

Jon A. Franke
Site Vice President

Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC
769 Salem Boulevard
Berwick, PA 18603
Tel. 570.542.2904 Fax 570.542.1504
Jon.Franke@TalenEnergy.com



APR 18 2016

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

10 CFR 50.73

**SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387(388)/2016-002-00
UNIT 1 LICENSE NO. NPF-14
UNIT 2 LICENSE NO. NPF-22
PLA-7454**

**Docket No. 50-387
50-388**

Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-387(388)/2016-002-00. The LER reports an event involving Secondary Containment being declared inoperable due to both doors of an airlock being open at the same time. This event was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "J. A. Franke", written over a horizontal line.

J. A. Franke

Attachment: LER 50-387(388)/2016-002-00

Copy: NRC Region I
Mr. J. E. Greives, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
Ms. T. E. Hood, NRC Project Manager
Mr. M. Shields, PA DEP/BRP

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**(See Page 2 for required number of
digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1

2. DOCKET NUMBER

05000387

3. PAGE

1 of 3

4. TITLE

Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to an Airlock Doors Open Due to Random Occurrence

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03	02	2016	2016	- 002	- 00	04	18	2016	Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2	05000388
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

9. OPERATING MODE	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)			
1	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10. POWER LEVEL	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(1)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(2)(i)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

LICENSEE CONTACT

C. E. Manges, Jr., Senior Engineer - Nuclear Regulatory Affairs

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(570) 542-3089

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED☐ YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)☒ NO**15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE**

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On March 2, 2016 at approximately 1330, contract employees leaving the Unit 2 Reactor Building verified a green light, but received an alarm when the door was about one quarter of the way open. The contract employees identified that workers had opened the door on the other side of the airlock. The workers on the other side were contract employees who indicated the green light was verified prior to the individual and crew entering the airlock. The airlock door on the other side opened as they were entering. After this incident, the airlock indication was tested and all equipment checked satisfactorily

With both airlock doors open simultaneously, Secondary Containment was briefly inoperable due to failure to meet Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3.

This event was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function (EN 51750). The condition also requires a Licensee Event Report (LER) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).

The cause of the event was determined to be random occurrence. There were no corrective actions required to address the cause. Although human performance issues were not involved, actions have been taken to improve human performance associated with airlock door use.

There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

NRC FORM 366A
(11-2015)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 10/31/2018



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER		
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1	05000387	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
		2016	- 002	- 00

NARRATIVE

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit 1 – Mode 1, 79 percent Rated Thermal Power

Unit 2 – Mode 1, 100 percent Rated Thermal Power

There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On March 2, 2016 at approximately 1330, contract employees leaving the Unit 2 Reactor Building EIS System Identifier: NG] through an airlock [EIS Component Identifier: AL] verified a green light [EIS Component Identifier: IL] with peer check three times, but received an alarm [EIS Component Identifier: ALM] when the airlock door [EIS Component Identifier: DR] was about one quarter of the way open. The contract employees identified that workers had opened the door on the other side of the airlock. The workers on the other side were contract employees who indicated the green light was verified prior to the individual and crew entering the airlock. The individual also verified no one was in the airlock via the window in the door. The airlock door on the other side opened as they were entering.

After this incident, the airlock indication was tested and all equipment checked satisfactorily

With both airlock doors open simultaneously, Secondary Containment was briefly inoperable due to failure to meet Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3.

This event was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function (EN 51750). The condition also requires a Licensee Event Report (LER) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).


CAUSE OF EVENT

The direct cause has been determined to be random occurrence.

ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The actual consequence was a brief entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 and an eight hour notification of the event to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

An engineering evaluation was performed and concluded that secondary containment could have performed its safety function of isolating as assumed in the accident analysis and also of re-establishing 0.25 inches vacuum (drawdown) within the assumed accident analysis time (10 minutes). Therefore, the subject event did not cause a loss of safety function. This event will not be counted as a safety system functional failure (SSFF) for the NRC performance indicator based on the engineering analysis that shows there was no loss of ability to fulfill the safety function.

NRC FORM 366A (11-2015)	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET	APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 <small>Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.</small>									
1. FACILITY NAME Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000387	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th colspan="3" style="text-align: left; padding: 2px;">3. LER NUMBER</th> </tr> <tr> <th style="width: 33%; text-align: center; padding: 2px;">YEAR</th> <th style="width: 33%; text-align: center; padding: 2px;">SEQUENTIAL NUMBER</th> <th style="width: 33%; text-align: center; padding: 2px;">REV NO.</th> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">2016</td> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">- 002</td> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">- 00</td> </tr> </table>	3. LER NUMBER			YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	2016	- 002	- 00
3. LER NUMBER											
YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.									
2016	- 002	- 00									
<p>NARRATIVE</p> <p>CORRECTIVE ACTIONS</p> <p>Although there were no identified human performance errors, a number of actions have been taken to improve human performance associated with airlock doors; these include the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A plant communication was prepared and disseminated describing proper actions associated with airlock doors and plant personnel were briefed on its content. 2. A station briefing sheet on airlock door operation has been added to the new to nuclear/Susquehanna supplemental worker Dynamic Learning Activity. 3. Supervisor observations of airlock door operation were completed. <p>PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS</p> <p>The following are recent LERs involving loss of secondary containment due to door issues:</p> <p>LER 50-387(388)/2015-011, "Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to an Airlock Door that Had Not Been Properly Latched", dated January 29, 2016.</p> <p>LER 50-388(387)/2015-006-00, "Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to Secondary Containment Boundary Door 104-R Breached", dated September 18, 2015.</p> <p>LER 50-387/2015-004-00, "Secondary Containment Inoperable due Secondary Containment Boundary Door Found Ajar," dated June 25, 2015.</p> <p>LER 50-388/2015-002-00, "Secondary Containment Inoperability Due Failure to Meet Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1," dated May 11, 2015</p> <p>LER 50-388(387)/2014-001-00, "Both Doors of a Secondary Containment Airlock Momentarily Open Due to a Personnel Error Resulting in Entry into Secondary Containment Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation," dated December 31, 2014</p> <p>LER 50-387(388)/2014-002-00, "Secondary Containment Door Found Ajar," dated April 9, 2014.</p>											