

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL

50-270

REC: OREILLY J P
NRC

ORG: PARKER W O
DUKE PWR

DOCDATE: 02/10/78
DATE RCVD: 02/10/78

DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO

COPIES RECEIVED

SUBJECT:

LTR 0 ENCL 1

LICENSEE EVENT REPT. NO. 50-270/78-01 CONCERNING CORE FLOOD TANK 2A
LEVEL INSTRUMENTS BEING INOPERABLE.

PLANT NAME: OCONEE - UNIT 2

REVIEWER INITIAL: XRL
DISTRIBUTOR INITIAL:

***** DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS *****

NOTES:

1. M. CUNNINGHAM - ALL AMENDMENTS TO FSAR AND CHANGES TO TECH SPECS

INCIDENT REPORTS
(DISTRIBUTION CODE A002)

FOR ACTION: ~~BRANCH CHIEF~~ REID**W/4 ENCL

INTERNAL:

~~REG FILE**W/ENCL~~
~~I & E**W/2 ENCL~~
SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO**W/ENCL
NOVAK/CHECK**W/ENCL
KNIGHT**W/ENCL
HANAUER**W/ENCL
EISENHUT**W/ENCL
SHAO**W/ENCL
KREGER/J. COLLINS**W/ENCL
L. CROCKER**W/ENCL

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GRIMES**W/ENCL
BUTLER**W/ENCL
TEDESCO**W/ENCL
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VOLLMER/BUNCH**W/ENCL
ROSA**W/ENCL
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EXTERNAL:

LPDR'S
WALHALLA, SC**W/ENCL
TIC**W/ENCL
NSIC**W/ENCL
ACRS CAT B**W/16 ENCL

COPIES NOT SUBMITTED PER
REGULATORY GUIDE 10.1

DISTRIBUTION: LTR 46 ENCL 46
SIZE: 1P+1P+1P

CONTROL NBR: 780470242

***** THE END *****

004

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

February 10, 1978

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 1217
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

RE: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence
Report RO-270/78-1.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

RLG:ge
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control



780470242

A002 / 5 *
0/1

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: RO-270/78-1

Report Date: February 10, 1978

Occurrence Date: January 13, 1978

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Description of Occurrence: Core Flood Tank 2A Level Instruments Inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Cold Shutdown

Description of Occurrence:

During the performance of procedure IP/O/A/201/1A, both level instruments on Core Flood Tank 2A were determined to be out of calibration in the non-conservative direction. One channel of level instrumentation was indicating high by 0.34 feet, the other by 0.45 feet. By Specification 3.3.6, only one level instrument may be inoperable during operation above 800 psig. Both instruments were calibrated and returned to operation.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

There was no apparent cause for the occurrence. These instruments were last calibrated during the previous refueling outage.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The core flood system is one of three means designed to provide emergency core cooling (ECCS), the others being the high and low pressure injection systems. In the event of an accident, all of these systems would have operated to maintain the core covered and to cool the core. The combined volume of water in both core flood tanks was always above the minimum amount required. Thus, the health and safety of the public were not endangered.

Corrective Action:

Both channels of level instruments were calibrated and returned to operation.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A:

CONTROL BLOCK:										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)									
<div> <div>01</div> <div>S</div> <div>C</div> <div>N</div> <div>E</div> <div>E</div> <div>2</div> <div>2</div> <div>0</div> <div>0</div> <div>-</div> <div>0</div> <div>0</div> <div>0</div> <div>0</div> <div>0</div> <div>-</div> <div>0</div> <div>0</div> <div>3</div> <div>4</div> <div>1</div> <div>1</div> <div>1</div> <div>1</div> <div>4</div> <div>5</div> </div>										<div> <div>7</div> <div>8</div> <div>9</div> <div>14</div> <div>15</div> <div>25</div> <div>26</div> <div>30</div> <div>57</div> <div>CAT</div> <div>58</div> </div>									
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NAME OF PREPARER K. R. Wilson

PHONE: (704) 373-8197

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CONTROL DESK

1978 FEB 16 PM 12 53

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