

**AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)**

CONTROL NO: 669

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|-----|-------|
| FROM: Duke Power Co. Charlotte, N.C. 28201 A.C. Thies | | DATE OF DOC 1/17/75 | DATE REC'D 1/22/75 | LTR XX | TWX | RPT | OTHER |
| TO: Norman C. Moseley | | ORIG | CC 1 | OTHER | SENT AEC PDR XX SENT LOCAL PDR XX | | |
| CLASS | UNCLASS XX | PROP INFO | INPUT | NO CYS REC'D 1 | DOCKET NO: 50-270 | | |

DESCRIPTION:

Ltr trans the following:

ENCLOSURES:

Abnormal Occurrence Rpt. AO-270/75-1 on
1/4/75 re: power level cutoff exceeded
during transient xenon conditions

ACKNOWLEDGED

DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME: *Oconee #2*

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION LDM 1/23/75

| | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| BUTLER (S) W/ Copies | SCHWENCER (S) W/ Copies | ZIEMANN (S) W/ Copies | REGAN (E) W/ Copies |
| CLARK (S) W/ Copies | STOLZ (S) W/ Copies | DICKER (E) W/ Copies | LEAR (S) W/ Copies |
| PARR (S) W/ Copies | VASSALLO (S) W/ Copies | KNIGHTON (E) W/ Copies | SPEIS (S) W/ Copies |
| KNIEL (S) W/ Copies | PURPLE (S) W/ Copies | YOUNGBLOOD (E) W/ Copies | |

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

| | | | | |
|---------------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| <u>REG FILE</u> | <u>TECH REVIEW</u> | <u>DENTON</u> | <u>LIC. ASST.</u> | <u>A/T IND</u> |
| ✓ AEC PDR | ✓ SCHROEDER | GRIMES | DIGGS (S) | BRAITMAN |
| ✓ LOG, ROOM P-506-A | ✓ ACCARRY | GAMMILL | GEARIN (S) | SALTZMAN |
| ✓ UNITIZING/STAFF | ✓ KNIGHT | ✓ KASTNER | ✓ GOULBOURNE (S) | B. HURT |
| ✓ CASE | ✓ PAWLICKI | BALLARD | ✓ KREUTZER (E) | |
| GIAMBUSO | ✓ CHAO | SPANGLER | LEE (S) | <u>PLANS</u> |
| BOYD | ✓ STELLO | | MAIGRET (S) | MCDONALD |
| MOORE (S) (BWR) | ✓ HOUSTON | <u>ENVIRO</u> | REED (E) | CHAPMAN |
| DEYOUNG (S) (PWR) | ✓ NOVAK | MULLER | SERVICE (S) | DUBE w/input |
| SKOVHOLT (S) | ✓ GSS | DICKER | SHEPPARD (S) | E. COUPE |
| GOLLER (S) | ✓ IPPOLITO | KNIGHTON | SLATER (E) | ✓ R. Hartfield (2) |
| P. COLLINS | ✓ TEDESCO | YOUNGBLOOD | SMITH (S) | ✓ KLECKER |
| DENISE | ✓ LONG | REGAN | TEETS (S) | ✓ F. WILLIAMS |
| <u>REG OPR</u> | ✓ LAINAS | PROJECT LDR | WILLIAMS (E) | |
| ✓ FILE & REGION | ✓ BENAROYA | | WILSON (S) | |
| ✓ T.R. WILSON | ✓ STEELE | <u>HARLESS</u> | INGRAM (S) | |
| | ✓ VOLINER | | | |

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| ✓ 1-LOCAL PDR <i>Walhalla, SC</i> | (1) (2) (10) - NATIONAL LABS | 1-PDR SAM/LA/IV |
| ✓ 1-TIC (ABERNATHY) | 1-M. PENNINGTON, RM E-201 G.T. | 1-BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB |
| ✓ 1-NSIC (BUCHANAN) | 1-CONSULTANTS | 1-G. ULRIKSON, ORNL |
| 1-ASLB | NEWMARK/BLUME/ACBABIAN | 1-AGRED (RUTH GUSMAN) RM E-127 G.T. |
| 1-NEWTON ANDERSON | | 1-J. RUKLES, RM E-2 G.T. |
| ✓ 5-ACRS SENT TO LIC. ASST. | | |


Kreutzer 1-23

DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

January 17, 1975



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Moseley:


Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence
Report A0-270/75-1.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



669

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: AO-270/75-1

Report Date: January 17, 1975

Occurrence Date: January 4, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 2

Identification of Occurrence: Power level cutoff exceeded during transient xenon conditions

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at approximately 80 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

On January 4, 1975, Oconee Unit 2 was operating at approximately 80 percent full power while waiting for xenon to approach equilibrium. The following sequence of events took place:

- 2226 Motor-operated valve 2MS-79, main steam line "2B" to second stage reheaters 2B1 and 2B2, opened due to a control switch malfunction.
- 2305 Reactor power increased to 84 percent full power and then returned to 82 percent full power. The control operator decreased reactor power to 78 percent full power.
- 2318 Valve 2MS-79 was found to be open and was subsequently closed remotely from the Control Room. An investigation determined that the valve control switch had malfunctioned and would give an "open" signal to the valve operator with a slight vibration of the switch. The breaker for valve 2MS-79 was opened and the control switch replaced. Reactor power was then increased to 80 percent full power.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Oconee Technical Specification 3.5.2.5.d does not allow reactor power to be increased above 82.5 percent full power unless xenon reactivity is within 10 percent of the value for operation at steady-state rated power. Reactor power was increased above 82.5 percent full power as a result of the abrupt opening of valve 2MS-79 which dumped main steam to the 2B second stage reheaters. This caused a decrease in reactor coolant average temperature and a resulting power increase. Valve 2MS-79 opened due to a faulty control switch.

Analysis of Occurrence:

This occurrence increased reactor power above the power level cutoff of 82.5 percent full power. The power level cutoff is designed to maintain power peaking within the limits of the AEC criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Although xenon reactivity was not within prescribed limits, the other parameters which affect power peaking, power tilt, and imbalance were within the normal operating limits.

Operation above the power level cutoff was limited to a short period of time because of the appropriate corrective action taken by the control operator. It is concluded that the occurrence did not affect the safe operation of the unit nor the health and safety of the public.

Corrective Action:

The control switch for valve 2MS-79 was replaced and a functional check performed to verify proper control of the valve motor operator.

Failure Data:

The control switch was a General Electric Type No. 2940 U201, 600 volt mold #9782430 with a center-off switch operator cam.