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**Advanced Passive 1000 (AP1000)  
Generic Technical Specification Traveler (GTST)**

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**Title: Changes Related to LCO 3.7.4, Secondary Specific Activity**

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**I. Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Travelers, Approved Since Revision 2 of STS NUREG-1431, and Used to Develop this GTST**

**TSTF Number and Title:**

TSTF-425-A, Rev 3, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control – RITSTF Initiative 5b

**STS NUREGs Affected:**

TSTF-425-A, Rev 3: NUREGs 1430, 1431, 1432, 1433, and 1434

**NRC Approval Date:**

TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3: 06-Jul-09

**TSTF Classification:**

TSTF-425-A, Rev 3: Technical Change

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**II. Reference Combined License (RCOL) Standard Departures (Std. Dep.), RCOL COL Items, and RCOL Plant-Specific Technical Specifications (PTS) Changes Used to Develop this GTST**

**RCOL Std. Dep. Number and Title:**

There are no Vogtle departures applicable to GTS 3.7.4.

**RCOL COL Item Number and Title:**

There are no Vogtle COL items applicable to GTS 3.7.4.

**RCOL PTS Change Number and Title:**

VEGP LAR DOC A003: References to various Chapters and Sections of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are revised to include FSAR.

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**III. Comments on Relations Among TSTFs, RCOL Std. Dep., RCOL COL Items, and RCOL PTS Changes**

This section discusses the considered changes that are: (1) applicable to operating reactor designs, but not to the AP1000 design; (2) already incorporated in the GTS; or (3) superseded by another change.

TSTF-425-A deferred for future consideration.

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**IV. Additional Changes Proposed as Part of this GTST (modifications proposed by NRC staff and/or clear editorial changes or deviations identified by preparer of GTST)**

Minor corrections were made to correct grammatical errors in the Bases.

APOG Recommended Changes to Improve the Bases

Revise the first paragraph of the “Background” section of the Bases to state:

. . . ~~Other~~**Therefore**, fission product isotopes, as well as activated corrosion products in lesser amounts, may ~~also~~ be found in the secondary coolant. . . .

This non-technical change provides improved clarity, consistency, and operator usability.

Throughout the Bases, references to Sections and Chapters of the FSAR do not include the “FSAR” clarifier. Since these Section and Chapter references are to an external document, it is appropriate to include the “FSAR” modifier. (DOC A003)

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## **V. Applicability**

### **Affected Generic Technical Specifications and Bases:**

Section 3.7.4, Secondary Specific Activity

### **Changes to the Generic Technical Specifications and Bases:**

The first paragraph of the “Background” section of the Bases is revised to improve clarity, consistency, and operator usability. (APOG Comment)

The acronym “FSAR” is added to modify “Section” and “Chapter” in references to the FSAR throughout the Bases. (DOC A003) (APOG Comment)

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**VI. Traveler Information****Description of TSTF changes:**

Not Applicable

**Rationale for TSTF changes:**

Not Applicable

**Description of changes in RCOL Std. Dep., RCOL COL Item(s), and RCOL PTS Changes:**

Not Applicable

**Rationale for changes in RCOL Std. Dep., RCOL COL Item(s), and RCOL PTS Changes:**

Not Applicable

**Description of additional changes proposed by NRC staff/preparer of GTST:**

The first paragraph of the “Background” section of the Bases is revised to state (APOG Comment):

. . . ~~Other~~**Therefore**, fission product isotopes, as well as activated corrosion products in lesser amounts, may ~~also~~ be found in the secondary coolant. . . .

The acronym “FSAR” is added to modify “Section” and “Chapter” in references to the FSAR throughout the Bases. (DOC A003) (APOG Comment)

**Rationale for additional changes proposed by NRC staff/preparer of GTST:**

The non-technical change to the “Background” section of the Bases provides improved clarity, consistency, and operator usability.

Since Bases references to FSAR Sections and Chapters are to an external document, it is appropriate to include the “FSAR” modifier.

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## **VII. GTST Safety Evaluation**

### **Technical Analysis:**

The changes are editorial, clarifying, grammatical, or otherwise considered administrative. These changes do not affect the technical content, but improve the readability, implementation, and understanding of the requirements, and are therefore acceptable.

Having found that this GTST's proposed changes to the GTS and Bases are acceptable, the NRC staff concludes that AP1000 STS Subsection 3.7.4 is an acceptable model Specification for the AP1000 standard reactor design.

### **References to Previous NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs):**

None

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**VIII. Review Information****Evaluator Comments:**

None

Randy Belles  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory  
865-574-0388

**Review Information:**

Availability for public review and comment on Revision 0 of this traveler approved by NRC staff on 5/19/2014.

**APOG Comments (Ref. 7) and Resolutions:**

1. (Internal # 3) Throughout the Bases, references to Sections and Chapters of the FSAR do not include the "FSAR" clarifier. Since these Section and Chapter references are to an external document, it is appropriate (DOC A003) to include the "FSAR" modifier. This is resolved by adding the FSAR modifier as appropriate.
2. (Internal #13) Many GTSTs evaluated TSTF-425 with the following note: Risk-informed TS changes will be considered at a later time for application to the AP1000 STS.

The NRC approval of TSTF-425, and model safety evaluation provided in the CLIIP for TSTF-425, are generically applicable to any design's Technical Specifications. As such, the replacement of certain Frequencies with a Surveillance Frequency Control Program should be included in the GTST for AP1000 STS NUREG.

However, implementation in the AP1000 STS should not reflect optional (i.e., bracketed) material showing retention of fixed Surveillance Frequencies where relocation to a Surveillance Frequency Control Program is acceptable. Since each represented AP1000 Utility is committed to maintaining standardization, there is no rationale for an AP1000 STS that includes bracketed options.

Consistent with TSTF-425 criteria, replace applicable Surveillance Frequencies with "In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency control Program" and add that Program as new AP1000 STS Specification 5.5.15.

NRC Staff disagreed with implementing TSTF-425 in the initial version of the STS. Although the APOG thinks the analysis supporting this traveler is general enough to be applicable to AP1000, staff thinks an AP1000-specific proposal from APOG is needed to identify any GTS SRs that should be excluded. Also, with the adoption of a Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP) in the AP1000 STS, bracketed Frequencies, which provide a choice between the GTS Frequency and the SFCP Frequency, are needed because the NRC will use the AP1000 STS as a reference, and to be consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev. 4. APOG was requested to consider proposing an AP1000 version of TSTF-425 for a subsequent revision of the STS.



3. (Internal # 410) In the “Background” section of the Bases, revise the first paragraph as follows:

. . . ~~Other~~**Therefore**, fission product isotopes, as well as activated corrosion products in lesser amounts, may ~~also~~ be found in the secondary coolant.

This non-technical change provides improved clarity, consistency, and operator usability. This is resolved by making the recommended change.

**NRC Final Approval Date:** 12/8/2015

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**NRC Contact:**

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301-415-1187  
Theodore.Tjader@nrc.gov

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**IX. Evaluator Comments for Consideration in Finalizing Technical Specifications and Bases**

None

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**X. References Used in GTST**

1. AP1000 DCD, Revision 19, Section 16, "Technical Specifications," June 2011 (ML11171A500).
2. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, Technical Specifications Upgrade License Amendment Request, February 24, 2011 (ML12065A057).
3. NRC Safety Evaluation (SE) for Amendment No. 13 to Combined License (COL) No. NPF-91 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3, and Amendment No. 13 to COL No. NPF-92 for VEGP Unit 4, September 9, 2013, ADAMS Package Accession No. ML13238A337, which contains:

ML13238A355	Cover Letter - Issuance of License Amendment No. 13 for Vogtle Units 3 and 4 (LAR 12-002).
ML13238A359	Enclosure 1 - Amendment No. 13 to COL No. NPF-91
ML13239A256	Enclosure 2 - Amendment No. 13 to COL No. NPF-92
ML13239A284	Enclosure 3 - Revised plant-specific TS pages (Attachment to Amendment No. 13)
ML13239A287	Enclosure 4 - Safety Evaluation (SE), and Attachment 1 - Acronyms
ML13239A288	SE Attachment 2 - Table A - Administrative Changes
ML13239A319	SE Attachment 3 - Table M - More Restrictive Changes
ML13239A333	SE Attachment 4 - Table R - Relocated Specifications
ML13239A331	SE Attachment 5 - Table D - Detail Removed Changes
ML13239A316	SE Attachment 6 - Table L - Less Restrictive Changes

The following documents were subsequently issued to correct an administrative error in Enclosure 3:

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|-------------|---|
| ML13277A616 | Letter - Correction To The Attachment (Replacement Pages) - Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4-Issuance of Amendment Re: Technical Specifications Upgrade (LAR 12-002) (TAC No. RP9402) |
| ML13277A637 | Enclosure 3 - Revised plant-specific TS pages (Attachment to Amendment No. 13) (corrected)  |
4. TSTF-GG-05-01, "Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Technical Specifications," June 2005.
  5. RAI Letter No. 01 Related to License Amendment Request (LAR) 12-002 for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4 Combined Licenses, September 7, 2012 (ML12251A355).
  6. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, Response to Request for Additional Information Letter No. 01 Related to License Amendment Request LAR-12-002, ND-12-2015, October 04, 2012 (ML12286A363 and ML12286A360)

7. APOG-2014-008, APOG (AP1000 Utilities) Comments on AP1000 Standardized Technical Specifications (STS) Generic Technical Specification Travelers (GTSTs), Docket ID NRC-2014-0147, September 22, 2014 (ML14265A493).
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**XI. MARKUP of the Applicable GTS Subsection for Preparation of the STS NUREG**

The entire section of the Specifications and the Bases associated with this GTST is presented next.

Changes to the Specifications and Bases are denoted as follows: Deleted portions are marked in strikethrough red font, and inserted portions in bold blue font.

Secondary Specific Activity  
3.7.4

### 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### 3.7.4 Secondary Specific Activity

LCO 3.7.4            The specific activity of the secondary coolant shall be  $\leq 0.1 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$  DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.

APPLICABILITY:    MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Specific activity not within limit.	A.1    Be in MODE 3.	6 hours
	<u>AND</u> A.2    Be in MODE 5.	36 hours

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.7.4.1    Verify the specific activity of the secondary coolant $\leq 0.1 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.	31 days

## B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

## B 3.7.4 Secondary Specific Activity

## BASES

**BACKGROUND** Activity in the secondary coolant results from steam generator tube LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). **Therefore, Other** fission product isotopes, as well as activated corrosion products in lesser amounts, may ~~also~~ be found in the secondary coolant. While fission products present in the primary coolant, as well as activated corrosion products, enter the secondary coolant system due to the primary to secondary LEAKAGE, only the iodines are of a significant concern relative to airborne release of activity in the event of an accident or abnormal occurrence (radioactive noble gases that enter the secondary side are not retained in the coolant but are released to the environment via the condenser air removal system throughout normal operation).

The limit on secondary coolant radioactive iodines minimizes releases to the environment due to anticipated operational occurrences or postulated accidents.

**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** The accident analysis of the main steam line break (SLB) as discussed in **FSAR** Chapter 15 (Ref. 1) assumes the initial secondary coolant specific activity to have a radioactive isotope concentration of 0.1  $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$  DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131. This assumption is used in the analysis for determining the radiological consequences of the postulated accident. The accident analysis, based on this and other assumptions, shows that the radiological consequences of a postulated SLB are within the acceptance criteria in SRP Section 15.0.1, and within the exposure guideline values of 10 CFR ~~Part~~ 50.34.

Secondary specific activity satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

**LCO** As indicated in the Applicable Safety Analyses, the specific activity limit of the secondary coolant is required to be  $\leq 0.1 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$  DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 to maintain the validity of the analyses reported in **FSAR** Chapter 15 (Ref. 1).

Monitoring the specific activity of the secondary coolant ensures that when secondary specific activity limits are exceeded, appropriate actions are taken in a timely manner to place the unit in an operational MODE that would minimize the radiological consequences of a DBA.

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BASES

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**APPLICABILITY** In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the limits on secondary specific activity apply due to the potential for secondary steam releases to the atmosphere.

In MODES 5 and 6, the steam generators are not being used for heat removal. Both the RCS and steam generators are depressurized, and primary to secondary LEAKAGE is minimal. Therefore, monitoring of secondary specific activity is not required.

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**ACTIONS** A.1 and A.2

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 exceeding the allowable value in the secondary coolant, is an indication of a problem in the RCS and contributes to increased post-accident doses. If the secondary specific activity cannot be restored to within limits within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS** SR 3.7.4.1

This SR verifies that the secondary specific activity is within the limits of the accident analysis. A gamma isotopic analysis of the secondary coolant, which determines DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, confirms the validity of the safety analysis assumptions as to the source terms in post-accident releases. It also serves to identify and trend any unusual isotopic concentrations that might indicate changes in reactor coolant activity or leakage. The 31 day Frequency is based on the detection of increasing trends of the level of DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, and allows for appropriate action to be taken to maintain levels below the LCO limit.

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**REFERENCES** 1. **FSAR** Chapter 15, "Accident Analyses."

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**XII. Applicable STS Subsection After Incorporation of this GTST's Modifications**

The entire subsection of the Specifications and the Bases associated with this GTST, following incorporation of the modifications, is presented next.

Secondary Specific Activity  
3.7.4

## 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

## 3.7.4 Secondary Specific Activity

LCO 3.7.4            The specific activity of the secondary coolant shall be  $\leq 0.1 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$  DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.

APPLICABILITY:    MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

## ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Specific activity not within limit.	A.1    Be in MODE 3.	6 hours
	<u>AND</u> A.2    Be in MODE 5.	36 hours

## SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.7.4.1    Verify the specific activity of the secondary coolant $\leq 0.1 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.	31 days

## B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

## B 3.7.4 Secondary Specific Activity

BASES

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**BACKGROUND** Activity in the secondary coolant results from steam generator tube LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Therefore, fission product isotopes, as well as activated corrosion products in lesser amounts, may be found in the secondary coolant. While fission products present in the primary coolant, as well as activated corrosion products, enter the secondary coolant system due to the primary to secondary LEAKAGE, only the iodines are of a significant concern relative to airborne release of activity in the event of an accident or abnormal occurrence (radioactive noble gases that enter the secondary side are not retained in the coolant but are released to the environment via the condenser air removal system throughout normal operation).

The limit on secondary coolant radioactive iodines minimizes releases to the environment due to anticipated operational occurrences or postulated accidents.

**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** The accident analysis of the main steam line break (SLB) as discussed in FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 1) assumes the initial secondary coolant specific activity to have a radioactive isotope concentration of 0.1  $\mu\text{Ci/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131}$ . This assumption is used in the analysis for determining the radiological consequences of the postulated accident. The accident analysis, based on this and other assumptions, shows that the radiological consequences of a postulated SLB are within the acceptance criteria in SRP Section 15.0.1, and within the exposure guideline values of 10 CFR 50.34.

Secondary specific activity satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

**LCO** As indicated in the Applicable Safety Analyses, the specific activity limit of the secondary coolant is required to be  $\leq 0.1 \mu\text{Ci/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131}$  to maintain the validity of the analyses reported in FSAR Chapter 15 (Ref. 1).

Monitoring the specific activity of the secondary coolant ensures that when secondary specific activity limits are exceeded, appropriate actions are taken in a timely manner to place the unit in an operational MODE that would minimize the radiological consequences of a DBA.

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BASES

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**APPLICABILITY**      In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the limits on secondary specific activity apply due to the potential for secondary steam releases to the atmosphere.

In MODES 5 and 6, the steam generators are not being used for heat removal. Both the RCS and steam generators are depressurized, and primary to secondary LEAKAGE is minimal. Therefore, monitoring of secondary specific activity is not required.

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**ACTIONS**            A.1 and A.2

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 exceeding the allowable value in the secondary coolant is an indication of a problem in the RCS and contributes to increased post-accident doses. If the secondary specific activity cannot be restored to within limits within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**      SR 3.7.4.1

This SR verifies that the secondary specific activity is within the limits of the accident analysis. A gamma isotopic analysis of the secondary coolant, which determines DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, confirms the validity of the safety analysis assumptions as to the source terms in post-accident releases. It also serves to identify and trend any unusual isotopic concentrations that might indicate changes in reactor coolant activity or leakage. The 31 day Frequency is based on the detection of increasing trends of the level of DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, and allows for appropriate action to be taken to maintain levels below the LCO limit.

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**REFERENCES**            1.    FSAR Chapter 15, "Accident Analyses."

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