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(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 2099
FILE: INCIDENT REPORT

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N.C. 28201 A.C. Thes		DATE OF DOC 2-21-75	DATE REC'D 2-24-75	LTR XX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr. Norman C. Moseley		ORIG	CC 1	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XX</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XX</u>		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-270		

DESCRIPTION: Ltr trans the following:

ENCLOSURES: Abnormal Occurrence AO-50-270/75-4
A on 1-31-75 re failure to provide a reactor building spray train when required...

(1 cy encl rec'd)

ACKNOWLEDGED

PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit 2

Do Not Remove

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

February 21, 1975

Regulatory Docket File



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Moseley:

My letter of February 13, 1975 transmitted Abnormal Occurrence Report AO-270/75-4. The investigation of the details of this incident has been completed and is described in the attached supplemental report AO-270/75-4A.


Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2
SUPPLEMENTAL ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

Received w/ Ltr Dated 2-21-75

Report No.: AO-270/75-4A

Report Date: February 21, 1975

Occurrence Date: January 31, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Failure to provide a reactor building spray train when required

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Heatup in progress, RC temperature and pressure greater than 250°F, 350 psig, respectively

Description of Occurrence:

On January 31, 1975 while in the process of conducting a unit startup for Oconee Unit 2, it was determined that the Reactor Coolant System had been elevated slightly above 250°F and 350 psig without an operable Reactor Building spray train as required by Technical Specification 3.3.1.a.

The sequence of events which led to this condition is presented below:

January 25, 1975 1135	Reactor shut down, Reactor Building spray (RPS) pump breakers racked out. RC system at 100 psig, 150°F.
January 28, 1975 0830	Controlling procedure for unit startup initiated.
January 29, 1975 1330	Control operator signed off as complete, the step in the unit startup procedure which states that the RBS system is in the ES standby mode. He referenced a RBS procedure, completed the same day, for his verification.
1400	Control operator had utility operator check "white tag log" and was informed that there were no entries to prevent startup.
January 31, 1975 0815	Control operator acknowledged RBS system operable on precritical checklist based upon 1330 entry of January 29, 1975 and the completed RBS procedure.
0915	Control operator discovered white tags for RBS pump breakers in the white tag log. Investigation revealed that breakers were racked out.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

There are two apparent causes for this occurrence: The utility operator that performed the procedure for the Reactor Building Spray System did not understand that he was to place the system in the ES standby mode. He completed the valve checklist but did not rack in the RBS pump breakers. The second cause was that the utility operator that checked the white tag log did not complete the review. The control operator assumed that the review had been completed and no conditions existed which would prevent unit startup. In both cases, the lack of complete, accurate communications was at cause.

Corrective Action:

The station Manager has personally talked with the individuals involved in this incident and pointed out the discrepancies in their performance. The Superintendent of Operations is reviewing this incident with other operating personnel. A board is being mounted in the Control Room for each unit on which permanent tags will be hung to denote the status of the Reactor Building spray pump breakers. This will be installed by March, 1975.

Duke Power Company
Docket No. 50-270 Oconee Unit 2

ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT NO:

AO-270/75-4A

DISTRIBUTION:

→ Frank Logan, Central Files, DRA, HQs

cc With Enclosures

Region II Docket Files - 50-270

Region II Inspector with enclosures

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

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U.S.A.E.O.
REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION II
ATLANTA, GA.
FEB 25 10 03 AM '75