

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

FILE NUMBER
INCIDENT REPORT

TO:

MR N C MOSELEY

FROM:

DUKE POWER COMPANY
CHARLOTTE, NC
W O PARKER, JR

DATE OF DOCUMENT

2-12-76

DATE RECEIVED

2-23-76

☐ LETTER☐ NOTORIZED

PROP

INPUT FORM

NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED

☒ ORIGINAL
☐ COPY☒ UNCLASSIFIED

1

DESCRIPTION

LTR TRANS THE FOLLOWING.....

ENCLOSURE

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-287/76-1 ON 2-12-76
RE CHARCOAL ABSORBER FILTERS IN B PENETRATION
ROOM VENTILATION TRAIN FOUND INOPERABLE
DURING TEST.....

ACKNOWLEDGED

DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME: OCONEE #3

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

SAFETY

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

ENVIRO 2-27-76 RKB

BRANCH CHIEF:

W/3 CYS FOR ACTION

LIC. ASST:

W/ CYS

ACRS CYS 16 HOLDING SENT TO LA

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE

NRC PDR

I & E (2)

MIPC (3)

SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO

HOUSTON

NOVAK/CHECK

GRIMES/SCHWENCER

CASE

F. WILLIAMS

HANAUER

TEDESCO/MACCARY

EISENHUT

BAER

SHAO

VOLLMER/BUNCH

KREGER/J. COLLINS

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

LPDR: WALKHALL, SC

TIC

NSIC

CONTROL NUMBER


1676

DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C.

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

Regulatory


File Cy



TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

February 12, 1976

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Re: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence
Report RO-287/76-1.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr.

MST:mmmb

Attachment

CC Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

1676

DUKE POWER COMPANY
Oconee Unit 3

Report No.: RO-287/76-1

Report Date: February 12, 1976

Occurrence Date: January 13, 1976

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Charcoal absorber filters in B Penetration Room ventilation train found inoperable during test.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 100 percent full power.

Description of Occurrence:

On January 13, 1976, annual "in place" leakage testing was performed on the Penetration Room Ventilation System. The "A" train of the Penetration Room Ventilation System (PRVS) met the acceptance criteria of Technical Specification 4.5.3.2; however, the "B" train charcoal filter unit did not meet the acceptance criteria. Maintenance action was immediately initiated, and new charcoal filters were installed and tested within eight hours.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of the failure of the "B" train PRVS charcoal filter unit was due to excessive moisture which had collected on the unit. This probably occurred during a quarterly system test which was conducted when steam leaks existed in the penetration room.

Analysis of Occurrence:

In the event of a postulated loss of coolant accident, it was assumed in the Safety Evaluation Report that 50 percent of Reactor Building leakage would occur in the Penetration Room. Two redundant trains of Penetration Room ventilation are provided to filter this leakage to reduce the amount of radioactive material which would reach the atmosphere. The charcoal filters were assumed to be 90% efficient in the removal of iodine. In this incident, one train of the PRVS charcoal filters did not meet the requirements of Technical Specification 4.5.3.2 in that it did not remove 99% of the Freon-112 which was used in the test. The redundant train of the PRVS was tested, and its operability was demonstrated. The affected train would also have been partially effective in the unlikely event of a loss of coolant accident. It is, therefore, concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected by this incident.

Report No. RO-287/76-1
February 12, 1976
Page 2

Corrective Action:

The "B" train PRVS charcoal filter was replaced and satisfactorily tested. In addition, the procedure for the quarterly system test will be changed to require that the filter housing drain valves are opened for ten minutes prior to the performance of the test. This will prevent any excess moisture from passing through the filters.