

**AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL**  
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 4549

FILE: 210

<b>FROM:</b> Duke Power Company Charlotte, N. C. 28201 A. C. Thies		<b>DATE OF DOC</b> 5-15-74	<b>DATE REC'D</b> 5-21-74	<b>LTR</b> X	<b>MEMO</b>	<b>RPT</b>	<b>OTHER</b>
<b>TO:</b> Mr. Giambusso		<b>ORIG</b> 1 signed	<b>CC</b>	<b>OTHER</b>	<b>SENT AEC PDR</b> X <b>SENT LOCAL PDR</b> X		
<b>CLASS</b>	<b>UNCLASS</b> XXXX	<b>PROP INFO</b>	<b>INPUT</b>	<b>NO CYS REC'D</b> 1	<b>DOCKET NO:</b> 50-270		
<b>DESCRIPTION:</b> Ltr trans the following:				<b>ENCLOSURES:</b> Abnormal Occurrence Report # AO-270/74-3, on 5-5-74, concerning the failure to verify containment integrity prior to unit startup			
<b>PLANT NAME:</b> Oconee Unit # 2				<p align="center"><b>Do Not Remove</b> <b>ACKNOWLEDGED</b></p> <p align="center">( 1 cy rec'd)</p>			

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

5-22-74

AB

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**INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION**

<u>REG FILE</u> AEC PDR OGC, ROOM P-506A MUNTZING/STAFF CASE GIAMBUSO BOYD MOORE (L)(BWR) DEYOUNG(L)(PWR) SKOVHOLT (L) GOLLER(L) P. COLLINS DENISE REG OPR FILE & REGION(3) MORRIS STEELE	<u>TECH REVIEW</u> HENDRIE SCHROEDER MACCARY KNIGHT PAWLICKI SHAO STELLO HOUSTON NOVAK ROSS IPPOLITO TEDESCO LONG LAINAS BENAROYA VOLLMER	DENTON GRIMES GAMMILL KASTNER BALLARD SPANGLER  <u>ENVIRO</u> MULLER DICKER KNIGHTON YOUNGBLOOD REGAN PROJECT LDR  HARLESS	<u>LIC ASST</u> DIGGS (L) GEARIN (L) GOULBOURNE (L) LEE (L) MAIGRET (L) REED (E) SERVICE (L) SHEPPARD (L) SLATER (E) SMITH (L) TEETS (L) WADE (E) WILLIAMS (E) WILSON (L)	<u>A/T IND</u> BRAITMAN SALTZMAN B. HURT  <u>PLANS</u> MCDONALD DUBE w/Input  <u>INFO</u> C. MILES B. KING (E/W-358) KLECKER EISENHUT  <u>AOR FILE</u> D. THOMPSON(2)
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**EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION**

1 - LOCAL PDR Walhalla, S. C.	(1)(2)(10)-NATIONAL LAB'S	1-PDR-SAN/LA/NY
1 - TIC (ABERNATHY)	1-ASLEP(E/W Bldg, Rm 529)	1-GERALD LELLOUCHE
1 - NSIC(BUCHANAN)	1-W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	BROOKHAVEN NAT. LAB
1 - ASLB	1-CONSULTANT'S	1-AGMED(Ruth Gussman)
1 - P. R. DAVIS (AEROJET NUCLEAR)	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	RM-B-127, GT.
16 - CYS ACRS HOLDING SENT TO LIC ASST.	1-GERALD ULRIKSON...ORNL	1-RD..MULLER..F-309 GT
S. SHEPPARD ON 5-22-74	1-B & M SWINEBROAD, Rm E-201 GT	

Regulatory

File Cy.

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES  
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT  
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

May 15, 1974



Mr. Angelo Giambusso  
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects  
Directorate of Licensing  
Office of Regulation  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545

Re: Oconee Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Giambusso:


Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station  
Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence  
Report AO-270/74-3.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr  
Attachment

cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley



4549

DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: AO-270/74-3

Report Date: May 15, 1974

Occurrence Date: May 5, 1974

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Failure to verify containment integrity prior to unit startup

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Shutdown since January 22, 1974.  
At the time of discovery of the occurrence, reactor coolant temperature was 465°F and reactor coolant pressure was 2155 psig.

Description of Occurrence:

Oconee Technical Specification 3.6 requires that containment integrity be maintained whenever all three of the following conditions exist:

1. Reactor coolant pressure is 300 psig or greater.
2. Reactor coolant temperature is 200°F or greater.
3. Nuclear fuel is in the core.

One of the conditions which must be satisfied to establish containment integrity (Technical Specification definition 1.7) is that the containment leakage determined at the last testing interval satisfies Technical Specification 4.4.1. Specification 4.4.1.2.5(b) requires that a local leak detection test be performed on the personnel hatch outer door seals at intervals not to exceed four months if the hatch has been opened in that period.

On April 25, 1974, it was brought to the attention of members of the Oconee supervisory staff that the leakage test for the personnel hatch had been scheduled for January 22, 1974. The Administrative Procedure No. 11, "Performance of Periodic Testing or Sampling," permits postponement of periodic tests if the condition of the unit, system, or component is such that the testing cannot or need not be performed within the required time interval. Since the unit was in a cold shutdown condition, it was decided, under the provisions of Administrative Procedure No. 11, that the personnel hatch leak test could be postponed until immediately prior to unit startup.

On May 5, 1974, unit startup had commenced with reactor coolant temperature at 465°F and pressure at 2155 psig; the reactor had not been made critical. Operations personnel reviewed the technical specifications and Administrative Procedure No. 11 and subsequently concluded that Technical Specifications 4.4.1 and 3.6.1 had not been met in that the leakage test on the personnel hatch had not been completed prior to exceeding 300 psig and 200°F.

Reactor coolant system cooldown and depressurization was initiated immediately.

The personnel hatch leak rate test was initiated on May 5, 1974 and completed satisfactorily on May 6, 1974.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The failure to perform the leak rate test on the personnel hatch was discovered prior to criticality, and the reactor coolant system was immediately cooled down and depressurized. The personnel hatch was tested immediately and met all acceptance criteria. Therefore, it is concluded that this occurrence did not affect the health and safety of the public.

Corrective Action:

As immediate corrective action, cooldown and depressurization of the reactor coolant system was initiated. The leak rate test of the personnel hatch was performed and all acceptance criteria were satisfied.

To prevent recurrence of similar incidents, Administrative Procedure No. 11 will be clarified to assure that the latitude permitted by this procedure remains within the requirements of the technical specifications.