

# Seminar: WASH-1400 and the Origins of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) in the Nuclear Industry

WASH-1400  
(NUREG 75/014)

## REACTOR SAFETY STUDY

AN ASSESSMENT  
OF ACCIDENT RISKS  
in

U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS


U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OCTOBER 1975

Saul Levine



WASH-1400  
Study  
Directors

Norman Rasmussen



Dr. Thomas Wellock



Tom Wellock is the historian for the U.S. NRC. Trained as both an engineer and a historian, he writes scholarly histories of the regulation of commercial nuclear energy. Until 2010 he was a Professor in the Department of History at Central Washington University in Ellensburg, Washington. He is the author of two books, *Critical Masses: Opposition to Nuclear Power in California, 1958-1978* and *Preserving the Nation: The Conservation and Environmental Movements, 1870-2000*, and has authored numerous articles on the history of nuclear power. As an engineer, he worked for General Dynamics Corporation as a reactor test engineer in the construction of Los Angeles and Trident class submarines.

Dr. Robert J. Budnitz



Dr. Budnitz has been involved with nuclear-reactor safety and radioactive waste for many years. He is on the scientific staff at the University of California Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), where he works on nuclear power safety security and radioactive-waste management. From 2002 to 2007 he was at UC's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), during which period he worked on a two year special assignment in Washington to assist the Director of Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management to develop a new Science & Technology Program. Prior to joining LLNL in 2002, he ran a one-person consulting practice in California for over two decades. In 1978-1980 he was a senior official on the staff of the U.S. NRC, serving as Deputy Director and then Director of the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. In this two-year period, Dr. Budnitz was responsible for formulating and guiding the large NRC research program. From 1967-1978 he was at LBNL, including three years (1975-1978) as Associate Director of LBNL and Head of LBNL's Energy & Environmental Division.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Two White Flint North Auditorium  
November 9, 2015, 10:00am to 12:00pm

 **Office of Nuclear  
Regulatory Research**

 **KNOWvember**  
NRC'S KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM



# **A Figure of Merit: The Search for the “P” in PRA**

Tom Wellock

November 9, 2015

- Determinism—The preferred approach to safety.
- Fault-tree methodology borrowed from aerospace.
- WASH-1400 started at request of Congress

- Determinism—The preferred approach to safety.
  - Probabilism sought since early 1950s.
- Fault-tree methodology borrowed from aerospace.
  - Much work done in nuclear field.
- WASH-1400 started at request of Congress
  - AEC had already initiated study on its own for political and technical reasons.

- **Hanford Reactors**
  - **Safety through isolation**
  - **Reactor Safeguard Committee (ACRS)**
  - **Little inherent safety**
  - **Defense-in-Depth (1948)**



Hanford B Reactor

TWENTY-FIVE CENTS




NOVEMBER 18, 1957

*Edward Teller*

**U.S. SCIENCE**  
Where It Stands Today

# TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE



SCIENTIST  
EDWARD TELLER


RONALD LOVELL  
730-B ASHMAN AVE  
SANTA MONICA CAL  
90401 24 1218 0730

(REG. U.S. PAT. OFF.)

VOL. LXX NO. 21

# WASH-3: The First Safety Standard

$$D=0.01\sqrt{P}$$



BY JW Jordan DATE 6/8/81  
BY AE Barker DATE 6/10/81  
ll Orgill 5/11/99  
PDQMAN 6-7-99

A. B. Greninger, Manager  
Engineering Department  
703 Building, 700 Area

July 20, 1953

This document consists of  
4 pages, ~~10~~

EVALUATION OF PROBABILITY OF DISASTER

- Failure to develop “top event” leads to focus on component and system reliability instead.
- Hanford’s experience unique. Risk quantification not pursued at Savannah River—more inherent safety.

# Seeing the Forest with Trees

Decision and Fault Trees in the  
1960s




FIG. 1. Progressive splitting on the biological pattern. (It does not follow that every split will be in terms of a new variable; in practice it is quite feasible for group G to be split on variable D, or for group C to be split on variable B.




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


FIG. 1.—Analysis of proposal to test-market new product




Figure 7-1a. Domestic Hot-Water System




Figure 7-1b. Fault Tree and Boolean Expression for Hot-Water System

Bell Labs Fault Tree for a Hot Water Heater (1962)




FIGURE 8 : FAULT TREE WITH SECONDARY FAILURE TECHNIQUE  
(The triangles indicate a transfer to another portion of the tree)





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


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



Figure 1. Hazard Evaluation Diagram



# FAULT TREE FOR TOTAL LOSS OF POWER




FIGURE 7-3.

# FAULT TREE FOR TOTAL LOSS OF POWER




FIGURE 7-3.




FIGURE 1-1

CONCEPTUAL FAULT LOGIC DIAGRAM

# FAULT TREE FOR TOTAL LOSS OF POWER




FIGURE 7-3.




FIGURE 1-1

## CONCEPTUAL FAULT LOGIC DIAGRAM

GEAP 13639





Figure 2-1. Overall Fault Tree Example




# SYMBOLS

FAILURE

EVENT

CONDITION



(SEE FIGURE 5.2-2)



John Garrick





FIGURE 5.7

FAULT DIAGRAM FOR INCIDENTS INITIATED BY A REACTOR  
COOLANT CIRCUIT FAILURE





FIGURE 2



Steve Hanauer

**THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF  
MAJOR ACCIDENTS IN LARGE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS**

*A Study of Possible Consequences if Certain Assumed Accidents,  
Theoretically Possible but Highly Improbable, Were to Occur  
in Large Nuclear Power Plants*



WASH-740

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

*March 1957*

- WASH-740 Update (1965)
  - Congressional Request
  - Larger consequences than original study
  - Probability calculations fail
  - AEC refuses to publish
    - Continues funding reliability and risk studies through Holmes and Narver and at Idaho lab.
  - Regulatory skepticism

# Under Siege in the 1970s

- Antinuclear Movement
  - Local Opposition
  - Low-level emissions controversy
  - ECCS
- NEPA—Class 9 accidents.
- ATWS




Henry Kendall, Union of Concerned Scientists



Sen. Mike Gravel



Saul Levine



Norm Rasmussen

- WASH-1400

- Launched in March 1972.
  - Has political goals (Executive Summary) and technical/regulatory.
- Significant advances in methodology by early 1973. AEC wants PRA analysis group.
- Early results reported in January 1974 by Dixie Lee Ray. A big hit but trouble ahead.



Ghillie and Jacques (poodle)

***WASH-1400: THE FIRST 15 YEARS OF PRA AFTER  
ITS PUBLICATION (REACTION, PROGRESS,  
IMPEDIMENTS, AND WHY)***

**9 November 2015**

**NRC Seminar on  
“WASH-1400 and the Origins of PRA  
in the Nuclear Industry”**

**Robert J. Budnitz**

**Energy Geosciences Division  
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory  
University of California  
Berkeley CA 94720 USA  
<RJBudnitz @ LBL.gov>**

# Chronology

<b>1972 - 73</b>	<b>Early objections (<i>before the RSS was launched</i>)</b>
<b>1975</b>	<b>Publication of WASH-1400 (RSS) – initial reactions</b>
<b>1975 - 77</b>	<b>Turmoil -- what do the RSS results mean?</b>
<b>1977 - 78</b>	<b>NRC “Lewis Committee”, RARG (<i>“everybody” testified</i>)</b>
<b>Sept. 1978</b>	<b>RARG report --- endorsed PRA, criticized aspects of RSS</b>
<b>Jan. 1979</b>	<b>NRC Commission “bailed out”—staff and industry reaction</b>
<b>March 1979</b>	<b>Three Mile Island !!</b>
<b>1979 - 80</b>	<b>Reactions to PRA after TMI (<i>positive, negative, ambivalent</i>)</b>
<b>1979 - 83</b>	<b>First industry PRAs, seismic PRA, fire PRA, PRA Procedures Guide, severe-accident research, AEOD, ASEP, PRA and life extension</b>
<b>1986</b>	<b>NRC Safety Goal Policy Statement</b>
<b>1988 - 91</b>	<b>IPE, IPEEE</b>
<b>1990</b>	<b>NUREG-1150</b>