

**NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL**  
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: **4973**

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT FILE

FROM: Duke Power Co. Charlotte, N.C. A.C. Thies			DATE OF DOC 4-30-75	DATE REC'D 5-6-75	LTR XX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Norman C. Moseley			ORIG 1 Signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XX</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XX</u>		
CLASS	UNCLASS XX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-270		

**DESCRIPTION:**

Ltr. trans the following....

**ENCLOSURES:**

Abnorm. Occurr. # 75-4, on 3-26-75, concerning Quench tank low level....

( 1 cy. Encl. rec'd) **REMOVE**

PLANT NAME: Oconee # 2

**FOR ACTION/INFORMATION**

VCR 5-8-75

BUTLER (L) W/ Copies	SCHWENCER (L) W/ Copies	ZIEMANN (L) W/ Copies	REGAN (E) W/ Copies
CLARK (L) W/ Copies	STOLZ (L) W/ Copies	DICKER (E) W/ Copies	LEAR (L) W/ Copies
PARR (L) W/ Copies	VASSALLO (L) W/ Copies	KNIGHTON (E) W/ Copies	SPELS W/ Copies
KNIEL (L) W/ Copies	PURPLE (L) W/ Copies	YOUNGBLOOD (E) W/ Copies	

**INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION**

<b>REG FILE</b> NRC PDR OGC, ROOM P-506A GOSSICK/STAFF CASE GIAMBUSSO BOYD MOORE (L) DEYOUNG (L) SKOVHOLT (L) GOLLER (L) (Ltr) P. COLLINS DENISE REG OPR FILE & REGION (2) MIPC/PE (3) STEELE	<b>TECH REVIEW</b> SCHROEDER MACCARY KNIGHT PAWLICKI SHAO **STELLO **HOUSTON **NOVAK ROSS IPPOLITO TEDESCO LONG LAINAS BENAROYA VOLLMER	<b>ENVIRO</b> DENTON **GRIMES GAMMILL KASTNER BALLARD SPANGLER  ENVIRO MULLER DICKER KNIGHTON YOUNGBLOOD REGAN PROJECT LDR  HARLESS	<b>LIC ASST</b> R. DIGGS (L) H. GEARIN (L) E. GOULBOURNE (L) P. KREUTZER (E) J. LEE (L) M. MAIGRET (L) S. REED (E) M. SERVICE (L) S. SHEPPARD (L) M. SLATER (E) H. SMITH (L) S. TEETS (L) G. WILLIAMS (E) V. WILSON (L) R. INGRAM (L)	<b>A/T IND.</b> BRAITMAN SALTZMAN MELTZ  PLANS MCDONALD CHAPMAN DUBE (Ltr) E. COUPE PETERSON HARTFIELD (2) KLECKER EISENHUT WIGGINTON  F. WILLIAMS HANAUER
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**EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION**

1 - LOCAL PDR <i>Thallalla</i>	1 - NATIONAL LABS	1 - PDR-SAN/LA/NY
1 - TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10)	1 - W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	1 - BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB
1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN)	1 - CONSULTANTS	1 - G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
1 - ASLB	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	1 - AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN) Rm B-127 GT
1 - Newton Anderson		1 - J. D. RUNKLES, Rm E-201 GT
5 - ACRS SENT TO LIC ASST		
** SEND ONLY TEN DAY REPORTS <i>Sheppard</i>		

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES  
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT  
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

April 30, 1975

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Suite 818  
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station  
Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event  
Report UE-270/75-4.



Very truly yours,



A. C. Thies

ACT:vr  
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



4973

DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: UE-270/75-4

Report Date: April 30, 1975

Event Date: March 26, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: Quench tank low level

Conditions Prior to Event: Unit at 100 percent full power

Description of Event:

On March 26, 1975, a quench tank low level alarm was received in the Oconee Unit 2 control room. The alarm was acknowledged; however, it was incorrectly identified. Approximately 20 minutes later, the Assistant Control Operator observed a low quench tank level of 40 inches. Corrective action was taken and normal quench tank level was regained 45 minutes after the initial alarm.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:

Immediately prior to this incident, the alarm next to the quench tank low level alarm had been intermittently alarming. The operator heard the audio portion of the alarm, looked up, and mistakenly thought this alarm was the intermittent alarm again. The apparent cause of this event was misidentification of an alarm due to the proximity of the alarm panels.

Analysis of Event:

The quench tank is used to condense steam from the pressurizer relief valves. In the event the pressurizer relief valves had actuated and the water level in the quench tank been below the spray nozzles, it is probable that the quench tank rupture discs would have actuated. This would have allowed steam to be relieved to the steam generator cavity. However, all radioactive effluent would have been contained in the reactor building. In addition, this incident would not affect the safe operation of the unit. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

Personnel involved in this incident have been reminded of the importance of considering each alarm as a new and different alarm. It is considered that further corrective action as a result of this incident is not warranted.