

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

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 FACIL: 50-287 OCONEE #3, DUKE POWER CO.
 AUTH. NAME: LEWIS, J.R. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: DUKE POWER CO.
 RECIP. NAME: RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: **REG. 2, ATLANTA, OFF. OF THE DIRECTOR

DOCKET #
 05000287

SUBJECT: LER 78-022/03L-0 on 781212: isolation valve 3FDW-106 on 3A
 OTSG sample line failed to close. Caused by valve inability
 to withstand necessary environ.

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report Number: RO-287/78-22

Report Date: January 15, 1979

Occurrence Date: December 16, 1978

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Valve 3FDW-106 Failed to Close

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: RCS Heatup, 300 psi, 200°F

Description of Occurrence:

On December 16, 1978, containment isolation valve 3FDW-106 failed to close under system pressure. Redundant valve 3FDW-105 was locked closed within four hours pursuant to Technical Specification 3.6.3 b(2). After repairing the stuck limit switch the valve was cycled and verified to be operable.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This type of valve failure on this and other identical valves has occurred on several previous occasions. Corrective actions suggested by the manufacturer have been unsuccessful in resolving the problem. The valves appear to be unsuitable for long-term operation in the system environment.

Analysis of Occurrence:

3FDW-106 is an isolation valve on the steam generator sample line. The failure of the valve did not violate containment integrity as the redundant valve was operable and would have performed its Engineered Safeguard function if necessary. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not endangered.

Corrective Action:

The stuck limit switch was repaired and the valve was cycled to assure operability.

This failure is one of similar failures which have occurred at the Oconee Nuclear Station. The affected valves (FDW-106 and -108 have been replaced on Unit 2, and the valves on Units 1 and 3 will be replaced at their next scheduled refueling outages.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK:										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)																																		
[0][1] [S][C][N][E][E][3][2][0][0]-[0][0][0][0][0]-[0][0]										[3][4][1][1][1][1][4]																																		
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REPORT SOURCE [L][6][0][5][0][0][0][2][8][7][7][1][2][1][6][7][8][8][0][1][1][5][7][9]																																												
DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE																																		
REPORT DATE																																												
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)																																												
At 0745 isolation valve 3FDW-106 on 3A OTSG sample line failed to close.																																												
The redundant valve 3FDW-105 operated properly thereby maintaining contain-																																												
ment integrity. Since containment integrity was not jeopardized, the health																																												
and safety of the public were not endangered.																																												
SYSTEM CODE [H][J]					CAUSE CODE [E]					CAUSE SUBCODE [B]					COMPONENT CODE [V][A][L][V][E][X]					COMP. SUBCODE [F]					VALVE SUBCODE [D]																			
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [7][8]					EVENT YEAR []					SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [0][2][2]					OCCURRENCE CODE [0][3]					REPORT TYPE [L]					REVISION NO. [0]																			
ACTION TAKEN [B]					FUTURE ACTION [A]					EFFECT ON PLANT [Z]					SHUTDOWN METHOD [Z]					HOURS [0][0][0][0]					ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [Y]					NPRO-4 FORM SUB. [Y]					PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [L]					COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [R][3][4][0]				
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)																																												
The initial corrective action was repair of stuck limit switch and cycling																																												
of valve. Similar failures have occurred on several occasions, indicating																																												
that this valve cannot withstand the necessary environment. Therefore, the																																												
valves (FDW-106 and -108) will be replaced with valves of appropriate design.																																												
FACILITY STATUS [C]					% POWER [0][0][0]					OTHER STATUS NA					METHOD OF DISCOVERY [B]					DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Observation during routine sampling.																								
ACTIVITY RELEASED [Z]					CONTENT [Z]					AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA					LOCATION OF RELEASE NA																													
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER [0][0][0]					TYPE [Z]					DESCRIPTION NA																																		
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER [0][0][0]					DESCRIPTION NA																																							
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE [Z]					DESCRIPTION NA																																							
PUBLCITY ISSUED [N]					DESCRIPTION NA																																							
NAME OF PREPARER S. R. Lewis																																												
PHONE: (704) 373-8285																																												

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