

1. The 1.30 DNBR limit produced by the combination of the radial peak, axial peak and position of the axial peak that yields no less than a 1.30 DNBR.
2. The combination of radial and axial peak that causes central fuel melting at the hot spot. The limit is 20.5 kw/ft for Unit 2.

Power peaking is not a directly observable quantity, and, therefore, limits have been established on the bases of the reactor power imbalance produced by the power peaking.

The specified flow rates for Curves 1, 2, and 3 of Figure 2.1-2B correspond to the expected minimum flow rates with four pumps, three pumps, and one pump in each loop, respectively.


The curve of Figure 2.1-1B is the most restrictive of all possible reactor coolant pump-maximum thermal power combinations shown in Figure 2.1-3B.

The maximum thermal power for three-pump operation is 87.18 percent due to a power level trip produced by the flux-flow ratio $74.7 \text{ percent flow} \times 1.080 = 80.68 \text{ percent power}$ plus the maximum calibration and instrument error. The maximum thermal power for other coolant pump conditions are produced in a similar manner.

For each curve of Figure 2.1-3B, a pressure-temperature point above and to the left of the curve would result in a DNBR greater than 1.30 or a local quality at the point of minimum DNBR less than 22 percent for that particular reactor coolant pump situation. The 1.30 DNBR curve for four-pump operation is more restrictive than any other reactor coolant pump situation because any pressure/temperature point above and to the left of the four-pump curve will be above and to the left of the other curves.

References

- (1) Coorelation of Critical Heat Flux in a Bundle Cooled by Pressurized Water, BAW-10000, March 1970.
- (2) Oconee 2, Cycle 4 - Reload Report - BAW-1491, August, 1978.
- (3) Oconee 2, Cycle 5 - Reload Report - BAW-1565, September, 1979.



CURVE	REACTOR COOLANT FLOW (GPM)
1	374,880
2	280,035
3	183,690



CORE PROTECTION
SAFETY LIMITS
UNIT 2
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
Figure 2.1-2B

During normal plant operation with all reactor coolant pumps operating, reactor trip is initiated when the reactor power level reaches 105.5% of rated power. Adding to this the possible variation in trip setpoints due to calibration and instrument errors, the maximum actual power at which a trip would be actuated could be 112%, which is more conservative than the value used in the safety analysis. (4)

Overpower Trip Based on Flow and Imbalance

The power level trip set point produced by the reactor coolant system flow is based on a power-to-flow ratio which has been established to accommodate the most severe thermal transient considered in the design, the loss-of-coolant flow accident from high power. Analysis has demonstrated that the specified power-to-flow ratio is adequate to prevent a DNBR of less than 1.3 should a low flow condition exist due to any electrical malfunction.

The power level trip setpoint produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides both high power level and low flow protection in the event the reactor power level increases or the reactor coolant flow rate decreases. The power level trip setpoint produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides overpower DNB protection for all modes of pump operation. For every flow rate there is a maximum permissible power level, and for every power level there is a minimum permissible low flow rate. Typical power level and low flow rate combinations for the pump situations of Table 2.3-1A are as follows:

1. Trip would occur when four reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 108% and reactor flow rate is 100%, or flow rate is 92.59% and power level is 100%.
2. Trip would occur when three reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 80.68% and reactor flow rate is 74.7% or flow rate is 69.44% and power level is 75%.
3. Trip would occur when one reactor coolant pump is operating in each loop (total of two pumps operating) if the power is 59.92% and reactor flow rate is 49.0% or flow rate is 45.37% and the power level is 49%.

The flux-to-flow ratios account for the maximum calibration and instrument errors and the maximum variation from the average value of the RC flow signal in such a manner that the reactor protective system receives a conservative indication of the RC flow.

For safety calculations the maximum calibration and instrumentation errors for the power level trip were used.

The power-imbalance boundaries are established in order to prevent reactor thermal limits from being exceeded. These thermal limits are either power peaking kw/ft limits or DNBR limits. The reactor power imbalance (power in the top half of core minus power in the bottom half of core) reduces the power level trip produced by the power-to-flow ratio such that the boundaries of Figure 2.3-2A - Unit 1 are produced. The power-to-flow ratio reduces the power

2.3-2B - Unit 2

2.3-2C - Unit 3

level trip and associated reactor power/reactor power-imbalance boundaries by 1.08% for 1% flow reduction.

Pump Monitors

The pump monitors prevent the minimum core DNBR from decreasing below 1.3 by tripping the reactor due to the loss of reactor coolant pump(s). The circuitry monitoring pump operational status provides redundant trip protection for DNB by tripping the reactor on a signal diverse from that of the power-to-flow ratio. The pump monitors also restrict the power level for the number of pumps in operation.

Reactor Coolant System Pressure

During a startup accident from low power or a slow rod withdrawal from high power, the system high pressure setpoint is reached before the nuclear over-power trip setpoint. The trip setting limit shown in Figure 2.3-1A - Unit 1
2.3-1B - Unit 2
2.3-1C - Unit 3

for high reactor coolant system pressure (2300 psig) has been established to maintain the system pressure below the safety limit (2750 psig) for any design transient. (1)

The low pressure (1800) psig and variable low pressure (11.14 T_{out} - 4706) trip
(1800) psig (11.14 T_{out} - 4706)
(1800) psig (11.14 T_{out} - 4706)

setpoints shown in Figure 2.3-1A have been established to maintain the DNB
2.3-1B
2.3-1C

ratio greater than or equal to 1.3 for those design accidents that result in a pressure reduction. (2,3)

Due to the calibration and instrumentation errors the safety analysis used a variable low reactor coolant system pressure trip value of (11.14 T_{out} - 4746)
(11.14 T_{out} - 4746)
(11.14 T_{out} - 4746)


Coolant Outlet Temperature

The high reactor coolant outlet temperature trip setting limit (619°F) shown in Figure 2.3-1A has been established to prevent excessive core coolant
2.3-1B
2.3-1C

temperatures in the operating range. Due to calibration and instrumentation errors, the safety analysis used a trip setpoint of 620°F.

Reactor Building Pressure

The high reactor building pressure trip setting limit (4 psig) provides positive assurance that a reactor trip will occur in the unlikely event of a loss-of-coolant accident, even in the absence of a low reactor coolant system pressure trip.



PROTECTIVE SYSTEM
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SETPOINTS
UNIT 2



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
Figure 2.3-2B

RPS Segment

1. Nuclear Power Max.
(% Rated)
2. Nuclear Power Max.
on Flow (2) and Imb
(% Rated)
3. Nuclear Power Max.
on Pump Monitors, (
4. High Reactor Coolan
Pressure, psig, Max
5. Low Reactor Coolant
Pressure, psig, Mir
6. Variable Low Reacto
System Pressure psi
7. Reactor Coolant Ten
8. High Reactor Build
Pressure, psig, Ma

-
- (1) T_{out} is in degrees
 - (2) Reactor Coolant Sy
 - (3) Administratively c
set only during re
 - (4) Automatically set
of the RPS are byp

3.2 HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION AND CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEMS

Applicability

Applies to the high pressure injection and the chemical addition systems.

Objective

To provide for adequate boration under all operating conditions to assure ability to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown condition.

Specification

The reactor shall not be critical unless the following conditions are met:

- 3.2.1 Two high pressure injection pumps per unit are operable except as specified in 3.3.
- 3.2.2 One source per unit of concentrated soluble boric acid in addition to the borated water storage tank is available and operable.

This source will be the concentrated boric acid storage tank containing at least the equivalent of 1147 ft³ of 8700 ppm boron as boric acid solution with a temperature at least 10°F above the crystallization temperature. System piping and valves necessary to establish a flow path from the tank to the high pressure injection system shall be operable and shall have the same temperature requirement as the concentrated boric acid storage tank. At least one channel of heat tracing capable of meeting the above temperature requirement shall be in operation. One associated boric acid pump shall be operable.

If the concentrated boric acid storage tank with its associated flow-path is unavailable, but the borated water storage tank is available and operable, the concentrated boric acid storage tank shall be restored to operability within 72 hours or the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition and be borated to a shutdown margin equivalent to 1% $\Delta k/k$ at 200°F within the next twelve hours; if the concentrated boric acid storage tank has not been restored to operability within the next 7 days the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition within an additional 30 hours.

If the concentrated boric acid storage tank is available but the borated water storage tank is neither available nor operable, the borated water storage tank shall be restored to operability within one hour or the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within 6 hours and in a cold shutdown condition within an additional 30 hours.

Bases

The high pressure injection system and chemical addition system provide control of the reactor coolant system boron concentration.(1) This is normally accomplished by using any of the three high pressure injection pumps in series with a boric acid pump associated with either the boric acid mix tank or the concentrated boric acid storage tank. An alternate method of boration will be the use of the high pressure injection pumps taking suction directly from the borated water storage tank.(2)

The quantity of boric acid in storage in the concentrated boric acid storage tank or the borated water storage tank is sufficient to borate the reactor coolant system to a 1% $\Delta k/k$ subcritical margin at cold conditions (70°F) with the maximum worth stuck rod and no credit for xenon at the worst time in core life. The current cycles for each unit, Oconee 1, Cycle 6, Oconee 2, Cycle 5, and Oconee 3, Cycle 5 were analyzed with the most limiting case selected as the basis for all three units. Since only the present cycles were analyzed, the specifications will be re-evaluated with each reload. A minimum of 1147 ft³ of 8,700 ppm boric acid in the concentrated boric acid storage tank, or a minimum of 350,000 gallons of 1800 ppm boric acid in the borated water storage tank (3) will satisfy the requirements. The volume requirements include a 10% margin and, in addition, allow for a deviation of 10 EFPD in the cycle length. The specification assures that two supplies are available whenever the reactor is critical so that a single failure will not prevent boration to a cold condition. The required amount of boric acid can be added in several ways. Using only one 10 gpm boric acid pump taking suction from the concentrated boric acid storage tank would require approximately 15 hours to inject the required boron. An alternate method of addition is to inject boric acid from the borated water storage tank using the makeup pumps. The required boric acid can be injected in less than six hours using only one of the makeup pumps.

The concentration of boron in the concentrated boric acid storage tank may be higher than the concentration which would crystallize at ambient conditions. For this reason, and to assure a flow of boric acid is available when needed, these tanks and their associated piping will be kept at least 10°F above the crystallization temperature for the concentration present. The boric acid concentration of 8,700 ppm in the concentrated boric acid storage tank corresponds to a crystallization temperature of 77°F and therefore a temperature requirement of 87°F. Once in the high pressure injection system, the concentrate is sufficiently well mixed and diluted so that normal system temperatures assure boric acid solubility.

REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Section 9.1; 9.2
- (2) FSAR, Figure 6.2
- (3) Technical Specification 3.3

- f. If the maximum positive quadrant power tilt exceeds the Maximum Limit of Table 3.5-1, the reactor shall be shut down within 4 hours. Subsequent reactor operation is permitted for the purpose of measurement, testing, and corrective action provided the thermal power and the Nuclear Overpower Trip Setpoints allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination are restricted by a reduction of 2% of thermal power for each 1% tilt for the maximum tilt observed prior to shutdown.
- g. Quadrant power tilt shall be monitored on a minimum frequency of once every 2 hours during power operation above 15% full power.

3.5.2.5 Control Rod Positions

- a. Technical Specification 3.1.3.5 does not prohibit the exercising of individual safety rods as required by Table 4.1-2 or apply to inoperable safety rod limits in Technical Specification 3.5.2.2.
- b. Except for physics tests, operating rod group overlap shall be $25\% \pm 5\%$ between two sequential groups. If this limit is exceeded, corrective measures shall be taken immediately to achieve an acceptable overlap. Acceptable overlap shall be attained within two hours or the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within an additional 12 hours.
- c. Position limits are specified for regulating and axial power shaping control rods. Except for physics tests or exercising control rods, the regulating control rod insertion/withdrawal limits are specified on figures 3.5.2-1A1 and 3.5.2-1A2 (Unit 1); 3.5.2-1B1, and 3.5.2-1B2 (Unit 2); 3.5.2-1C1, 3.5.2-1C2 and 3.5.2-1C3 (Unit 3) for four pump operation, and on figures 3.5.2-2A1 and 3.5.2-2A2 (Unit 1), 3.5.2-2B1, and 3.5.2-2B2 (Unit 2); 3.5.2-2C1, 3.5.2-2C2 and 3.5.2-2C3 (Unit 3) for two or three pump operation. Also, excepting physics tests or exercising control rods, the axial power shaping control rod insertion/withdrawal limits are specified on figures 3.5.2-4A1, and 3.5.2-4A2 (Unit 1); 3.5.2-4B1, and 3.5.2-4B2, (Unit 2); 3.5.2-4C1, 3.5.2-4C2, and 3.5.2-4C3 (Unit 3).

If the control rod position limits are exceeded, corrective measures shall be taken immediately to achieve an acceptable control rod position. An acceptable control rod position shall then be attained within two hours. The minimum shutdown margin required by Specification 3.5.2.1 shall be maintained at all times.

3.5.2.6 Xenon Reactivity

Except for physics tests, reactor power shall not be increased above the power-level-cutoff shown in Figures 3.5.2-1A1, 3.5.2-1A2 for Unit 1; Figures 3.5.2-1B1, and 3.5.2-1B2, for Unit 2; and Figures 3.5.2-1C1, 3.5.2-1C2, and 3.5.2-1C3 for Unit 3 unless one of the following conditions is satisfied:

1. Xenon reactivity did not deviate more than 10 percent from the equilibrium value for operation at steady state power.
2. Xenon reactivity deviated more than 10 percent but is now within 10 percent of the equilibrium value for operation at steady state rated power and has passed its final maximum or minimum peak during its approach to its equilibrium value for operation at the power level cutoff.
3. Except for xenon free startup (when 2. applies), the reactor has operated within a range of 87 to 92 percent of rated thermal power for a period exceeding 2 hours.

3.5.2.7 Reactor power imbalance shall be monitored on a frequency not to exceed two hours during power operation above 40 percent rated power. Except for physics tests, imbalance shall be maintained within the envelope defined by Figures 3.5.2-3A1, 3.5.2-3A2, 3.5.3-3B1, 3.5.2-3B2, 3.5.2-3C1, 3.5.2-3C2, and 3.5.2-3C3. If the imbalance is not within the envelope defined by these figures, corrective measures shall be taken to achieve an acceptable imbalance. If an acceptable imbalance is not achieved within two hours, reactor power shall be reduced until imbalance limits are met.

3.5.2.8 The control rod drive patch panels shall be locked at all times with limited access to be authorized by the manager or his designated alternate.

Bases

Operation at power with an inoperable control rod is permitted within the limits provided. These limits assure that an acceptable power distribution is maintained and that the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are minimized. For a rod declared inoperable due to misalignment, the rod with the greatest misalignment shall be evaluated first. Additionally, the position of the rod declared inoperable due to misalignment shall not be included in computing the average position of the group for determining the operability of rods with lesser misalignments. When a control rod is declared inoperable, boration may be initiated to achieve the existence of 1% $\Delta k/k$ hot shutdown margin.


The power-imbalance envelope defined in Figures 3.5.2-3A1, 3.5.2-3A2, 3.5.2-3B1, 3.5.2-3B2, 3.5.2-3C1, 3.5.2-3C2 and 3.5.2-3C3 is based on LOCA analyses which have defined the maximum linear heat rate (see Figure 3.5.2-5) such that the maximum clad temperature will not exceed the Final Acceptance Criteria. Corrective measures will be taken immediately should the indicated quadrant tilt, rod position, or imbalance be outside their specified boundary. Operation in a situation that would cause the Final Acceptance Criteria to be approached should a LOCA occur is highly improbable because all of the power distribution parameters (quadrant tilt, rod position, and imbalance) must be at their limits while simultaneously all other engineering and uncertainty factors are also at their limits.** Conservatism is introduced by application of:

- a. Nuclear uncertainty factors
- b. Thermal calibration
- c. Fuel densification power spike factors (Units 1 and 2 only)
- d. Hot rod manufacturing tolerance factors
- e. Fuel rod bowing power spike factors

The 25% \pm 5% overlap between successive control rod groups is allowed since the worth of a rod is lower at the upper and lower part of the stroke. Control rods are arranged in groups or banks defined as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Function</u>
1	Safety
2	Safety
3	Safety
4	Safety
5	Regulating
6	Regulating
7	Xenon transient override
8	APSR (axial power shaping bank)


** Actual operating limits depend on whether or not incore or excore detectors are used and their respective instrument calibration errors. The method used to define the operating limits is defined in plant operating procedures.



ROD POSITION LIMITS
FOR FOUR PUMP OPERATION
FROM 0 TO 290 \pm 10 EFPD
UNIT 2
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION




Figure 3.5.2-1B1



ROD POSITION LIMITS
FOR FOUR PUMP OPERATION
AFTER 290 ± 10 EFPD
UNIT 2
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION




Figure 3.5.2-1B2



ROD POSITION LIMITS
FOR TWO AND THREE PUMP OPERATION
FROM 0 TO 290 \pm 10 EFPD
UNIT 2
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 3.5.2-2B1






ROD POSITION LIMITS
FOR TWO AND THREE PUMP OPERATION
AFTER 290 ± EFPD
UNIT 2



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 3.5.2-2B2




OPERATIONAL POWER IMBALANCE ENVELOPE
FOR OPERATION FROM 0 TO 290 EFPD

UNIT 2
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 3.5.2-3B-1






OPERATIONAL POWER IMBALANCE ENVELOPE
FOR OPERATION AFTER 290 ± 10 EFPD
UNIT 2



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION


Figure 3.5.2-3B2



APSR POSITION LIMITS
FOR OPERATION FROM 0 TO 290 EFPD
UNIT 2
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION



Figure 3.5.2-4B1



APSR POSITION LIMITS
FOR OPERATION AFTER 290 ± 10 EFPD
UNIT 2
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
Figure 3.5.2-4B2