


# APR1400 Safety Analysis



**KEPCO/KHNP**  
**Apr. 20~21. 2016**

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  - ✓ Safety Analysis
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- APR1400 Design Features
- Design Review Status
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- Summary

# Introduction (Safety Analysis)

- DCD Chapters for Safety Analyses
  - ✓ 15.0: Introduction - Transient and Accident Analyses
  - ✓ Non-LOCA
    - 15.1: Increase in Heat Removal by the Secondary System
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    - 15.3: Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate
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    - 6.2.1.5 & 15.6.5: Large Break LOCA (LBLOCA)
    - 15.6.5: Small Break LOCA (SBLOCA)
    - 15.6.5: Long Term Cooling (LTC)


# Introduction (Regulatory Bases)

- Code of Federal Regulations
  - ✓ 10 CFR 50.46\*
  - ✓ Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors
- Regulatory Bases
  - ✓ Regulatory Guide 1.157, BE Calculations of ECCS Performance
  - ✓ Regulatory Guide 1.206, Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)
  - ✓ NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for NPP: LWR Edition – Transient and Accident Analysis
  - ✓ NUREG-1230, Compendium of ECCS Research for Realistic LOCA Analysis
  - ✓ NUREG-5249, Quantifying Reactor Safety Margins: Application of Code Scaling, Applicability and Uncertainty Evaluation Methodology to a LBLOCA (CSAU)

\* Rule making of 10CFR50.46(C) is on going.

# APR1400 Design Features

- SIS: 4 mechanically & electrically independent trains
- Direct Vessel Injection (DVI)
- A safety injection pump and a safety injection tank (SIT-FD) are installed in each train
- All the ECC water is injected into the upper annulus of reactor pressure vessel




SIS : Safety Injection System  
ECC : Emergency Core Cooling

# APR1400 Design Features

- Fluidic Device in SIT regulates the injection flow rate and enhances removal of decay heat in early reflood phase
- Topical Report;  
'Fluidic Device Design'  
(APR1400-Z-M-TR-12003,  
Dec. 2012)

SIT-FD Injection Flow Rate



# Design Review Status

## ➤ Large Break LOCA

- ✓ Topical Report; 'Realistic Evaluation Methodology for Large-Break LOCA of the APR1400'
- ✓ 99 Audit Issues for Discussion Related to CAREM, August 2015.
- ✓ NRC Large Break LOCA Audit, January 12~14, 2016.
- ✓ Responses for 99 Audit Issues are under Review

## ➤ Small Break LOCA

- ✓ Analysis Results Confirmed the Satisfaction of Acceptance Criteria
- ✓ Application of CENPD-137P for APR1400 Proceeds

## ➤ LTC / Non-LOCA

- ✓ Analysis Results Confirmed the Satisfaction of Acceptance Criteria
- ✓ Request for Additional Information (RAI) Process

CAREM : Code Accuracy based Realistic Evaluation Model



# Overview of LBLOCA Analysis

## ➤ License Information for LBLOCA

- ✓ Topical Report Submission
  - ; ‘Realistic Evaluation Methodology for Large-Break LOCA of the APR1400’ (APR1400-F-A-TR-12004), Dec. 2012
- ✓ Code Accuracy based Realistic Evaluation Model (CAREM)
- ✓ Codes
  - RELAP5/MOD3.3K: Thermal-hydraulic analysis
  - CONTEMPT4/MOD5: Containment back pressure calculation
  - Two codes are consolidated to exchange P & M/E data
- ✓ Licensing process for CAREM is currently under way



# Overview of LBLOCA Analysis

- Code & Methodology
    - ✓ RELAP5/MOD3.3K & CONTEMPT4/MOD5
      - Two codes exchange mass & energy (RELAP5) and pressure (CONTEMPT4) as boundary conditions for each other
    - ✓ CAREM developed based on the CSAU
      - Uncertainties are quantified by non-parametric statistics and SRS calculation
      - Introduce Experimental Data Covering (EDC) for confirmation of uncertainty parameters and their ranges & distributions
- CSAU: Code Scaling, Applicability and Uncertainty (NUREG-5249)  
SRS: Simple Random Sampling  
EDC: Experimental Data Covering


# Overview of LBLOCA Analysis

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
ACRS Meeting (Apr.20-21, 2016)

# LBLOCA Analysis Results

## ➤ 100% Double-ended Guillotine Break in Pump Discharge Leg



Water Levels in Core and Downcomer



SRS Peak Cladding Temperatures

# LBLOCA Analysis Results

| Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT)         |                                    | Value, °C              |
|---|------------------------------------|------------------------|
| SRS Results                             | Highest PCT                        | 1,000.3                |
|   | Highest Reflood PCT                | 999.8                  |
| Scale BIAS Evaluation Results           | Final BIAS Reflood PCT             | 1,002.9                |
|   | Max. BIAS Case Reflood PCT         | 999.8                  |
|   | - ECC Bypass BIAS                  | +3.1                   |
|   | - Steam Binding BIAS               | +0.0                   |
| Final PCT (w/ BIAS)                     |                                    | 1,002.9 <sup>(1)</sup> |
| Max. Cladding Oxidation                 |                                    | Value, %               |
| SRS Results                             | Max. Cladding Oxidation            | 3.85                   |
| Scale BIAS Evaluation Results           | Final BIAS Max. Cladding Oxidation | 3.86                   |
|   | Max. BIAS Case Cladding Oxidation  | 3.85                   |
|   | - ECC Bypass BIAS                  | +0.01                  |
|   | - Steam Binding BIAS               | +0.0                   |
| Final Max. Cladding Oxidation (w/ BIAS) |                                    | 3.86                   |

- Licensing PCT
- $$= \text{PCT}_{95/95} + \Delta \text{PCT}_{\text{Bias results}}$$
- $$+ \Delta \text{PCT}_{\text{additional}} (10 \text{ } ^\circ\text{C})$$
- $$= 1,012.9 \text{ } ^\circ\text{C} (1,855.2 \text{ } ^\circ\text{F}) \leq$$
- $$1,204.4 \text{ } ^\circ\text{C} (2,200 \text{ } ^\circ\text{F})$$
- The satisfaction of acceptance criteria is confirmed for APR1400 design

# Overview of SBLOCA Analysis

- Small Break Loss Of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA)
  - ✓ Technical Report Submission; ‘Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model’ (APR1400-F-A-NR-14001), Sep. 2014
  - ✓ C-E SBLOCA Evaluation Model (CENPD-137P)
  - ✓ Codes
    - CEFLASH-4AS: T/H behavior of RCS during blowdown phase
    - COMPERC-II: T/H behavior of RCS during reflood phase
    - PARCH and STRIKIN-II: Fuel rod heat-up calculation (PCT, PLO)
  - ✓ Methodology & Codes approved by the NRC for existing US PWRs are Applied

# SBLOCA Analysis Results

## ➤ Peak Cladding Temperature and Oxidation Percentage


| Break                     | Peak Cladding Temperature, °C (°F) | Maximum Cladding Oxidation, % | Maximum Core-Wide Oxidation, % |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 465 cm <sup>2</sup> /PD   | 498 (929)                          | 0.0017                        | < 0.0003                       |
| 325 cm <sup>2</sup> /PD   | 492 (917)                          | 0.0015                        | < 0.0002                       |
| 93 cm <sup>2</sup> /PD    | 565 (1,049)                        | 0.0010                        | < 0.0001                       |
| 46.5 cm <sup>2</sup> /PD  | 568 (1,054)                        | 0.0008                        | < 0.0002                       |
| 372 cm <sup>2</sup> /DVI  | 624 (1,156)                        | 0.0195                        | < 0.0029                       |
| 93 cm <sup>2</sup> /DVI   | 569 (1,056)                        | 0.0069                        | < 0.0009                       |
| 46.5 cm <sup>2</sup> /DVI | 571 (1,059)                        | 0.0018                        | < 0.0003                       |
| 18.6 cm <sup>2</sup> /DVI | 616 (1,140)                        | 0.0029                        | < 0.0006                       |
| 27.9 cm <sup>2</sup> /HL  | 568 (1,055)                        | 0.0006                        | < 0.0002                       |

# Overview of LTC Analysis


- Long Term Cooling (LTC)
  - ✓ Technical Report Submission
    - ; ‘Post-LOCA Long Term Cooling Evaluation Model’  
(APR1400-F-A-NR-14003), Sep. 2014
  - ✓ C-E Post-LOCA Long Term Cooling Evaluation Model  
(CENPD-254P-A)
  - ✓ Codes
    - CELDA: Long term depressurization and refill of the RCS
    - NATFLOW: Flowrates, pressure and temperature in primary system
    - CEPAC: SG cooldown performance
    - BORON: Transient boric acid concentration in the core
  - ✓ Adopting the Interim Method (Waterford Unit 3, ML050490396)



# LTC Analysis Results



Inner Vessel Boric Acid Concentration



Overlap of Acceptable LTC Modes

# Overview of Non-LOCA Analyses

## ➤ License Information for Non-LOCA

- ✓ Technical Report Submission

- ; ‘Non-LOCA Safety Analysis Methodology of the APR1400’  
(APR1400-Z-A-NR-14006-P), Sep. 2014

- ✓ CESEC-Digital Simulation of a CE NSSS (CENPD-107)

- ✓ CENPD-188, 190, 98, 135, 161, 206, 183, CEN-214, etc.

- ✓ Codes

- CESEC-III: NSSS thermal hydraulic transient simulation
  - COAST: Reactor coolant flow coastdown simulation
  - STRIKIN-II: Fuel performance evaluation (temperature & enthalpy)
  - CETOP-D/TORC: Core T/H performance evaluation (DNBR)
  - HERMITE: Reactor core thermal hydraulic transient simulation

# Non-LOCA Analysis Results

## ➤ 15.1 Increase in Heat Removal by the Secondary System (1/2)

| Section | Event                             | Class | Acceptance Criteria                            | Analysis Results |
|---------|-----------------------------------|-------|--|------------------|
| 15.1.1  | Decrease in Feedwater Temperature | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |                                   |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |                                   |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
| 15.1.2  | Increase in Feedwater Flow        | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |                                   |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |                                   |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
| 15.1.3  | Increase in Steam Flow            | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |                                   |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |                                   |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |

AOO: Anticipated Operational Occurrence

DNBR: Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio

# Non-LOCA Analysis Results

## ➤ 15.1 Increase in Heat Removal by the Secondary System (2/2)

| Section | Event   | Class | Acceptance Criteria                            | Analysis Results |
|---------|---|-------|--|------------------|
| 15.1.4  | Inadvertent Opening of a Steam Generator Relief or Safety Valve | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |   |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |   |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
| 15.1.5  | Steam System Piping Failure Inside and Outside the Containment  | PA    | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |   |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |   |       | Radiological consequences                      | Satisfied        |

PA: Postulated Accident

# Non-LOCA Analysis Results

## ➤ 15.2 Decrease in Heat Removal by the Secondary System (1/3)

| Section | Event                    | Class | Acceptance Criteria                            | Analysis Results |
|---------|--------------------------|-------|--|------------------|
| 15.2.1  | Loss of External Load    | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |                          |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |                          |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
| 15.2.2  | Turbine Trip             | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |                          |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |                          |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
| 15.2.3  | Loss of Condenser Vacuum | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |                          |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |                          |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |

# Non-LOCA Analysis Results

## ➤ 15.2 Decrease in Heat Removal by the Secondary System (2/3)

| Section | Event  | Class | Acceptance Criteria                            | Analysis Results |
|---------|--|-------|--|------------------|
| 15.2.4  | Closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valve                | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |  |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |  |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
| 15.2.6  | Loss of Nonemergency AC Power to the Station Auxiliaries | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |  |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |  |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
| 15.2.7  | Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow                            | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |  |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |  |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |

# Non-LOCA Analysis Results

## ➤ 15.2 Decrease in Heat Removal by the Secondary System (3/3)

| Section | Event  | Class | Acceptance Criteria   | Analysis Results             |
|---------|--|-------|---|------------------------------|
| 15.2.8  | Feedwater System Pipe Break Inside and Outside the Containment | PA    | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure (low)<br>< 120% design pressure (very low) | < 2,750 psia<br>< 3,000 psia |
|         |  |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure (low)<br>< 120% design pressure (very low)  | < 1,320 psia<br>< 1,440 psia |
|         |  |       | Radiological consequences   | Satisfied                    |



# Non-LOCA Analysis Results

## ➤ 15.3 Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate

| Section | Event                               | Class | Acceptance Criteria                            | Analysis Results |
|---------|-------------------------------------|-------|--|------------------|
| 15.3.1  | Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |                                     |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |                                     |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
| 15.3.3  | Reactor Coolant Pump Rotor Seizure  | PA    | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |                                     |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |                                     |       | Radilogical consequences                       | Satisfied        |
| 15.3.4  | Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Break    | PA    | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |                                     |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |                                     |       | Radilogical consequences                       | Satisfied        |

# Non-LOCA Analysis Results

## ➤ 15.4 Reactivity and Power Distribution Anomalies (1/2)

| Section | Event   | Class | Acceptance Criteria                            | Analysis Results |
|---------|---|-------|--|------------------|
| 15.4.1  | Uncontrolled Control Element Assembly Withdrawal form a Subcritical or Low-Power Start up Condition | AOO   | Peak centerline temperature < melting point    | < 20 kW/ft       |
|         |   |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
| 15.4.2  | Uncontrolled Control Element Assembly Withdrawal at Power   | AOO   | Peak centerline temperature < melting point    | < 20 kW/ft       |
|         |   |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
| 15.4.3  | Control Element Assembly Misoperation   | AOO   | Peak linear heat generation rate               | < 20 kW/ft       |
|         |   |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
| 15.4.4  | Startup of an Inactive Reactor Coolant Pump   | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |   |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |   |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |

# Non-LOCA Analysis Results

## ➤ 15.4 Reactivity and Power Distribution Anomalies (2/2)

| Section | Event  | Class | Acceptance Criteria                                    | Analysis Results   |
|---------|--|-------|--|--------------------|
| 15.4.6  | Inadvertent Decrease in Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant System    | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure         | < 2,750 psia       |
|         |  |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure          | < 1,320 psia       |
|         |  |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                        | Satisfied          |
|         |  |       | Operator action time<br>> 15 minutes (MODEs 1,2,3,4,5) | > 30 minutes       |
|         |  |       | Operator action time > 30 minutes (MODE 6)             | Prohibit (TS3.9.7) |
| 15.4.7  | Inadvertent Loading and Operation of a Fuel Assembly in an Improper Position | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure         | < 2,750 psia       |
|         |  |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure          | < 1,320 psia       |
|         |  |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                        | Satisfied          |
| 15.4.8  | 15.4.8 Spectrum of Control Element Assembly Ejection Accidents               | PA    | Maximum RCS pressure < Service Limit C                 | Satisfied          |
|         |  |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure          | < 1,320 psia       |
|         |  |       | Maximum fuel rod enthalpy < 230 cal/g                  | Satisfied          |
|         |  |       | Radilological consequences                             | < well within      |

# Non-LOCA Analysis Results

## ➤ 15.5 Increase in Reactor Coolant Inventory

| Section | Event   | Class | Acceptance Criteria                            | Analysis Results |
|---------|---|-------|--|------------------|
| 15.5.1  | Inadvertent Operation of the Emergency Core Cooling System that Increases the Reactor Coolant Inventory | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |   |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |   |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
| 15.5.2  | Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction that Increases the Reactor Coolant Inventory             | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |   |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |   |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |

# Non-LOCA Analysis Results

## ➤ 15.6 Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory

| Section | Event   | Class | Acceptance Criteria                            | Analysis Results |
|---------|---|-------|--|------------------|
| 15.6.1  | Inadvertent Opening of a PWR Pressurizer Pressure Relief Valve      | PA    | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |   |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
| 15.6.2  | Failure of Small Lines Carrying Primary Coolant Outside Containment | AOO   | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |   |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |   |       | Minimum DNBR > 95/95 DNBR Limit                | Satisfied        |
|         |   |       | Radiological consequences                      | Satisfied        |
| 15.6.3  | Steam Generator Tube Failure  | PA    | Maximum RCS pressure<br>< 110% design pressure | < 2,750 psia     |
|         |   |       | Maximum SG pressure<br>< 110% design pressure  | < 1,320 psia     |
|         |   |       | Radiological consequences                      | Satisfied        |

# Summary

- APR1400 Design Features and APR1400 Safety Analyses Design Review Status
- Safety Analyses are Conducted in Accordance with the NRC Regulations: LBLOCA/SBLOCA/LTC/Non-LOCA
- Methodologies
  - ✓ LBLOCA: Realistic Evaluation Methodology (CAREM)
  - ✓ SBLOCA: C-E SBLOCA Evaluation Model (CENPD-137P)
  - ✓ LTC: C-E Post-LOCA Long Term Cooling Evaluation Model (CENPD-254P-A)
  - ✓ Non-LOCA: Deterministic Evaluation Methodology (CENDP-107)
- Based on the results of safety analyses, codes and methodologies are applicable to the APR1400 DCD Chapter 15
- APR1400 design is confirmed the satisfaction of acceptance criteria in Safety Analyses