

IPRenewal NPEmails

From: Haagensen, Brian
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2016 7:02 AM
To: Dentel, Glenn; Lally, Christopher; Pinson, Brandon; Schussler, Jason
Cc: Tifft, Doug; Pickett, Douglas; Newman, Garrett; Rich, Sarah; Gray, Mel; Gray, Harold; Halter, Mandy; Screnci, Diane; Sheehan, Neil
Subject: FW: Larry Coyle Comments - Apr 8 Stakeholder Briefing 1245pm.docx
Attachments: Larry Coyle Comments - Apr 8 Stakeholder Briefing 5pm.docx

Attached is the prepared statement on the Unit 2 baffle bolt degradation that Larry Coyle (SVP) will read on the State and Local Officials Stakeholders call today at 10:00 AM. We expect lots of questions.

Brian

From: Walpole, Robert W [mailto:rwalpol@entergy.com]
Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2016 7:26 PM
To: Haagensen, Brian
Subject: [External_Sender] Larry Coyle Comments - Apr 8 Stakeholder Briefing 1245pm.docx

Brian,

Attached is Larry's statement that he will make to the Stakeholders.

Bob Walpole

Regulatory Assurance Manager

Indian Point Entergy Center
914-254-6710 (Work)
914-760-2019 (Cell)

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Email Number: 5613

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Subject: FW: Larry Coyle Comments - Apr 8 Stakeholder Briefing 1245pm.docx
Sent Date: 4/8/2016 7:02:09 AM
Received Date: 4/8/2016 7:02:12 AM
From: Haagensen, Brian

Created By: Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov

Recipients:

"Tifft, Doug" <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
"Pickett, Douglas" <Douglas.Pickett@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
"Newman, Garrett" <Garrett.Newman@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
"Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
"Gray, Mel" <Mel.Gray@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
"Gray, Harold" <Harold.Gray@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
"Halter, Mandy" <Mandy.Halter@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
"Screnci, Diane" <Diane.Screnci@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
"Sheehan, Neil" <Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
"Dentel, Glenn" <Glenn.Dentel@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
"Lally, Christopher" <Christopher.Lally@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
"Pinson, Brandon" <Brandon.Pinson@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
"Schussler, Jason" <Jason.Schussler@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None

Post Office: R1PWMSMRS02.nrc.gov

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MESSAGE	634	4/8/2016 7:02:12 AM
Larry Coyle Comments - Apr 8 Stakeholder Briefing 5pm.docx		23179

Options

Priority: Standard
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Larry Coyle Comments

April 8, 2016 Stakeholder Briefing

Good morning, as Deb mentioned, I'm going to take a moment to briefly discuss the recent issues identified following an inspection of bolts on the removable insert liner of the Unit 2 reactor vessel.

I want to emphasize that we identified the issues with the reactor vessel insert liner bolts as a result of a specialized, robust inspection of the unit 2 reactor vessel internals implemented in accordance with the plant's license renewal programs, going well beyond normal inspections performed during prior refueling outages.

This comprehensive inspection of the reactor vessel and internal components was scheduled to be conducted during the current refueling outage at unit 2 in accordance with our long-standing license renewal commitments to the NRC. Contrary to some statements you may have seen in the press, we did not conduct these inspections due to intervention or criticisms in our ongoing NRC proceeding. All other inspections are complete and show critical components at Unit 2 continue to perform safely and as intended.

We performed visual inspections of 1,232 bolts and visual and ultrasonic inspections of more than 832 bolts located on the reactor vessel's removable insert liner – called a baffle core – for a total of 2,064 bolts inspected. Each bolt, about two inches long and made of stainless steel, secures vertical plates to horizontal plates to form the perimeter of the liner. The bolts with identified issues were found only on the face of the removable liner, while bolts along the edges had no issues. The plates give the fuel assemblies their geometry layout within the reactor.

Out of those more than 2000 bolts that were inspected, 227 of those bolts were found to have issues that require further analysis. Bolt heads were missing on two of those 227 bolts with identified issues; with the stem remaining in place. Ultrasonic testing found signs of degradation or other issues such as missing lock-bars.

Out of the total 227 bolts, we visually identified 31 as slightly protruding. Another 14 couldn't be inspected with the ultrasonic testing device because we were unable to get the device to connect onto the bolts due to a configuration issue interface with our equipment. The remaining 182 bolts (of the 227) were identified as ultrasonic testing (UT) failures.

Each UT test consists of ten passes of the UT. If any of the UT passes indicated a spike – even if it was just one of the ten passes – we called that a UT failure. If a bolt had 10 of 10 passes, indicating all ten failed, it was also a UT failure.

We are sending out for further analysis a myriad of bolts with different test failures to get us more information on the issue. An analysis is going to be conducted by Westinghouse and a qualified independent engineering firm (LPI). The bolt issues will be corrected prior to returning Indian Point Unit 2 to operation. We are also analyzing potential impacts on Unit 3. In addition

to being three cycles younger than unit 2, Unit 3 also underwent a modification years ago that resulted in fewer high energy neutrons affecting bolts than Unit 2. As a result, bolt wear at Unit 3 would be expected to be less than at Unit 2, but our detailed review is ongoing.

The issues identified with the reactor vessel insert liner bolts did not have an impact public health or safety.

This work is expected to add several weeks to the refueling and maintenance outage and that schedule and work plan is still under development. Due to federal regulations and business sensitive information, we are restricted in the level of detail we can provide about exact estimates on returning the plant to service.

The bottom line is we will not operate the plants if we couldn't do so safely.