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CONTROL NO: 9239

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT FILE
5-4

FROM: Duke Power Co. Charlotte, N.C. William O. Parker		DATE OF DOC 8-27-75	DATE REC'D 9-2-75	LTR	TWX	RPT XX	OTHER
TO: NRC		ORIG None	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR XXX		
					SENT LOCAL PDR XXX		
CLASS	UNCLASS XX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-270		

DESCRIPTION:
Letter trans the following.....

ENCLOSURES:

Unusual Event # 75-13, onn7-31-75, Concerning
One train of Reactor Building Spray inadvert-
ently taken out of service.....

(1 Copy Enclosure Received)

PLANT NAME: Oconee # 2

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

SAb 9-3-75

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ACKNOWLEDGED

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1 - TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10)	1 - W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	1 - BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB
1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN)	1 - CONSULTANTS	1 - G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
1 - ASLB	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	1 - AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN) Rm B-127 GT
1 - Newton Anderson		1 - J. D. RUNKLES, Rm E-201 GT
5 - ACRS SENT TO LIC ASST S. Sheppard		
** SEND ONLY TEN DAY REPORTS		

[Handwritten signature]

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

August 27, 1975

(NRC PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM)

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303




Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Moseley:


Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event Report UE-270/75-13.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

MST:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Roger S. Boyd



9239

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: UE-270/75-13

Report Date: August 27, 1975

Event Date: July 31, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: One train of Reactor Building Spray inadvertently taken out of service

Conditions Prior to Event: Unit at 100 percent full power

Description of Event:

On July 31, 1975, the Reactor Building Spray Engineered Safeguards Test was performed on Oconee Unit 1. In the performance of the test, the Control Operator instructed the Utility Operator to open the breaker for valve 1BS-2. A Utility Operator's trainee inadvertently opened the Unit 2 breaker for valve 2BS-2, thereby removing one train of Reactor Building spray from service on an operating unit. The breaker to 2BS-2 was opened approximately 20 seconds until the Utility Operator acknowledged a Unit 2 alarm and had the trainee close the breaker for valve 2BS-2.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:

The apparent cause of this event was operator error in that the trainee was not adequately supervised and operated the breaker on the wrong unit. The breakers were clearly identified as to valve number and unit number.

Analysis of Event:

This incident resulted in one train of Reactor Building spray being inoperable for approximately 20 seconds. The redundant train of building spray and the entire Reactor Building Cooling System were operable during this time and would have functioned properly if needed. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The personnel involved in this incident have been reminded of the importance of assuring that they properly identify components prior to operation. The Shift Supervisor has discussed with personnel the necessity for proper communications and proper supervision of trainees to avoid future occurrences.

50-270/75-13

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING


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


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Docket No. 50-270

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