

AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 5894

FILE: A/D

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N. C. 28201 A. C. Thies			DATE OF DOC 6-25-74	DATE REC'D 6-28-74	LTR X	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: A. Giambusso			ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR X SENT LOCAL PDR X		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-270			

DESCRIPTION:

Ltr trans the following:

ENCLOSURES:

AO-270/74-7: Reporting abnormal occurrence on 6-15-74, regarding liquid waste disposal valve failure, 2LWD-1.

ACKNOWLEDGED

DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit #2

(1 cy rec'd)

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

7-1-74 GC

BUTLER (L)	SCHWENCER (L)	ZIEMANN (L)	REGAN (E)
W/ CYS	W/ CYS	W/ CYS	W/ CYS
CLARK (L)	STOLZ (L)	DICKER (E)	
W/ CYS	W/ CYS	W/ CYS	W/ CYS
W/ CYS	VASSALLO (L)	KNIGHTON (E)	
W/ CYS	W/ CYS	W/ CYS	W/ CYS
KNIEL (L)	✓PURPLE (L)	YOUNGBLOOD (E)	
W/ CYS	W/ CYS	W/ CYS	W/ CYS

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

✓REG FILE	✓TECH REVIEW	DENTON	LIC ASST	A/T IND
✓AEC PDR	✓HENDRIE	GRIMES	DIGGS (L)	BRAITMAN
✓OGC	✓SCHROEDER	GAMMILL	GEARIN (L)	SALTZMAN
✓MUNTZING/STAFF	✓MACCARY	KASTNER	GOULBOURNE (L)	B. HURT
✓CASE	✓KNIGHT	BALLARD	KREUTZER (E)	
GIAMBUSO	✓PAWLICKI	SPANGLER	LEE (L)	<u>PLANS</u>
BOYD	✓SHAO		MAIGRET (L)	MCDONALD
MOORE (L)(LWR-2)	✓STELLO	<u>ENVIRO</u>	REED (E)	CHAPMAN
DEYOUNG (L)(LWR-1)	✓HOUSTON	MULLER	SERVICE (L)	DUBE w/input
SKOVHOLT (L)	✓NOVAK	DICKER	SHEPPARD (L)	E. COUPE
✓GOLLER (L)	✓ROSS	KNIGHTON	SLATER (E)	
P. COLLINS	✓IPPOLITO	YOUNGBLOOD	SMITH (L)	✓D. THOMPSON (2)
DENISE	✓TEDESCO	REGAN	✓TEETS (L)	✓KLECKER
✓REG OPR	✓LONG	PROJECT MGR	WILLIAMS (E)	✓EISENHUT
✓FILE & REGION (3)	✓LAINAS		WILSON (L)	
✓MORRIS	✓BENAROYA			
✓STEELE	✓VOLLMER	HARLESS		

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

✓1 - LOCAL PDR Walhalla, S. C.	(1)(2)(10)-NATIONAL LABS	1-PDR-SAN/LA/NY
✓1 - TIC (ABERNATHY)	1-ASLBP(E/W Bldg, Rm 529)	1-BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB
✓1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN)	1-W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	1-G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
1 - ASLB	1-B&M SWINEBROAD, Rm E-201 GT	1-AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN)
1 - P. R. DAVIS	1-CONSULTANTS	Rm B-127 GT
✓16 - ACRS SENT TO LIC ASST	NEWARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	1-RD..MUELLER, Rm F-309
7-1-74 TEETS		GT

Regulatory Docket File

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

June 25, 1974

Mr. Angelo Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545



Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence
Report AO-270/74-7.


Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'A. C. Thies'.

A. C. Thies

ACT:gje
Attachment

cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley



5894

5894

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: AO-270/74-7

Report Date: June 25, 1974

Occurrence Date: June 15, 1974

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Liquid Waste Disposal Valve Failure, 2LWD-1

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Operation at 75 Percent of Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

On June 15, 1974, a routine attempt to pump the Unit 2 Reactor Building normal sump failed. It was noted that the sump level did not decrease nor did the sump pumps develop a discharge pressure. The pumps were vented without success and the discharge path was flushed with demineralized water to ensure continuity. The loss of flow was due to the failure of ES valve 2LWD-1, Unit 2 Reactor Building sump isolation valve.

Designation of Apparent Cause:

ES valve 2LWD-1 was found partially open with the valve diaphragm not operable by the stem. This resulted in flow blockage from the Reactor Building sump to the sump pumps.

Analysis of Occurrence:

ES valve 2LWD-1 is one of two redundant isolation valves for the Reactor Building sump. Since valve 2LWD-2 was operable during this incident, it would have provided proper isolation of the Reactor Building in the event of an ES signal. Repairs to valve 2LWD-1 were completed promptly before the Reactor Building sump level reached a critical level and backed up into the Reactor Building basement. It is concluded that there was no effect on the health and safety of the public.

Corrective Action:

A liquid nitrogen freeze seal was installed on the pipe between the Reactor Building sump and isolation valve 2LWD-1 to provide leakage protection while repairing the valve. The valve was disassembled and found to have a shattered diaphragm compressor. A new compressor, diaphragm, gasket, and roll pin were installed. The valve was tested, and the capability to pump the Reactor Building sump was regained.