

**Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2  
COL Application  
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CHAPTER 14  
INITIAL TEST PROGRAM

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**CHAPTER 14**

**INITIAL TEST PROGRAM**

14.1 SPECIFIC INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN PRELIMINARY/FINAL  
SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTS

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no  
departures or supplements.

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**14.2 SPECIFIC INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN STANDARD SAFETY  
ANALYSIS REPORTS**

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

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**14.2.1 SUMMARY OF TEST PROGRAM AND OBJECTIVES**

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Add the following subsection at the end of DCD **Subsection 14.2.1**:

STD COL 14.4-3 FSAR **Section 14.2** provides the requirements to be included in the Startup Administrative Manual (Procedures), as discussed in DCD **Subsection 14.4.3**. The information referenced in this section meets the Initial Test Program (ITP) criteria of NUREG-0800 and is formatted to follow Regulatory Guide 1.206, Part I, Section C.I.14.2.

The ITP is applied to structures, systems, and components that perform the functions described in the Regulatory Guide 1.68 evaluation in FSAR **Section 1.9**. The ITP is also applied to other structures, systems and components. The Startup Administrative Manual includes a list of the AP1000 structures, systems and components to which the ITP is applied.

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Add the following Subsections after DCD **Subsection 14.2.1.3**

**14.2.1.4 Testing of First of a Kind Design Features**

STD COL 14.4-3 First of a kind (FOAK) testing may occur in any of the phases, depending on the nature of the testing and required sequencing of the tests. When testing FOAK design features, applicable operating experience from previous test performance on other AP1000 plants is reviewed, where available, and the ITP modified as needed based on those lessons learned.

**14.2.1.5 Credit for Previously Performed Testing of First of a Kind Design Features**

In some cases, FOAK testing is required only for the first of a new design or for the first few plants of a standard design. In such cases, credit may be taken for the previously performed tests. A discussion is included in the startup test reports of the results of those tests that are credited.

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14.2.2 ORGANIZATION, STAFFING, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

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Replace the existing information in DCD **Subsection 14.2.2** with the following new paragraph and subsections.

STD COL 14.4-1

The AP1000 plant test and operations (PT&O) organization is described in **Subsection 14.2.2.1**. The organization for operating and maintaining the AP1000 plant is described in **Section 13.1**.

The PT&O organization structure (organizational chart) is included in the Startup Administrative Manual.

**Table 13.4-201** provides milestones for initial test program implementation.

14.2.2.1 PT&O Organization

The Initial Test Program (ITP) is the responsibility of the PT&O Organization. The ITP includes three phases of testing:

- Construction and Installation Testing
- Preoperational Testing
- Startup Testing

14.2.2.1.1 Manager in Charge of PT&O

The Manager in Charge of PT&O reports directly to the plant manager. The manager in charge of PT&O manages the ITP. The Manager in Charge of PT&O is responsible for:

- Staffing the PT&O Organization.
- Developing, reviewing, and approving the administrative and technical procedures associated with the preoperational and startup phases.
- Managing the ITP and personnel.
- Implementing the ITP schedule.
- Managing contracts associated with the ITP.

14.2.2.1.2 Functional Manager in Charge of PT&O Support

The Functional Manager in Charge of PT&O Support reports directly to the Manager in Charge of PT&O. The Functional Manager in Charge of PT&O



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Support plans and schedules procedure development to support startup. The Functional Manager in Charge of PT&O Support verifies that the test documents conform to the approved project procedures.

The Functional Manager in Charge of PT&O Support reviews and approves test procedures. These procedures are used to demonstrate that a system and its components meet the design and performance criteria.

**14.2.2.1.3 PT&O Engineers**

The PT&O engineers report directly to the Functional Manager in Charge of PT&O Support. The PT&O engineers are responsible for developing system test procedures.

**14.2.2.1.4 Functional Manager in Charge of Startup**

The Functional Manager in Charge of Startup reports directly to the Manager in Charge of PT&O and manages the preoperational and startup testing. The Functional Manager in Charge of Startup is responsible for:

- Participating in the Joint Test Working Group (JTWG) and ensuring that the JTWG reviews and approves administrative and test procedures. The JTWG structure and responsibilities are defined in **Subsection 14.2.2.3**.
- Preparing a detailed preoperational and startup testing schedule.
- Coordinating construction turnover to the PT&O organization.
- Informing the Manager in Charge of PT&O when vendor support essential to preoperational and startup testing is required, and coordinating vendor participation.
- Supervising and directing the startup engineers.
- Involving operations personnel in testing activities. Utilizing operations personnel, to the extent practical, as test witnesses or test performers to provide the operations personnel with experience and knowledge.
- Developing and implementing administrative controls to address system and equipment configuration control.
- Maintaining the startup schedule.
- Maintaining a daily startup log and issuing periodic progress reports that identify overall progress and potential challenges.

**14.2.2.1.5 Startup Engineers**

The startup engineers report directly to the Functional Manager in Charge of Startup. The startup engineers are responsible for:

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- Complying with administrative controls.
- Identifying any special or temporary equipment or services needed to support testing.
- Coordinating testing with involved groups.
- Reviewing and evaluating test results.

**14.2.2.2 PT&O Organization Personnel Qualifications and Training**

Procedures are prepared to confirm that test personnel have adequate training, qualification and certification. Records are kept for extent of experience, involvement in procedure and test development, training programs, and level of qualification. The training organization qualifies Test Personnel as applicable, in accordance with the requirements of the applicable Quality Assurance Program. Training is performed as agreed between Westinghouse and the Licensee. Westinghouse test personnel training is per certified design.

Acceptable qualifications of non-supervisory test engineers follow the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.28 as discussed in Appendix 1AA, i.e., ASME NQA-1-1994, Appendix 2A-1, Nonmandatory Guidance on the Qualification of Inspection and Test Personnel.

The training program/procedures shall include:

- The education, training, experience, and qualification requirements of supervisory personnel, test personnel, and other major participating organizations responsible for managing, developing, or conducting each test phase, or development of testing, operating, and emergency procedures.
- The establishment of a training program for each organizational unit, with regard to the scheduled preoperational and initial startup testing. This training program provides meaningful technical information beyond that obtained in the normal startup test program and provide supplemental operator training. This program also satisfies the criteria described in TMI Action Plan Item I.G.1 of NUREG-0660 and NUREG-0737.

The Startup Administrative Manual (Procedure) shall include:

- The implementation of measures to verify that personnel formulating and conducting test activities are not the same personnel who designed or are responsible for satisfactory performance of the system(s) or design features(s) being tested. This provision does not preclude members of the design organization from participating in test activities. This description also includes considerations of staffing effects that could result from overlapping initial test programs at multi-unit sites.

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14.2.2.3      Joint Test Working Group

The Joint Test Working Group (JTWG) consists of an organizational group of authorized representative personnel from the Plant's operations and support group functions, Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC), Architect Engineer and other test support groups as identified below.

The Licensee has the overall responsibility for conduct of the Startup Test Program. The Westinghouse Startup Manager may be assigned overall responsibility and authority for technical direction of the Startup Test Program and may act as the JTWG Chairman.

The JTWG Chairman reports to the Chairman of the Plant Owner's Operations Review Committee (PORC) or qualified designee for matters of Startup test authority and acceptance.

The JTWG provides the following administrative oversight activities associated with the Startup Test Program:

- Review, evaluate and approve Startup Test Program administrative and test procedures.
- Oversee the implementation of the Preoperational Test Program and the Startup Test Program, including planning, scheduling and performance of Preoperational and Startup testing.
- Review and evaluate Construction, Preoperational and Startup test results and test turnover packages.

At a minimum, the JTWG is composed of qualified representatives provided from the following organizations:

- Licensee's Operations Group
- Licensee's Maintenance Group
- Site Preoperational Test Group
- Site Startup Test Group
- Licensee's Engineering Group
- Licensee's Corrective Action Organization
- Westinghouse Site Engineering Group
- Licensee's Health Physics/Chemistry Group
- Licensee's Quality Assurance Group

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The following are additional generic details of the key responsibilities, authorities and interfaces of the Licensee Organizations delineated above:

- **Operations Group**

The Operations Group has the overall responsibility for Plant Operations, including administrative control and tag-outs subsequent to system turnover. Their primary interfaces are with the Licensee Engineering and Technical Support organizations as well as the Westinghouse Engineering Organization, Preoperational and Startup Testing Teams and Construction Services Group.

- **Maintenance Group**

The Maintenance Group has the overall responsibility for the Maintenance of Plant systems and components subsequent to System Turnover. They are key participants and maintainers of system maintenance control and tag-outs. Their primary interfaces are with the Licensee Operations Group and Technical Support organizations, as well as the Westinghouse Engineering Organization, Preoperational and Startup Testing Teams and Construction Services Group.

- **Corrective Action Organization**

The Corrective Action Organization may be an organization specific to itself or may be a part of the Performance Assessment organization, the Quality Organization or another organization. This organization, together with every other site organization, is responsible for the administration and management of the corrective action program, as well as the identification of conditions adverse to quality. This organization interfaces with site organizations and identifies and documents conditions which need to be documented in the corrective action program.

- **Engineering Group**

This group has the primary responsibility for site engineering and design oversight of the plant components and systems, as well as interfacing with the vendor engineering organization. This organization primarily interfaces with the Operations Group as well as the Westinghouse Site Engineering Organization, Preoperational and Startup Testing Teams and Construction Services Group. The responsibility for training the testing personnel in accordance with applicable Quality Assurance Program is delegated and implemented as agreed to by Westinghouse. Westinghouse test personnel training is per certified design.

- **Health Physics/Chemistry Group**

This Technical Support organization has the responsibility and authority to maintain Health Physics and system chemistry conditions at the plant, particularly after system turnover. This organization primarily interfaces

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with the Licensee Operations Group, as well as the Westinghouse Engineering Organization, Preoperational and Startup Testing Teams and Construction Services Group.

- **Quality Assurance Group**

This group has the responsibility to verify that the applicable site Quality commitments are met within the scope of work performed at the site. This includes meeting the Criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. The primary interfaces for this group are the Licensee Operations Group and Technical Support organizations, including Quality Control and other quality organizations, as well as the Westinghouse Engineering Organization, Preoperational and Startup Testing Teams and Construction Services Group.

- **Site Preoperational Test Group**

This group has the primary responsibility for the development, maintenance and performance of the site preoperational procedures at the site. The primary interfaces for this group are the Licensee Operations Group and Technical Support organizations, as well as the Westinghouse Engineering Organization, Startup Testing Teams and the Construction Services Group. Additional specific information regarding this organization's responsibilities and interfaces is described in **Subsection 14.2.2.5**, below. Once preoperational testing is complete, this group turns systems over to the Startup Group.

- **Site Startup Test Group**

This group has the primary responsibility for the development, maintenance and performance of the site startup procedures at the site. The primary interfaces for this group are the Licensee's Operations Group and Technical Support organizations, as well as the Westinghouse Engineering Organization, Preoperational Testing Team and the Construction Services Group. Additional specific information regarding this organization's responsibilities and interfaces is described in **Subsection 14.2.2.6**, below. The Startup Test Group turns over systems to the licensee when testing is complete.

- **Westinghouse Site Engineering Group**

This group has the primary responsibility for the vendor interface between the site and the vendor's home offices, as well as the design authority for the primary vendor's components and systems. The various Westinghouse site leads for specific disciplines are a part of this organization. This organization primarily interfaces with Licensee Operations Group, as well as the Westinghouse Engineering Organization, Preoperational and Startup Testing Teams and Construction Services Group. The responsibility for training the testing personnel in accordance with the applicable Quality Assurance Program

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is delegated and implemented as agreed to by Westinghouse and the Licensee. Westinghouse test personnel training is per certified design.

**14.2.2.4 Site Construction Group (Architect Engineer)**

The Site Construction Group consists of the following, as necessary to support the Site Startup Test Program:

- **Construction Group**

The Construction group has the primary responsibility for the construction and construction testing of the Balance of Plant (BOP) engineering systems and components. During Construction and Construction Testing, this group has authority over administrative control and tagouts of these systems. Their main interface is with the System Preoperational and Startup Testing Groups, as well as the Licensee Operations Group. The Construction Group is responsible for addressing open items in the system turnover punch lists to address turnover acceptability of the system.

- **Construction Services Group**

The Construction Services Group primarily supports the Construction Group with activities necessary to support construction of systems and testing of the BOP systems and components, including the construction of scaffolding, installation and removal of insulation, and similar activities. With agreement between the necessary parties, this group may also support the Westinghouse Site Engineering Group with similar activities on the primary side. The primary interfaces of this group are the Construction Group and the organizations of the JTWG.

- **Construction Services Procurement Group**

The Construction Services Procurement Group is responsible for the quality procurement of components and equipment necessary to support plant construction and testing. The primary interfaces of this group include the Construction Services Group and the Construction Services Quality Group.

- **Construction Services Quality Group**

The Construction Services Quality Group is responsible for the oversight of the Quality Program during Construction Activities, including those pertinent to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and the disposition of Significant Construction Deficiencies, 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports as necessary. This group primarily interfaces with the Construction and Services groups as well as the Westinghouse Site Engineering group and the JTWG.

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- Construction Services Training Group

This group is primarily responsible for the training and qualification of Site Construction Personnel in accordance with the applicable Quality Assurance Program. Their primary interface is with the qualified Construction personnel.

The Site Construction Group performs the following functions and scope of work, as necessary to support the Site Startup Test Program:

- Construction Installation and Testing, including management of construction testing documentation.
- Construction and Installation activities required to support Preoperational and Startup Test Programs.
- Vendor interface and procurement associated with supporting testing activities.
- Provide staffing as needed to support the testing activities.
- Turnover of Construction and Installation tested equipment, systems, and testing documentation to the Site Preoperational Test Group.

**14.2.2.5 Site Preoperational Test Group**

The Site Preoperational Test Group consists of the following, as necessary to support the Site Startup Test Program:

- Engineering Leads
- Preoperational Test Teams

The Site Preoperational Test Group performs the following functions and scope of work, as necessary to support the Site Startup Test Program:

- Coordinate tagging and maintenance prior to turnover to the Licensee to support system acceptance testing.
- Accept systems for turnover from the installation organization.
- Plan, scope and schedule plant systems for test to support the plant Preoperational Test Program.
- Manage and oversee the testing of plant systems to support the Plant Hot-Functional Test Program.
- Resolve open items and exceptions identified during implementation of the Preoperational Test Program.

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- Accept and turn over Preoperational Test Packages to the Site Licensee.
- Support completion of Hot-Functional Test Program.
- Coordinate other support tasks required during Startup Testing activities with responsible groups (e.g., Licensee's Organization).

**14.2.2.6 Site Startup Test Group**

The Site Startup Test Group consists of the following, as necessary to support the Site Startup Test Program:

- Engineering Leads
- Startup Test Teams

The Site Startup Test Group performs the following functions and scope of work, as necessary to support the Site Startup Test Program:

- Coordinate tagging and maintenance as required to support system and equipment acceptance testing.
- Accept systems, structures and components from the Licensee for integrated testing.
- Plan, scope and schedule plant systems, structures and components for testing, to support Plant Startup.
- Manage and oversee the testing of plant systems, structures and components to support the Plant Power Ascension Test Program.
- Resolve open items and exceptions identified during implementation of the Startup Test Program.
- Accept and turn over Startup Test Packages to the Site Licensee.
- Coordinate other support tasks required during Startup Testing activities with responsible groups (e.g., Licensee's Organization).

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**14.2.3 TEST SPECIFICATIONS AND TEST PROCEDURES**

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Add the following text at the end of DCD **Subsection 14.2.3**:

STD COL 14.4-3     The Startup Administrative Manual shall include the following controls:



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- Controls to provide test procedures that include appropriate prerequisites, objectives, safety precautions, initial test conditions, methods to direct and control test performance, and acceptance criteria by which the test is evaluated.
- Controls for the format of individual test procedures to provide consistency with the guidance contained in RG 1.68; or provide justifications for any exceptions.
- Controls to provide for participation of the principal design organizations in establishing test objectives, test acceptance criteria, and related performance requirements during the development of detailed test procedures. Each test procedure should include acceptance criteria that account for the uncertainties used in transient and accident analyses. The participating system designers should include the nuclear steam supply system vendor, architect-engineer, and other major contractors, subcontractors, and vendors, as applicable.
- Controls to provide for personnel with appropriate technical backgrounds and experience to develop and review test procedures. Persons filling designated management positions should perform final procedure review and approval.
- Controls to make the approved test procedures for satisfying FSAR testing commitments are made available to the NRC inspectors approximately 60 days prior to their intended use.

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14.2.3.1      Conduct of Test Program

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Add the following text and Subsection at the end of DCD **Subsection 14.2.3.1**:

STD COL 14.4-3

The Startup Administrative Manual (procedure) governs the initial testing and is issued no later than 60 days prior to the beginning of the pre-operational phase. Testing during all phases of the test program is conducted using approved test procedures.

14.2.3.1.1      Procedure Verification

Since procedures may be approved for implementation weeks or months in advance of the scheduled test date, a review of the approved test procedure is required before commencement of testing. The test engineer is responsible for verifying:

- Drawing and document revision numbers listed in the reference section of the test procedure agree with the latest revisions.

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- The procedure text reflects any design and licensing (i.e., FSAR and Technical Specifications) changes made since the procedure was originally approved for implementation.
- Any new (since preparation of the procedure) Operating Experience lessons learned are incorporated into individual test procedures.

Procedures require signoff verification for prerequisites and instruction steps. This signoff includes identification of the person doing the signoff and the date and time of completion.

Test engineers maintain chronological logs of test status to facilitate turnover and aid in maintaining operational configuration control. These logs become part of the test documentation.

There is a documented turnover process to make known the test status and equipment configuration when personnel transfer responsibilities, such as during a shift change.

Test briefings are conducted for each test in accordance with administrative procedures. When a shift change occurs before test completion, another briefing occurs before resumption or continuation of the test.

Data collected is marked or identified with test, date, and person collecting data. This data becomes part of the test documentation.

The plant corrective action program is used to document deficiencies, discrepancies, exceptions, non-conformances and failures (collectively known as test exceptions) identified in the ITP. The corrective action documentation becomes part of the test documentation. WEC and/or other design organizations participate in the resolution of design-related problems that result in, or contribute to, a failure to meet test acceptance criteria.

The plant manager approves proceeding from one test phase to the next during the ITP. Approvals are documented in an overall ITP governance document.

Administrative procedures detail the test documentation review and approval. Review and approval of test documentation includes the test engineer, testing supervisor, Startup Group manager, WEC site representative or appropriate vendor, and JTWG. Final approval is by the plant manager.

Plant readiness reviews are conducted to assure that the plant staff and equipment are ready to proceed to the next test phase or plateau.

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**14.2.3.1.2 Work Control**

STD SUP 14.2-5

The Startup Group is responsible for preparing work requests when assistance is required from the Construction organization. Work requests are issued in accordance with a site-specific procedures governing the work management

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process. The plant staff, upon identifying a need for Construction organization assistance, coordinates their requirements through the appropriate Startup Test Engineer.

Activities requiring Construction organization work efforts are performed under the plant tagging procedures. Tagging requests are governed by a site-specific procedure for equipment clearance. Tagging procedures shall be used for protection of personnel and equipment and for jurisdictional or custodial conditions that have been turned over in accordance with the turnover procedure.

The Startup Group is responsible for supervising minor repairs and modifications, changing equipment settings, and disconnecting and reconnecting electrical terminations as stipulated in a specific test procedure. Startup Test Engineers may perform independent verification of changes made in accordance with approved test procedures.

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**14.2.3.1.3      System Turnover**

STD SUP 14.2-6

During the construction phase, systems, subsystems, and equipment are completed and turned over in an orderly and well-coordinated manner. Guidelines are established to define the boundary and interface between related system/subsystem and are used to generate boundary scope documents; for example, marked-up piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs) and electrical schematic diagrams are provided for scheduling and subsequent development of component and system turnover packages. The system turnover process includes requirements for the following:

- Documenting inspections performed by the construction organization (e.g., highlighted drawings showing areas inspected).
- Documenting results of construction testing.
- Determining the construction-related inspections and tests that need to be completed before preoperational testing begins. Any open items are evaluated for acceptability of commencing preoperational testing.
- Developing and implementing plans for correcting adverse conditions and open items, and means for tracking such conditions and items.
- Verifying completeness of construction and documentation of incomplete items.

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**14.2.3.1.4      Conduct of Modifications During the Initial Test Program**

STD SUP 14.2-7

Temporary alterations may be required to conduct certain tests. These alterations are documented in the test procedures. The test procedures contain restoration steps and retesting necessary to confirm satisfactory restoration to

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the required configuration. Modifications may be performed by the Construction organization or the plant staff processes prior to NRC issuance of the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding. If the modification invalidates a previously completed ITAAC, then that ITAAC is re-performed. Each modification is reviewed to determine the scope of post-modification testing that is to be performed. Testing is conducted and documented to maintain the validity of preoperational testing and ITAAC. Alterations made following NRC issuance of the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding are in accordance with plant processes and meet license conditions. Modifications that require changes to ITAAC require NRC approval of the ITAAC change.

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14.2.3.1.5      Conduct of Maintenance During the Initial Test Program

STD SUP 14.2-8

Corrective or preventive maintenance activities are reviewed to determine the scope of postmaintenance testing to be performed. Prior to NRC issuance of the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding, post-maintenance testing is conducted and documented to maintain validity of associated preoperational testing and ITAAC remain valid. Maintenance performed following NRC issuance of the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding is in accordance with plant staff processes and meets license conditions.

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14.2.3.2      Review of Test Results

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Add the following Subsections at the end of DCD **Subsection 14.2.3.2:**

STD COL 14.4-4

14.2.3.2.1      Review and Approval Responsibilities

Upon completion of a test, the startup engineer is responsible for:

- Reviewing the test data.
- Evaluating the test results.
- Verifying that the acceptance criteria are met.
- Verifying that the test results that do not meet acceptance criteria are entered into the corrective action program.
- Verifying that the results of retesting do not invalidate ITAAC acceptance criteria.

Test results are reviewed and approved by the JTWG. Review and approval of test results are kept current such that succeeding tests are not dependent on systems or components that have not been adequately tested. Test exceptions which do not meet acceptance criteria are identified to the affected and responsible design organizations and entered into the corrective action program. Implementation of corrective actions and retests are performed as required.

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Prior to initial fuel load, the results of the preoperational test phase are comprehensively reviewed by the PT&O organization and the JTWG to verify the results indicate that the required plant structures, systems, and components are capable of supporting the initial fuel load and subsequent startup testing. The plant manager approves fuel loading.

Each area of startup testing is reviewed and evaluated by the PT&O organization and the JTWG. The test results at each power ascension testing power plateau are reviewed and evaluated by the PT&O organization and the JTWG and approved by the plant manager before proceeding to the next plateau. Startup test reports are prepared in accordance with the guidance in position C.9 of Regulatory Guide 1.68, "Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."

The reactor vendor is responsible for reviewing and approving the results of the tests of supplied equipment. Architect Engineer representatives review and approve the results of the tests of supplied equipment. Other vendors' representatives review and approve the results of the tests of supplied equipment. Final approval of individual test completion is by the plant manager after approval by the Joint Test Working Group (JTWG).

#### 14.2.3.2.2 Technical Evaluation

Each completed test package is reviewed by technically qualified personnel to confirm satisfactory demonstration of plant, system or component performance and compliance with design and license criteria.

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#### 14.2.3.3 Test Records

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Add the following subsection at the end of DCD **Subsection 14.2.3.3:**

##### 14.2.3.3.1 Startup Test Reports

STD COL 14.4-4 Startup test reports are generated describing and summarizing the completion of tests performed during the ITP. A startup report is submitted at the earliest of:

- 1) 9 months following initial criticality,
- 2) 90 days after completion of the ITP, or
- 3) 90 days after start of commercial operations. If one report does not cover all three events, then supplemental reports are submitted every three months until all three events are completed. These reports:
  - Address each ITP test described in the FSAR.
  - Provide a general description of measured values of operating conditions

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or characteristics obtained from the ITP as compared to design or specification values.

- Describe any corrective actions that were required to achieve satisfactory operation.
- Include any other information required by license conditions.

---

Add the following subsections after DCD **Subsection 14.2.5**:

Utilization of Operating Experience

STD SUP 14.2-4

Administrative procedures provide methodologies for evaluating and initiating action for operating experience information (OE). DCD **Subsection 14.2.5** describes the general use of operating experience by WEC in the development of the test program.

14.2.5.1 Use of OE During Test Procedure Preparation

Administrative procedures require review of recent internal and external operating experience when preparing test procedures.

14.2.5.2 Sources and Types of Information Reviewed for ITP Development

Multiple sources of operating experience were reviewed to develop this description of the ITP administration program. These included INPO Reports, INPO Guidelines, INPO Significant Event Reports, INPO Significant Operating Experience Reports and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.68.

14.2.5.3 Conclusions from Review

The following conclusions are a result of the OE review conducted to develop this ITP administration program description:

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LNP SUP 14.2-1

- The test procedures should provide guidance as to the expected plant response and instructions concerning what conditions warrant aborting the test. Errors and problems with the procedures should be anticipated. A means for prompt but controlled approval of changes to test procedures is needed. Critical test procedures should provide specific criteria for test termination and specific steps to conduct test termination in a safe and orderly manner. Providing procedural guidance for aborting the test could prevent delays in plant restoration. Conservative guidance for actions to be taken should be included in the procedures.

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STD SUP 14.2-4

- Plant simulators may prove useful in preparing for special tests and verifying procedures.

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- Appropriate component/system operability should be verified prior to critical tests.
- The need to perform physics tests that can produce severe power tilts should be evaluated, particularly if tests at other similar reactors have provided sufficient data to verify the adequacy of the nuclear physics analysis.
- Compensatory measures should be implemented in accordance with guidance for infrequently performed tests or evolutions, where appropriate.

14.2.5.4 Summary of Test Program Features Influenced by the Review

The conclusions from the preceding section were incorporated in **Section 14.2.**

14.2.5.5 Use of OE during Conduct of ITP

Administrative procedures require discussion of operating experience when performing pre-job briefs immediately prior to the conduct of a test.

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14.2.6 USE OF PLANT OPERATING AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

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Add the following text and Subsection to the end of DCD **Subsection 14.2.6:**

STD COL 14.4-3

These procedures are used extensively in the Human-Machine Interface Testing, which is integrated as a part of the Control Room Design finalization. Additionally, the AP1000 plant operating and emergency procedures are developed to support the following design finalization activities:

- Human Factors Engineering
- Operational Task Analysis
- Training Simulator Development
- Verification and Validation of the Procedures and the Training Material

The AP1000 emergency, abnormal and some normal operating procedures, along with some Alarm Response Procedures and surveillance procedures, are exercised and verified in the processes delineated above and in the Control Room design finalization process.

In addition, the AP1000 Preoperational Testing and Startup Test procedures are verified and validated during the design finalization process, which helps prevent human factors issues with the development of these procedures. In addition, the plant operators use the Normal Operating Procedures while preoperational and

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startup tests are performed, which adds to their validity and the plant operators training.

**14.2.6.1 Operator Training and Participation during Certain Initial Tests  
(TMI Action Plan Item I.G.1, NUREG-0737)**

The objective of operator participation is to increase the capability of shift crews to operate facilities in a safe and competent manner by assuring that training for plant changes and offnormal events is conducted.

Operators are trained on the specifics of the ITP schedule, administrative requirements and tests. Specific Just In Time training is conducted for selected startup tests.

The ITP may result in the discovery of an acceptable plant or system response that differs from the expected response. Test results are reviewed to identify these differences and the training for operators is changed to reflect them. Training is conducted as soon as is practicable in accordance with training procedures.

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**14.2.8 TEST PROGRAM SCHEDULE**

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Add the following text and subsection at the end of DCD **Subsection 14.2.8:**

STD SUP 14.2-1

A site-specific initial test program schedule will be provided to the NRC after issuance of the COL. This schedule will address each major phase of the test program (including tests that are required to be completed before fuel load), as well as the organizational impact of any overlap of first unit initial testing with initial testing of the second unit.

The sequential schedule for individual startup tests should establish that testing is completed in accordance with plant technical specification requirements for structures, systems and components (SSC) operability before changing plant modes. Additionally, the schedule establishes that the safety of the plant is not dependent on the performance of untested SSCs. Guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.68 is used for development of the schedule.

The Startup Administrative Manual shall include the following controls:

- Test Procedure Development Schedule:
  - Controls to establish a schedule for the development of detailed testing, plant operating, and emergency procedures. These procedures, to the extent practical, are trial-tested and corrected during the initial test program prior to fuel loading in order to establish their adequacy.



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- Controls to confirm that approved test procedures are in a form suitable for review by NRC inspectors at least 60 days prior to their intended use, or at least 60 days prior to fuel loading for fuel loading and startup test procedures.
- Controls to provide timely notification to the NRC of changes in approved test procedures previously available for NRC review.
- Initial Test Program Schedule:
  - Controls to establish a schedule to conduct the major phases of the initial test program, relative to the expected fuel loading date. This is covered in License Conditions in Part 10 of the COL Application.
  - Controls to allow at least 9 months for conducting preoperational testing.
  - Controls to allow at least 3 months for conducting startup testing, including fuel loading, low-power tests, and power-ascension tests.
  - Controls to overlap test program schedules (for multi-unit sites) such that they do not result in significant divisions of responsibilities or dilutions of the staff provided to implement the test program.
  - Controls to sequence the schedule for individual startup tests, insofar as is practicable, such that testing is completed prior to exceeding 25 percent power for the plant SSCs that are relied upon to prevent, limit, or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. The schedule should establish that, insofar as is practicable, testing is accomplished as early in the test program as is feasible and that the safety of the plant is not dependent on the performance of untested SSCs.

The milestone schedule for developing plant operating procedures is presented in **Table 13.4-201**. The operating and emergency procedures are available prior to start of licensed operator training and, therefore, are available for use during the ITP. Required or desired procedure changes may be identified during their use. Administrative procedures describe the process for revising plant operating procedures.

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14.2.9      PREOPERATIONAL TEST DESCRIPTIONS

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Add the following subsection at the beginning of DCD **Subsection 14.2.9**

STD SUP 14.2-2

During preoperational testing, it may be necessary to return system control to Construction organization to repair or modify the system or to correct new problems. Administrative procedures include direction for:

- Means of releasing control of systems and or components to construction.

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- Methods used for documenting actual work performed and determining impact on testing.
  - Identification of required testing to restore the system to operability/functionality/availability status, and to identify tests to be re-performed based on the impact of the work performed.
  - Authorizing and tracking operability and unavailability determinations.
  - Verifying retests stay in compliance with ITAAC.
- 

14.2.9.1.6 Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System Testing

General Test Acceptance Criteria and Methods

LNP DEP 6.4-2 Revise paragraph (f) of DCD **Subsection 14.2.9.1.6**, General Test Acceptance Criteria and Methods section, to read as follows:

f) The ability to maintain the main control room environment within specified limits for 72 hours (Reference **subsection 6.4.3.2**) is verified with a test simulating a loss of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system. This testing demonstrates the control room heatup from 0 to 6 hours with the actual heat loads from the battery powered equipment and personnel specified for this time period (for the MCR [room 12401], there is automatic deenergization of specific non-safety MCR heat loads). The control room temperature versus time versus heat load data are used to verify the analysis basis used to assure that the control room conditions remain within specified limits for the 72 hour time period. Periodic grab samples will be taken of the control room air environment to support analyses to confirm that specified limits would not be exceeded for 72 hours.

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14.2.9.2.22 Pressurizer Surge Line Testing (First Plant Only)

STD COL 3.9-5 **Purpose**

The purpose of the pressurizer surge line testing is: a) to obtain data to verify the proper operation of temperature sensors installed on the pressurizer surge line and pressurizer spray line, and b) to obtain Reactor Coolant System piping displacement measurements for baseline data, as described in DCD **subsections 3.9.3, 14.2.5, and 14.2.9.1.7** item (d).

**Prerequisites**

The construction tests for the individual components associated with the Reactor Coolant System have been completed. The testing and calibration of the required test instrumentation has been completed. The temporary sensors and instrumentation lead wires required for monitoring thermal stratification, cycling,

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and striping have been installed. The calibration of the transducers and the operability of the data acquisition equipment have been verified. Prior to testing of the piping system, a pretest walk-down shall be performed to verify that the anticipated piping movement is not obstructed by objects not designed to restrain the motion of the system (including instrumentation and branch lines). The system walk-down shall also verify that supports are set in accordance with the design.

**General Test Methods and Acceptance Criteria**

The performance of the Reactor Coolant System is observed and recorded during a series of individual tests that characterize the various modes of system operation. This testing verifies that the temperature sensors operate as described in DCD subsection 3.9.3 and in appropriate design specifications.

- a) Verify the proper operation of temperature sensors installed on the pressurizer surge line and pressurizer spray line.
- b) Record sensor data at specified intervals throughout hot functional testing of the RCS system, including during the drawing and collapsing of the bubble in the pressurizer.
- c) Retain the following plant parameters time history for the same data recording period:
  - Hot leg temperature
  - Reactor Coolant System pressure
  - Reactor coolant pump status
  - Pressurizer level
  - Pressurizer temperature (liquid and steam)
  - Pressurizer spray temperature
  - Pressurizer spray and auxiliary spray flow
  - Normal residual heat removal system flow rate
  - Passive core cooling system – passive residual heat removal flow rate.
- d) Monitor pressurizer surge line and pressurizer spray line for valve leakage.
- e) Remove the transducers and associated hardware after the completion of testing.

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- f) Proper operation of the temperature sensors in the pressurizer surge and spray lines is verified.

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14.2.9.4.15 Seismic Monitoring System Testing

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Add the following text at the beginning of DCD **Subsection 14.2.9.4.15**:

STD COL 14.4-5 The seismic monitoring system testing described in this section of the DCD also applies to site-specific seismic sensors.

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Add the following subsections after DCD **Subsection 14.2.9.4.21**:

14.2.9.4.22 Storm Drains

STD COL 14.4-5 **Purpose**

Storm drain system testing verifies that the drains prevent plant flooding by diverting storm water away from the plant, as described in **Section 2.4**.

**Prerequisites**

Construction of the storm drain system is completed, and the system is operational.

**General Test Methods and Acceptance Criteria**

The storm drain system is visually inspected to verify the flow path is unobstructed. The system is observed under simulated or actual precipitation events to verify that the runoff from roof drains and the plant site and adjacent areas does not result in unacceptable soil erosion adjacent to, or flooding of, Seismic Category I structures.

14.2.9.4.23 Off-site AC Power Systems

**Purpose**

Off-site alternating current (ac) power system testing demonstrates the energization and proper operation of the as-installed switchyard components, as described in **Section 8.2**.

**Prerequisites**

Construction testing of plant off-site ac power systems, supporting systems, and components is completed. The components are operational and the switchyard equipment is ready to be energized. The required test instrumentation is

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properly calibrated and operational. The off-site grid connection is complete and available.

**General Test Methods and Acceptance Criteria**

The plant off-site ac power system components undergo a series of individual component and integrated system tests to verify that the off-site ac power system performs in accordance with the associated component design specifications. The individual component and integrated tests include:

- a. Availability of ac and direct current (dc) power to the switchyard equipment is verified.
- b. Operation of high voltage (HV) circuit breakers is verified.
- c. Operation of HV disconnect switches and ground switches is verified.
- d. Operation of substation transformers is verified.
- e. Operation of current transformers, voltage transformers, and protective relays is verified.
- f. Operation of switchyard equipment controls, metering, interlocks, and alarms that affect plant off-site ac power system performance is verified.
- g. Design limits of switchyard voltages and stability are verified.
- h. Under simulated fault conditions, proper function of alarms and protective relaying circuits is verified.
- i. Operation of instrumentation and control alarms used to monitor switchyard equipment status.
- j. Proper operation and load carrying capability of breakers, switchgear, transformers, and cables; and verification of these items by a non-testing means such as a QC nameplate check of as built equipment where testing would not be practical or feasible.
- k. Verification of proper operation of the automatic transfer capability of the preferred power supply to the maintenance power supply through the reserve auxiliary transformer.
- l. Switchyard interface agreement and protocols are verified.

The test results confirm that the off-site ac power systems meet the technical and operational requirements described in [Section 8.2](#).

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14.2.9.4.24 Raw Water System

**Purpose**

LNP COL 14.4-5 Raw water system testing verifies that the as-installed components supply raw water to the circulating water cooling tower basin, service water system cooling tower basin, fire protection water storage tanks, and other systems, as described in [Subsection 9.2.11](#).

**Prerequisites**

Construction testing of the raw water system is completed. The components are operational and the storage tanks and cooling tower basins are able to accept water. Required support systems, electrical power supplies, and control circuits are operational.

**General Test Methods and Acceptance Criteria**

The raw water system component and integrated system performance is observed to verify that the system functions, as described in [Subsection 9.2.11](#) and in appropriate design specifications. The individual component and integrated system tests include:

- a. Operation of the system pumps, traveling screens, automatic strainers, and valves is verified.
- b. Operation of the system instrumentation, controls, actuation signals, alarms, and interlocks is verified.

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14.2.9.4.25 Sanitary Drainage System

**Purpose**

STD COL 14.4-5 Sanitary drainage system testing verifies that the as-installed components properly collect and discharge sanitary waste, as described in DCD [Subsection 9.2.6](#).

**Prerequisites**

Construction testing of the sanitary drainage system is completed. Required support systems, electrical power supplies, and control circuits are operational.

**General Test Methods and Acceptance Criteria**

The sanitary drainage system component and integrated system performance is observed to verify that the system functions, as described in [Subsection 9.2.6.2.1](#) and in appropriate design specifications. The individual component and integrated system tests include:

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- a. Operation of lift stations and valves is verified.
- b. Operation of the system instrumentation, controls, actuation signals, and interlocks is verified.

**14.2.9.4.26 Fire Brigade Support Equipment**

**Purpose**

Fire brigade support equipment testing verifies that the equipment operates and is available when needed to perform the fire brigade functions, as described in [Section 9.5](#).

**Prerequisites**

Equipment is ready and available for testing.

**General Test Methods and Acceptance Criteria**

The fire brigade support equipment undergoes a series of inspections to verify availability and operability. Equipment is available for selection and use, based on the hazard. Fire brigade support equipment tests include:

- a. Location of portable extinguishers is verified; portable extinguishers are verified fully charged.
- b. Operation of portable ventilation equipment is verified.
- c. Operation of portable communication equipment is verified.
- d. Operation of portable lighting is verified.
- e. Operation of self-contained breathing apparatus and face masks is verified.
- f. Operation of keys to open locked fire area doors is verified.
- g. Turnout gear functionality and availability is verified.
- h. Compatibility of threads for hydrants, hose couplings, and standpipe risers with the local fire department equipment is verified, or alternatively, an adequate supply of readily available hose thread adaptors is verified.

**14.2.9.4.27 Portable Personnel Monitors and Radiation Survey Instruments**

**Purpose**

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Portable personnel monitors and radiation survey instruments testing verifies that the devices operate in accordance with their intended function in support of the radiation protection program, as described in **Chapter 12**.

**Prerequisites**

Portable personnel monitors, radiation survey instruments, and appropriate certified test sources are on site.

**General Test Method and Acceptance Criteria**

The portable personnel monitors and radiation survey instruments are source checked, tested, maintained, and calibrated in accordance with the manufacturers' recommendations. The portable monitors and instruments tests include:

- a. Proper function of the monitors and instruments to respond to radiation is verified, as required.
- b. Proper operation of instrumentation controls, battery, and alarms, if applicable.

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**14.2.10    STARTUP TEST PROCEDURES**

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Add the following at the beginning of DCD **Subsection 14.2.10**:

STD SUP 14.2-3

The startup testing program is based on increasing power in discrete steps. Major testing is performed at discrete power levels as described in DCD **Subsection 14.2.7**. The first tests during Power Ascension Testing that verify movements and expansion of equipment are in accordance with design, and are conducted at a power level as low as practical (approximately 5 percent).

The governing Power Ascension Test Plan requires the following operations to be performed at appropriate steps in the power-ascension test phase:

- Conduct any tests that are scheduled at the test condition or power plateau.
- Confirm core performance parameters (core power distribution) are within expectations.
- Determine reactor power by heat balance, calibrate nuclear instruments accordingly, and confirm the existence of adequate instrumentation overlap between the startup range and power range detectors.
- Reset high-flux trips just prior to ascending to the next level to a value no greater than 20 percent beyond the power of the next level unless



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Technical Specification limits are more restrictive.

- Perform general surveys of plant systems and equipment to confirm that they are operating within expected values.
- Check for unexpected radioactivity in process systems and effluents.
- Perform reactor coolant leak checks.
- Review the completed testing program at each plateau; perform preliminary evaluations, including extrapolation core performance parameters for the next power level; and obtain the required management approvals before ascending to the next power level or test condition.

Upon completion of a given test, a preliminary evaluation is performed that confirms acceptability for continued testing. Smaller transient changes are performed initially, gradually increasing to larger transient changes. Test results at lower powers are extrapolated to higher power levels to determine acceptability of performing the test at higher powers. This extrapolation is included in the analysis section of the lower power procedure.

Surveillance test procedures may be used to document portions of tests, and ITP tests or portions of tests may be used to satisfy Technical Specifications surveillance requirements in accordance with administrative procedures. At Startup Test Program completion, a plant capacity warranty test is performed to satisfy the contract warranty and to confirm safe and stable plant operation.

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Add the following subsection after DCD **Subsection 14.2.10.4.28**:

**14.2.10.4.29 Cooling Tower(s)**

STD COL 14.4-5

**Objectives**

- Verify proper cooling tower(s) function. Provide thermal acceptance testing of the cooling tower's heat removal capabilities.

**Prerequisites**

- The cooling tower(s) is structurally complete and in good operating condition.
- Circulating water system testing is complete.
- Required support systems, electrical power supplies, and control circuits are operational.

**Test Method**

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Thermal performance of the cooling towers is tested and verified using established industry test standards.

**Performance Criteria**

The cooling tower(s) perform as described in **Subsection 10.4.5** and in appropriate design specifications.

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**14.3 CERTIFIED DESIGN MATERIAL**

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

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Add the following subsections after DCD **Subsection 14.3.2.2**.

**14.3.2.3 Site-Specific ITAAC (SS-ITAAC)**

STD SUP 14.3-1

A table of inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) entries is provided for each site-specific system described in this FSAR that meets the selection criteria, and that is not included in the certified design. The intent of these ITAAC is to define activities that are undertaken to verify the as-built system conforms with the design features and characteristics defined in the system design description. ITAAC are provided in tables with the following three-column format:

<b>Design Commitment</b>	<b>Inspection, Tests, Analyses</b>	<b>Acceptance Criteria</b>
--------------------------	------------------------------------	----------------------------

Each design commitment in the left-hand column of the ITAAC tables has associated inspections, tests, or analyses (ITA) requirements specified in the middle column. The acceptance criteria for the ITA are defined in the right-hand column.

SS-ITAAC do not address ancillary buildings and structures on the site, such as administrative buildings, parking lots, warehouses, training facilities, etc.

**Selection Criteria**

- In determining those structures, systems, or components for which ITAAC must be prepared, the following questions are considered for each structure, system, or component:
  - Are any features or functions classified as Class A, B, or C?
  - Are any defense-in-depth features or functions provided?
  - For nonsafety-related systems, are any features or functions credited for mitigation of design basis events?
  - For nonsafety-related systems, are there any features or functions that have been identified in DCD **Section 16.3** as candidates for additional regulatory oversight?

If the answer to any of the above questions is yes, then ITAAC are prepared.

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- The scope and content of the ITAAC correspond to the scope and content of the site-specific system design description.
- One inspection, test, or analysis may verify one or more provisions in the system design description. An ITAAC that specifies a system functional test or an inspection may verify a number of provisions in the system design description. There is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between the ITAAC and the system design descriptions.
- As required by 10 CFR 52.103, the inspections, tests, and analyses are completed (and the acceptance criteria satisfied) prior to initial fuel loading.
- The ITAAC verify the as-built configuration and performance characteristics of structures, systems, and components as identified in the system design descriptions.

**Selection Methodology** – Using the selection criteria, ITAAC table entries are developed for each selected system. This is achieved by evaluating the design features and performance characteristics defined in the system design descriptions and preparing an ITAAC table entry for each design description criterion that satisfies the selection criteria. A close correlation exists between the left-hand column of the ITAAC and the corresponding design description entries.

The ITAAC table is completed by selecting the method to be used for verification (either a test, an inspection, or an analysis) and the acceptance criteria for the as-built feature.

The approach used to perform the tests, inspections, or analyses is similar to that described in DCD [Subsection 14.3.2.2](#).

#### 14.3.2.3.1 Emergency Planning ITAAC (EP-ITAAC)

EP-ITAAC have been developed to address implementation of elements of the Emergency Plan. Site-specific EP-ITAAC are based on the generic ITAAC provided in Appendix C.II.1-B of Regulatory Guide 1.206. These ITAAC have been tailored to the specific reactor design and emergency planning program requirements.

#### 14.3.2.3.2 Physical Security ITAAC (PS-ITAAC)

STD COL 13.6-1

Generic PS-ITAAC have been developed in a coordinated effort between the NRC and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). These generic ITAAC have been tailored to the AP1000 design and site-specific security requirements.

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14.3.2.3.3 Other Site-Specific Systems

STD SUP 14.3-1 One additional site-specific system has been determined to meet the ITAAC selection criteria, and ITAAC have been included for the Transmission Switchyard and Offsite Power System (ZBS) as indicated in [Table 14.3-201](#). Systems not meeting the selection criteria are subject to the normal functional testing to verify that newly designed and installed systems, structures, or components perform as designed.

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LNP SUP 14.3-2 A summary of the AP1000 structures, systems, or components considered for selection is given in [Table 14.3-201](#). This table supplements DCD [Table 14.3-1](#).

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14.3.3 CDM SECTION 3.0, NON-SYSTEM BASED DESIGN  
DESCRIPTIONS AND ITAAC

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Add the following new subsections after the first paragraph in DCD [Subsection 14.3.3](#).

14.3.3.1 Roller Compacted Concrete Bridging Mat ITAAC (RCC-ITAAC)

LNP SUP 14.3-3 The design of the RCC bridging mat underneath the nuclear island basemat is described in [Subsection 2.5.4.5.4](#). RCC-ITAAC have been developed to verify the as-built configuration and performance characteristics of the RCC bridging mat. These ITAAC have been tailored to the specific design and construction methodology used.

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14.3.3.2 Waterproof Membrane ITAAC

LNP COL 2.5-17 The design of the waterproof membrane beneath the nuclear island basemat is described in DCD [Subsection 3.4.1.1.1.1](#). Waterproof Membrane ITAAC have been developed to address verification that the mudmat-waterproofing-RCC interface beneath the nuclear island basemat has a minimum coefficient of friction to resist sliding of 0.55.

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14.3.3.3 Turbine Building, Radwaste Building, and Annex Building Drilled  
Shafts ITACC

LNP SUP 14.3-4 The design of the drilled shafts to support the Turbine Building, Radwaste Building, and Annex Building foundations and structures is described in [Subsections 2.5.4.8](#) and [2.5.4.10](#). ITAAC for these buildings have been developed to address verification of the physical arrangements of the drilled shaft foundations.

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14.3.3.4      Pipe Rupture Hazard Analysis ITAAC

STD COL 3.6-1      A pipe rupture hazard analysis is part of the piping design. The analyses will document that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) which are required to be functional during and following a design basis event have adequate high-energy and moderate-energy pipe break mitigation features. The locations of postulated ruptures and essential targets will be established and required pipe whip restraint and jet shield designs will be included. The as-designed pipe rupture hazards analysis will be based on the as-designed piping analysis and will be in accordance with the criteria outlined in DCD Subsections 3.6.1.3.2 and 3.6.2.5. The evaluation will address environmental and flooding effects of cracks in high and moderate energy piping. The report of the pipe rupture hazard analysis shall conclude that, for each postulated piping failure, the systems, structures, and components that are required to be functional during and following a design basis event are protected.

The as-built reconciliation of the pipe rupture hazards evaluation whip restraint and jet shield design in accordance with the criteria outlined in DCD Subsections 3.6.1.3.2 and 3.6.2.5 are covered in as-built ITAAC identified in DCD Tier 1 to demonstrate that the as-built pipe rupture hazards mitigation features reflect the design, as reconciled. The reconciliation report will be made available for NRC inspection or audit when it has been completed.

The as-designed pipe rupture hazard analysis completed for the first standard AP1000 plant will be available to subsequent standard AP1000 plants under the "one issue, one review, one position" approach for closure.

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14.3.3.5      Piping Design ITAAC

STD COL 3.9-7      The piping design ITAAC consists of the piping analysis for safety-related ASME Code piping. The piping design is completed on a package-by-package basis for applicable systems. In order to support closure of the piping design ITAAC, information consisting of the as-designed piping analysis for piping lines chosen to demonstrate all aspects of the piping design will be made available for NRC review, inspection, and/or audit. This information will consist of a design report referencing the as-designed piping calculation packages, including ASME Section III piping analysis, support evaluations and piping component fatigue analysis for Class I piping. The piping packages to be analyzed are identified in the DCD.

The ASME Code prescribes certain procedures and requirements that are to be followed for completing the piping design. The piping design ITAAC includes a verification of the ASME Code design report to ensure that the appropriate code design requirements for each system's safety class have been implemented.

A reconciliation of the applicable safety-related as-built piping systems is covered in as-built ITAAC identified in DCD Tier 1 to demonstrate that the as-built piping

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reflects the design, as reconciled. The reconciliation report will be made available for NRC inspection or audit when it has been completed.

The piping design completed for the first standard AP1000 plant will be available to subsequent standard AP1000 plants under the "one issue, one review, one position" approach for closure.

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**Table 14.3-201  
ITAAC Screening Summary**

	Structure/ System Acronym	Structure/System Description	Selected for ITAAC
LNP SUP 14.3-2	DRS	Storm Drain System	<u>XX</u>
	MES	Meteorological and Environmental Monitoring System	<u>XX</u>
	RWS	Raw Water System	<u>XX</u>
	TVS	Closed Circuit TV System	<u>XX</u>
	VPS	Pump House Building Ventilation System	NA
	YFS	Yard Fire Water System	<u>XX</u>
	ZBS	Transmission Switchyard and Offsite Power System	XX
	ZRS	Offsite Retail Power System	<u>XX</u>

Legend: XX = Site-specific system selected for ITAAC – title only, no entry for COLA  
 XX = Selected for ITAAC  
 NA = System is not part of LNP design



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**Table 14.3-202 (Sheet 1 of 4)  
Design Basis Accident Analysis**

	<b>Reference</b>	<b>Design Feature</b>	<b>Value</b>
LNP DEP 3.2-1	DCD Subsection 6.3.6.1.3	The bottom of the in-containment refueling water storage tank is located above the direct vessel injection nozzle centerline (ft).	≥ 3.4
	DCD Subsection 6.3.6.1.3	The pH baskets are located below plant elevation 107' 2".	
	DCD Figure 6.3-1	The passive core cooling system has two direct vessel injection lines.	
	DCD Table 6.3-2	The passive core cooling system has two core makeup tanks, each with a minimum required volume (ft <sup>3</sup> ).	2500
	DCD Table 6.3-2	The passive core cooling system has two accumulators, each with a minimum required volume (ft <sup>3</sup> )	2000
	DCD Table 6.3-2	The passive core cooling system has an in-containment refueling water storage tank with a minimum required water volume (ft <sup>3</sup> )	73,900
	DCD Subsection 6.3.2.2.3	The containment floodup volume for a LOCA in PXS room B has a maximum volume (ft <sup>3</sup> ) (excluding the IRWST) below a containment elevation of 108 feet.	73,500
	DCD Table 6.3-2	Each sparger has a minimum discharge flow area (in <sup>2</sup> ).	≥ 274
	DCD Table 6.3-2	The passive core cooling system has two pH adjustment baskets each with a minimum required volume (ft <sup>3</sup> ).	280
	DCD Subsection 14.2.9.1.3f	The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger minimum natural circulation heat transfer rate (Btu/hr)	
		- With 520°F hot leg and 80°F IRWST	≥ 1.78 E+08
		- With 420°F hot leg and 80°F IRWST	≥ 1.11 E+08
	DCD Subsection 6.3.6.1.3	The centerline of the HX's upper channel head is located above the HL centerline (ft).	≥ 26.3
	DCD Figure 6.3-1	The CMT level sensors (PXS-11A/B/C/D, -12A/B/C/D, -13A/B/C/D, and -14A/B/C/D) upper level tap centerlines are located below the centerline of the upper level tap connection to the CMTs (in).	1" ± 1"
	DCD Figure 6.3-1	The CMT inlet lines (cold leg to high point) have no downward sloping sections.	
	DCD Figure 6.3-1	The maximum elevation of the CMT injection lines between the connection to the CMT and the reactor vessel is the connection to the CMTs.	
	DCD Figure 6.3-1	The PRHR inlet line (hot leg to high point) has no downward sloping sections.	

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**Table 14.3-202 (Sheet 2 of 4)  
Design Basis Accident Analysis**

	<b>Reference</b>	<b>Design Feature</b>	<b>Value</b>
LNP DEP 3.2-1	DCD <b>Figure 6.3-1</b>	The maximum elevation of the IRWST injection lines (from the connection to the IRWST to the reactor vessel) and the containment recirculation lines (from the containment to the IRWST injection lines) is less than the bottom inside surface of the IRWST.	
	DCD <b>Figure 6.3-1</b>	The maximum elevation of the PRHR outlet line (from the PRHR to the SG) is less than the PRHR lower channel head top inside surface.	
	DCD <b>Subsection 7.1.2.10</b>	Isolation devices are used to maintain the electrical independence of divisions and to see that no interaction occurs between nonsafety-related systems and the safety-related system. Isolation devices serve to prevent credible faults in circuit from propagating to another circuit.	
	DCD <b>Subsection 7.1.4.2</b>	The ability of the protection and safety monitoring system to initiate and accomplish protective functions is maintained despite degraded conditions caused by internal events such as fire, flooding, explosions, missiles, electrical faults and pipe whip.	
	DCD <b>Subsection 7.1.2</b>	The flexibility of the protection and safety monitoring system enables physical separation of redundant divisions.	
	DCD <b>Subsection 7.2.2.2.1</b>	The protection and safety monitoring system initiates a reactor trip whenever a condition monitored by the system reaches a preset level.	
	DCD <b>Subsection 7.2.2.2.8</b>	The reactor is tripped by actuating one of two manual reactor trip controls from the main control room.	
	DCD <b>Subsection 7.3.1.2.2</b>	The in-containment refueling water storage tank is aligned for injection upon actuation of the fourth stage automatic depressurization system via the protection and safety monitoring system.	
	DCD <b>Subsection 7.3.1.2.3</b>	The core makeup tanks are aligned for operation on a safeguards actuation signal or on a low-2 pressurizer level signal via the protection and safety monitoring system.	
	DCD <b>Subsection 7.3.1.2.4</b>	The fourth stage valves of the automatic depressurization system receive a signal to open upon the coincidence of a low-2 core makeup tank water level in either core makeup tank and low reactor coolant system pressure following a preset time delay after the third stage depressurization valves receive a signal to open via the protection and safety monitoring system.	

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**Table 14.3-202 (Sheet 3 of 4)  
Design Basis Accident Analysis**

LNP DEP 7.3-1

Reference	Design Feature	Value
DCD Subsection 7.3.1.2.4	The first stage valves of the automatic depressurization system open upon receipt of a signal generated from a core makeup tank injection alignment signal coincident with core makeup tank water level less than the Low-1 setpoint in either core makeup tank via the protection and safety monitoring system.	
DCD Subsection 7.3.1.2.4	The second and third stage valves open on time delays following generation of the first stage actuation signal via the protection and safety monitoring system.	
DCD Subsection 7.3.1.2.5	The reactor coolant pumps are tripped upon generation of a safeguards actuation signal or upon generation of a low-2 pressurizer water level signal.	
DCD Subsection 7.3.1.2.7	The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger control valves are opened on low steam generator water level or on a CMT actuation signal via the protection and safety monitoring system.	
DCD Subsection 7.3.1.2.9	The containment recirculation isolation valves are opened on a safeguards actuation signal in coincidence with low-3 in-containment refueling water storage tank water level via the protection and safety monitoring system.	
DCD Subsection 7.3.1.2.14	The demineralized water system isolation valves close on a signal from the protection and safety monitoring system derived from either a reactor trip signal, a source range flux doubling signal, low input voltage to the 1E dc uninterruptible power supply battery chargers or if the source range flux doubling logic is blocked during shutdown.	
DCD Subsection 7.3.1.2.15	The chemical and volume control system makeup line isolation valves automatically close on a signal from the protection and monitoring system derived from a source range flux doubling, high-2 pressurizer level, high-2 steam generator level signal, a safeguards signal coincident with high-1 pressurizer level, or high-2 containment radioactivity.	
DCD Subsection 7.3.2.2.1	The protection and monitoring system automatically generate an actuation signal for an engineered safety feature whenever a monitored condition reaches a preset level.	
DCD Subsection 7.3.2.2.9	Manual initiation at the system-level exists for the engineered safety features actuation.	

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Design Basis Accident Analysis**

LNP DEP 7.3-1

Reference	Design Feature	Value
DCD Subsection 9.3.6.7	The demineralized water system isolation valves close on a signal from the protection and safety monitoring system derived from either a reactor trip signal, a source range flux doubling signal, low input voltage to the 1E dc and uninterruptible power supply battery chargers, a safety injection signal or if the source range flux doubling logic is blocked during shutdown conditions.	
DCD Subsection 9.3.6.7	The chemical and volume control system makeup line isolation valves automatically close on a signal from the protection and safety monitoring system derived from a source range flux doubling, high-2 pressurizer level, high steam generator level signal, or a safeguards signal coincident with high-1 pressurizer level.	
DCD Subsection 10.1.2	Safety valves are provided on both main steam lines.	
DCD Subsection 10.2.2.4.3	The flow of the main steam entering the high-pressure turbine is controlled by four stop valves and four governing control valves. The stop valves are closed by actuation of the emergency trip system devices.	
DCD Subsection 10.3.1.1	The main steam supply system is provided with a main steam isolation valve and associated MSIV bypass valve on each main steam line from its respective steam generator.	
DCD Subsection 10.3.1.1	A main steam isolation valve (MSIV) on each main steam line prevents the uncontrolled blowdown of more than one steam generator and isolates nonsafety-related portions of the system.	
DCD Subsection 10.3.1.2	Power-operated atmospheric relief valves are provided to allow controlled cooldown of the steam generator and the reactor coolant system when the condenser is not available.	
DCD Subsection 10.3.2.1	The main steam supply system includes: - One main steam isolation valve and one main steam isolation valve bypass valve per main steam line. - Main steam safety valves. - Power-operated atmospheric relief valves and upstream isolation valves.	
DCD Subsection 10.3.2.3.2	In the event that a design basis accident occurs, which results in a large steam line break, the main steam isolation valves with associated main steam isolation bypass valves automatically close.	

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**Table 14.3-203  
Radiological Analysis**

LNP DEP 6.4-1

Reference	Design Feature	Value
Section 8.3.1.1.6	Electrical penetrations through the containment can withstand the maximum short-circuit currents available either continuously without exceeding their thermal limit, or at least longer than the field cables of the circuits so that the fault or overload currents are interrupted by the protective devices prior to a potential failure of a penetration.	
Section 9.4.1.1.1	The VBS isolates the HVAC ductwork that penetrates the main control room boundary on High-2 particulate or iodine concentrations in the main control room supply air or on extended loss of ac power to support operation of the main control room emergency habitability system.	
Section 12.3.2.2.1	During reactor operation, the shield building protects personnel occupying adjacent plant structures and yard areas from radiation originating in the reactor vessel and primary loop components. The concrete shield building wall and the reactor vessel and steam generator compartment shield walls reduce radiation levels outside the shield building to less than 0.25 mrem/hr from sources inside containment. The shield building completely surrounds the reactor components.	
Section 12.3.2.2.2	The reactor vessel is shielded by the concrete primary shield and by the concrete secondary shield which also surrounds other primary loop components. The secondary shield is a structural module filled with concrete surrounding the reactor coolant system equipment, including piping, pumps and steam generators. Extensive shielding is provided for areas surrounding the refueling cavity and the fuel transfer canal to limit the radiation levels.	
Section 12.3.2.2.3	Shielding is provided for the liquid radwaste, gaseous radwaste and spent resin handling systems consistent with the maximum postulated activity. Corridors are generally shielded to allow Zone II access, and operator areas for valve modules are generally Zone II or III for access. Shielding is provided to attenuate radiation from normal residual heat removal equipment during shutdown cooling operations to levels consistent with radiation zoning requirements of adjacent areas.	

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**Table 14.3-204  
Radiological Analysis**

LNP DEP 6.4-2

Reference	Design Feature	Value
Table 2-1	Plant elevation for maximum flood level (ft)	≤ 100
Section 2.3.4	Atmospheric dispersion factors - X/Q (sec/m <sup>3</sup> )	
	- Site Boundary X/Q	
	0 - 2 hour time interval	≤ 5.1 x 10 <sup>-4</sup>
	- Low Population Zone Boundary X/Q	
	0 - 8 hours	≤ 2.2 x 10 <sup>-4</sup>
	8 - 24 hours	≤ 1.6 x 10 <sup>-4</sup>
	24 - 96 hours	≤ 1.0 x 10 <sup>-4</sup>
	96 - 720 hours	≤ 8.0 x 10 <sup>-5</sup>
Table 6.2.3-1	Containment penetration isolation features are configured as in Table 6.2.3-1	
Table 6.2.3-1	Maximum closure time for remotely operated containment purge valves (seconds)	≤ 10
Table 6.2.3-1	Maximum closure time for all other remotely operated containment isolation valves (seconds)	≤ 60
Section 6.4.2.3	The minimum storage capacity of all storage tanks in the VES (scf)	≥ 327,574
Deleted		
Section 6.4.4	The maximum temperature in the instrumentation and control rooms and dc equipment rooms following a loss of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system remains over a 72-hour period (°F).	≤ 120
Section 6.4.4	The main control emergency habitability system nominally provides 65 scfm of ventilation air to the main control room from the compressed air storage tanks.	65 ± 5
Section 6.4.4	Sixty-five ± five scfm of ventilation flow is sufficient to pressurize the control room to 1/8 <sup>th</sup> inch water gauge differential pressure (WIC).	1/8 <sup>th</sup>
Section 6.4.5.1	The maximum temperature in the main control room pressure boundary following a loss of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system over a 72-hour period (°F) (dry bulb temperature)	95
Figure 6.4-2	The main control room emergency habitability system consists of two sets of emergency air storage tanks and an air delivery system to the main control room.	
Section 6.5.3	The passive heat removal process and the limited leakage from the containment result in offsite doses less than the regulatory guideline limits.	

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**14.4 COMBINED LICENSE APPLICANT RESPONSIBILITIES**

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

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**14.4.1 ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING**

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STD COL 14.4-1 This COL Item is addressed in **Section 14.2**.

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**14.4.2 TEST SPECIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES**

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STD COL 14.4-2 Preoperational and startup test specifications and procedures are provided to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of DCD **Subsection 14.2.3**. The controls for development of test specifications and procedures are also described in **Subsection 14.2.3**.

A cross reference list is provided between ITAACs and test procedures and/or sections of test procedures.

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**14.4.3 CONDUCT OF TEST PROGRAM**

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STD COL 14.4-3 A site-specific startup administration manual (procedure), which contains the administration procedures and requirements that govern the activities associated with the plant initial test program, as described in FSAR **Section 14.2** is provided.

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**14.4.4 REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF TEST RESULTS**

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STD COL 14.4-4 Review and evaluation of individual test results, as well as final review of overall test results and selected milestones or hold points are addressed in **Subsection 14.2.3.2**. Test exceptions or results that do not meet acceptance criteria are identified to the affected and responsible design organizations, and corrective actions and retests, as required, are performed.

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**14.4.5 INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS**

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STD COL 14.4-5 This COL Item is addressed in **Subsections 14.2.9.4.15, 14.2.9.4.22 through**  
LNP COL 14.4-5 **14.2.9.4.27, 14.2.10.4.29**, and in the Physical Security Plan.

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14.4.6 FIRST-PLANT-ONLY AND THREE-PLANT-ONLY TESTS

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STD COL 14.4-6 First-plant-only and first-three-plant-only tests either are performed in accordance with DCD [Section 14.2.5](#) or a justification is provided that the results of the first-plant-only and first-three-plant-only tests are applicable to a subsequent plant. If the tests are not performed, the justification is provided prior to preoperational testing.

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APPENDIX 14A  
DESIGN ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA/ITAAC CLOSURE PROCESS

This **section** of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with no departures or supplements.