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FILE: INCIDENT REPORT FILE

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N.C. 28242 Wm. O. Parker			DATE OF DOC 7-3-75	DATE REC'D 7-11-75	LTR XX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr. Norman C. Moseley			ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XX</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XX</u>		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-287		

DESCRIPTION: Ltr trans the following:

ENCLOSURES: Abnormal Occurrence AO-50-287/
75-8 on 6-19-75 re reactor building engineer
ed safeguards pressure transmitter out of
calibraton.....

(1 Orig cy encl rec'd)

PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit 3

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

DHL 7-14-75

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

July 3, 1975

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Re: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence
Report AO-287/75-8.


Very truly yours,

W.O. Parker, Jr.

William O. Parker, Jr.

MST:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



1357

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report No.: AO-287/75-8

Report Date: July 3, 1975

Occurrence Date: June 19, 1975

Facility: Oconee, Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Reactor Building Engineered Safeguards pressure transmitter out of calibration

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit in cold shutdown

Description of Occurrence:

On June 19, 1975, a Reactor Building Engineered Safeguards pressure transmitter calibration was performed for Oconee Unit 3. This calibration was performed because the Periodic Instrument Surveillance Test of Reactor Building Engineered Safeguards pressure transmitters indicated that agreement among the three transmitters was not within the required 0.6 psi. The calibration indicated that the "C" channel transmitter would not have tripped until an actual Reactor Building pressure of 4.615 psig was achieved. Technical Specification 3.5.3 requires that the Engineered Safeguards high Reactor Building pressure actuation occur at less than or equal to 4 psig.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of this incident was drift of the Reactor Building Engineered Safeguards pressure transmitter. This drift was detected by periodic instrument surveillance testing.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The ES system actuates at a Reactor Building pressure of 4 psig to start the Reactor Building cooling system and to provide containment integrity. In addition, these pressure transmitters serve as a backup to the reactor coolant system pressure transmitters to initiate actuation of the high pressure injection and low pressure injection systems. The design of the Engineered Safeguards system requires a two-out-of-three coincidence logic to produce an ES actuation. In this incident, two channels of the ES RB pressure were properly calibrated and would have tripped at the proper Reactor Building pressure. In addition, the fact that the "C" channel would have tripped at a Reactor Building pressure of 4.615 psig vice 4.0 psig would not have significantly affected the operation of the ES system. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The Channel C Reactor Building Engineered Safeguards pressure transmitter has been recalibrated. It is considered that periodic surveillance will continue to provide early indication of instrument drift.

U.S.A.E.C.
REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION II
ATLANTA, GA.
JUL 7 10 13 AM '75