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DOCKET #
 05000269

Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

Reportable Occurrence Report

SUBJECT: ~~Sta~~ 79-025/03L-0 on 790724: during transfer of auxiliary power from normal to startup transformer, breaker on one 4160 volt main feeder bus failed to close, Caused by short circuit due to damaged wire. Damaged wire replaced.

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report Number: RO-269/79-25

Report Date: August 23, 1979

Occurrence Date: July 24, 1979

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Main Feeder Bus Isolated

Description of Occurrence:

At 2347 on July 23, 1979, an attempt was made to transfer auxiliary power from normal transformer 1T to startup transformer CT1 for Unit 1. However, breaker BLT-1 failed to close, isolating one of the two 4160 volt main feeder buses from transformer CT-1. At approximately 0000 on July 24, 1979, it was determined that there was a short circuit in the control wiring for the breaker, and the breaker was therefore inoperable. Unit 1 was at 23% full power as a result of a steam generator tube leak, and was in a cold shutdown condition by approximately 0300 on July 23 in order to permit investigation of the leak. Investigation of the short circuit revealed a bundle of wires passing through a cable sleeve from the cable room to the control room which had been blackened. All of the wires in the cable sleeve were replaced by July 30, 1979, and breaker BLT-1 was successfully operated twice. The unit remained at cold shutdown throughout this period as a result of the steam generator tube repairs.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Breaker BLT-1 failed to close, isolating one of the two 4160 volt main feeder buses, as a result of a short circuit in the control wiring for the breaker. Although the exact cause of the short circuit has not been identified, it is believed that the insulation for the wires in the cable sleeve may have been damaged during the removal of firestop material in the cable sleeve on June 27, 1979, or as a result of the subsequent installation of new firestop material.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.7.2(d)1 allows one 4160 volt main feeder bus to be inoperable for up to 24 hours during hot standby or power operation. As a result of the steam generator tube leak, the unit was in a cold shutdown condition within 3½ hours after the breaker was determined to be inoperable, satisfying Technical Specification 3.7.2. During the period the breaker was inoperable, the other main feeder bus supplied auxiliary power to Unit 1. This incident resulted in a shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation, and must therefore be reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), although it was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

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Corrective Action:

Investigation of the breaker failure indicated that it was due to a short circuit in the breaker's control wiring. The short circuit was traced back to a bundle of wires in a cable sleeve between the cable room and control room which were blackened. All the wires in the cable sleeve were replaced, and the breaker was successfully operated twice. In addition, procedures for repairing electrical penetration firestops will be revised to assure that cables are not damaged during the installation of firestop material.

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | S | C | N | E | E | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5 |

LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 23 25 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 58

CONT

01 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 9 | 9 |

60 61 SOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | Unit 1 was operating at 23% full power due to a steam generator tube leak when

03 | an attempt was made to transfer auxiliary power from the normal to the startup

04 | transformer. However, the breaker to one of the two 4160 volt main feeder buses

05 | failed to close. Auxiliary power was supplied by the other bus. In addition,

06 | the unit was placed in cold shutdown within 3½ hours as a result of the tube

07 | leak. Therefore, this incident was of no significance with respect to safe

08 | operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

09 |

SYSTEM CODE 11 CAUSE CODE 12 CAUSE SUBCODE 13 COMPONENT CODE 14 COMP. SUBCODE 15 VALVE SUBCODE 16

E | B | E | A | C | K | T | B | R | K | A | Z |

17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 7 | 9 | 18 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 19 | 0 | 3 | 20 | L | 21 | 0 | 22 | 0 |

23 | ACTION TAKEN | A | 24 | FUTURE ACTION | G | 25 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 26 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 27 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 29 | NRC-4 FORM SUB. | Y | 30 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | L | 31 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | Z | Z | Z | Z | 32 |

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | The breaker failed to close due to a short circuit, which may have been the

11 | result of wiring damaged during installation of new firestop material in a

12 | cable sleeve. The damaged wire was replaced, and the breaker was successfully

13 | operated twice. The firestop repair procedures will be revised to preclude

14 | future such occurrences.

15 |

FACILITY STATUS 28 % POWER 29 OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32

E | 0 | 2 | 3 | NA | A | Operator observation

33 | ACTIVITY RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 36 |

37 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 38 | TYPE | Z | 39 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 40 |

41 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 42 | TYPE | NA | 43 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 44 |

45 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 46 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 47 |

48 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | 49 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 50 |

51 | NAME OF PREPARER | S. R. Lewis | 52 | PHONE | (704) 373-8285 | 53 |

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