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CONTROL NO: 8660

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT FILE

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N.C. William O. Parker, Jr.			DATE OF DOC 8-11-75	DATE REC'D 8-14-75	LTR	TWX	RPT XXX	OTHER
TO: NRC			ORIG 1 Signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XXX</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XXX</u>		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-270		

DESCRIPTION:

Letter Trans the Following.....

ENCLOSURES:

Abnormal Occurance #75-13 on 7-28-75, Concerning Simultaneous outage of one string of Keowee Batteries and one string of switching station batteries.

(1 Copy Enclosure Received)

PLANT NAME: Oconee #2

50-270

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

SAB 8-18-75

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INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE NRC PDR OGC, ROOM P-506A GOSSICK/STAFF CASE GIAMBUSSO BOYD MOORE (L) DEYOUNG (L) SKOVHOLT (L) GOLLER (L) (Ltr) P. COLLINS DENISE REG OPR FILE & REGION (2) MIPC/PE (3) STEELE	TECH REVIEW SCHROEDER MACCARY KNIGHT PAWLICKI SHAO **STELLO **HOUSTON **NOVAK ROSS IPPOLITO TEDESCO J. COLLINS LAINAS BENAROYA VOLLMER	DENTON **GRIMES GAMMILL KASTNER BALLARD SPANGLER ENVIRO MULLER DICKER KNIGHTON YOUNGBLOOD REGAN PROJECT LDR HARLESS	LIC ASST R. DIGGS (L) H. GEARIN (L) E. GOULBOURNE (L) P. KREUTZER (E) J. LEE (L) M. RUSHBROOK (L) S. REED (E) M. SERVICE (L) S. SHEPPARD (L) M. SLATER (E) H. SMITH (L) S. TEETS (L) G. WILLIAMS (E) V. WILSON (L) R. INGRAM (L) M. DUNCAN (E)	A/T IND. BRAITMAN SALTZMAN MELTZ PLANS MCDONALD CHAPMAN DUBE (Ltr) E. COUPE PETERSON HARTFIELD (2) KLECKER EISENHUT WIGGINTON F. WILLIAMS HANAUER
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

1 - LOCAL PDR Walhalla, SC.	1 - TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10) - NATIONAL LABS	1 - PDR-SAN/LA/NY
1 - NSI (BUCHANAN)	1 - W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	1 - BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB
1 - Newton Anderson	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	1 - G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
** SEND ONLY TEN DAY REPORTS		1 - AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN) Rm B-127 GT
		1 - J. D. RUNKLES, Rm E-201 GT

DUKE POWER COMPANY


POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

August 11, 1975



Regulatory

File Cy.

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence
Report AO-270/75-13.

Very truly yours,

W.O. Parker, Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr. *WOP*

ROS:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



8660

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: AO-270/75-13

Report Date: August 11, 1975

Occurrence Date: July 28, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Simultaneous outage of one string of Keowee batteries and one string of switching station batteries

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at rated power

Description of Occurrence:

On July 28, 1975, during the process of planning the startup of Unit 1 (Units 2 and 3 in full power operation), it was discovered that one string of Keowee batteries and one string of switching station batteries were being charged and were therefore out of service simultaneously. The charging of the Keowee batteries (one string) had begun at 0850 hours, July 28, 1975, and the charging of the switching station batteries (one string) had begun at 0915 hours, July 28, 1975. Although the control operator was notified that these batteries were to be taken out of service, he failed to recognize that they should not be taken out of service simultaneously. When the error was discovered at 1535 hours, power reduction of Units 2 and 3 was immediately initiated to bring the units to a hot shutdown. The batteries were returned to service at 1554 hours and power reduction ceased.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of this occurrence was operator error in that he failed to realize that the two sets of batteries should not be taken out of service simultaneously.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The one string of switching station batteries and the one string of Keowee batteries were out of service for approximately six hours and forty minutes, during which time the station operated normally. The switching station battery system is a redundant system which provides emergency power for primary control and protective relaying when normal AC rectified power is unavailable. Similarly, the Keowee batteries, one string for each Keowee unit, provide emergency Keowee station power when the normal power is unavailable. One string of each of the two systems has the capacity for handling full loads during an emergency situation. Therefore, it can be concluded that the health and safety of the public were not affected by this occurrence.

Corrective Action:

The charging procedure for the Keowee battery system and the switching station battery system will be revised to require confirmation from the control operator that when it is desired to charge one of these systems (either Keowee or switching station), the other system is not being charged at the same time. Additionally, all operating personnel have been instructed to review the incident report and pertinent sections of the Technical Specifications.

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

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AUG 13 10 09 AM '75

U.S. AIR
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REGION II
ATLANTA, GA.

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