

March 22, 2016

Email from Tom Gurdziel: Fukushima-related Comments
for the 5 Year Anniversary (written March 7, 2016)

From: [Tom Gurdziel](#)
To: [CHAIRMAN Resource](#)
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Subject: [External_Sender] Fukushima-related Comments for the 5 Year Anniversary (written 3-7-2016)
Date: Monday, March 07, 2016 9:08:32 PM

Good morning,

Here in the United States, there is a Fukushima Steering Committee established to smooth the path to commercial nuclear plant/site improvements in responding to multi-plant, site wide external event-caused accidents. These meetings are public and also recorded. Therefore, an interested organization, or even a member of the public, can pretty much keep up to date with actions taken and those underway.

In 5 years, I have not seen released to the public any industry-wide decisions made by the Japanese commercial nuclear power industry. Decisions, (for plants less than 40 years old), might cover:

Should we have a high fidelity, full scope simulator for EACH UNIT?

Should we have separate control rooms for EACH UNIT?

Should we increase operating crew size?

Should we move some safety-related powerboards to different, (higher), elevations?

Should flood/tsunami protection walls be at least as high as any recently experienced tsunamis or is half as high good enough? Should they resist impact from water and from debris?

Should Site Emergency Directors meet certain (or even any) requirements? What would they be?

Have we revised any emergency operating procedures?

Today, do our reactor building foundations hold water or leak?

What are we going to do for final disposal of contaminated, wrecked nuclear powerplants?

What are our capabilities for final disposal of spent fuel (or even the now unneeded new fuel)?

How fast should we inform the public of any melted reactor fuel?

Should we remove all those non-by passable hardened vent rupture disks (like the one at Unit 2 that never opened)?

Should maximum accident-operating primary containment pressure be procedurally specified to be no higher than original design pressure?

Should plant operators be trained to operate emergency equipment like fire trucks and the new containment filters?

Thank you,

Tom Gurdziel

Note that this information may have been shared already with IAEA, WANO, and INPO.

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