



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

May 26, 2016

Mr. Scott Batson  
Site Vice President  
Oconee Nuclear Station  
Duke Energy Corporation  
7800 Rochester Highway  
Seneca, SC 29672-0752

SUBJECT: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 - ISSUANCE OF LICENSE  
AMENDMENTS REGARDING EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL SCHEME  
CHANGE (CAC NOS. MF6454, MF6455, AND MF6456)

Dear Mr. Batson:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 399, 401, and 400 to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55, for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The amendments are in response to your application dated June 23, 2015, as supplemented by letters dated February 4, 2016, and March 18, 2016.

The amendments approve adoption of an emergency action level (EAL) scheme based on the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," dated November 2012. NEI 99-01, Revision 6, was endorsed by the NRC by letter dated March 28, 2013.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

S. Batson

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If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (301) 415-4090 or [jeffrey.whited@nrc.gov](mailto:jeffrey.whited@nrc.gov).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jeffrey A. Whited". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Jeffrey" and last name "Whited" clearly distinguishable.

Jeffrey A. Whited, Project Manager  
Plant Licensing Branch II-1  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 399 to DPR-38
2. Amendment No. 401 to DPR-47
3. Amendment No. 400 to DPR-55
4. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: Distribution via Listserv



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC

DOCKET NO. 50-269

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 399  
Renewed License No. DPR-38

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (ONS, the facility), Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-38, filed by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (the licensee), dated June 23, 2015, as supplemented by letters dated February 4, 2016, and March 18, 2016, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 1

2. Accordingly, by Amendment No. 399, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 is hereby amended to authorize implementation of the emergency action level scheme described in the licensee's application dated June 23, 2015, as supplemented by letters dated February 4, 2016, and March 18, 2016, and evaluated in the NRC staff's safety evaluation enclosed with this amendment.
3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented by March 31, 2017.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

*Michelle L. Evans for*

William M. Dean, Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Date of Issuance: May 26, 2016



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC

DOCKET NO. 50-270

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 401  
Renewed License No. DPR-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility), Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-47, filed by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (the licensee) dated June 23, 2015, as supplemented by letters dated February 4, 2016, and March 18, 2016, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 2

2. Accordingly, by Amendment No. 401, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to authorize implementation of the emergency action level scheme described in the licensee's application dated June 23, 2015, as supplemented by letters dated February 4, 2016, and March 18, 2016, and evaluated in the NRC staff's safety evaluation enclosed with this amendment.
3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented by March 31, 2017.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

*Michelle G. Evans for*

William M. Dean, Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Date of Issuance: May 26, 2016



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC

DOCKET NO. 50-287

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 400  
Renewed License No. DPR-55

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 (the facility), Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-55, filed by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (the licensee) dated June 23, 2015, as supplemented by letters dated February 4, 2016, and March 18, 2016, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 3

2. Accordingly, by Amendment No. 400, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 is hereby amended to authorize implementation of the emergency action level scheme described in the licensee's application dated June 23, 2015, as supplemented by letters dated February 4, 2016, and March 18, 2016, and evaluated in the NRC staff's safety evaluation enclosed with this amendment.
3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented by March 31, 2017.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

*Michelle G. Evans for*

William M. Dean, Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Date of Issuance: May 26, 2016





UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO

AMENDMENT NO. 399 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38

AMENDMENT NO. 401 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47

AND

AMENDMENT NO. 400 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270, AND 50-287

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated June 23, 2015 (Reference 1), as supplemented by letters dated February 4, 2016 (Reference 2), and March 18, 2016 (Reference 3) Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy or the licensee) requested a change to the emergency plan for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (Oconee, the facility). Specifically, the proposed change would revise the emergency action level (EAL) scheme for each unit based on the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 99-01, Revision (Rev.) 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," dated November 2012 (Reference 4). NEI 99-01, Rev. 6, was endorsed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) by letter dated March 28, 2013 (Reference 5).

The supplemental letters dated February 4, 2016, and March 18, 2016, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published the *Federal Register* on August 14, 2015 (80 FR 48922). This *Federal Register* notice was corrected on August 20, 2015 (80 FR 50663) to correct the dates for filing any comments and a request for a hearing. The no significant hazards consideration determination, as originally published, was not affected.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The applicable regulations and guidance for the emergency plans are as follows.

## 2.1 Regulations

Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), Section 50.47, "Emergency plans," sets forth emergency plan requirements for nuclear power plant facilities. The regulations in 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1)(i) state, in part, that:

. . . no initial operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by the NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

Section 50.47(b) to 10 CFR Part 50 establishes the standards that the onsite and offsite emergency response plans must meet for the NRC staff to make a positive finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

Planning standard (4) of Section 50.47(b) to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that onsite and offsite emergency response plans meet the following:

A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

Section 50.47(b)(4) to 10 CFR Part 50 emphasizes the use of a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, assuring that implementation methods are relatively consistent throughout the industry for a given reactor and containment design while simultaneously providing an opportunity for a licensee to modify its EAL scheme as necessary to address plant-specific design considerations or preferences.

Section IV.B of Appendix E, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities," to 10 CFR Part 50, states, in part, that:

The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant.

## 2.2 Guidance

The EAL development guidance was initially established in NRC Generic Letter (GL) 79-50, "Emergency Plans Submittal Dates," October 10, 1979 (Reference 6), and was subsequently revised in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 (Reference 7), which was endorsed as an approach for the development of an EAL scheme by NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.101, Rev. 2, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors," October 1981 (Reference 8).

As industry and regulatory experience was gained with the implementation and use of EAL schemes, the industry issued revised EAL scheme development guidance to reflect lessons learned. To date, NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," January 1992 (Reference 9); NEI 99-01, Rev. 4, January 2003 (Reference 10); Rev. 5, February 2008 (Reference 11); and Rev. 6, were provided to the NRC for review and endorsement as generic (non-plant-specific) EAL development guidance. RG 1.101, Rev. 3, August 1992 (Reference 12) and Rev. 4, July 2003 (Reference 13), endorsed NUMARC/NESP-007 and NEI 99-01, Rev. 4, as acceptable alternatives for licensees to consider in the development of their plant-specific EAL schemes and allowed licensees to develop plant-specific EALs based upon an alternative approach not endorsed by the NRC. NEI 99-01, Rev. 5, was endorsed by the NRC as generic (non-plant-specific) EAL scheme development guidance by letter dated February 22, 2008 (Reference 14). As stated above, NEI 99-01, Rev. 6, was endorsed by the NRC as generic (non-plant-specific) EAL scheme development guidance by Reference 5.

The EAL development guidance contained in GL 79-50; NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1; NUMARC/NESP-007; and NEI 99-01, Revs. 4, 5, and 6, are all considered generic EAL scheme development guidance, as they are not plant-specific and may not be entirely applicable for some reactor designs. However, the guidance contained in these documents bounds the most typical accident/event scenarios for which emergency response is necessary, in a format that allows for industry standardization and consistent regulatory oversight. Most licensees choose to develop plant-specific EAL schemes using the latest endorsed EAL development guidance with appropriate plant-specific alterations as applicable. Pursuant to Section IV.B (2) of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, a revision to an EAL must be approved by the NRC before implementation, if the licensee is changing from one EAL scheme to another.

In summary, the NRC staff considers the following methods acceptable for use in developing plant-specific EALs that meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), with the understanding that licensees may want to develop EALs that differ from the applicable guidance document as allowed in RG 1.101 and in the applicable endorsement letters:

- Appendix 1, "Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants," to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1;
- NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2;
- NEI 99-01, Rev. 4;

- NEI 99-01, Rev. 5; and
- NEI 99-01, Rev. 6.

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2003-18, "Use of NEI 99-01, 'Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,' Rev. 4, Dated January 2003," October 8, 2003 (Reference 15), with Supplement 1 dated July 13, 2004 (Reference 16), and Supplement 2 dated December 12, 2005 (Reference 17), also provides guidance for developing or changing a standard emergency classification and action level scheme. In addition, RIS 2003-18 and its supplements provide recommendations to assist licensees, consistent with Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, in determining whether to seek prior NRC approval of deviations from the guidance.

Regardless of the generic EAL scheme development guidance document used by a licensee to develop its EAL scheme, or if a licensee chose to develop its EAL scheme using an alternative approach not endorsed by the NRC, or a combination of the two, the NRC staff reviews the EAL scheme to assure that it meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

### 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

In its license amendment request (References 1, 2, and 3), the licensee proposed to revise the current Oconee EAL scheme to one based on NEI 99-01, Rev. 6. In References 1, 2, and 3, the licensee submitted the proposed EAL scheme, the technical basis containing an evaluation and rationale for each proposed EAL change, and a matrix providing a line-by-line comparison of the proposed initiating conditions, mode applicability, and EAL wording to that found in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6. The comparison matrix also included a description of global changes applicable to the EAL scheme and a justification for any differences or deviations from NEI 99-01, Rev. 6. The application stated that the licensee used the terms "difference" and "deviation," as defined in RIS 2003-18, as supplemented, when comparing its proposed plant-specific EALs to the generic EALs in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6.

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed plant-specific EAL scheme, technical basis, comparison matrix, and all additional information provided in the licensee's application and supplemental response. As discussed in this safety evaluation (SE), the NRC staff determined that both the current and proposed EALs have modifications from NEI 99-01, Rev. 6, guidance due to specific plant designs and licensee preference.

Although the EALs must be plant-specific, the NRC staff reviewed the proposed EALs for the following key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme to ensure consistency and regulatory stability, as outlined in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6:

- Consistency, including standardization of intent, if not in actual wording (i.e., the EALs would lead to similar decisions under similar circumstances at different plants);
- Human factors engineering and user friendliness;
- Potential for emergency classification level upgrade only when there is an increasing threat to public health and safety;

- Ease of upgrading and downgrading the emergency classification level;
- Thoroughness in addressing and disposing of the issues of completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654 (i.e., the EALs are unambiguous and are based on plant-specific indicators);
- Technical completeness for each classification level;
- Logical progression in classification for multiple events; and
- The use of objective and observable values.

As discussed in this SE, the NRC staff determined that the proposed EAL modifications do not alter the intent of any specific EAL described in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6. The licensee chose to modify its proposed EAL scheme from the generic EAL scheme development guidance provided in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6, in order to adopt a format that is better aligned with how it currently implements its EALs, as well as with plant-specific writer's guides and preferences.

To aid in understanding the nomenclature used in this SE, the following conventions are used:

- The first letter signifies the EAL category;
- The second letter signifies the emergency classification level:
  - G = General Emergency (GE),
  - S = Site Area Emergency (SAE),
  - A = Alert, and
  - U = Notification of Unusual Event (UE)
- The number denotes the sequential subcategory designation from the plant-specific EAL scheme.

An EAL set refers to EALs within an EAL Recognition Category and subcategory that includes an escalation path for one or more classification levels. Not all EALs require an EAL set.

This SE uses the numbering system from the proposed plant-specific EAL scheme; however, the numbering system from the generic EAL scheme development guidance contained in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6, is annotated in [brackets] to aid in cross-referencing the proposed plant-specific EAL numbering convention with that of the guidance.

### 3.1 Category 'R' – Abnormal Radiological Release/Radiological Effluent

#### 3.1.1 Oconee EAL Set RU1/RA1/RS1/RG1 [AU1/AA1/AS1/AG1]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL set is to ensure an EAL is declared upon plant-specific indications of a release of radioactivity (gaseous and/or liquid). In recognition of the lower possible radioactivity

concentrations, the assessment of liquid releases is limited to the UE and Alert emergency classification levels. The set provides for accident assessments using pre-calculated values based on assumed conditions, real-time parameters, and field monitoring results.

The NRC staff verified that the progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

- RU1 - This EAL addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release).
- RA1 - This EAL addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 1 percent of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Protective Action Guides (PAGs).
- RS1 - This EAL addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 10 percent of the EPA PAGs.
- RG1 - This EAL addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to the EPA PAGs.

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.1.2 Oconee EAL Set RU2/RA2/RS2/RG2 [AU2/AA2/AS2/AG2]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL set is to ensure an EAL is declared plant-specific indications of potential or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly or multiple assemblies. It addresses a lowering of water level over irradiated fuel or fuel uncover (i.e., level below the top of the fuel), a spectrum of fuel handling accidents that result in mechanical damage to irradiated fuel (e.g., a dropped fuel assembly), and addresses NRC Order EA-12-051, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation," March 12, 2012 (Reference 18).

The NRC staff verified that the progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

- RU2 - This EAL addresses a decrease in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevated radiation levels.
- RA2 - This EAL addresses events that have caused imminent or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly, or a significant lowering of water level within the spent fuel pool and addresses NRC Order EA-12-051.
- RS2 - This EAL addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to imminent fuel damage and addresses NRC Order EA-12-051.
- RG2 - This EAL addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to a prolonged uncover of spent fuel and addresses NRC Order EA-12-051.

The SAE and GE emergency classification levels for this specific accident progression are also bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier tables, as well as EALs RS1 and RG1. With the availability of new spent fuel pool level instrumentation, the enhanced EALs will provide a redundant escalation path by including specific SAE and GE EALs.

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.1.3 Oconee EAL RA3 [AA3]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure an EAL is declared when radiation levels in the plant are at a level such that it limits normal access, as well as when the plant has indications of fuel clad degradation. These EALs address elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms and areas sufficient to preclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to maintain normal plant operation, or to perform a normal plant cooldown and shutdown. This includes equipment in the control room and the central alarm station. The Alert EAL is primarily intended to ensure that the plant emergency response organization (ERO) is activated to support the control room in removing the impediment to normal access, as well as assisting in quantifying potential damage to the fuel. Indications of increasing radiation levels in the plant are bounded by indication of fission product barrier loss or potential loss, as well as in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the

requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.2 Category 'C' – Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malfunction

#### 3.2.1 Oconee EAL Set CU1/CA1/CS1/CG1 [CU1/CA1/CS1/CG1]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL set is to ensure an EAL is declared upon a loss of reactor pressure vessel inventory and/or reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage.

The NRC staff verified that the progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

- CU1 - This EAL addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor reactor vessel/RCS level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage.
- CA1 - This EAL addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier).
- CS1 - This EAL addresses a significant and prolonged loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory control and makeup capability leading to imminent fuel damage.
- CG1 - This EAL addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of active fuel with containment challenged.

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### 3.2.2 Oconee EAL CU2/CA2 [CU2/CA2]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and



accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL set is to ensure an EAL is declared upon a loss of available alternating current (AC) power to emergency power electrical busses.

The NRC staff verified that the progression from UE to Alert is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in EALs RS1 and RG1.

- CU2 - This EAL describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to safety systems.
- CA2 - This EAL addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all safety systems requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal, and the ultimate heat sink.

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.2.3 Oconee EAL Set CU3/CA3 [CU3/CA3]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL set is to ensure an EAL is declared upon an inability to maintain control of decay heat removal.

The NRC staff verified that the progression from UE to Alert is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in EALs RS1 and RG1.

- CU3 - This EAL addresses an unplanned increase in RCS temperature above the technical specification cold shutdown temperature limit or the inability to determine RCS temperature and level.

- CA3 - This EAL addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed.

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### 3.2.4 Oconee EAL CU4 [CU4]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an EAL is declared when a loss of vital direct current (DC) power which compromises the ability to monitor and control operable safety systems when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode. It is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and offsite response organizations (OROs) are aware of the event and resources necessary to respond to the event are mobilized and any necessary compensatory measures are promptly implemented. The Alert, SAE, and GE emergency classification levels for a protracted loss of Vital DC power are bounded by indications available in EALs CA1, CA3, CS1, CG1, RA1, RS1, and RG1.

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### 3.2.5 Oconee EAL CU5 [CU5]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL is to highlight the importance of emergency communications by ensuring that an EAL is declared if normal communication methods for onsite and offsite personnel or for OROs, including the NRC, are lost. It is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the loss of communications capabilities, resources necessary to restore communications are mobilized, and compensatory measures are promptly implemented. The NRC staff verified that no escalation path is necessary for this EAL.

The communication methods derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.2.6 Oconee EAL CA6 [CA6]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an EAL is declared when hazardous events lead to potential damage to safety systems. The hazardous events of interest include, but are not limited to, an earthquake, flooding, high winds, tornado strike, explosion, fire, or any other hazard applicable for a specific site. It is primarily intended to ensure that the plant ERO is activated to support the control room in understanding the event impacts and restoring affected safety system equipment to service. The SAE and GE classification levels for this accident progression are bounded by indications available in EALs CS1, CG1, RS1, and RG1.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

## 3.3 Category 'E' – Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

### 3.3.1 Oconee EAL EU1 [E-HU1]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure an EAL is declared upon an event that results in damage to the confinement boundary of a storage cask containing spent fuel, regardless of the cause. It is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the cask damage, resources necessary to respond to the event are mobilized, and protective measures are promptly implemented.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.4 Category 'F' – Fission Product Barrier Matrix

This category is unique in the overall EAL scheme, as the thresholds are not intended to be stand-alone indicators of a particular event occurring at the plant. Rather, the thresholds are to be used as triggers within the particular logic configuration needed to reflect a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier. Light-water nuclear power plants in the United States have three fission product barriers: fuel cladding, RCS, and primary containment. Licensees are to develop thresholds that provide EAL decisionmakers input into making an event declaration based upon degradation of one or more of these fission product barriers.

There are numerous triggers used as logic inputs to decide on the appropriate classification based upon the number of loss and/or potential loss indicators that are triggered for each barrier. By design, these indicators are redundant with other similar indicators in the Category 'R' and Category 'S' EAL sets, due to the importance for licensees to be able to recognize reactor and/or fission product barrier events as timely as possible, using the best available indicators from several different perspectives.

The NRC staff verified that the logic used to determine the appropriate emergency classification is consistent with the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The progression from Alert to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

- FA1 - Any loss or any potential loss of either the fuel clad or RCS barrier.
- FS1 - loss or potential loss of any two barriers.
- FG1 - Loss of any two barriers and loss or potential loss of the third barrier.

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.5 Category 'H' – Hazards

#### 3.5.1 Oconee EAL Set HU1/HA1/HS1/HG1 [HU1/HA1/HS1/HG1]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL set is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon a security-related event.

This EAL set was developed in accordance with the guidance from NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events," July 18, 2005 (Reference 19), and RIS 2006-12, "Endorsement of Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance 'Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile Action'," July 19, 2006 (Reference 20), for licensees to implement, regardless of the specific version of the generic EAL scheme development guidance used, or if the particular licensee developed its EAL scheme using an alternative approach. Based upon lessons learned from the implementation and use of this EAL set, particularly the insights gained from combined security and emergency preparedness drills, the NRC staff and the industry worked to enhance the language of these EALs in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6, so as to eliminate any confusion, without changing the intent of the EAL set as set forth in NRC Bulletin 2005-02 and RIS 2006-12.

The NRC staff verified that the progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

- HU1 - This EAL addresses events that pose a threat to plant personnel or safety system equipment.
- HA1 - This EAL addresses the occurrence of a hostile action within the owner controlled area or notification of an aircraft attack threat.
- HS1 - This EAL addresses the occurrence of a hostile action within the protected area.
- HG1 - This EAL addresses an event in which a hostile force has taken physical control of the facility to the extent that the plant staff can no longer operate equipment necessary to maintain key safety functions. It also addresses a hostile action leading to a loss of physical control that results in actual or imminent damage to spent fuel.

The NRC staff verified that this EAL set is consistent with the guidance provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02 and RIS 2006-12, as further enhanced by the lessons learned from implementation and drills, and revised in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.5.2 Oconee EAL HU2 [HU2]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values. This EAL is considered part of an EAL set containing EALs CA6 and SA9, depending on the Operating Mode applicable at the time of the event.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon a seismic event that results in accelerations at the plant site greater than specified for an operating basis earthquake. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the earthquake magnitude at the plant site and that post-event damage assessments are promptly implemented. Indications of earthquake-induced damage to components containing radioactive materials are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RA1, RS1, or RG1.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.5.3 Oconee EAL HU3 [HU3]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values. This EAL is considered part of an EAL set containing EALs CA6 and SA9, depending on the Operating Mode applicable at the time of the event.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon the effects that natural or technological hazard events may have on the facility that are considered to be precursors to a more significant event or condition or have potential impacts that warrant emergency notification to local, State, and Federal authorities. Specific hazards addressed include:

- Tornado strike within the protected area,
- Internal room or area flooding requiring electrical isolation of a safety system component,
- Movement in the protected area impeded by an offsite event (gaseous),
- An external event that prohibits the plant staff from accessing the site, and
- Other site-specific events.

This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the hazardous event affecting the plant site, and post-event damage assessments are promptly implemented. In addition, other events that may impact the effective implementation of the site emergency plan are considered in this EAL. Indications of hazard-induced damage to components containing radioactive materials are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RA1, RS1, or RG1.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### 3.5.4 Oconee EAL HU4 [HU4]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values. This EAL is considered part of an EAL set containing EALs CA6 and SA9, depending on the Operating Mode applicable at the time of the event.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon the effect that fires may have on the facility that may be indicative of a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. It is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the fire, and post-event damage assessments are promptly implemented. Indications of a protracted fire involving radioactive materials are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RA1, RS1, or RG1.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### 3.5.5 Oconee EAL HA5 [HA5]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon the effect that toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, or flammable gases may have on the facility that precludes or impedes access to equipment necessary to maintain normal plant operation or that are required for a normal plant cooldown and shutdown. This EAL is intended to ensure that the plant ERO is

activated to support the control room in removing the impediment to normal access to the affected area or room.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### 3.5.6 Oconee EAL Set HA6/HS6 [HA6/HS6]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL set is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon a control room evacuation with the inability to control critical plant systems remotely.

The NRC staff verified that the progression from Alert to SAE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

- HA6 – This EAL addresses an evacuation of the control room that results in transfer of plant control to alternate locations outside the control room.
- HS6 - This EAL addresses an evacuation of the control room that results in transfer of plant control to alternate locations, and the control of a key safety function cannot be reestablished in a timely manner.

The GE classification level for this specific accident progression is bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EAL RG1.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### 3.5.7 Oconee EAL Set HU7/HA7/HS7/HG7 [HU7/HA7/HS7/HG7]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.



The intent of this EAL set is to provide decision-makers with EALs to consider when, in their judgment, an emergency classification is warranted.

The NRC staff verified that the progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

- HU7 – This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist that are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a UE.
- HA7 – This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist that are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for an Alert.
- HS7 – This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist that are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a SAE.
- HG7 – This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist that are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a GE.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.6 Category 'S' – System Malfunction

#### 3.6.1 Oconee EAL Set SU1/SA1/SS1/SG1 [SU1/SA1/SS1/SG1]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL set is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon a loss of available AC power sources to the emergency busses.

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's evaluation and justification for plant-specific changes associated with this EAL set and verified that the progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

- SU1 – This EAL addresses a prolonged loss of offsite power.
- SA1 – This EAL describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to safety systems.

- SS1 – This EAL addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all safety systems requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink.
- SG1 - This EAL addresses a prolonged loss of all power sources to AC emergency buses.

The instrumentation, values, and listing of applicable power sources derived for this EAL subcategory are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.6.2 Oconee EAL Set SS2/SG1 [SS8/SG8]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL set is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon a loss of site AC and DC sources. The EAL's intent is to ensure that an EAL is declared when a loss of AC or DC power event occurs, as this condition compromises the ability of the licensee to monitor and control the removal of decay heat.

The NRC staff verified that the progression from SAE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

- SS2 - This EAL addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitor and control safety systems.
- SG1 - This EAL addresses a concurrent and prolonged loss of both AC and Vital DC power.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.6.3 Oconee EAL Set SU3/SA3 [SU2/SA2]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific

implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL set is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon the effect that a loss of available indicators in the control room has on the facility.

The NRC staff verified that the progression from UE to Alert is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RS1 and RG1.

- SU3 – This EAL addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring normal plant conditions without the ability to obtain safety system parameters from within the control room.
- SA3 - This EAL addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring rapidly changing plant conditions during a transient without the ability to obtain safety system parameters from within the control room.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### 3.6.4 Oconee EAL SU5 [SU4]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon indications of RCS leakage. By design, this EAL is redundant with corresponding indicators from a loss or potential loss of fission product barriers, as well as radiation monitoring, to ensure reactor and/or fission product barrier events are recognized. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members are aware of the RCS leakage and support the control room in implementation of appropriate response measures. Escalation of the emergency classification is bounded by the fission product matrix, as well as EALs RA1, RS1, and RG1.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.6.5 Oconee EAL Set SU6/SA6/SS6 [SU5/SA5/SS5]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL set is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon the effect that a failure of the reactor protection system may have on the plant.

The NRC staff verified that the progression from UE to SAE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The GE classification level for this event is bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EAL RG1.

- SU6 - This EAL addresses an event where the reactor protection system (RPS) fails to automatically shut down the reactor when required, yet the reactor is successfully shut down by taking manual action(s) at the reactor control consoles.
- SA6 – This EAL addresses an event where the reactor protection system (RPS) fails to automatically shut down the reactor when required and operator actions taken at the reactor control consoles to manually shut down the reactor are unsuccessful.
- SS6 - This EAL addresses an event where the reactor protection system (RPS) fails to automatically shut down the reactor when required, all operator actions to manually shut down the reactor are unsuccessful, and continued power generation is challenging the capability to adequately remove heat from the core, the RCS, or both.

The instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.6.6 Oconee EAL SU7 [SU6]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL is to highlight the importance of emergency communications by ensuring that an EAL is declared if normal communication methods for onsite and offsite personnel, or for OROs including the NRC, are lost. It is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the loss of communications capabilities, the resources necessary to restore communications are mobilized, and compensatory measures are promptly implemented.

The communication methods derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### 3.6.7 Oconee EAL SU4 [SU3]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an EAL is declared based upon RCS activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members are aware of the elevated reactor coolant activity and support the control room in implementation of appropriate response measures. Escalation of the emergency classification is bounded by the fission product barrier matrix, as well as EALs RA1, RS1 and RG1.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### 3.6.8 Oconee EAL SA9 [SA9]

The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon a hazardous event that leads to potential damage to safety systems needed for the current operating mode. The hazardous events of interest include, but are not limited to, an earthquake, flooding, high winds, tornado strike, explosion, fire, or any other hazard applicable for a specific site. It is primarily intended to

ensure that the plant ERO is activated to support the control room in understanding the event impacts and restoring affected safety system equipment to service. The SAE and GE classification levels for this accident progression are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.6.9 Oconee EAL SU8 [SU7]

Based on its review, the NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and is, therefore, considered part of a standard EAL scheme. The NRC staff also verified that this EAL is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, addresses the completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure an EAL is declared based upon indications of containment barrier degradation due to a failure of one or more containment penetrations to automatically isolate (close) when required by an actuation signal. It also addresses an event that results in high containment pressure with a concurrent failure of containment pressure control systems. By design, this EAL is redundant with corresponding indicators from a loss or potential loss of fission product barriers, as well as radiation monitoring, to ensure reactor and/or fission product barrier events are recognized. It is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of significant challenges to containment integrity, and compensatory measures are promptly implemented. The escalation of the emergency classification level is bounded by the fission product barrier table, as well as in EALs RA1, RS1, and RG1.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL subcategory is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

## 3.7 Summary

The NRC staff has reviewed the technical bases for the proposed EAL scheme, the modifications from NEI 99-01, Rev. 6, and the licensee's evaluation of the proposed changes. The licensee chose to modify its proposed EAL scheme from the generic EAL scheme development guidance provided in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6, in order to adopt a format that is better aligned with how it currently implements its EALs, as well as with plant-specific writer's guides and preferences. The NRC staff verified that these modifications do not alter the intent of any specific EAL within a set, category, or within the entire EAL scheme described in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed changes meet the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b).

The NRC staff determined that the proposed EAL scheme uses objective and observable values, is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, follows logical progressions for escalating events, and allows for event downgrading and upgrading based upon the potential risk to the public health and safety. Risk assessments were appropriately used to set the boundaries of the emergency classification levels and ensure that all EALs that trigger an emergency classification are in the same range of relative risk. In addition, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed EAL scheme is technically complete and consistent with EAL schemes implemented at similarly designed plants.

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's proposed EAL scheme is acceptable and provides reasonable assurance that the licensee can and will take adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's plant-specific EAL bases document provided by Enclosure 2 of the licensee's letter dated February 4, 2016 (Reference 2), is acceptable.

#### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the South Carolina State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 because the amendment approves an acceptable EAL scheme which is required for operation of the facility. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding in the *Federal Register* on August 14, 2015 (80 FR 48922). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

#### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

## 7.0 REFERENCES

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Date: May 26, 2016

S. Batson

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If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (301) 415-4090 or [jeffrey.whited@nrc.gov](mailto:jeffrey.whited@nrc.gov).

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

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Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 399 to DPR-38
2. Amendment No. 401 to DPR-47
3. Amendment No. 400 to DPR-55
4. Safety Evaluation

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