



June 29, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Serial No 16-267
NRA/WDC R0
Docket Nos. 50-336/50-423
License Nos. DPR-65/NPF-49

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3
SUPPLEMENT TO INFORMATION REGARDING LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST
FOR REMOVAL OF SEVERE LINE OUTAGE DETECTION FROM THE OFFSITE
POWER SYSTEM

In a letter dated June 30, 2015, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) requested amendments to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) and to Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 for Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3). The proposed amendments would revise the MPS2 and MPS3 Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs) to: 1) delete the information pertaining to the severe line outage detection (SLOD) special protection system, 2) update the description of the tower structures associated with the four offsite transmission lines feeding Millstone Power Station (MPS), and 3) describe how the current offsite power source configuration and design satisfies the requirements of General Design Criteria (GDC)-17, "Electric Power Systems" and GDC-5, "Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components." The amendments also request Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval of a new Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) requirement, "Offsite Line Power Sources," for MPS2 and MPS3. This supplement proposes a revision to the TRM actions and the FSAR information for MPS2 and MPS3 as submitted in the June 30, 2015 license amendment request (LAR).

Attachments 1 and 2 to this letter provide DNC's proposed revisions to the TRM actions for MPS2 and MPS3, respectively. Since the proposed revisions are more limiting than those previously proposed in the June 30, 2015 LAR, the basis for the proposed revisions is still valid. Attachments 3 and 4 contain a replacement page for FSAR page 8.1-10 and 8.2-8, for MPS2 and MPS3, respectively, which add a description of the proposed new TRM actions.

This supplement does not require a revision to the conclusion of the significant hazards consideration provided in the June 30, 2015 LAR since the proposed changes are more limiting than previously proposed. The proposed amendment as supplemented does not involve a significant hazards consideration pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.92.


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Should you have any questions in regard to this submittal, please contact Wanda Craft at (804) 273-4687.

Sincerely,



Mark D. Sartain
Vice President – Nuclear Engineering



COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA)

COUNTY OF HENRICO)

The foregoing document was acknowledged before me, in and for the County and Commonwealth aforesaid, today by Mark D. Sartain, who is Vice President – Nuclear Engineering of Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. He has affirmed before me that he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing document in behalf of that Company, and that the statements in the document are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Acknowledged before me this 29TH day of June, 2016.

My Commission Expires: May 31, 2018
Vicki L. Hull
Notary Public

Commitments made in this letter: None.

Attachments:

1. Revisions to Proposed New Technical Requirement for Offsite Line Power Sources, (For Information Only - MPS2)
2. Revisions to Proposed New Technical Requirement for Offsite Line Power Sources, (For Information Only – MPS3)
3. Replacement Page 8.1-10 MPS2 FSAR
4. Replacement Page 8.2-8 MPS3 FSAR

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ATTACHMENT 1

**REVISIONS TO PROPOSED NEW TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT FOR OFFSITE
LINE POWER SOURCES
(FOR INFORMATION ONLY)**

**DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2**

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES

OFFSITE LINE POWER SOURCES


TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT

3.8.1.2 The offsite lines to the Millstone Switchyard: 310, 348, 371 (includes 364 line), and 383, shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

When Millstone Power Station (MPS) electrical output exceeds 1650 MWe net.


ACTION:

-  a. With one offsite line nonfunctional, perform the following or reduce total station output to the limiting value associated with the loss of one additional line in accordance with the Millstone Facility Out Guide stability operating limits within the next 6 hours:

1. Restore FUNCTIONALITY of the affected offsite line within 72 hours, or
2. Establish the following ACTION requirements AND restore FUNCTIONALITY within 14 days.

 7 days for Lines 310, 348, and 383, or within 14 days for Line 371/364

- a. Once per shift, verify the remaining offsite lines to the MPS switchyard are FUNCTIONAL.
- b. Perform an initial weather assessment for the scheduled line outage duration and then once per shift thereafter.

-  1. If the assessment predicts adverse or inclement weather will exist while the offsite line is nonfunctional (i.e., out of service), reduce total station output to the limiting value associated with the loss of one additional line in accordance with the Millstone Facility Out Guide stability operating limits, prior to arrival of the adverse or inclement weather.

- c. Within one hour prior to or after entering this condition and at least once per 24 hours thereafter, verify that both the Millstone Unit 2 EDGs and the Millstone Unit 3 EDGs are OPERABLE and the Millstone Unit 3 SBO diesel generator is available. Restore any inoperable Millstone Unit 2 EDG or Millstone Unit 3 EDG to OPERABLE status and/or the Millstone Unit 3 SBO to available status within 72 hours or reduce total station output to the limiting value associated with the loss of one additional line in accordance with the Millstone Facility Out Guide stability operating limits within the next 6 hours.

 ≤ 1650 MWe net

- b. With two offsite lines nonfunctional, reduce total station output ~~in accordance with the Millstone Facility Out Guide stability operating limits~~ within the next 30 minutes.

to ≤ 1650 MWe net

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.8.1.2 The four offsite lines to the Millstone Switchyard shall be determined to be FUNCTIONAL at least once per 7 days when station output exceeds 1650 MWe net.

BASES:

TR 3.8.1.2 requires that all four offsite 345 kV transmission lines are FUNCTIONAL when MPS electrical output exceeds 1650 MWe net. TR 3.8.1 contains ACTIONS that must be performed when one offsite 345 kV transmission line is nonfunctional.

TR 3.8.1.2 provides flexibility to preclude plant downpowers due to planned and unplanned offsite transmission line outages. The TRM requirements provide this flexibility while also maintaining adequate defense-in-depth to ensure grid reliability and stability are preserved and the ability of the plants to respond to design basis accidents is not adversely affected.

With one offsite line nonfunctional, ACTION a.1 allows 72 hours to restore FUNCTIONALITY. This 72-hour allowed outage time (AOT) is conservatively based on the loss of one offsite line being equal to the risk of losing one onsite connection to the offsite power system (i.e., TS 3.8.1.1).

and

7 days for Lines 310, 348, and 383, or 14 days for Line 371/364

With one offsite line nonfunctional, ACTION a.2 contains the provision to allow up to ~~14 days~~ to restore FUNCTIONALITY if ACTIONS a.2.a, a.2.b, and a.2.c are met. The ~~14 day~~ AOT reduces the risk of a plant perturbation as a result of having to downpower the unit for short duration line outages. The ~~14 day AOT~~ provides flexibility for conducting maintenance and improves operational safety margin by the following:

applicable

- Minimizes the number of plant downpowers for short duration 345 kV transmission line outages.
- Reduces the likelihood of a loss of offsite power event by establishing an AOT with additional defense-in-depth measures to minimize the potential for a double circuit failure scenario which can result in grid instability.

applicable

During the ~~14 day~~ AOT, ACTION a.2.a ensures there are no known issues that could threaten the reliability of the remaining 345 kV transmission lines. Verifying the remaining 345 kV offsite transmission lines to the MPS switchyard are FUNCTIONAL, increases confidence that the remaining 345 kV lines will remain FUNCTIONAL during the planned outage of the affected 345 kV line.

applicable

During the ~~14 day~~ AOT, the action to perform weather assessments as required by ACTION a.2.b ensures appropriate actions are taken to minimize the potential for adverse or inclement weather event to impact grid reliability with one line nonfunctional. If adverse

or inclement weather is predicted, the nonfunctional 345 kV line would be restored to FUNCTIONAL status or station output would be reduced to the limiting value associated with the loss of one additional line in accordance with the Millstone Facility Out Guide stability operating limits prior to the arrival of the adverse or inclement weather.

During the 14 day AOT, ACTION a.2.c (i.e., both the Millstone Unit 2 and Millstone Unit 3 EDGs are operable and the Millstone Unit 3 SBO is available) provides assurance that AC power will be available to support required safety-related equipment in the unlikely event of a complete loss of offsite power during the time one of the 345 kV lines is nonfunctional. This ACTION ensures that electrical power will be available in a timely manner to perform the required functions to maintain cooling to the reactor core in the unlikely event a loss of offsite power was to occur during this 14 day AOT.

For the condition where the 14 day AOT is in use for one nonfunctional transmission line and one or more of the following components is out-of-service:

- a Millstone Unit 2 EDG
- a Millstone Unit 3 EDG
- the Millstone Unit 3 SBO diesel generator

72 hours is allowed for restoration of the out-of-service component. If any one of these components is not restored within 72 hours, reduce total station output to the limiting value associated with the loss of one additional line in accordance with the Millstone Facility Out Guide stability operating limits within the next 6 hours.

REFERENCE:

License Amendment XXX

The allowed outage times for Lines 310, 348, 371/364, and 383 are based on the configuration of the transmission lines at Hunts Brook Junction where Lines 383 and 310 cross over Line 371/364 and Line 348 runs to the west of the crossover. With Line 348, 310, or 383 nonfunctional, the possibility exists that either Line 383 or 310 could drop on Line 371/364 and result in three lines nonfunctional. This condition would impact grid stability and therefore, a 7-day AOT is allowed with the specified ACTION requirements in place. When Line 371/364 is nonfunctional, if either Line 310 or 383 drops, two transmission lines remain FUNCTIONAL. Therefore, a 14-day AOT is allowed with the specified ACTION requirements in place.

ATTACHMENT 2

**REVISIONS TO PROPOSED NEW TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT FOR OFFSITE
LINE POWER SOURCES**

(FOR INFORMATION ONLY)

**DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3**

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES

OFFSITE LINE POWER SOURCES

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT

3.8.1 The offsite lines to the Millstone Switchyard: 310, 348, 371 (includes 364 line), and 383, shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

When Millstone Power Station (MPS) electrical output exceeds 1650 MW_e net.

ACTION:

- ≤ 1650 MW_e net
- a. With one offsite line nonfunctional, perform the following or reduce total station output to the limiting value associated with the loss of one additional line in accordance with the Millstone Facility Out Guide stability operating limits within the next 6 hours:
1. Restore FUNCTIONALITY of the affected offsite line within 72 hours, or
 2. Establish the following ACTION requirements AND restore FUNCTIONALITY within 14 days. ← 7 days for Lines 310, 348, and 383, or 14 days for Line 371/364
- a. Once per shift, verify the remaining offsite lines to the MPS switchyard are FUNCTIONAL.
- b. Perform an initial weather assessment for the scheduled line outage duration and then once per shift thereafter.
1. If the assessment predicts adverse or inclement weather will exist while the offsite line is nonfunctional (i.e., out of service), reduce total station output to the limiting value associated with the loss of one additional line in accordance with the Millstone Facility Out Guide stability operating limits, prior to arrival of the adverse or inclement weather.
- ≤ 1650 MW_e net
- c. Within one hour prior to or after entering this condition and at least once per 24 hours thereafter, verify that both the Millstone Unit 2 EDGs and the Millstone Unit 3 EDGs are OPERABLE and the Millstone Unit 3 SBO diesel generator is available. Restore any inoperable Millstone Unit 2 EDG or Millstone Unit 3 EDG to OPERABLE status and/or the Millstone Unit 3 SBO

to available status within 72 hours or reduce total station output to the limiting value associated with the loss of one additional line in accordance with the Millstone Facility Out Guide stability operating limits within the next 6 hours.

≤ 1650 MWe net

- b. With two offsite lines nonfunctional, reduce total station output in accordance with the Millstone Facility Out Guide stability operating limits within the next 30 minutes.

to ≤ 1650 MWe net

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.8.1 The four offsite lines to the Millstone Switchyard shall be determined to be FUNCTIONAL at least once per 7 days when station output exceeds 1650 MW_e net.

BASES:

TR 3.8.1 requires that all four offsite 345 kV transmission lines are FUNCTIONAL when MPS electrical output exceeds 1650 MW_e net. TR 3.8.1 contains ACTIONS that must be performed when one offsite 345 kV transmission line is nonfunctional.

TR 3.8.1 provides flexibility to preclude plant downpowers due to planned and unplanned offsite transmission line outages. The TRM requirements provide this flexibility while also maintaining adequate defense-in-depth to ensure grid reliability and stability are preserved and the ability of the plants to respond to design basis accidents is not adversely affected.

With one offsite line nonfunctional, ACTION a.1 allows 72 hours to restore FUNCTIONALITY. This 72-hour allowed outage time (AOT) is conservatively based on the loss of one offsite line being equal to the risk of losing one onsite connection to the offsite power system (i.e., TS 3.8.1.1).

7 days for Lines 310, 348, and 383, or 14 days for Line 371/364

and

With one offsite line nonfunctional, ACTION a.2 contains the provision to allow up to 14 days to restore FUNCTIONALITY if ACTIONS a.2.a, a.2.b, and a.2.c are met. The 14-day AOT reduces the risk of a plant perturbation as a result of having to downpower the unit for short duration line outages. The 14-day AOT provides flexibility for conducting maintenance and improves operational safety margin by the following:

applicable

- Minimizes the number of plant downpowers for short duration 345 kV transmission line outages.
- Reduces the likelihood of a loss of offsite power event by establishing an AOT with additional defense-in-depth measures to minimize the potential for a double circuit failure scenario which can result in grid instability.

During the ^{applicable} 14 day AOT, ACTION a.2.a ensures there are no known issues that could threaten the reliability of the remaining 345 kV transmission lines. Verifying the remaining 345 kV offsite transmission lines to the MPS switchyard are FUNCTIONAL, increases confidence that the remaining 345 kV lines will remain FUNCTIONAL during the planned outage of the affected 345 kV line.

During the ^{applicable} 14 day AOT, the action to perform weather assessments as required by ACTION a.2.b ensures appropriate actions are taken to minimize the potential for adverse or inclement weather event to impact grid reliability with one line nonfunctional. If adverse or inclement weather is predicted, the nonfunctional 345 kV line would be restored to FUNCTIONAL status or station output would be reduced to the limiting value associated with the loss of one additional line in accordance with the Millstone Facility Out Guide stability operating limits prior to the arrival of the adverse or inclement weather. ^{≤ 1650 MWe net}

During the ^{applicable} 14 day AOT, ACTION a.2.c (i.e., both the Millstone Unit 2 and Millstone Unit 3 EDGs are operable and the Millstone Unit 3 SBO is available) provides assurance that AC power will be available to support required safety-related equipment in the unlikely event of a complete loss of offsite power during the time one of the 345 kV lines is nonfunctional. This ACTION ensures that electrical power will be available in a timely manner to perform the required functions to maintain cooling to the reactor core in the unlikely event a loss of offsite power was to occur during this 14 day AOT. ^e

For the condition where the ^{applicable} 14 day AOT is in use for one nonfunctional transmission line and one or more of the following components is out-of-service:

- a Millstone Unit 2 EDG
- a Millstone Unit 3 EDG
- the Millstone Unit 3 SBO diesel generator

72 hours is allowed for restoration of the out-of-service component. If any one of these components is not restored within 72 hours, reduce total station output to the limiting value associated with the loss of one additional line in accordance with the Millstone Facility Out Guide stability operating limits within the next 6 hours. ^{≤ 1650 MWe net}

REFERENCE:

License Amendment XXX

The allowed outage times for Lines 310, 348, 371/364, and 383 are based on the configuration of the transmission lines at Hunts Brook Junction where Lines 383 and 310 cross over Line 371/364 and Line 348 runs to the west of the crossover. With Line 348, 310, or 383 nonfunctional, the possibility exists that either Line 383 or 310 could drop on Line 371/364 and result in three lines nonfunctional. This condition would impact grid stability and therefore, a 7-day AOT is allowed with the specified ACTION requirements in place. When Line 371/364 is nonfunctional, if either Line 310 or 383 drops, two transmission lines remain FUNCTIONAL. Therefore, a 14-day AOT is allowed with the specified ACTION requirements in place.

ATTACHMENT 3

REPLACEMENT PAGE 8.1-10 MPS2 FSAR

**DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2**

MPS-2 FSAR

- a. With any one of the four Millstone 345 kV transmission circuits out of service the plant remains stable for any three-phase fault normally cleared (four cycles) or any one-phase fault with the delayed clearing (eight cycles).

- b. ~~In order to meet the licensing requirement that no single mechanical failure, such as a tower falling or a line dropping, is able to simultaneously affect all circuits in such a way that off site power would be lost, simultaneous 3-phase faults have been tested for each of the two circuits which are mounted upon common towers. With all lines in service the system remains stable for this two circuit disturbance. It should be recognized that the four circuits leaving the Millstone switchyard are paired on two widely spaced rows of double circuit structures for only a short distance, and, hence the exposure to this double circuit outage is small.~~

~~Without Millstone Unit 1 on line, the net Millstone output does not threaten system stability, even in the event of this double circuit fault. Double circuit faults on the Millstone Beseck and Millstone Manchester lines do not require generation rejection in order to maintain system stability.~~

- e. ~~The simultaneous loss of two Millstone circuits on common structures following a previous (non simultaneous) outage of either of the other Millstone circuits (or any other critical element) must not result in instability. All of the critical outages of this type effectively result in the loss of three of the four Millstone circuits and leave the Millstone station weakly tied to the transmission grid. To prevent instability for these extremely severe (and highly improbable) disturbances, it is necessary for the SLOD SPS to be in service when the loss of the two circuits on common structures takes place.~~

The Millstone units are connected to the large interconnected transmission system in the eastern half of the United States. The interconnected system frequency is maintained at 60 ± 0.03 Hz in accordance with NPCC standards for the bulk power system. The system is designed and operated such that the loss of the largest single supply to the grid does not result in the complete loss of preferred power. The system design considers the loss, through a single event, of the largest capacity being supplied to the grid, removal of the largest load from the grid, or loss of the most critical transmission line. This could be the total output of a single Millstone reactor unit, the largest generating unit on the grid, or possibly multiple generators as a result of the loss of a common transmission tower, transformer, or a breaker in a switchyard or substation.

15-15

INSERT

~~In order to ensure that the interconnected system will remain stable following certain postulated faults, an SPS, or generation rejection scheme, has been installed at the Millstone Station switchyard. The SLOD, continuously monitors the individual state of four transmission line circuits terminated at Millstone 15G switchyard, together with the generation output at the Millstone complex. The four line circuits are:~~

1. ~~Millstone Manchester Line (Number 310);~~
2. ~~Millstone Beseck (Number 348);~~

INSERT

In order to ensure the interconnected system will remain stable and offsite power circuits meet GDC-17 requirements, the following technical requirement actions and generation output restrictions will be implemented when both Millstone Power Station Unit 2 and Unit 3 are at power:

With any of the 345 kV offsite transmission lines (310, 348, 371 (includes 364 line), and 383) out of service or nonfunctional, the nonfunctional transmission line shall be restored to functional status within 72 hours or total station output shall be reduced to ≤ 1650 MWe net within the next 6 hours; or, alternatively, within 7 days for Lines 310, 348, and 383 or 14 days for Line 371/364 with the following action requirements in place:

- a. Once per shift, verify the remaining lines are functional,
- b. Once per shift, perform a weather assessment,
- c. Once per 24 hours, verify the EDGs are operable and the SBO diesel is available.

If any of the above actions cannot be met or if a weather assessment predicts adverse or inclement weather will exist while a transmission line is nonfunctional (i.e., out of service), total station output shall be reduced to ≤ 1650 MWe net within the next 6 hours to ensure the stability and availability of the electrical grid is maintained.

With two 345 kV offsite transmission lines nonfunctional, total output shall be reduced to ≤ 1650 MWe net within the next 30 minutes.

The allowed outage times (AOT) for Lines 310, 348, 371/364, and 383 are based on the configuration of the transmission lines at Hunts Brook Junction where Lines 383 and 310 cross over Line 371/364 and Line 348 runs to the west of the crossover. With Line 348, 310, or 383 nonfunctional, the possibility exists that either Line 383 or 310 could drop on Line 371/364 and result in three lines nonfunctional. This condition would impact grid stability and therefore, a 7-day AOT is allowed with the specified action requirements in place. When Line 371/364 is nonfunctional, if either Line 310 or 383 drops, two transmission lines remain functional. Therefore, a 14-day AOT is allowed with the specified action requirements in place.

ATTACHMENT 4

REPLACEMENT PAGE 8.2-8 MPS3 FSAR

**DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3**

MPS-3 FSAR

or the isolation of an area can cause a deficiency or surplus of generation respectively. Either case causes frequency deviations. High frequency deviations causes generation to be tripped, and low frequency causes automatic load shedding. Either action applied appropriately helps the frequency to recover to 60 Hz within a few minutes.

The system is designed and operated such that the loss of the largest single supply to the grid does not result in the complete loss of preferred power. The system design considers the loss, through a single event, of the largest capacity being supplied to the grid, removal of the largest load from the grid, or loss of the most critical transmission line. This could be the total output of a single Millstone reactor unit, the largest generating unit on the grid, or possibly multiple generators as a result of the loss of a common transmission tower, transformer, or a breaker in a switchyard or substation.

15-16

INSERT

~~In order to ensure that the interconnected system will remain stable following certain postulated faults, Special Protection Systems, or generation rejection schemes, have been installed at the Millstone Station switchyard. The Severe Line Outage Detector or SLOD continuously monitors the individual state of four transmission line circuits terminated at Millstone 15G switchyard together with the generation output at the Millstone complex. The four line circuits are:~~

- ~~1. Millstone Manchester Line (Number 310);~~
- ~~2. Millstone Beseck Line (Number 348);~~
- ~~3. Millstone Card Street Line (Number 383);~~
- ~~4. Millstone Montville Line (Number 371)~~

~~Should the system condition arise where any one of the four critical line circuits is unavailable, the generation at Millstone is above a predetermined MW level, and two specific transmission circuits are forced out, then generation will automatically be curtailed at Millstone. Stability studies indicate that during maximum output conditions (2001 MW), Millstone Unit 3 can be successfully tripped and system stability maintained leaving Millstone Unit 2 in synchronism with the transmission network. The tripping of this unit results in a generation reduction of up to approximately 1143 MW with 858 MW remaining synchronized.~~

~~Studies indicate that a large loss of generation in New England could lead to voltage problems in New York and Pennsylvania, when heavy west to east power transfers are taking place on their systems. ISO New England monitors the loading on the New York and Pennsylvania systems to determine the maximum allowable amount of generation loss which the interconnected system can safely tolerate. Whenever any one of the four (4) critical line circuits involved in the generation rejection scheme is out of service, the output of Millstone 3 is reduced to the maximum allowable amount of generation loss.~~

~~The operation of the SLOD Millstone generation rejection scheme is based on the outage of combinations of certain transmission circuit elements. This system continuously monitors the individual status of the four critical transmission elements together with the generation output of~~

INSERT

In order to ensure the interconnected system will remain stable and offsite power circuits meet GDC-17 requirements, the following technical requirement actions and generation output restrictions will be implemented when both Millstone Power Station Unit 2 and Unit 3 are at power:

With any of the 345 kV offsite transmission lines (310, 348, 371 (includes 364 line), and 383) out of service or nonfunctional, the nonfunctional transmission line shall be restored to functional status within 72 hours or total station output shall be reduced to ≤ 1650 MWe net within the next 6 hours; or, alternatively, within 7 days for Lines 310, 348, and 383 or 14 days for Line 371/364 with the following action requirements in place:

- a. Once per shift, verify the remaining lines are functional,
- b. Once per shift, perform a weather assessment,
- c. Once per 24 hours, verify the EDGs are operable and the SBO diesel is available.

If any of the above actions cannot be met or if a weather assessment predicts adverse or inclement weather will exist while a transmission line is nonfunctional (i.e., out of service), total station output shall be reduced to ≤ 1650 MWe net within the next 6 hours to ensure the stability and availability of the electrical grid is maintained.

With two 345 kV offsite transmission lines nonfunctional, total output shall be reduced to ≤ 1650 MWe net within the next 30 minutes.

The allowed outage times (AOT) for Lines 310, 348, 371/364, and 383 are based on the configuration of the transmission lines at Hunts Brook Junction where Lines 383 and 310 cross over Line 371/364 and Line 348 runs to the west of the crossover. With Line 348, 310, or 383 nonfunctional, the possibility exists that either Line 383 or 310 could drop on Line 371/364 and result in three lines nonfunctional. This condition would impact grid stability and therefore, a 7-day AOT is allowed with the specified action requirements in place. When Line 371/364 is nonfunctional, if either Line 310 or 383 drops, two transmission lines remain functional. Therefore, a 14-day AOT is allowed with the specified action requirements in place.