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FILE: **INCIDENT REPORT FILE**

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N.C. A.C. Thies			DATE OF DOC 4-11-75	DATE REC'D 4-16-75	LTR XXX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Norman C. Moseley			ORIG 1 Signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XXX</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XXX</u>		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-287		

DESCRIPTION:
Letter trans the following.....

ENCLOSURES:
Abnorm. Occurr. # 75-6, on 3-27-75, concern-
ing Inadvertent isolation of Keowee under-
ground feeder....

DO NOT REMOVE

(1 cy. Encl. rec'd)

PLANT NAME: Oconee #3

ACKNOWLEDGED

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

VCR 4-17-75

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DUKE POWER COMPANY



POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

April 11, 1975



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence
Report AO-287/75-6.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report No.: AO-287/75-6

Report Date: April 11, 1975

Occurrence Date: March 27, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Inadvertent isolation of Keowee underground feeder

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Power operation

Description of Occurrence:

On March 27, 1975, the Keowee Emergency Start Test was performed from the Oconee Unit 3 control room. The test is performed by isolating the Keowee overhead transmission line from the 230 kv switchyard, inhibiting one Keowee unit, and starting the remaining Keowee unit with the emergency start circuits. The first portion of the test, with Unit 2 inhibited, satisfactorily resulted in Keowee Unit 1 charging the underground feeder. When the inhibit was removed from Keowee Unit 2 and Unit 1 was inhibited, ACB3 (breaker from Unit 1 to underground feeder) opened resulting in both Keowee units being isolated from the underground feeder and overhead transmission lines for a period of five minutes.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of this occurrence was a deficiency in the procedure in that it did not caution that a Keowee unit inhibit results in the opening of the associated breaker to the underground feeder. The Test Coordinator performing the test did not realize the existence of this interlock.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The Keowee Hydro Station supplies emergency power to the Oconee Nuclear Station through the underground feeder in the event of a system blackout and the loss of the Oconee units. This incident resulted in the Keowee Hydro Station being separated from Oconee for a period of five minutes. Should emergency power have been required, ACB-4 could have been closed by operator action to connect Keowee Unit 2 to the underground feeder. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action:

The Keowee Emergency Start Test procedure has been changed to assure that either ACB3 or ACB4 is closed at all times during the test. This will result in one Keowee unit being connected to the underground feeder circuit at all times.