

AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 8347

FILE:

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N.C. 28201 Mr. A.C. Thies			DATE OF DOC 11-16-73	DATE REC'D 11-19-73	LTR X	MEMO	RPT	OTHER
TO: A. Giambusso			ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR XXX SENT LOCAL PDR XXX		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-270		
DESCRIPTION: Ltr reporting an abnormal occurrence at the Oconee Station concern....Reactor Bldg. Spray Valves 2BS-1 and 2BS-2.....trans the following..				ENCLOSURES: Abnormal Occurrence Report. AO-270/73-1				
PLANT NAME: Oconee				<p align="center">ACKNOWLEDGED</p> <p align="center">DO NOT REMOVE</p>				

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

11-20-73

JB

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BOYD	✓ SHAO		MAIGRET (L)	DUBE
MOORE (L) (BWR)	✓ STELLO	<u>ENVIRO</u>	SERVICE (L)	<u>INFO</u>
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	✓ IPPOLITO	YOUNGBLOOD	WADE (E)	
✓ REG OPR	✓ TEDESCO	REGAN	WILLIAMS (E)	
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✓ 16 - CYS ACRS HOLDING Sent to Goulbourne	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	RM-B-127, GT.
11-20-73	1-GERALD ULRIKSON...ORNL	1-RD..MULLER..F-309 GT

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

November 16, 1973

Mr. Angelo Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545



Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Giambusso:


Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence Report A0-270/73-1, "Reactor Building Spray Valves 2BS-1 and 2BS-2."

Very truly yours,

A.C. Thies
A. C. Thies *P.A.B.*

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 2
ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT AO-270/73-1
REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY VALVES 2BS-1 AND 2BS-2

Description of the Incident

On October 26, 1973, a periodic test was performed to verify reactor building spray pump 2B performance. The procedure required that the system be returned to the condition as found prior to the test; however, the reactor building spray valves 2BS-1 and 2BS-2 were inadvertently left closed and the breakers for the motor operators were left in the open position. On November 6, 1973, the valves were found closed and the breakers were found open during the Engineered Safeguards Equipment Operability Audit conducted prior to initial criticality. Reactor coolant system temperature and pressure were 250°F and 500 psi. Technical Specification 3.3.1 required one reactor building spray pump and its associated spray nozzle header to be available when reactor coolant pressure is 350 psi or greater or when reactor coolant temperature is 250°F or greater. Regulatory Operations, Region II, was informed on November 7, 1973 that this limiting condition for operation had been exceeded.

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was to return the reactor building spray system to its normal operating condition. The incident has been reviewed and a memorandum emphasizing the need for close attention to signing off items on procedural checklists and the clearing of tags will be written. The memorandum will also emphasize that for those breakers which have remote indication in the control room (such as BS-1 and BS-2) the position indication is not lost when the breaker is racked out. This memorandum and a report concerning the incident will be reviewed by all shifts by November 23, 1973.

Safety Analysis

In the event of an Engineered Safeguards actuation, at least two reactor building cooling fans and associated cooling units (as required by Technical Specification 3.3.1) would be available. Furthermore, reactor coolant

system temperature and pressure at the time of the incident were 250°F and 500 psig, respectively. With at least two cooling units available and the low energy inventory in the reactor coolant system, the reactor building design pressure could not have been exceeded. The incident occurred before initial criticality and therefore no fission products were present. The incident did not affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.