upstream of 1SI-889B, 1P-15B SI Pump Check Valve; Dated 07/27/2016  
CL 7A; Safety Injection System Checklist Unit 1; Revision 36  
Drawing 110E017 Sheet 1; P&ID Safety Injection System; Revision 59  
Drawing 110E017 Sheet 2; P&ID Safety Injection System; Revision 66  
Drawing 499B466; Sheet 1303; Elementary Wiring Diagram Auxiliary Feed Pump 2P-53 Automatic Actuation; Revision 0  
Drawing 499B466; Sheet 1304; Elementary Wiring Diagram Auxiliary Feed Pump 2P-53 Discharge and Recirculation Valves Control; Revision 0  
Drawing E-1573E-A; Main Control Board Section 2C04 – Front – CPR56 Vertical Section; Revision 19  
Drawing E-2007; Sheet 12; 120V AC Instrument Bus Distribution Panel 2Y-03; Revision 2  
Drawing E-2065; Sheet 5; Secondary Plant Instrumentation Instrument Loop; Revision 6  
Drawing M-209; Sheet 14; P&ID Starting & Service Air System Diesel Generator Building; Revision 13  
Drawing M-217; Sheet 1; P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System; Revision 103  
Drawing M-219; Sheet 1; P&ID Fuel Oil System Diesel Generator Building; Revision 50  
Drawing M-219; Sheet 3; P&ID Fuel Oil System Diesel Generator Building; Revision 3  
Drawing M-2217; P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System; Revision 5  
Drawing M-227; Sheet 1; P&ID Glycol Cooling System Diesel Generator Building; Revision 11  
Drawing PBE-137; G-500 Starting and Monitoring Circuit External Connections; Revision 3  
Drawings WOODGROUP Series; G-05 Gas Turbine Engine Control System  
Master Data Book; MDB 3.2.11 2Y03; Instrument Panels; Revision 6  
Master Data Book; MDB 3.2.12 D63; DC Distribution; Revision 1  
Procedure CL 11A G-03; G-03 Diesel Generator Checklist; Revision 9  
Procedure CL13E Part 2; Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Lineup Motor Driven; Revision 53

### 1R05 Fire Protection

AR 01875052; NFPA-805 Electrical Review Short Time Pick-Up Concerns  
AR 01875056; NFPA-805 Electrical Review Instantaneous Trip Time Concerns  
AR 01884019; NFPA-805 Commitments  
AR 02103264; D-414 Has a Low Battery Fault Alarm Light Illuminated

Door Reader Transaction History – EDG Room; 08/08/2016 – 08/09/2016.  
 Door Reader Transaction History – PAB; 08/08/2016 – 08/09/2016.  
 Drawing M-144 Sheet 1; Heating & Ventilation Temperature Control; Revision 27  
 Drawing PBC-218 Sheet 21; Fire Barrier Locations for Turbine Building, Aux Building, and Containment Elev. 8', Revision 7  
 Drawing PBC-218 Sheet 22; Fire Barrier Locations for Turbine Building, Aux Building, and Containment Elev. 26', Revision 7  
 Drawing PBC-218 Sheet 4; Fire Protection for Turbine Building Aux Building & Containment Elev. 44'; Revision 15  
 Drawing PBC-219 Sheet 23; Fire Emergency Procedure 4.10 Aux Building & Containment Elev. 26'; Revision 6  
 Drawing PBC-219 Sheet 27; Fire Emergency Procedure 4.13 Turbine Building & Aux Building Elev. 8'; Revision 12  
 Drawing PBC-219 Sheet 3; Fire Emergency Procedure 4.3 Aux Building & Containment Elev. 8'; Revision 5  
 FEP 4.10; Auxiliary Building – El. 46' CCW HX Room, GS Equipment Room; El. 26' Truck Access, Drum Prep; Revision 9  
 FEP 4.13; Emergency Diesel Generator (G01/G02) And Compressor Rooms; Revision 12  
 FEP 4.3; PAB North - El. 8' Charging Pump Area Unit 2, Cryogenic Equipment Area; Revision 10  
 FHAR; Fire Hazards Analysis Report; Revision 7  
 Fire Round Performance Sheet – PAB; Four-Hour Rounds; Dated 08/08/2016.  
 Fire Round Performance Sheet – PAB; Four-Hour Rounds; Dated 08/09/2016.  
 Fire Round Performance Sheet – PAB; Hourly Rounds; Dated 08/08/2016.  
 Fire Round Performance Sheet – PAB; Hourly Rounds; Dated 08/09/2016.  
 Fire Round Performance Sheet – Turbine Hall; Four-Hour Rounds; Dated 08/08/2016.  
 Fire Round Performance Sheet – Turbine Hall; Four-Hour Rounds; Dated 08/09/2016.  
 Fire Round Performance Sheet – Turbine Hall; Hourly Rounds; Dated 08/08/2016.  
 Fire Round Performance Sheet – Turbine Hall; Hourly Rounds; Dated 08/09/2016.  
 RMP 9057, Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Surveillance, Revision 6

#### 1R06 Flooding

AR 01634515; IER1 11-1 Non-Seismic Flood Barrier  
 AR 01914192; 95002 Preps: FSAR Table A.7 Description Misleading  
 AR 01930944; Subsoil Drain Cleanout Covers Not Watertight  
 AR 01977210; Internal Flood Protection of VSGR and CSR Questioned  
 AR 02102849; Flood Permit Tags Appear to Have Been Removed Early  
 AR 02134417; NP 8.4.17 Changes (Flooding)  
 AR 02127800; NP 8.4.17 Allowed Items to be Added W/O 50.59 Process  
 Calculation 2014-0007; Allowable Flood Levels; Revision 0  
 Calculation 2014-02058; Internal Flooding Effects; Revision 0  
 Calculation PBNP 26256-026-501; Evaluation of Block Wall West of CSTs; Revision 0  
 Condition Report Search; Flooding; 9/21/15 – 9/21/16  
 Drawing C-100; PBNP Foundation Plan & Sub Drainage; Revision 18  
 Drawing SK-C-250; Non-Vital Switchgear Room Block Wall Reinforcement Details; Revision 0  
 Drawing SK-C-251; Non-Vital Switchgear Room Block Wall Reinforcement Details; Revision 0  
 Drawing UE 6704 E-353470; Slab Demolition & Drain Pipe Relocation Plan Sects & Details; Revision 4  
 EC 271960; Reinforce Masonry Wall on the East Side of NVSGR; Revision 0  
 EC 281710; Seal Manhole and Cleanouts in Subsoil Drain System; Revision 0

EPMP 9.0; Equipment Important to Emergency Response; Attachment A, Table of Equipment Important to Emergency Response; Revision 8  
FSAR Appendix A.7; Plant Flooding; FSAR 2015  
NP 7.2.29; External Events Program; Revision 5  
NP 8.4.17; PBNP Flooding Program; Revision 24  
OM 4.3.8; Control of Time Critical and Time Sensitive Operator Actions; Attachment A-6, Isolation of Internal Turbine Building and Diesel Generator Building Flood Sources; Revision 13  
SCR 2013-0124; Remove Auxiliary Feedwater Room Continuous Floodwatch from CLB; Dated 7/23/13  
SLP 3; Safe Load Path and Rigging Manual; Turbine Building Main Crane and Truck Bay Jib Crane; Revision 16  
WO 40356963; 1ICP 05.047 – Secondary Level Controller / Switches Operational Check; Condenser Pit Level High Switch Testing

#### 1R07 Annual Heat Sink Performance

AR 02026056; Delaminating Coating and Small Pits Inside HX-12B  
AR 02134216; GL 89-13 Program Has Incorrect EDG HX Tube Plugging Limit  
AR 02137078; No Acceptance Criteria For CFC Tube Plugging NRC Identified  
CAMP 909.13; Continuous Chlorination of Service Water in Manual Mode for Mussel Control; Revision 3  
CAMP 909.15; Continuous Chlorination of Service Water in Manual Mode; Revision 0  
Condition Evaluation 02137078; No Acceptance Criteria For CFC Tube Plugging  
Condition Report Search; Heat Exchanger; 4/1/15 – 9/14/16  
DBD-12; Service Water System Design Bases Document; Rev. 23  
GL 89-13; Program Document; Revision 14  
NP 3.2.7; Service / Circulating Water Monitoring and Biofouling Program; Revision 3  
NP 3.2.8; Open Cooling Water Systems Optimization Plan; Revision 0

#### 1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program

AOP-2B; Feedwater System Malfunction; Revision 18  
Licensed Operator Regualification Evaluated Scenario Drill Package; Segment 16D  
OP 5B; Blender Operation/Dilution/Boration; Revision 40  
OP-AA-03; Reactivity Management; Revision 0  
OP-AA-100; Operations Expectations; Revision 1  
OP-AA-100-1000; Conduct of Operations; Revision 16  
OP-AA-103-1000; Reactivity Management; Revision 5  
RMP 9201; Control and Documentation for Troubleshooting and Repair Activities; Revision 15; Dated 9/13/16  
WO 40486456; Complex Troubleshooting Needed for AOP-2B Entry

#### 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

AR 02076885; K-3B Out-Of-Service (Not Loading Properly)  
AR 02079502; K-3B Compressor Failure to Load  
AR 02085956; K-0003B SA Compressor Not Loading  
AR 02091060; K-3B Service Air Compressor Failure to Load  
AR 02091284; Mechanical Binding of SA Unloader Solenoid  
AR 02145197; SA Low Pressure Alarm Followed by Standby SA Compressor



Condition Report Search; Service Air System; May 1, 2015 – Aug 22, 2016  
EACE 02076885; K-3B Out-Of-Service (Not Loading Properly); Dated 11/18/15  
EACE 02145794; K-3A Service Air Compressor Trip; Dated 8/17/16  
Eval-PB-SA-00288; Service Air (a)(1) Review and Action Plan; Accessed 8/23/16  
LTA PB-15-0019, Long Term Action for SA Moisture Issue; Dated 3/27/16  
Maintenance Rule Function Scoping and Criteria; Service Air; Accessed 8/22/16  
Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluation; Service Air Compressor AR 02076885 and AR 02079502; Dated 10/19/15  
Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluation; Service Air Compressor AR 0208956; Dated 11/10/15  
Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluation; Service Air Compressor AR 02091060 and 02091284; Dated 12/3/15  
Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluation; Service Air Compressor AR 02145794; Dated 8/11/16

### 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

AR 02144742; IT-08B Risk Look Ahead  
AR 02145347; Schedule as Written Could Result in Orange Risk for U1  
AR 02145936; Phoenix Risk Monitor  
Condition Report Search; 6/14/16 through 9/14/16  
Daily Production Meeting Look-Ahead Elevated Risk A&B Adherence Grade; 07/13/16 to 09/02/16  
Non-Technical Specification Equipment OOS and Fire Impairment Log; Dated 7/25/16  
Non-Technical Specification Equipment OOS and Fire Impairment Log; Dated 8/11/16  
NP 10.3.7; Online Safety Assessment; Revision 37  
Point Beach Abnormal Equipment Alignment Report; Dated 8/11/16  
Point Beach Unit 1 Historical Risk Data Report; Dated 8/31/16  
Point Beach Unit 1 Historical Risk Data Report; Dated 9/6/16  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Plant Configuration Report; Dated 8/31/16 08:28 AM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Plant Configuration Report; Dated 8/31/16 09:28 AM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Plant Configuration Report; Dated 8/31/16 09:31 AM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Plant Configuration Report; Dated 8/31/16 12:30 PM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Plant Configuration Report; Dated 8/31/16 02:42 PM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Plant Configuration Report; Dated 9/6/16 12:15 PM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Plant Configuration Report; Dated 9/6/16 12:30 PM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Plant Configuration Report; Dated 9/6/16 04:36 PM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 7/22/16 04:00 PM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 7/26/16 03:55 AM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 7/27/16 04:45 AM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 7/28/16 07:19 PM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 7/29/16 03:40 AM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 8/11/16 03:03 AM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 8/31/16 04:32 AM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 9/3/16 11:38 PM  
Point Beach Unit 1 Station Daily Status Report; Dated 7/29/16  
Point Beach Unit 1 Station Daily Status Report; Dated 8/31/16  
Point Beach Unit 2 Historical Risk Data Report; Dated 9/6/16  
Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Plant Configuration Report; Dated 9/6/16 04:41 PM  
Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Plant Configuration Reports; Dated 5/11/16  
Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Plant Configuration Reports; Dated 7/25/16 10:00 AM

Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Plant Configuration Reports; Dated 7/25/16 10:56 AM  
 Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Plant Configuration Reports; Dated 7/25/16 12:55 PM  
 Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Plant Configuration Reports; Dated 7/25/16 13:20 PM  
 Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 7/22/16 04:00 PM  
 Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 7/26/16 03:55 AM  
 Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 7/27/16 04:45 AM  
 Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 7/28/16 07:19 PM  
 Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 7/29/16 03:40 AM  
 Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 8/11/16 03:03 AM  
 Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 8/31/16 04:32 AM  
 Point Beach Unit 2 Phoenix Risk Summary Report; Dated 9/3/16 11:38 PM  
 Point Beach Unit 2 Station Daily Status Report; Dated 7/29/16  
 Point Beach Unit 2 Station Daily Status Report; Dated 8/31/16  
 Station Logs; Dated 7/25/16  
 Station Logs; Dated 7/27/16  
 Station Logs; Dated 8/10/16  
 Station Logs; Dated 8/11/16  
 Station Logs; Dated 8/31/16  
 Station Logs; Dated 9/6/16  
 Technical Specification Equipment OOS and Fire Impairment Log; Dated 7/25/16  
 Technical Specification Equipment OOS and Fire Impairment Log; Dated 7/29/16  
 Technical Specification Equipment OOS and Fire Impairment Log; Dated 8/11/16

#### 1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments

Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan; 1T-034A Tank Level; Updated 08/18/16  
 Adverse Condition Monitoring Plan; Pressurizer Pressure Channel Check Instrument / Indicator  
 2PT-449  
 AR 02106027; FNOT2040260-01 Not in Compliance with EN-AA-203-1001  
 AR 02122521; Unit 1 Inside CTMT ECCS UT Finds Void (GAMP)  
 AR 02134597; 2016 CAP FSA: Operability Determination 1SI-850B Stroke Time  
 AR 02142689; 2PT-449 Yellow Pressurizer T-Mod Feasibility Walkdown Results  
 AR 02143474; Gas Void Found Upstream of 1SI-889B, 1P-15B SI Pump CV  
 AR 02150150; 1T-34A May Require Three Fills in August  
 AR 02152044; Complex Troubleshooting Needed For AOP-2B Entry  
 AR 02152431; Red Tavag Channel (2T-401) on Unit 2 Noisy  
 AR 02153159; Documentation of AOP Entry CS/Feed System from 08/24/16  
 AR 02154199; Corrosion on Cells 43, 51, 53, and 51 of D-105  
 Condition Report Search; Operability Determination; 01/01/16 - 9/13/16  
 DBD-03; Design Basis Document; Condensate and Feedwater System; Revision 17  
 DBD-19; 125 VDC System Design Basis Document; Revision 14  
 Drawing 541F445; Sheet 1; P&ID Reactor Coolant System; Revision 50  
 Drawing 883D195; Sheet 13; Logic Diagrams Safeguards Actuation Signals; Revision 6  
 Drawing 883D195; Sheet 7; Logic Diagrams Safeguards Actuation Signals; Revision 25  
 FSAR Section 7.2; Reactor Protection System; Revision 2012  
 FSAR Section 7.3; Engineered Safeguards Actuation System; Revision 2012  
 FSAR Section 8.7; 125 VDC Electrical Distribution System; Revision 2014  
 Graph of Tavag Loop A-1 Red from September 9, 2016  
 Level 1 Operational Decision-Making Action Plan: Unit 2 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter  
 2PT-449

LTR-LIS-08-543; Westinghouse Letter and Attachment, Non-Condensable Gas Voids in ECCS Piping, Assessment of Potential Effects on Reactor Coolant System Transients Including Chapter 15 Events; Dated 08/19/08  
 POD 02138501; Prompt Operability Determination for Reactor Protection System DANA Amplifier Electrolytic Capacitors  
 POR 02143474; Past Operability Review for Gas Void Found Upstream of 1SI-889B, 1P-15B SI Pump Check Valve; Dated 07/21/2016  
 Station Log Search; T-401; 08/01/16 - 10/01/16  
 TAR 01718806; Void Found During U1 Sentinel Point Monitoring; Revision 0  
 WP 2016-039; Unit 1 SI-889B Void Monitoring Work Plan; Dated 07/14/2016

#### 1R18 Plant Modifications

Calculation 129187-P-0008, Rev. 7, Point Beach Unit 1 – Main Steam Outside Containment – Piping Qualifications for EPU Conditions  
 DG-M10, Rev. 3, Pipe Support Guidelines  
 Drawing 20735H Sheet 2; 30" O.D. Pipe Main Steam Stop Valve; Revision 00  
 Drawing P-107, Rev. 13, Main Stm. Outside Ctmt to HP Turb Control Valves and to Condenser  
 Drawing P-307 Sht. 52, Rev. 0, Pipe Hanger / Support Detail for EB-1-H19  
 Drawing P-307 Sht. 53, Rev. 1, Pipe Hanger / Support Detail for EB-1-H9  
 DRS 211, Rev. 4, Design Report Summary for Fig. 211N Sway Strut, Anvil International  
 EC 286161; 1MS-2017, HX-1B SG Header Main Steam Stop Control Valve Leak Sealant Repair; Revision 1  
 EC 286224, 1MS-2017 Leak Sealant Enclosure (Verify the Title)  
 EC 286224; 1MS-2017, HX-1B SG Header Main Steam Stop Control Valve Bearing Housing Flange Leak Enclosure; Revision 1  
 LSP-PEEN-02; Engineering Procedure; Drill & Tap Flange for Injection; Revision 0  
 SCR 2016-0042; 10 CFR 50.59 Screening for 1MS-2017 Steam Leak 1R36 Repair; Revision 0  
 TS 39 Train B; 1MS-2017, Main Steam Isolation Valve Operability Trip Test Unit 1; Revision 0

#### 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

0-SOP-SA-001; Operation of Service Air Compressors; Revision 20  
 2-SOP-CC-001; Component Cooling System; Revision 26; Dated 6/30/16  
 AR 02071304; Charging Pump VFD Ground Fault Wiring Concerns  
 AR 02083505; PBNP Service Air Meets Criteria for (A)(1)  
 AR 02090847; Gross Packing Leakage From Valve  
 AR 02138728; Z-2009B, Flex Pump Failed to Start  
 AR 02139709; Both W-14 CR Charcoal Fans Cycling During PMT  
 AR 02140780; Contingency Task Needed for 2P-011A Shaft Replacement  
 AR 02141345; Component Cooling Water Pump (2P-11A) Motor Shaft End Play  
 AR 02142473; 1P-002C Broken Discharge Valve Spring  
 AR 02142739; 1P-2C Charging Pump Failed PMT  
 AR 02144921; 1/2P-002A/B/C-Z Charging Pump Variable Frequency Drive Signal Cond PM  
 AR 02145197; SA Low Pressure Alarm Followed by Standby SA Compressor  
 AR 02145794; K-3A Service Air Compressor Trip  
 AR 02147663; Issues Associated with RTS Testing K-3A SA Compressor  
 AR 02152256; G-01 ESTR Replaced is Functional PMT For Replacement Adequate  
 Condition Report Search; PMT; June 10, 2016 to September 10, 2016  
 DBD 04; Design Basis Document; Chemical Volume and Control System; Revision 10  
 DBD 11; Design Basis Document; Safety Injection and Containment Spray System; Revision 23

Drawing 110E017 Sheet 1; P&ID Safety Injection System; Revision 59  
 Drawing 110E017 Sheet 2; P&ID Safety Injection System; Revision 66  
 Drawing 684J741 Sheet 2; P&ID Chemical & Volume Control; Revision 76  
 FSAR Section 7.7; Control Systems; Revision 2012  
 FSAR Section 8.6; 120 VAC Vital Instrument Power; Revision 2014  
 FSAR Section 9.1; Component Cooling Water; Revision 2014  
 FSAR Section 9.3; Chemical and Volume Control System; Revision 2015  
 ISTBG 4<sup>th</sup> Interval App N; PBNP In-Service Testing Background Valve Data Sheet, 1SI-889B, SI Pump 1P-15B Discharge Check Valve; Revision 0  
 ISTBG 4<sup>th</sup> Interval App N; PBNP In-Service Testing Background Valve Data Sheet, 1SI-854E, SI Pump 1P-15B To RCS Loop A Cold Leg Injection Check Valve; Revision 0  
 IT 01 Train B; High Head Safety Injection Pumps and Valves Train B Unit 1; Revision 6  
 IT 13 Train A; 2P-11A, Component Cooling Water Pump and Valves Unit 2; Revision 5;  
 Dated 6/30/16  
 IT 21; Charging Pumps and Check Valve Test (Quarterly) Unit 1; Revision 23; Dated 7/11/16  
 IT 21; Charging Pumps and Check Valve Test (Quarterly) Unit 1; Revision 23; Dated 7/9/16  
 IT 21; Charging Pumps and Check Valve Test (Quarterly) Unit 1; Revision 23; Dated 7/8/16  
 IT 22; Charging Pumps and Check Valve Test (Quarterly) Unit 2; Revision 24  
 MA-AA-203-1000; Maintenance Testing; Revision 5  
 OI 128D; Fill and Vent Train B SI Pump Modes 1-3 Unit 1; Revision 3  
 PDM 3.0; Infrared Thermography Program; Revision 7  
 PRA 5.21; PRA Notebook; Instrument / Service Air System Notebook; Revision 0  
 Report of Calibration; MCDP-020; Fluke 51 II; November 2, 2015  
 RMP 9003-9; Charging Pump Suction and Discharge Valve Overhaul; Revision 11;  
 Dated 7/8/16  
 RMP 9003-9; Charging Pump Suction and Discharge Valve Overhaul; Revision 11;  
 Dated 7/11/16  
 RMP 9003-9; Charging Pump Suction and Discharge Valve Overhaul; Revision 11;  
 Dated 7/9/16  
 RMP 9006-5; Component Cooling Water Pump Overhaul; Attachment D, Pump and Motor Bearing Temperature Log; Revision 33  
 RMP 9006-5; Component Cooling Water Pump Overhaul; Revision 33; Dated 6/30/16  
 RMP 9045-5; 1DY-04 Yellow Channel Instrument Bus Static Inverter Maintenance Procedure; Revision 27; Dated 8/10/16  
 RMP 9201; Control and Documentation for Troubleshooting and Repair Activities – Repair Plan for WO 40483718-01, 1DY-04 Transfer to Backup Power; Dated 8/8/16  
 RMP 9347-4; Functional Testing of Contactors / Thermal Overload Relays; Revision 9  
 RMP 9404; Motor E-max Testing; Revision 13  
 Station Log Search for 7/9/16-7/12/16; Search Term “Charging Pump”  
 WO 40379406-07; 2P-11A Found Outboard Seal Leaking, OPS PMT / RTS for Bearing / Seal Replacement  
 WO 40379406-07; 2P-11A Found Outboard Seal Leaking, Record Running Current during Pump PMT Run  
 WO 40390364-02; B52-DB50-041 Breaker Maintenance per RMP 9303 and RMP 9369, Setup and Stage Spare Breaker per RMP 9369-1  
 WO 40416822 01; K-003A Semi-Annual Compressor Maintenance  
 WO 40416822 02; K-003A Service Air Compressor Operations PMT / RTS  
 WO 40461511 01; 2P-002B Charging Pump Replace Signal Conditioner Module  
 WO 40461511 04; 2P-002B Charging Pump Ops Return to Service and PMT  
 WO 40476052-01; 2P-11A Rotating Components Assembly and Adjustments, Motor Installation  
 WO 40477296 06; 1P-2C, Troubleshoot VFD

WO 40477296-02; 1P-2C Loud Intermittent Knocking Noise, Perform Video Probe Inspection  
WO 40477296-04; 1P-2C Loud Intermittent Knocking Noise, Replace Check Valves  
WO 40479782 01E; P-15B SI Pump Discharge Check, SI-889B, Inspection / Blue Check  
WO 40479782 01F; P-15B SI Pump Discharge Check, SI-889B, Disc Lap / Seat Stone  
WO 40479782 02; P-15B SI Pump Discharge Check, SI-889B, OPS PMT RTS  
WO 40480928 04; K-003A Service Air Compressor Perform Repairs Testing of Remote  
Contactor  
WO 40480928 05; K-003A Service Air Compressor Operations PMT / RTS  
WO 40480928 09; K-003A Service Air Compressor Perform Thermography of Control Panel

#### 1R22 Surveillance Testing

AR 02066405; Relay 2-276/A05 Found Inoperable During 2RMP 9071-1  
AR 02076361; Status Light Not Checked Correctly During Surveillance  
AR 02115536; Diesel Fire Pump Start Circuit 2 Failing Due to Vibration  
AR 02120319; SFCP Evaluation For SR 3.5.2.2 ECCS Venting  
Calculation 2005-0007; Electrical System Transient Analysis; Revision 3B  
Calculation 2007-0002; Emergency Diesel Generator Frequency Uncertainty Calculation;  
Revision 10  
Calculation 97-0215; Water Volume Swept by TDAFW Pumps Following a Seismic/Tornado  
Event Affecting Both Units; Revision 005-A  
Calculation 97-0215; Water Volume Swept by TDAFW Pumps Following a Seismic/Tornado  
Event Affecting Both Units; Revision 005-B  
Drawing M-207 Sheet 1; Service Water System; Revision 81  
Drawing M-207 Sheet 1A; Service Water System; Revision 40  
Drawing M-207 Sheet 2; Service Water System; Revision 47  
Drawing M-217 Sheet 1; Auxiliary Feed System; Revision 103  
Drawing M-217 Sheet 2; Auxiliary Feed System; Revision 34  
Inservice Testing Program Table – AF; 2AF-4006, TDAFWP 2P-29 Service Water Supply  
Isolation Valve; Revision 5  
ISTBG 4<sup>th</sup> Interval App N; PBNP In-Service Testing Background Valve Data Sheet, 2AF-04006,  
TDAFWP 2P-29 Service Water Supply Isolation Valve; Revision 0  
IT 09B; TDAFP Suction From SW MOV Exercise Test (Quarterly) Unit 2; Revision 17  
LER 97-031-00; Non-conservative Setpoint for Auxiliary Feedwater Low Suction Pressure Trip;  
Dated 07/21/1997  
RMP 9043-19; Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Remote Meter Calibration; Revision 10  
WO 40423407; TS-81, G-01 Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test  
WO 40427090; IT 09B; U2 TDAFP SW Suction Valve Quarterly Test

#### 1EP6 Drill Evaluation

AR 02140654; Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) Failure  
Condition Report Search; EP Department; January 1, 2016 to September 12, 2016  
LER 97-031-00; Non-conservative Setpoint for Auxiliary Feedwater Low Suction Pressure Trip;  
Dated 07/21/1997  
Point Beach Nuclear Accident Reporting System Form; Completed on September 12, 2016  
Procedure EPIP 1.1; Course of Actions; Revision 7  
WO 40427090; IT 09B; U2 TDAFP SW Suction Valve Quarterly Test

## 2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

ALARA Package No: 16-R004; Remove and Install RV Head Including RV Head Undress/Redress Activities, Upper Internals Remove/Install, Cavity Seal Ring Remove/Install and Activities in RHLDA; Revision 0

ALARA Package No: 16-R011; Steam Generator Eddy Current; Revision 0

AR 02078101; Dose ALARA during Unit Two Entry; October 6, 2015

AR 02078594; Radioactive Particle Identified on Modesty Garment; October 10, 2015

AR 02078645; U2R34: PCE 2; October, 7 2015

AR 02123284; 11.5MR Received VS 11MR Threshold during ECC UT Examinations; April 15, 2016

AR 02125118; Dose for 1-TS-ECCS-002 Train A/B Higher Than Anticipated; April 15, 2016

Assessment #: PBNP RP 16-15; NRC IP 71124.02, Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls; NRC IP 71151, Occupational ALARA Performance Indicator Verification

CAMP 600.3; Primary Side Sampling Procedures: Hot Leg Liquid Sampling-Depressurized Liquid; Revision 6

Dose Reduction Action Item Matrix for Sustained Performance

HPIP 3.53; Counting of Air Samples for Low Level, Long Lived Radioactive Alpha Particulate Contamination; Revision 15

Point Beach Alpha Characterization Survey Study Update for 2016; August 17, 2016

Point Beach Nuclear Plant 5-Year ALARA Plan 2016-2020; Revision 0

RP-AA-102-1000; Alpha Monitoring; Revision 2

RP-AA-104; ALARA Program, Revision 5

RP-AA-104-1000; ALARA Implementing Procedure; Revision 10

RP-AA-104-2003; Five Year ALARA Plan Template; Revision 1

RWP 16-001; Radwaste Shipment, Resin Change Out and Filter Change Activities; Revision 00

RWP 16-002; Site Specific Areas; Revision 01

RWP 16-1004; Outage Shielding Activities; Revision 01

RWP 16-1005; Operations Activities; Revision 01

Work Order Package 40313593 01; Quality Record; May 6, 2016

## 2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment

Annual Monitoring Report 2015 Nextera Energy Point Beach, LLC, Point Beach Nuclear Plant Environmental Manual; Revision 25; February 11, 2014

AR 0195246; RE-230 Local Flow Meter Reads 0 Locally; March 26, 2014

AR 02062068; 1RE-215 Indication Rising; July 22, 2015

AR 02091010; U1 LR215 PPCS Alarm – Unexpected; November 12, 2015

AR 02095944; Moisture Intrusion in 1RE-215 Detector Well Causing Failures; December 7, 2015

AR 02096915; 1RE-219 U1 SG Blowdown Alert Alarm; December 11, 2015

AR 02097558; 1RE-219 and Redundant Channel Readings Were Elevated for a 2<sup>nd</sup> Time; December 15, 2015

Assessment # PBSA-CHEM-16-03, RETS/ODCM Quick Hit; June 16, 2016

CAMP 031, Preparation of Batch Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Permits Using RETSCODE Software; Revision 14

HPIP 3.52.1, Radiological Sampling for Release Accountability; Revision 37

HPIP 3.52.2, Containment Forced Vent/Purge/Confined Space Sample from RE-211/212 Cubicle; Revision 11

Offsite Dose Calculation Manual; Revision 18; November 7, 2007

OP 9C, Containment Venting and Purging Unit 1; Revision 11

OP 9C, Containment Venting and Purging Unit 2; Revision 11

Radiological Effluent Control Manual; Revision 5; January 13, 2009  
RAM 2.2, Unplanned/Unscheduled Radioactive Liquid Release Calculation; Revision 10  
RAM 2.3, Liquid Radioactive Releases: Vendor Laboratory-Offsite Sample Analysis; Revision 6  
RAM 3.1, Radioactive Liquid Waste Permits; Revision 17  
RAM 3.2, Radioactive Batch Liquid Releases; Revision 16  
RAM 3.2.1, Steam Generator Storage Facility/Warehouse 7 Sump Discharges; Revision 7  
RAM 4.1, Radioactive Continuous Liquid Releases; Revision 9  
RAM 4.2, Façade Sump Discharge; Revision 10  
RAM 5.1, Radioactive Airborne Effluent Releases; Revision 11  
RAM 5.2, Unplanned/Unscheduled Radioactive Airborne Release Calculations; Revision 8  
RAM 6.1, Radioactive Continuous Airborne Releases; Revision 7  
RAM 6.2, Miscellaneous Steam Releases; Revision 8  
RAM 6.8, Multi-Assembly Sealed Basket (MSB) or Dry Shielded Canister (DSC) Radioactive Gas Discharge Permit; Revision 2  
RAM 7.1, Containment Forced Ventilation during Power Generation; Revision 11  
RAM 7.2, Containment Manual Vent Using Purge Valves; Revision 7  
RAM 7.3, Containment Purge; Revision 7

#### 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

AR 02052030; POR Request for W-185A & B A-06 Switchgear Room Fans  
AR 02138501; Reactor Protection System Dana Amp Electrolytic Capacitors  
AR 02154867; Revision to July 2016 Participation Performance Indicator  
Attachment C PI Data Calculation, Review and Approval; ODCM Rad. Eff. Occurrences; August 2015 through August 2016  
Attachment C PI Data Calculation, Review and Approval; RCS Activity; August 2015 through August 2016  
Condition Report Search; July 1, 2015 – Sep 13, 2016; ACE, CE, EACE, RCE only  
Control Room Logs Search; CCW; December 15-20, 2015  
Control Room Logs; December 21, 2015  
Initial Correspondence; NRC Occupational Exposure Performance Indicator Data; August 2015 through August 2016  
LER 266/2015-001-00; Unit 1 Degraded Condition  
LER 266/2015-006-01; Unit 1 Automatic Reactor Trip  
LER 266/2016-002-00; Unit 1 Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications  
LER 266/2016-003-00; Unit 1 Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications  
LER 301/2015-005-01; Main Transformer Lockout and Associated Loss of Buses Results in System Actuation  
Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Search; October 1, 2015 – Sep 12, 2016

#### 4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

AR 02122199; 4-1-16 Unit 1 “A” RCP Starting Event Timeline  
AR 02122346; Unplanned TSAC 3.6.6.C on Unit 1  
Control Room Logs; April 2, 2016  
LER 266/2016-002-00; Unit 1 Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications  
LER 266/2016-003-00; Unit 1 Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

#### 4OA5 Other Activities

10 CFR 72.48 Screening and Evaluations 2015-2016

2012 Facilities Monitoring Program Annual Report; dated January 16, 2013  
 2016 Dry Fuel Storage ALARA Plan  
 CR 02144237; Apparent Causal Evaluation – Initiated Loading DSC-24 with DSC-25 Move  
 Sheets; dated August 25, 2016  
 HTPT-DSC-AREVA; High Temperature Liquid Penetrant Examination Using the Color Contrast  
 Solvent Removable Method; dated June 15, 2016  
 ISFSI Condition Reports 2015-2016  
 ISFSI Organization Chart  
 ISFSI Training Records  
 MSLT-DSC-AREVA; Mass Spectrometer Leak Test Procedure Dry Fuel Storage Canister;  
 Revision 0  
 PAB Crane Condition Reports 2015-2016  
 PBF-5101; Fuel/Insert/Component Movement Authorization; Revision 17  
 PBN 15-008; ISFSI Audit; dated July 31, 2015  
 PBN-BFJF-16-112; Irradiated Fuel Assembly Selection for Point Beach 2016 ISFSI Campaign;  
 Revision 1  
 PBSA-PROJ-16-06; 2016 ISFSI Dry Fuel Storage Campaign Preparation Assessment Report;  
 dated June 7, 2016  
 Point Beach 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report for NUHOMS-32PT System; Revision 15  
 Point Beach 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report for VSC-24 System; Revision 7  
 RP 17 Part 1; Preparation of TC/DSC; Revision 21  
 RP 17 Part 2; Place DSC/TC into Spent Fuel Pool; Revision 22  
 RP 17 Part 3; Loading Spent Fuel into the DSC; Revision 17  
 RP 17 Part 4; Remove DSC/TC from Spent Fuel Pool; Revision 24  
 RP 17 Part 5; Sealing 32PT DSC; Revision 24  
 RP 17 Part 6; Move DSC/TC from Decontamination Area to ISFSI; Revision 19  
 Visual Welding Inspection Report – Transfer Cask; October 20, 2015  
 WO 40352232-04; Z-015 Mechanical Inspection and Maintenance per RMP 9120; dated  
 August 31, 2015  
 WO 40406354-02; NUHOMS OS-197 Transfer Cask Lift Beam; May 19, 2016  
 WO 40451310-01; Z-015 Quarterly Crane Inspection; dated May 5, 2016  
 WPS TN P8-P8-GT1; Welding Procedure Specification; Revision 2  
 WPS TN P8-P8-GT2; Welding Procedure Specification; Revision 2

#### 4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

CR 02144237; Apparent Cause Evaluation – Initiated Loading DSC-24 with DSC-25 Move  
 Sheets; dated August 25, 2016  
 PBF-5101; Fuel/Insert/Component Movement Authorization; Revision 17  
 PBN-BFJF-16-112; Irradiated Fuel Assembly Selection for Point Beach 2016 ISFSI Campaign;  
 Revision 1  
 RP 17 Part 3; Loading Spent Fuel into the DSC; Revision 17



## LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS	Agencywide Document Access Management System
AFW	Auxiliary Feed Pump
ALARA	As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable
AOP	Abnormal Operating Procedure
AR	Action Request
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CCW	Component Cooling Water
CFR	<i>Code of Federal Regulations</i>
CR	Condition Report
DBD	Design Basis Document
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
DSC	Dry Shielded Canister
EC	Engineering Change
ECCS	Emergency Core Cooling System
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Report
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IP	Inspection Procedure
ISFSI	Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
IR	Inspection Report
LCO	Limiting Condition for Operation
LER	Licensee Event Report
LLC	Limited Liability Corporation
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OA	Other Activities
ODCM	Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
OOS	Out of Service
PAB	Primary Auxiliary Building
PI	Performance Indicator
PM	Planned or Preventative Maintenance
PMT	Post-Maintenance Testing
SW	Service Water
TS	Technical Specification
WO	Work Order

R. Coffey

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Jamnes Cameron, Chief  
Branch 4  
Division of Reactor Projects

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