

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 2860

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT FILE

FROM: Duke Power Co. Charlotte, N.C. 28201 A.C. Thies			DATE OF DOC 3/12/75	DATE REC'D 3/15/75	LTR xx	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: N.C. Moseley			ORIG	CC 1	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR xxx SENT LOCAL PDR xxx		
CLASS	UNCLASS xxx	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-270		
DESCRIPTION: Ltr trans the following:				ENCLOSURES: Unusual Event Rpt. UE-270/75-2 occurring 2/6/75 re: failure of emergency condenser cooling water valves CCW7 and CCW8 ACKNOWLEDGED DO NOT REMOVE				
PLANT NAME: Oconee 2								

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

Idm 3/18/75

BUTLER (L)	SCHWENCER (L)	ZIEMANN (L)	REGAN (E)
W/ Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies
CLARK (L)	STOLZ (L)	DICKER (E)	LEAR (L)
W/ Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies
PARR (L)	VASSALLO (L)	KNIGHTON (E)	SPELS
W/ Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies
KNIEL (L)	✓ PURPLE (L)	YOUNGBLOOD (E)	
W/ Copies	W/3 Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE	TECH REVIEW	DENTON	LIC ASST	A/T IND
✓ NRC PDR	✓ SCHROEDER	**GRIMES	R. DIGGS (L)	BRAITMAN
OGC, ROOM P-506A	MACCARY	GAMMILL	H. GEARIN (L)	SALTZMAN
GOSSICK/STAFF	KNIGHT	KASTNER	E. GOULBOURNE (L)	MELTZ
✓ CASE	PAWLICKI	BALLARD	P. KREUTZER (E)	
GIAMBUSSO	SHAO	SPANGLER	J. LEE (L)	PLANS
BOYD	**STELLO		M. MAIGRET (L)	MCDONALD
MOORE (L)	**HOUSTON	ENVIRO	S. REED (E)	CHAPMAN
DEYOUNG (L)	**NOVAK	MULLER	M. SERVICE (L)	DUBE (Ltr)
SKOVHOLT (L)	✓ ROSS	DICKER	✓ S. SHEPPARD (L)	E. COUPE
GOLLER (L) (Ltr)	✓ IPPOLITO	KNIGHTON	M. SLATER (E)	PETERSON
P. COLLINS	✓ TEDESCO	YOUNGBLOOD	H. SMITH (L)	HARTFIELD (2)
DENISE	LONG	REGAN	S. TEETS (L)	✓ KLECKER
REG OPR	LAINAS	PROJECT LDR	G. WILLIAMS (E)	EISENHUT
✓ FILE & REGION (2)	BENAROYA	HARLESS	V. WILSON (L)	WIGGINTON
✓ T.R. WILSON (3)	✓ VOLLMER		R. INGRAM (L)	✓ F. WILLIAMS
STEELE				✓ HANAUER

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

✓ 1 - LOCAL PDR Walhalla, SC	1 - NATIONAL LABS	1 - PDR-SAN/LA/NY
✓ 1 - TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10)	1 - W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	1 - BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB
✓ 1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN)	1 - CONSULTANTS	1 - G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
1 - ASLB	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	1 - AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN)
1 - Newton Anderson		Rm B-127 GT
✓ 5 - ACRS SENT TO LIC ASST		1 - J. D. RUNKLES, Rm E-201
** SEND ONLY TEN DAY REPORTS		GT

Shppard 3-18


DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

March 12, 1975

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Moseley:


Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event
Report UE-270/75-2.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



2860

Regulatory

File Cy

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: UE-270/75-2

Report Date: March 12, 1975

Event Date: February 6, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: Failure of emergency condenser cooling water valves CCW7 and CCW8

Conditions Prior to Event: Unit in cold shutdown

Description of Event:

On February 6, 1975, the single operating Oconee Unit 2 condenser circulating water (CCW) pump tripped. All six condenser outlet valves operated correctly by closing; however, two valves, CCW 7 and 8, which align the CCW discharge to the Keowee tailrace to provide a gravity flow siphon effect, failed to open. Another CCW pump was started and an investigation as to the cause of this event was initiated.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:

The 2B CCW pump tripped when an indicator bulb socket failed, during bulb replacement, and created a short circuit through the socket to the breaker trip circuit. The apparent cause of the failure of valves CCW 7 and 8 to open was due to a misaligned contact in a relay associated with the control circuitry for CCW 7. This prevented the open signal from reaching the controller for CCW 7. Valve CCW 8 is interlocked to CCW 7; hence, it did not open.

Analysis of Event:

The failure of emergency condenser cooling water valves CCW 7 and 8 occurred during the time the unit was in cold shutdown and thus the function of the valves was not necessary. In the event that the unit had been at power when all CCW pumps were lost, condenser vacuum would have decreased resulting in a turbine trip and then a high RC pressure reactor trip. Adequate heat removal capacity would have been available by the use of the main steam relief valves. In addition, CCW 7 and 8 could have been manually operated from the control room to obtain the gravity flow of condenser water. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The indicator lamp socket for the 2B CCW pump was replaced and the relay in the control circuitry for CCW 7 was realigned. The Condenser Circulating

Water System Gravity and Recirculation Flow Test was performed on February 11, 1975 and resulted in valves CCW 7 and 8 operating properly.

Since manual actuation of these valves is available in the event of a loss of CCW pumps, and an annual surveillance test is performed to verify this automatic function, no further corrective action is considered necessary.