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CONTROL NO: 8952

FILE: A/B

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N.C. 28201 Mr. A.C. Thies			DATE OF DOC 12-11-73	DATE REC'D 12-17-73	LTR X	MEMO	RPT	OTHER
TO: A. Giambusso			ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR XXX SENT LOCAL PDR XXX		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-270		

DESCRIPTION:  
Ltr reporting an abnormal occurrence at the Oconee Nuclear Power Station Unit #2...trans the following.....

ENCLOSURES:  
Abnormal Occurrence Report No. UE-270/73-1  
concerning Engineered Safeguards Valve  
2LP-22 and Low Pressure Injection Pump 2B.

**ACKNOWLEDGED**  
(1 cy encl rec'd)

**DO NOT REMOVE**

PLANT NAME: Oconee #2

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 12-18-73 JB

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**EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION**

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING


422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES  
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT  
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

December 11, 1973

Mr. Angelo Giambusso  
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects  
Directorate of Licensing  
Office of Regulation  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20545



Re: Oconee Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Giambusso:


Pursuant to Section 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event Report UE-270/73-1, "Engineered Safeguards Valve 2LP-22 and Low Pressure Injection Pump 2B".

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

ACT/jg  
Attachment

cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
Region II  
Suite 818  
230 Peachtree Street, N.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



8952

DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 2  
UNUSUAL EVENT REPORT UE-270/73-1  
ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS VALVE 2LP-22  
AND  
LOW PRESSURE INJECTION PUMP 2B

Description of the Incident

On November 12, 1973, during performance of the monthly checkout of Engineered Safeguards channel 4, Engineered Safeguards Valve 2LP-22 failed to open and the low pressure injection pump 2B failed to start. It was found that the torque switch on the motor operator of 2LP-22 was not adjusted properly, allowing excessive torque to be applied when the valve was closed. Therefore, when it was attempted to open the valve during the Engineered Safeguards periodic test, the current overload caused the valve motor operator breaker to trip. It was found that the failure of the low pressure injection pump to start was due to its breaker not being racked in properly. Regulatory Operations, Region II, was informed of the incident on November 13, 1973.

Corrective Action

The torque switch on 2LP-22 was adjusted properly, and the operability of the valve was verified using the checkout procedure for Engineered Safeguards channel 4. To prevent similar incidents, when any maintenance is done which could affect the torque required to operate an Engineered Safeguards valve, the valve will be functionally checked for proper operability.

The operability of the low pressure injection pump 2B was checked on four successive days by racking the breaker out and in, and then performing the operability check. The pump started each time the test was performed. As a result of these tests, it was determined that the failure of this pump to operate was not due to a mechanical malfunction, but was the result of not properly racking in the breaker. The station staff will review this incident with appropriate station personnel, stressing the importance of ensuring breakers are properly racked in.

Safety Analysis

In the event of the failure of 2LP-22, system redundancy is provided by 2LP-21, actuated by Engineered Safeguards channel 3 (low pressure initiation) or channel 7 (reactor building spray initiation).

Engineered Safeguards channel 3 and low pressure injection pump 2A provide redundancy in the event of the failure of low pressure injection pump 2B. Both redundant components had been checked on November 12, 1973, using appropriate Engineered Safeguards periodic tests, and both components operated properly. It is concluded that this incident did not affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.