

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 7901230242 DOC. DATE: 79/01/15 NOTARIZED: NO

DOCKET #
05000287

FACIL: 50-287 OCONEE #3, DUKE POWER CO.

AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION

WILSON, K.R. DUKE POWER CO.

RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

**REG. 2, ATLANTA, OFF. OF THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: LER 78-018/03L-0 on 781129 ES Channelw Amanually tripped to allow for repairs, ES Channel B tripped spuriously causing HPI, LPI & Bldg Spray actuation. Bypassing of channels was intentional, planned operator action prevented damage.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A002S COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 3+1
TITLE: INCIDENT REPORTS

NOTES: M. CUNNINGHAM - ALL AMENDS TO FSAR & CHANGES TO TECH**SPECS**

ACTION:	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES		RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES	
		LTTR	ENCL		LTTR	ENCL
	05 BC <u>ORR #4</u>	4	4			
INTERNAL:	01 REG FILE	1	1	02 NRC PDR	1	1
	09 I&E	2	2	11 MPA	3	3
	14 TA/EDO	1	1	15 NOVAK/KNIEL	1	1
	16 EEB	1	1	17 AD FOR ENGR	1	1
	18 PLANT SYS BR	1	1	19 I&C SYS BR	1	1
	20 AD PLANT SYS	1	1	21 AD SYS/PROJ	1	1
	22 REAC SAFT BR	1	1	23 ENGR BR	1	1
	24 COLLINS	0	0	24 KREGER	1	1
	25 PWR SYS BR	1	1	26 HOUSTON	0	0
	26 VOLLMER	1	1	E JORDAN/IE	1	1
EXTERNAL:	03 LPDR	1	1	04 NSIC	1	1
	27 ACRS	16	16			

JAN 25 1979

A04

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 43 ENCL 43

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report Number: RO-287/78-18

Report Date: January 15, 1979

Occurrence Date: November 29, 1978

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Engineered Safeguards (ES) Channels Manually Bypassed

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 99% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

At approximately 1000 on November 29, 1978 ES Analog Channel A was manually tripped in order to allow repairs/recalibration on the associated Reactor Building (RB) narrow-range transmitter while minimum operability and redundancy was maintained as required by Technical Specification 3.5.1.2. At 1212 ES Channel B, RB pressure, tripped spuriously. With 2-out-of-3 ES Analog Channels tripped ES Digital Channels 1 through 6 (HPI, LPI, RB Isolation) tripped actuating their respective functions. The rapid injection of water caused pressurizer level to begin rising rapidly and cooling water to the reactor coolant pumps was isolated. After the actuation of ES Digital Channels 1-6, the operators verified from appropriate control room indications that reactor coolant system pressure and RB pressure were not behaving abnormally or as would be expected for a required ES actuation. The operators acted quickly in response to the inadvertent ES actuation. Affected components were placed in manual control to return the reactor to steady state power operation. At 1230 ES Channel B was reset and by 1244 ES Channel A was reset and the Digital Channels were returned to automatic.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The trip on high RB pressure was apparently a spurious event. Such spurious trips are not routine but do occur on an infrequent basis. It was only significant in this instance because another channel was manually tripped for routine on-line repairs.

The bypassing of the channels during the recovery operations was the result of intentional operator action to restore the unit to a safe operating condition. It was done so in an orderly fashion and the ES Channels were returned to normal status in a short period of time, less than 35 minutes.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The initiating event, actuation of digital channels 1 through 6, resulted from a spurious trip of the second analog channel. The entire ES system functioned properly. During the recovery operations the ES system was taken into manual control. If an event requiring ES actuation had occurred, manual action might have been required.

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3
Page 2

Analysis of Occurrence Continued:

The decision to take the ES system into manual is considered timely and appropriate when the adverse economic and safety implications of continued automatic operations which could have resulted in component damages. The health and safety of the general public was not adversely affected by this event.

Corrective Action:

All ES systems were returned to normal operating conditions following the occurrence. Since the event resulted from a spurious trip occurring simultaneously with an intentionally tripped channel it is not considered that this event will become a recurring problem. No additional corrective actions are considered warranted at this time.

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK:										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)									
<div> <div>01</div> <div>S C N E E 3</div> <div>200-000000-000</div> <div>3411111</div> <div>4</div> <div>5</div> </div>										<div> <div>LICENSEE CODE</div> <div>LICENSE NUMBER</div> <div>LICENSE TYPE</div> <div>57 CAT 58</div> </div>									
<div> <div>01</div> <div>L</div> <div>6050002877112978</div> <div>8</div> <div>011579</div> <div>9</div> </div>										<div> <div>REPORT SOURCE</div> <div>DOCKET NUMBER</div> <div>EVENT DATE</div> <div>REPORT DATE</div> </div>									
<div> <div>02</div> <div>At 1000 on November 29, 1978 ES Channel A was manually tripped to allow</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>03</div> <div>for repairs on an associated transmitter. At 1212 ES Channel B tripped</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>04</div> <div>spuriously causing HPI, LPI, and Building Spray actuation. During recovery</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>05</div> <div>from this unrequired actuation some ES components and channels were bypassed</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>06</div> <div>which constitutes operation in a degraded mode. The ES system was only in</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>07</div> <div>manual control for a short period of time (< 35 minutes) and could have been</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>08</div> <div>operated normally if required. This event, therefore, caused no adverse</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>09</div> <div>health or safety effects.</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>09</div> <div> <div> <div>I B</div> <div>X</div> <div>Z</div> <div>Z Z Z Z Z Z</div> <div>Z</div> <div>Z</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div>17</div> <div> <div> <div>78</div> <div>018</div> <div>03</div> <div>L</div> <div>0</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div>18</div> <div> <div> <div>X</div> <div>Z</div> <div>Z</div> <div>0000</div> <div>Y</div> <div>N</div> <div>N</div> <div>Z999</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div>10</div> <div>The bypassing of the channels was intentional, planned operator action and</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>11</div> <div>was done in order to prevent damage to major components which could have</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>12</div> <div>had considerable safety and economic impact. This problem is not considered</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>13</div> <div>to be recurring in nature and the administrative/procedural controls are</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>14</div> <div>thought to be adequate to handle the situation.</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>15</div> <div> <div> <div>E</div> <div>099</div> <div>NA</div> <div>Z</div> <div>Operator Action</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div>16</div> <div> <div> <div>Z</div> <div>Z</div> <div>NA</div> <div>NA</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div>17</div> <div> <div> <div>000</div> <div>Z</div> <div>NA</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div>18</div> <div> <div> <div>000</div> <div>NA</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div>19</div> <div> <div> <div>Z</div> <div>NA</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div>20</div> <div> <div> <div>N</div> <div>NA</div> </div> </div> </div>																			

7901230242