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FILE NUMBER
INCIDENT REPORT

TO: Mr. Noeman C. Moseley

FROM: Duke Power Company
Charlotte, North Carolina
Mr. William O. Parker, Jr.

DATE OF DOCUMENT
1/31/77DATE RECEIVED
2/11/77

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DESCRIPTION

Ltr. trans the following:

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PLANT NAME:

Oconee Unit No. 2

(1-P)

ENCLOSURE

Licensee Event Report (RO 50-270/77-1) on
1/11/77 concerning fluctuating borated water
level indication being erroneous due to a
faulty level indication channel.....

(2-P)

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 2/11/77

RJL

☒ BRANCH CHIEF: Schwencer

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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

☒ LPDR: Walhalla, S.C.

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CONTROL NUMBER

1445
270
A.O. 400

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

January 31, 1977

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270



Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/77-1.


Very truly yours,

W. O. Parker, Jr.
By *WAS*

William O. Parker, Jr.

LJB:ge
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control



1445

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: RO-270/77-1

Report Date: January 31, 1977

Occurrence Date: January 11, 1977

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: One channel of borated water storage tank level indication inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 100 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

On January 11, 1977 one of two redundant channels of the Oconee Unit 3 borated water storage tank (BWST) level instruments indicated a fluctuating tank water level. The remaining instrument indicated that the level of borated water required by Technical Specifications was being maintained. Investigation was promptly initiated and revealed that the fluctuating water level indication was erroneous due to a faulty level indication channel.

This condition is considered to be reportable since it constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a Limiting Condition for operation. Technical Specification 3.3.5 makes provision for the removal from service for test or monitoring of any component of high pressure injection, low pressure injection or reactor building spray for a period of 24 hours provided not more than one train of each system is afflicted. The BWST level channel was restored to operable status within five and one-half hours.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This occurrence was caused by the freezing of the process line between the Oconee Unit 2 BWST and the BWST level transmitter. Due to an installation deficiency the wire connection tees associated with the Dekoron heat tracing system had not been insulated which allowed the process line to be exposed to below freezing temperatures and resulted in the frozen line and faulty indication.

Analysis of Occurrence:

This occurrence resulted in the loss of one of two redundant channels of BWST level indication for approximately five and one-half hours. During this period, the redundant level transmitter properly indicated the true level in the BWST. The conditions of the BWST required by Technical Specification 3.2 were maintained and the emergency core cooling systems would have performed as required in the unlikely event they were needed. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action:

The process line was promptly thawed and insulation was placed around the wire connection tees of the Dekoron heat tracing lines. The level instrumentation was checked and verified operable. The insulation surrounding the process lines has also been examined.

The present Dekoron heat tracing system surrounding the process lines will be replaced by a Nelson heat tracing system by October 3, 1977. The new system will add an extra emergency heat trace line on the piping which will be powered by a separate power supply. In addition, a cold weather checklist has been created. The checklist requires inspection of the insulation on the impulse lines and heat tracing of the BWST level instrumentation when the temperature is below 35°F.

FEB 3 9 54 AM '77

U.S.A.F.
REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION I
ATLANTA, GA.