

50-287

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

FILE NUMBER

INCIDENT REPORT

TO: Mr. Norman C. Moseley

FROM: Duke Power Company
Charlotte, North Carolina
Mr. William O. Parker, Jr.

DATE OF DOCUMENT

6/2/76

DATE RECEIVED

6/17/76

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DESCRIPTION

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(1-P)

PLANT NAME:

Oconee Unit #3

ENCLOSURE

Licensee Event Report (RO 50-287/76-5) on
5/4/76 concerning ES valve being determined
inoperable during surveillance testing.

(1-P)

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

SAFETY

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

ENVIRO 6/21/76 RJL

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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

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CONTROL NUMBER

6166

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

June 2, 1976

Regulatory Docket

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence
Report RO-287/76-5.



Very truly yours,



William O. Parker, Jr. *By HSB*

EDB:vr
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control



6166

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report No.: RO-287/76-5

Report Date: June 2, 1976

Occurrence Date: May 4, 1976

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: ES valve determined inoperable during surveillance testing

Description of Occurrence:

On May 4, 1976, during the performance of surveillance testing, the quench tank reactor building isolation valve 3CS-5 could not be cycled from the open to the closed position. This valve is an Engineered Safeguards valve and is required to close upon receiving an ES actuation signal in order to assure containment integrity. Within approximately one hour from the time the determination of inoperability was made, the redundant containment isolation valve was locked closed. Oconee Technical Specification 3.6.4 (b)(2) states that a containment isolation valve may be inoperable provided the affected penetration is isolated within four hours by the use of a deactivated automatic valve secured and locked in the isolated position.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Investigation revealed that valve 3CS-5 would not close electrically from the Control Room due to an inoperable torque limit switch; however, the valve was operable locally at the breaker by overriding the torque limit switch. The specific cause of torque switch failure has not been determined due to inaccessibility of the valve during power operation.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Valve 3CS-5 was properly isolated in compliance with Oconee Technical Specification 3.6.4(b)(2) by securing the redundant valve, 3CS-6, in the closed position. In the event that containment integrity had been required, the redundant isolation valve would have closed upon an ES actuation. Containment integrity was not affected by this incident, and it is therefore concluded that the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

Valve 3CS-5 will be repaired during the next unit outage. In the interim, a temporary procedure has been prepared and approved to operate the valve when needed from the breaker cabinet where the torque limit switch may be electrically overridden.

JUN 7 10 32 AM '76

STON & SONS
ATLANTA, GA.
END OF LINE