

AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 11965
FILE: _____

FROM: Duke Power Co. Charlotte, N.C. A.C.Thies			DATE OF DOC 11-29-74	DATE REC'D 12-5-74	LTR xxxx	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr. Norman C. Moseley			ORIG 1-signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR xxxxxxxx SENT LOCAL PDR xxxxxxxx		
CLASS	UNCLASS xxxxxxx	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-287		

DESCRIPTION:

Ltr Trans the Follow ing:

ACKNOWLEDGED

DO NOT REMOVE
PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit 3

ENCLOSURES:

Abnormal Occurrence #74-4 on 10-19-74 concerning
Failure of Reactor Building Containment Valve
3FDW-108.....

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

12-7-74 JGB

BUTLER (L) W/ Copies	SCHWENCER (L) W/ Copies	ZIEMANN (L) W/ Copies	REGAN (E) W/ Copies
CLARK (L) W/ Copies	STOLZ (L) W/ Copies	DICKER (E) W/ Copies	LEAR (L) W/ Copies
PARR (L) W/ Copies	VASSALLO (L) W/ Copies	KNIGHTON (E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies
KNIEL (L) W/ Copies	PURPLE (L) W/ Copies	YOUNGBLOOD (E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<u>REG FILE</u> AEC PDR OGC, ROOM P-506A MUNTZING/STAFF CASE GIAMBUSO BOYD MOORE (L) (BWR) DEYOUNG (L) (PWR) SKOVHOLT (L) GOLLER (L) P. COLLINS DENISE REG OPR FILE & REGION (2) MORRIS STEELE	<u>TECH REVIEW</u> SCHROEDER MACCARY KNIGHT PAWLICKI SHAO STELLO HOUSTON NOVAK ROSS PPOLITO TEDESCO LONG AINAS BENAROYA VOLIMER	<u>DENTON</u> GRIMES GAMMILL KASTNER BALLARD SPANGLER <u>ENVIRO</u> MULLER DICKER KNIGHTON YOUNGBLOOD REGAN PROJECT LDR <u>HARLESS</u>	<u>LIC ASST</u> DIGGS (L) GEARIN (L) GOULBOURNE (L) KREUTZER (E) LEE (L) MAIGRET (L) REED (E) SERVICE (L) SHEPPARD (L) SLATER (E) SMITH (L) TEETS (L) WILLIAMS (E) WILSON (L)	<u>A/T IND</u> BRAITMAN SALTZMAN B. HURT <u>PLANS</u> MCDONALD CHAPMAN DUBE w/input E. COUPE D. THOMPSON (2) KLECKER EISENHUT
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

✓ LOCAL PDR <u>Walhalla, S.C.</u>	✓ TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10)	✓ NSIC (BUCHANAN)	1 - ASLB	1 - Newton Anderson	1 - ACRS HOUSING	Sent to Lic. Asst.
1 - NATIONAL LABS	1 - ASLBP (E/W Bldg, Rm 529)	1 - W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	1 - B&M SWINEBROAD, Rm E-201 GT	1 - CONSULTANTS	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	
1 - PDR-SAN/LA/NY	1 - BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB	1 - G. ULRICKSON, ORNL	1 - AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN) Rm B-127 GT	1 - R. D. MUELLER, Rm E-201 GT		

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING


422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

November 29, 1974

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Re: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:


Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event
Report UE-287/74-4.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies
A. C. Thies

ACT:gje
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



11965

Duke Power Company
Oconee Unit 3

Report No: UE-287/74-4

Report Date: November 29, 1974

Event Date: October 19, 1974

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: Failure of Reactor Building Containment Valve 3FDW-108

Conditions Prior to Event: Unit at 40 percent full power.

Description of Event:

On October 19, 1974 the quarterly performance test of Engineered Safeguards valves was conducted on Oconee Unit 3. The B Steam Generator sample line isolation valve, 3 FDW-108, failed to indicate closed after being given the close command. The valve was manually closed and chain locked to insure containment integrity until the valve could be repaired.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:

The air supply to the pneumatic operator and proper functioning of the electrical circuits have been verified to be operating correctly. When tested, the valve opened remotely in less than one second; however, it took fifteen seconds to close. Successive tests resulted in longer closing times. The valve has been closed and locked. The actual cause of this valve failure has not been determined.

Analysis of Event:

Valve 3 FDW-108 is one of two redundant valves which allows isolation of the B steam generator sample line in the unlikely event of an Engineered Safeguards actuation. This valve is manually closed during operation, and is opened only for steam generator sampling. The failure of this valve during test did not affect containment integrity as the redundant valve was operable. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

This valve has been manually closed and locked to ensure containment integrity until repairs can be made during the next maintenance outage. A determination of the failure mechanism cannot be determined until that time.