DUKE POWER COMPANY

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Summary of Nuclear Station Modifications Completed under 10CFR50.59

01C13

DESCRIPTION: The Unit 1 Cycle 13 Fuel Reload.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The results of this evaluation indicate that there are no unreviewed safety questions associated with the 01C13 reload.

02C12

DESCRIPTION: The Unit 2 Cycle 12 Fuel Reload.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The results of this evaluation indicate that there are no unreviewed safety questions associated with the 02C12 reload.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Complete | Complete | N/A | N/A |

ON - 12422

DESCRIPTION: This modification involves replacement of the Reactor Building and unit vent monitors. The current monitors are troublesome and spare parts are becoming unavailable. A new detector, RIA-49A, will be added to the RB monitor for high range gas detection. In addition, a computer based system control and data acquisition system will be added for use by these and other monitors to be replaced in future plant modifications. Another portion of this modification will lock close instrument air valve IA-1119 and designate IA-1115 as normally closed. This will insure the prevention of an over pressure condition for the RB monitor.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The modification has no impact on the function of any system. These replacement monitors are as good as or better than the monitors being replaced. The monitors are used to insure that radioactive effluent releases are maintained within acceptable limits. As such, the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety which were previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. No new failure modes or operating characteristics are created by this modification. The rerouted sample lines will be field routed and supported. The monitors will be seismically anchored. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety which is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR will not be created.

No adverse impact to any safety system will result. No unreviewed safety questions are created by this modification.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Complete | Incomplete | Incomplete | N/A |

ON - 22458

DESCRIPTION: This modification will replace valves 2FDW-106, 2FDW-108, and 2RC-7 for the Outside Containment Portion and valves 2FDW-105, 2FDW-107 and 2RC-5 for the Inside Containment Portion.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The subject valves are Engineered SafeGuard Containment Isolation Valves. They are sample lines from the Steam Generator and Pressurizer. The valves are being replaced for maintenance reasons. The safety function of these valves is to close on an ES signal to isolate containment. The replacement valves will be seismically supported and are seismically and environmentally qualified. The power requirement of the operators will be limited to that of the existing valves due to limited ES power at Oconee. The EMOs will be purchased with identical electrical characteristics and the solenoids will be safety related.

Accordingly, this modification will have no effect on the probability, consequences or possibility of new accidents evaluated in the FSAR. Nor will it affect the probability, consequences or possibility of malfunctions of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR. The margin of safety defined in the bases of the Tech. Specs is unaffected. The answers to each of the 10CFR50.59 unreviewed safety questions are "no".

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | Complete | Complete | Complete | N/A |

ON - 12477
ON - 22477
ON - 32477

DESCRIPTION: In order to increase the effectiveness of the guard for the 6" ASW pipe running between the SSF and the Reactor Building, the existing guard is being enlarged. Concrete is being placed around the pipe where the pipe exists the Aux Building. Grout is being placed above and on the sides of the concrete guard inside the Case Decon. Tank Room.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The SSF provides an alternate means to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition for any or all Oconee Units for a period of at least 3 days with no damage control provided. The SSF Aux Service Water System (ASW) is designed to provide FDW to the S/G's during an SSF event as part of the means to maintain hot shutdown. Protection of the unburied portion of the ASW piping is required both inside and outside of the Aux. Building. These NSM's will provide protection in addition to what presently exists by the placement of concrete and grout as described above.

It has been determined that this additional concrete will not adversely affect the seismic analysis and response of the QA condition 1 ASW piping. The probability or consequences of accidents or equipment malfunctions previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased by this modification. Nor will be possibility of a new type of accident or equipment malfunction be created by this modification. No assumptions stated in the plant SAR, no setpoints and no plant parameters are affected by these NSMs so there is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Tech Specs. There are no unanswered safety questions associated with these NSMs.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | Complete | Complete | Complete | N/A |

ON - 12549
ON - 22549

DESCRIPTION: This modification revised the Reactor Coolant System temperature display.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Although the ICS system controls nuclear safety related systems, it is non-safety related and non-QA. The ICC system, on the other hand, is nuclear safety related. The displays themselves are strictly for operator information and are non-safety.

Electrical fault isolation will be provided for both the connections between the $T_H$ display instrumentation and the ICC cabinets and those between the $T_C$ instrumentation and the ICS cabinets. The $T_{AV}$ display will not require any additional fault isolation since it is just replacing an existing display.

A seismic review will be performed on the affected control board to assure that its seismic integrity has not been compromised by the modification.

The proposed instrumentation changes do not involve functional changes to any plant system; nor will any new failure modes be introduced. No safety system will be degraded as a result of this modification. The probability of previously evaluated accidents will not be increased and the possibility of a new accident will not be created.

The fault isolation devices will preclude the failure of the ICC and ICS systems due to a failure of the new display instrumentation. The seismic review should guarantee that the control board will not be adversely affected by the additional displays. Thus, the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased.

No plant parameter that is controlled by Tech Specs or that has any effect on the plant safety/design analyses will be changed by this modification. Thus, no margin of safety will be reduced. There are no unreviewed safety questions involved with the NSM.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | Complete | Complete | Complete | N/A |

ON - 12552
ON - 22552

DESCRIPTION: The subject NSM proposes to review the Reactor Coolant System temperature display. Specifically, three digital displays are be installed on UB1 to provide the operator with $T_H$, $T_C$ and $T_{AV}$ indication. Each display will be equipped with a control switch for selecting of the alternative signal channels to be displaced.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Although the ICS system controls nuclear safety related systems, it is non-safety related and non-QA. The ICC system, on the other hand, is nuclear safety related. The displays themselves are strictly for operator information and are non-safety.

Electrical fault isolation will be provided for both the connections between the $T_H$ display instrumentation and the ICC cabinets and those between the $T_C$ instrumentation and the ICS cabinets. The $T_{AV}$ display will not require any additional fault isolation since it is just replacing an existing display.

A seismic review will be performed on the affected control board to assure that its seismic integrity has not been compromised by the modification.

The proposed instrumentation changes do not involve functional changes to any plant system; nor will any new failure modes be introduced. No safety system will be degraded as a result of this modification. The probability of previously evaluated accidents will not be increased and the possibility of a new accident will not be created.

The fault isolation devices will preclude the failure of the ICC and ICS systems due to a failure of the new display instrumentation. The seismic review should guarantee that the control board will not be adversely affected by the additional displays. Thus, the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased.

No plant parameter that is controlled by Tech Specs or that has any effect on the plant safety/design analyses will be changed by this modification. Thus, no margin of safety will be reduced. There are no unreviewed safety questions involved with the NSM.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | Complete | Complete | Complete | N/A |

ON - 12574

DESCRIPTION: These modifications rearranged HPI system controls on the control board. The control switch for the temperature interlock bypass involving valve HP-5 was also changed. In addition to these changes, a receiver gauge to display both channels of the letdown storage tank level indication was added to the board.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Rearrangement of HPI system controls will not have an impact on the ability of the HPI system to perform its functions. The containment isolation function of HP5 is not affected by replacement of the temperature interlock bypass switch on the control board. The recorder and computer input will be unaffected by this modification. The function of the letdown storage tank to provide volume control and chemical adjustment of the reactor coolant system will be unaffected by this modification. A seismic review has been conducted. Appendix R has been considered for the new LDST receiver cable route.

Since the function of the equipment is not affected by these modifications, the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. No new failure modes are created, therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety which is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR will not be created. The consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety which were previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased because the safety systems of the plant are not affected by the changes made in these modifications. The equipment involved with these modifications will be at least as reliable as it was prior to these modifications and no safety limits or reactor coolant system parameters are affected. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases of the Tech Specs will not be reduced. No unreviewed safety questions are judged to be involved or created by these modifications.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | Complete | Complete | Complete | N/A |

ON - 22575

DESCRIPTION: The modification installed an additional set of controls (1 control switch and 2 indicating lights) for the Reactor Building Auxiliary Vent Fans Cooling Water Isolation Valve and the RB Cooling Unit Cooling Water Isolation Valve.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Control boards 3AB3 and 3VB3, and the control circuits for valves 3LPSW-565 and 3LPSW-566 will be affected by this NSM. All of these components are QA Condition 1. The LPSW system provides cooling water for normal and emergency services throughout the station. During an accident, if RB pressure reaches 3 psig, ES channels 5 and 6 send signals to these valves so that LPSW will be redirected from the RB Aux fan coolers to RBCU 3B. These signals close 3LPSW-565 and open 3LPSW-566. During shutdown the LPSW system removes decay heat.

This NSM will not change the existing switch and indicating light wiring or the way it operates. This NSM will not affect the way valves operate or the ability to function as designed. A control board seismic review has been performed that indicates no adverse affect. There are no 10CFR50 Appendix R concerns. This NSM will not increase the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR. This NSM will not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR. No new failure modes will be created by this NSM. Therefore, this NSM will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety different than already evaluated in the FSAR. This NSM will not affect any key safety parameters and therefore will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis to any technical specification. Based on this discussion, no unreviewed safety questions are judged to be involved or created by these modifications.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | Incomplete | Complete | Complete | N/A |

ON - 22576

DESCRIPTION: This modification will rearrange some components on control board AB-1 and UB-2. All of the meters and switches being moved are non-QA. AB-1 and UB-2 are QA-1 components. Therefore, the mounting of the components being moved will be done according to QA-4 requirements to assure no adverse seismic interaction with the boards. There is a control circuit change to accommodate new switches for the boric acid mix pump and concentrated boric acid transfer pump. These new switches combine the pump control switches with their respective batch counter control switches. This modification also removes two unused, disconnected switches from AB-1. The control board changes have been reviewed for seismic response concerns.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This modification does not affect any systems or component relevant to accident initiation or degrade the function of any equipment important to safety. Therefore, the probability of previously evaluated accidents and malfunctions of equipment are not increased. The function of the systems affected have not changed and these systems have no automatic emergency functions. The consequences of previously evaluated accidents and malfunctions of equipment are not increased. No new accidents are created by this modification. There are no new failure modes introduced by the control sitch combinations. All actions utilizing these switches are manual. Therefore, no new malfunctions of equipment are created. Operability of the CBA storage tank and its flow path including the CBA transfer pump is not degraded by this modification as required by Tech. Spec. No safety limits, setpoints or assumptions in any safety analysis have been affected by this modification. Therefore, the margin of safety defined in the bases to the Tech Specs is not reduced. There are no unreviewed safety questions resulting from this modification.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | Incomplete | Complete | Complete | N/A |

ON - 12577

DESCRIPTION: This modification will rearrange the HPI and LPI engineered safeguards (ES) bypass pushbutton controls on the control boards. These relocations will move the controls to areas near system indicators.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Movement of the HPI and LPI ES bypass pushbuttons will not affect the ability of the HPI or LPI system to fulfill the normal or emergency functions of the system. Because the modification consists of simply moving the control location and the function and purpose of the control is not affected, the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety which was previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. Since channel separation is maintained and the function of the controls is not affected, the consequences of an accident or malfunctions of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. No new failure modes are created by these changes and in fact a case can be made for more reliable operator performance since the new control location is closer to system indicators. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR will not be created. Since no safety or design limits are adversely affected, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any Tech Specs will not be reduced. Based on this discussion, no unreviewed safety question is judged to be involved with this modification.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Complete | Incomplete | Incomplete | N/A |

ON - 12579
ON - 22579

DESCRIPTION: This modification will rearrange the HPI and LPI engineered safeguards (ES) bypass pushbutton controls on the control boards.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Movement of the HPI and LPI ES bypass pushbuttons will not affect the ability of the HPI or LPI system to fulfill the normal or emergency functions of the system. Because the modification consists of simply moving the control location and the function and purpose of the control is not affected, the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety which was previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. Since channel separation is maintained and the function of the controls is not affected, the consequences of an accident or malfunctions of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. No new failure modes are created by these changes and in fact a case can be made for more reliable operator performance since the new control location is closer to system indicators. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR will not be created. Since no safety or design limits are adversely affected, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any Tech Specs will not be reduced. Based on this discussion, no unreviewed safety question is judged to be involved with this modification.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | Complete | Complete | Complete | N/A |

ON - 22584

DESCRIPTION: The pressure gage which provides indication of flow to the RC pump motor cooler will be replaced under this modification. The gage will be replaced with a C/P pressure switch. The pressure switch will provide indication of LPSW flow to the RC pump motor cooler and also provide a signal to the OAC on low flow conditions.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The indication is non-safety-related and the cabling is also non-safety-related. The pressure switch will not affect the LPSW piping any more than the present pressure gage. In addition there will be no impact on LPSW flow characteristics nor any seismic routings.

Since the LPSW system or any other system is not adversely affected by this replacement, the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased nor is the probability or consequence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR increased. The nature of the pressure switch and the fact that the LPSW system is not adversely affected preclude their potential role as event initiators. This modification will not create the possibility of an unanalyzed accident or create the possibility of an unanalyzed malfunction of equipment important to safety.

Operating parameters, safety limits and setpoints will remain the same. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any Tech Spec is not reduced by the modification. There are no unreviewed safety questions involved.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | Incomplete | Complete | Incomplete | N/A |

ON - 12639

DESCRIPTION:

This modification will replace the existing Transient Monitor System (TMS). The TMS is contained within a cabinet and will be mounted in the control room. Power will be supplied from the same source. Inputs to the TMS will include those inputs to the existing system plus inputs from the Operator Aid Computer (OAC), the Integrated Control System (ICS), the Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation (TSI), the Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) System, and annunciator systems. Cables will be run from the cable room to the control room and within the control room to connect to the new TMS. No other systems are affected.

SAFETY EVALUATION:

All components affected by this modification are nonsafety with the exception of the ICC. However, the portion of the ICC where connections will be made is non safety and is isolated from the safety-related portions. The TMS cabinet will be mounted QA4 to prevent interaction with adjacent components during a seismic event. There are no applicable design basis accidents. All cabling is non safety and a 10CFR50 Appendix R review has been initiated. The existing circuit protection is adequate for the new system. This NSM involves no safety concerns or unanswered safety questions.

| STATUS: | UNIT 1 | UNIT 2 | UNIT 3 | STATION |
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| | Complete | Incomplete | Incomplete | N/A |

ON - 22682

DESCRIPTION: This modification will replace Reactor Building Spray (BS) System pressure switches. The present switches contain teflon wetted materials which when exposed to radiation may fail resulting in a leakage path for radiation into the Control Room. The replacement switches will be designed for exposure to process and environmental radiation to minimize the potential for this radiation leakage.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The new pressure switches are QA 1 and are qualified for the radiation environment. The mounting brackets are qualified for the pressure switch loads and Appendix R separation criteria is not degraded. There the probability of malfunctions of equipment important to safety previously evaluation in the FSAR will not be increased. The pressure switches and their actuation signals do not initiate any FSAR accidents. Therefore, the probability of accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The trip logic and RPS trip and ES actuation set points have not been changed. The instrument accuracy and response times are acceptable for design basis accidents. Also the potential for hydrogen generation is not increased. Therefore, the consequences of accidents and malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. No new failure modes are created so the possibility of new accidents and malfunctions of equipment important to safety will not be created. No RPS or ES set points are changed so margins of safety as defined in the bases to Tech Specs are not reduced. There are no unreviewed safety questions associated with this modification.

| STATUS: | UNIT 1 | UNIT 2 | UNIT 3 | STATION |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Incomplete | Complete | Incomplete | N/A |

ON - 22692

DESCRIPTION: During outages, the equipment hatch cover was suspended from the hoist used to raise it to the open position. This configuration violated ANSI B30.16-1973 and OSHA 1910.179. To improve safety and achieve compliance with the above listed standards this modification provided a structure to support the equipment hatch cover in the open position.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The additional support steel associated with these NSMs is designed and procured to QA-1 standards and so has no credible failure modes which could result from design basis events; therefore, there is no increase in the probability of accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR. These modifications will improve safety during outages when the equipment hatch is open. There will be no attachment to the Reactor Building Liner Plate so containment will not be compromised and no other mitigative systems or components will be affected. It is therefore concluded that the consequences of accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR are not increased. Since no failure mechanisms are identified and the support structure has no active function or interactions with systems, components or structures important to safety, the possibility of accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety different from any already evaluated in the FSAR is not created. No set points or parameters are altered or changed so no margin of safety as defined in the bases to any Tech. Spec. is reduced. There are no unreviewed safety questions associated with this NSM.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | Complete | Complete | Complete | N/A |

ON - 32737

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: These modifications involve sample line reroutes and the addition of a pump to the sample lines for RIA-35. All the sample lines are field routed and non-QA. The return sample lines for RIA-31 will be routed to allow a choice of discharge to either the turbine building trench or the Component Cooling Water (CCW) discharge instead of continuing to RIA-35. These new sample lines will take samples from downstream of the present sample line tap locations. The new tap locations are QA1 and will be installed by wet tap. Pumps will be added to insure proper flow through RIA-35.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The modifications reroute sample lines and have no impact on the function of the sample lines or the process lines from which the samples are being taken. As such, the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety which were previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased.

No new failure modes or operating characteristics are created by this modification. The rerouted sample lines will be field routed and supported. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety which is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR will not be created.

Since the modification has no adverse impact on any safety systems, the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased.

No safety limits or reactor coolant system parameters are affected by this modification. Also, the bases to any technical specification are not affected. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases of any technical specification is not reduced.

Based on this discussion, no unreviewed safety questions are created by or involved with these modifications.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | Incomplete | Incomplete | Complete | N/A |

ON - 52740

DESCRIPTION: This modification will provide a protective cover for the Keowee turbine-generator speed switches. The cover will consist of a constructed steel shell which will encompass the speed switch and adequately attach to the Keowee powerhouse for support.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The Keowee hydro units can provide power to any of the Oconee Units for a reliable emergency onsite source. The speed switches are vital for startup and continued operation of the turbine-generators.

The modification is QA Condition 4. The cover is designed to prevent damage to the speed switches for pipe falling on the cover during an earthquake and power house siding blowing on the cover during high wind loads.

The ventilation of the switches and turbine-generators are not affected. The present switch covers are aluminum and have no ventilation openings. The new covers also do not need ventilation openings. The present switch cover does not cover up the turbine-generator ventilation openings. Neither will the new cover obstruct these openings.

This modification will increase the reliability of Keowee as an emergency backup for Oconee accidents. Therefore, the likelihood or consequences of accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. Also, since the switches are better protected, the probability or consequences of malfunctions of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. Ventilation concerns were considered and no other new failure modes are postulated. Therefore, the possibility of new accidents or malfunctions of equipment are not created. No design/safety limits are adversely affected so no margins of safety as defined in the bases to any Technical Specifications are reduced.

There are no unreviewed safety questions associated with this NSM.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | N/A | N/A | N/A | Complete |

ON - 52758

DESCRIPTION: Oconee Nuclear Station has maintained, in both spent fuel pools, a reserve of empty spent fuel storage spaces beyond the minimum required by the SAR. This reserve provides a safe distance between divers performing maintenance and spent fuel assemblies. It has been projected that the reserve now considered minimal will be diminished in the next refueling outage. By placing aged fuel assemblies at the perimeter nearest maintenance areas, the distance presently taken as being adequately safe for divers can be reduced. Additional safety is provided by placing a removable cage in the pool which is attached to the spent fuel racks. This cage will limit lateral movement and downward vertical movement of the diver so that the new reduced diver/assembly distance is maintained. This modification provides for the construction and installation of the diver restraint cage. There will be no change in fuel pool capacity or assembly configuration.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The presence of the diver restraint cage will not degrade the performance or reliability of the Fuel Pool Cooling System since it will be fabricated of stainless steel and will not produce corrosion products. Therefore, the probability of malfunctions of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased. There will be no effect on the assumptions made in the failure analysis of the Fuel Pool Cooling System so there is no increase in consequences of malfunctions of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The diver restraint cage has no effect on the reliability of the Fuel Handling Machine or Cask Handling Crane. Therefore, these is no increase in the probability of accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR. Calculations which were produced per QA-1 procedures show the added load from the diver restraint cage produces no stress in the spent fuel racks beyond that considered acceptable. So the effect of a dropped assembly or shipping cask is not increased and there is no increase in the consequences of accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR.

As previously stated, there is no increase in stress beyond that allowed by the FSAR. Therefore, the possibility of a malfunction of equipment different from any already evaluated in the FSAR is not created. The cage will weigh less than a fuel assembly so the possibility of an accident different from any already evaluated in the FSAR is not created.

No parameters or initial conditions assumed in the plant safety analysis report are affected so there is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Tech Specs.

There are no unanswered safety questions associated with this modification.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N/A | N/A | N/A | Complete |

ON-52762

DESCRIPTION: This modification will provide a 4 1/2 foot by 8 foot hole in the mezzanine floor of the storage area in the hot machine shop extension. Removable handrails with toe boards will be used to prevent a fall hazard. Currently the existing overhead crane cannot safely load all equipment onto the mezzanine level from the loading platform. This hole will enable the existing crane over the mezzanine area to be used to safely load equipment.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Between outages, large tool cabinets are stored on the mezzanine level of the hot machine shop extension. These cabinets cannot be safely loaded because there is not enough lifting height for the overhead crane. In addition, the overhead crane can not safely load wide equipment because it does not travel far enough out over the loading platform. This modification will allow an existing crane on the mezzanine level to safely raise this equipment to the mezzanine floor.

The slab modification is QA Condition 4 and seismic category 1. An analysis on the concrete floor slab and structural modifications has been performed. The handrail is QA Condition 4. The mezzanine level already exists as a balcony in the hot machine shop extension so there is no impact to any fire protection barriers. There are no radiological concerns associated with this modification.

The probability or consequences of accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR are unchanged as a result of this modification. There also is no effect on any equipment important to the safety of the plant. The addition of another means to get to the balcony will not create another accident scenario or place the plant in an unsafe condition due to an equipment malfunction. There are no changes in any parameters, set points, or safety limits associated with this modification; therefore, there is no impact on the margin of safety as defined in the bases of any Technical Specification.

Based on this discussion, there are no unreviewed safety questions involved with this modification.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | N/A | N/A | N/A | Complete |

ON - 52788

DESCRIPTION: This NSM will replace components in flow loop LW0920. This flow loop monitors and controls flow from the Radwaste Facility (RWF) Liquid Waste and Recycle (LW) System to the Keowee tailrace. This modification will replace the pneumatic components with electrical components, change the loop scale and signals on loop LW0920 from 300 gpm to 200 gpm, and add a convenience alarm for the RWF operators.

This NSM also replaces components in flow loops for the liquid waste influent flow, recycle feed tank influent flow, and turbine building sump effluent flow. The pneumatic square root extracts are being replaced with electronic square root extractors.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The flow loops are not adversely affected by this modification since their functions are not being changed. The isolation of the LW System to the Keowee tailrace by the radiation monitor signal is not affected by this modification. The subject modification is to a QA Condition 2 sub-system of the RWF. The facility and all of the associated systems are non-nuclear safety and non-seismic except for a portion of the building foundation which is designed to prevent the runoff of its liquid inventory following a seismic event. The subject modification is an operational enhancement which does not increase the probability or the consequences of such a release, does not create the possibility for any new type of accident, and does not adversely affect the design bases of the plant or the RWF. The RWF is a remote facility which does not contain any equipment important to safety and the potential for direct or secondary interactions with equipment important to safety does not exist. This will not increase the probability or the consequences of malfunctions of such equipment and will not create the possibility for any new type of malfunction of such equipment. The tech. specs. applicable to radioactive effluents and waste handling are not affected by this and no safety or design limits are adversely affected. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in any Tech. Spec. bases is not reduced.

This modification involves no safety concerns or unanswered safety questions.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | N/A | N/A | N/A | Complete |

ON - 52789

DESCRIPTION: This NSM will replace Radwaste Facility (RWF) pneumatic HVAC air flow rate transmitters with electronic transmitters and an electric to pneumatic transducer. A DC power supply will also be installed in a local terminal cabinet to provide power for the signal loops. Cabling will be required from a 120Vac panelboard to the power supply and from the power supply to each transmitter and transducer. These signal loops will drive existing indicators and a chart recorder.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This NSM will affect RWF HVAC air flow rate transmitters. The subject modification is to a QA Condition 2 sub-system of the RWF. The facility and all of the associated systems are non-nuclear safety and non-seismic except for a portion of the building foundation which is designed to prevent the runoff of its liquid inventory following a seismic event. The subject modification is an operational enhancement which does not increase the probability or the consequences of such a release, does not create the possibility for any new type of accident, and does not adversely affect the design bases of the plant or the RWF. The RWF is a remote facility which does not contain any equipment important to safety and the potential for direct or secondary interactions with equipment important to safety does not exist. This modification, therefore, will not increase the probability or the consequences of malfunctions of such equipment and will not create the possibility for any new type of malfunction of such equipment. The Technical Specifications applicable to radioactive effluents and waste handling are not affected by this and no margins of safety as defined in any Tech. Spec. bases are related to the operation of the RWF.

There are no unanswered safety questions associated with this NSM.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
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| | N/A | N/A | N/A | Complete |

ON - 12797
ON - 22797

DESCRIPTION: This modification replaced the existing internal oil circulating system for the polar crane trolley gear case with an external system.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The polar crane is located in the Reactor Building. The polar crane is mounted QA Condition 4 to the circular wide flange beam, but the crane is made of non-QA Condition components, including the present oil circulating system.

The FSAR states that the polar crane (unloaded condition) is a Class 1 structure. Class 1 structures are defined as those which prevent uncontrolled release of radioactivity and are designed to withstand all loadings without loss of function. Calculation OSC-3639, "160 Ton Polar Crane QA Condition Clarification and Miscellaneous Modifications," Revision 1, states that the polar crane is not required to mitigate any uncontrolled releases of radioactivity and, therefore, is not required to withstand all loadings without loss of function. However, the structural failure of the crane may cause uncontrolled releases of radioactivity by damage to the safe shutdown systems or decay heat removal systems. This reference examines why the polar crane is stated to be Class 1. The Class 1 classification primarily has to do with the order of events pertaining to the submittal of the FSAR, the issuance of QA and seismic criteria, and the issuance of Nuclear Regulatory Guide 1.29. This reference states that at the time the FSAR was submitted, categorizing the polar crane as a Class 1 structure in an unloaded condition by strict partial definition (structural failure causing radiological release) due to its need to remain on its rails during and after a seismic occurrence was applicable. With the QA condition classes now available, designing the crane to QA Condition 4 criteria allows for the crane to remain on its rails during and after a seismic event. Also, Duke's response to NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," stated procedures were written to give safe load paths for crane operation and load handling during operating modes used during crane operation. Crane operation is limited to hot shutdown -- reactor is shutdown, and cold shutdown -- fuel present in the core. As part of the response to NUREG-0612, Duke performed an analysis to show that the consequences of postulated load drops from the polar crane are within established limits. This response determined that non-structural failure or loading failure of the polar crane would not, directly or indirectly , result in a loss of function of any safe shutdown or decay heat removal systems.

The present oil circulating system is an internal system to the crane. The new oil circulating system will use portions of the existing system, but will have new components that are external to the polar crane. These new components include a pump which will be mounted to the polar crane. The mounting of the new oil system has been analyzed for seismic loads but is not to be classified as QA

Condition 4. The new system is not to be classified as QA Condition 4 since non-QA Condition materials are used in the mounting. Non-QA Condition materials are used since the polar crane is made of non-QA Condition material. The polar crane is mounted QA Condition 4 to the circular wide flange beam, but is made of non-QA Condition components.

The new components will add insignificant weight to the polar crane wide flange supports. The new oil collection system is environmentally qualified for the normal Reactor Building environment. The crane is not required for post-accident conditions and has no safety functions. The end plates on the new pump motor are aluminum and the motor stator is zinc. The entire motor is small and weighs approximately 20 pounds. The amount of zinc and aluminum is small. Therefore, the potential for hydrogen generation during a LOCA due to zinc water, zinc boric acid, or aluminum boric acid reactions is not significantly increased.

There are no unreviewed safety questions associated with this modification.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Complete | Complete | Complete | N/A |

ON - 22803

DESCRIPTION: This modification replaced 6.9kV switchgear cubicle 1TA-2 and spliced or replaced several cables in the area.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This NSM will affect switchgear cubicle 1TA-2 and several cables terminating in that switchgear or passing through the area. Switchgear cubicle 1TA-2 is not safety-related, but several of the affected cables are safety-related. Two of the terminal boxes and the terminal blocks inside the boxes will be QA1, and all the boxes will be mounted QA4. All safety-related cables will be terminated in QA1 boxes. The boxes will be mounted in the Turbine Building where no special equipment qualification is required. A 10 CFR 50 Appendix R review for the cabling has been initiated.

This modification involves no safety concerns or unreviewed safety questions.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Complete | Complete | Complete | N/A |

ON - 22805

DESCRIPTION: Replace carbon steel piping and components in the Condenser Circulation Water (CCW) System line to and from the turbine driven emergency feedwater (EFW) pump turbine oil cooler with stainless steel piping and components. The piping to be replaced consists of all piping from the connections on the 78 inch CCW lines thru the pump and cooler and back to the 78 inch line, as well as the branch lines provided for portable air-powered pumps. The carbon steel piping and components need to be replaced because of fouling.

Piping presently embedded in concrete will be replaced with piping to be routed and supported above the floor. All carbon steel piping that is not embedded will be replaced with no change to the routing. The abandoned embedded piping will be cut at floor level and capped or plugged.

The piping is still to be classified as QA Condition 1 class F but will not have a seismic interaction review to determine the effects of non-seismic pipe and equipment on it.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This modification is QA Condition 1 and safety related, although no seismic interaction review was performed. The pipe design temperature and pressure are not changed. The new pipe's wall thickness is less than some of the current piping but the pipe is adequate for the design conditions. The new piping and components are designed to allow adequate flow for cooling of the turbine driven EFW pump turbine oil cooler from either the CCW supply or the HPSW supply. The new piping layout meets net positive suction head (NPSHR) requirements. The pipe stress analysis and support design have been completed.

The EFW pump turbine oil cooler's oil supply and discharge piping are not assured to be seismically qualified. The NRC stated that the potential seismic failure of the turbine driven EFW train, due to failure of the turbine oil system, was acceptable since the motor driven pumps will be operable and provide unaffected redundancy during a seismic event. Thus the CCW cooling water supply to the turbine oil cooler does not have to be seismically qualified for its function since the NRC has evaluated the loss of the turbine driven EFW during a seismic event and has found it acceptable. This NSM still keeps this portion of the CCW System as class F (QA Condition 1 and seismically qualified) except for the seismic interaction potential from non-seismic pipe and equipment.

The flooding potential in the Turbine Building, due to this line breaking from potential seismic interaction damage, is insensitive to flow from such a small line breaking. There are other much larger non-seismic lines tied into the CCW System that could fail in a seismic event so the potential for flood damage is increased insignificantly.

ON - 22805 (Continued)

The LPSW supplied loads are the only safety related loads that can be affected by a pipe break in this CCW piping due to potential seismic damage. The safety related functions of the LPSW supplied loads are insensitive to the impact of lost flow due to a break in this branch line.

This modification involves no unanswered safety questions or safety concerns.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Incomplete | Complete | Incomplete | N/A |

ON - 22817

DESCRIPTION: NSM ON-22817/00 will add the ATWS Mitigation Systems Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) and the Diverse Scram System (DSS). Existing pressure switches for the Main Feedwater pump discharge pressure and the Main Feedwater pump turbine control oil pressure will be used as input for the ASMAC logic. Wide range RCS pressure transmitter loops RCPT0244 and RCPT0245 will be modified to supply a signal to the appropriate channels of the DSS. All instruments to be added are non-safety related, and all other equipment is non-safety with the exception of the isolation devices used to separate safety and non-safety signals. Two channels of automatic control will be established with individual programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Status and alarm indications will be added to the operator control board.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The AMSAC and the DSS are being added to meet the requirements of rule 10CFR50.62 on ATWS mitigation. The system is installed as a non-safety backup to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and is not required to mitigate any of the Chapter 15 accidents. The ATWS system is separated both physically and electrically from any safety-related system, and meets the requirements of the B&W Owners Group Generic ATWS Design Basis Document (10-09-85) approved by the NRC in 1988.

With the present design of the AMSAC and the DSS, the possibility of spurious actuation does exist. It is possible to actuate Emergency Feed Water (EFW) while main feed water is still available, and the DSS design could allow control rod groups to drop while the reactor is at full power. While this does not constitute an unsafe condition, it may create an unnecessary challenge to the Reactor Protection System (RPS). In both of the cases mentioned above, a spurious actuation would require a combination of extremely unlikely events to occur. The logic for the AMSAC and DSS is "two out of two", so in order to actuate, it must receive positive signals from two totally separate trains, and the probability of proceeding to trip or EFW actuation due to normal occurrences is minute.

The possibility for inadvertent actuation of the ATWS Mitigation System does exist. However the probability of inadvertent actuation is small due to the two-out-of-two logic needed for initiation. Also, the NRC has reviewed the design of the system and has issued its approval in the form of a Safety Analysis Report on Oconee's plant-specific submittal. Based on this prior NRC approval and the fact that the appropriate analyses have been performed for additions to the plant (i.e., seismic analysis and Appendix R review), it is determined that this modification does not involve any unreviewed safety questions.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Incomplete | Complete | Incomplete | N/A |

ON - 52838

DESCRIPTION: This modification will provide a method for automatic ventilation of the LW system demineralizer tanks C, D, E, F, G and H. This modification will add an air valve, flexhouse, and quick disconnect to each demineralizer tank. These additions will be made above the isolation valve on the resin fill/high point vent line for each tank. These additional lines will be routed to a common header which terminates at a vent tank. The vent tank has connections to the shielded area sump and the HVAC vacuum header. Automatic removal of any air that becomes trapped in the demineralizer tanks from backflushing or pre-coating the resins will discharge to the HVAC vacuum header. Tubing will be QA Condition 2 through the float valve and non-QA from the float valve on.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The RWF, along with all of its associated systems, is non Nuclear Safety Related. Also, with the exception of portions of the building itself, none of the structures, systems or components of the RWF are required to be seismically qualified. The subject NSM is an operational enhancement which does not adversely affect the design bases of the plant or the RWF.

There are no accidents evaluated in the FSAR involving the RWF or any of its associated systems, so the probabilities of the FSAR accidents are unaffected by any radwaste modification. RWF accidents are evaluated; however, the worst-case RWF release is bounded by 10CFR20 limits and the design basis of the RWF is not adversely affected. The creation of a new accident scenario not previously evaluated is not possible as a result of this modification. The remote RWF does not contain any equipment that is important to safety. The NSM does not affect the probability of any malfunction of such equipment. Since no plant system is degraded, there is no possibility of a new malfunction of equipment not addressed in the FSAR.

The proposed modification does not degrade any plant safety system. The consequences of any accident or equipment malfunction are not increased. This mod will not result in any additional radioactive gaseous effluents or unmonitored releases. Therefore, none of the Technical Specifi- cations applicable to radioactive waste management are adversely affected by the modification. No plant parameter that has any effect on the plant's safety/design analyses is impacted. No margin of safety is reduced.

Based on the above analysis, there are no unreviewed safety questions involved with the NSM.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N/A | N/A | N/A | Complete |

ON - 22849

DESCRIPTION: These urgent modifications replace flex hoses on the Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) portion of the Emergency Feedwater system with hard pipe. The flex hoses have not been reliable in service. They have leaked and blown completely on several occasions. The replacement piping will be carbon steel, which is compatible with existing ASW piping.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The low head Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) System is a backup system used to provide steam generator decay heat removal. This system is of particular importance during a tornado scenario, where the Auxiliary Service Water pump provides decay heat removal for all three units. Redundant trains of ASW for each steam generator are achieved by routing on train through the East Penetration room and one train through the West Penetration room. Also, the flex hose being replaced by this urgent modification serves no active protection function during a tornado (such as the decoupling of connected piping to prevent further damage).

None of the Technical Specifications applicable to secondary side decay heat removal are adversely affected and the modification does not adversely affect any plant safety limits, design parameters, or setpoints.

Based on the above discussion, it is determined that this modification involves no safety concerns or unreviewed safety questions and no FSAR or Technical Specification changes are required.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Incomplete | Complete | Incomplete | N/A |

ON - 52850

DESCRIPTION:

A. Install three undervoltage relays to monitor the switchyard voltage at the line side of each of the three startup transformers. Each of the undervoltage relays will be connected to one of three existing single phase spare PTs. These relays which are to be set at approximately 222.5KV will be connected in a two out of three configuration and timed for approximately 15 sec. to provide a permissive in each of the two redundant switchyard isolate circuits thru one of two redundant Cutler Hammer relays. This logic will provide a statalarm in the Unit One and Two Control Room, and the PSC, an event recorder point, and would initiate switchyard isolate if an ES signal is generated in any of the three units.

   This logic, which is safety-related, will be fed from the switchyard 125VDC system and is designed to be fail safe.

B. Remove the logic that considers the status of PCB20 (Unit 1) and PCB23 (Unit 2) from the E breaker automatic close circuitry for Units 1 & 2.

   Install switchyard isolate logic in the automatic closing circuit of each (E) breakers of Unit 3 to prevent fast transfer if switchyard isolate signal is generated from either switchyard isolate channels.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The External Grid Trouble Protection System (EGTPS) is designed to detect several undervoltage and underfrequency conditions in the 230kV switchyard and take specific actions to isolate the Keowee overhead power path from the transmission system if an undervoltage or underfrequency condition occurs. PIR 4-090-0029 was written to address a difference between the minimum analyzed voltage for starting LOCA loads and the voltage at which the EGTPS is automatically initiated.

Voltage will be measured by existing QA-4 mounted nonsafety potential transformers (PTs). The most common failure modes of a PT would be to indicate a lower voltage (shorted windings) or no voltage (total failure). These failure modes are in the safe direction. It is improbable that a PT would fail such that a higher than actual voltage is indicated. These same failure modes already exist since the present method of visual monitoring relies on nonsafety-related equipment. Safety-related voltage relay contacts used in the switchyard isolation logic will be arranged in a 2 out of 3 (2/3) logic. The outcome of the 2/3 logic will be connected to actuate two redundant safety-related relays. Contacts from these relays will be connected in parallel, and these parallel contacts will be connected in series with a parallel combination of safety-related LOCA signal contacts from both channel of all three units. This relay logic will be connected to activate both EGTPS channels. If the EGTPS is actuated by a failure of this new logic,

unit generation would not be interrupted since the EGTPS does not operate the unit tie breakers.

The E breaker automatic closing circuit changes will affect the logic deciding whether to perform a fast (150 milliseconds) or a delayed (1 second) transfer. This change will not adversely affect the ability of the breakers to transfer, only the speed of a transfer. The difference in the speed of a transfer (150 milliseconds vs. 1 second) has no safety significance. As documented in the operability evaluation for PIR 4-089-0193, the E breakers are protected against out of synchronism transfers during design basis events. The part of the modification that changes the E breaker automatic closing circuit is designed to enhance the overall reliability of the 4.16kV essential auxiliary power system. These E breaker automatic closing circuit changes will require minor rewiring and the addition of some relays. These relays will be safety-related and seismically mounted inside a safety-related cabinet.

This modification involves no unanswered safety questions.

| STATUS: | Unit 1 | Unit 2 | Unit 3 | Station |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Incomplete | Complete | Incomplete | N/A |

DUKE POWER COMPANY

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Summary of Procedure Changes
Completed under 10 CFR 50.59

Oconee Nuclear Station

Summary of Issued Procedures and Procedure Changes Completed Under 10CFR50.59 and Reviewed by the Nuclear Safety Review Board for 1990

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| IP/1/A/305/003 Change 66 | This procedure change removed the Intermediate Range (IR) and Source Range (SR) test, revised instruction for Removing/Returning the system to service, and deleted the Control Rod Drive Breaker (CRD) and Reactor Trip Assembly (RTA) Logic test. These tests will be handled by other procedures and the requirements of both FSAR and Tech. Specs. will be met. |
| IP/1/A/305/003A Change 62 | This procedure change removed the Source Range (SR) test, revised instruction for Removing/Returning the system to service, change the Flux/Imbalance Flow test inputs for fuel cycle 13, and deleted the Control Rod Drive Breaker (CRD) and Reactor Trip Assembly (RTA) Logic test. These tests will be handled by other procedures and the requirements of both FSAR and Tech. Specs. will be met. |
| IP/1/A/305/003B Change 61 | This procedure change removed the Intermediate Range (IR) test, revised instruction for Removing/Returning the system to service, change the Flux/Imbalance Flow test inputs for fuel cycle 13, and deleted the Control Rod Drive Breaker (CRD) and Reactor Trip Assembly (RTA) Logic test. These tests will be handled by other procedures and the requirements of both FSAR and Tech. Specs. will be met. |
| IP/1/A/305/003C Change 64 | This procedure change removed the Source Range (SR) test, revised instruction for Removing/Returning the system to service, change the Flux/Imbalance Flow test inputs for fuel cycle 13, and delete the control rod drive breaker and reactor trip assembly logic test. These tests will be handled by other procedures and the requirements of both FSAR and Tech. Specs. will be met. |
| IP/1/A/305/003D Change 68 | This procedure change removed the Intermediate Range (IR) test, revised instruction for Removing/Returning the system to service, change the Flux/Imbalance Flow test inputs for fuel cycle 13, and deleted the Control Rod Drive Breaker (CRD) and Reactor Trip Assembly (RTA) Logic test. These tests will be handled by other procedures and the requirements of both FSAR and Tech. Specs. will be met. |
| IP/0/A/330/3A Change 20 | This change to the procedure allows the use of a Multi-Amp timer for obtaining control rod drop times in the event that problems are encountered in trying to obtain these times from the unit computer. Also, the procedure is revised to reflect the new method of |

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| IP/O/A/330/3A<br>Change 20 (cont.) | performing the drop test as specified by the Performance group. This method consists of dropping Group 1 through 5, then Group 6, and then Group 7 so that all groups are not pulled at one time. This change does not deviate form the requirement of Tech. Spec. |
| CP/O/B/2002/08<br>Change 6 | This procedure provides steps to allow the addition of hydrazine to the pressurizer during unit start up. This allows the pressurizer to operate at high temperature with basically oxygen saturated water thus minimizing corrosion. The actual volume of hydrazine and flush water added to the pressurizer will less than 1 gallon therefore a boron dilution event could not occur. Calculations performed indicate that the amount of hydrazine added to the pressurizer will not cause an inadvertent increase in the pressurizer pressure or temperature. |
| CP/1/A/2002/04C<br>Change 7 | This procedure gives instructions for the new Post Accident Liquid Sampling was system installed per NSM-22614. The FSAR will be required to be updated because some of the sample point locations are not described in the FSAR. |
| CP/1/A/2002/04D<br>Change 9 | This procedure gives instructions for the new Post Accident Liquid Sampling was system installed per NSM-22614, The FSAR will be required to be updated because some of the sample point locations are not described in the FSAR. |
| IP/O/B/0330/008<br>Change 4 | This procedure change rewrites the procedure to conform with Appendix F of the NPD procedure development guide and to meet the APM requirement for 2 year review of safety related procedures. This procedure change also revised the prerequisite for the control rod drop test so that only group 1 thru 7 have to be at the I sub 2 limit. Also changed the control rod drive power supplies minimum and maximum voltage values and bandwith value. |
| TN/5/A/2850/00/0<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the installation of electrical equipment that will produce an alarm and provide a permissive for switchyard isolation if the switchyard voltage drops to a preset under voltage value. If an ES actuation from any unit occurs while the switchyard voltage is less than 22.5KV, the external grid protection system will automatically isolate the switchyard. Also, the fast transfer circuitry of all three units (E) breaker will be modified to remove the logic that considers the red bus as an alternate source. Appropriate measures are in the procedure for sub system removal and restoration, LCOs, and compliance with Tech. Spec. |

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| TN/2/A/2682/00/AK1<br>Original | The existing Mercoid pressure switches contained teflon wetted materials which when exposed to radiation, may fail resulting in a leakage path for radiation into the control room. This modification implementation procedure replaced existing Reactor Building Spray system pressure switches BSPS-18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 65, 67, and 68 with pressure switches suitable for exposure to radiation. These switches give input to the RPS and ES systems. Unit 2 will be at cold shutdown during the implementation of this procedure. |
| TN/2/A/2806/AM1<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the following: 1) isolation of the reactor building cooling units 2A, 2B and 2C including the four auxiliary cooling units. 2) Replacement of containment isolation valves 2LPSW-18, 2LPSW-21 and 2LPSW-24. 3) Replacement of the existing valve operators with limitorque electric motor operators and 4) Modify two supports in the turbine building. This work will be done while the RCS pressure is less than 250 degrees F and the unit is subcritial. Containment isolation is maintained during refueling activities. |
| TN/2/A/2458/0/BM1<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides detailed instructions for the replacement of valves 2FDW-106 and 2FDW-108, also the modification of 3 support restraints and the removal of another, in the Auxiliary Building Penetration Rooms. Unit 2 will be at cold shutdown and containment isolation will be maintained during fuel movement. |
| TN/2/A/2422/0/AS1<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the following: modifying structural steel above 2RIA-47, 48, and 49, replacement of 2RIA-43, 44, 45, 46, 47,48,and 49. Also the removal and reinstallation of the spent fuel pool (SFP) filtered exhaust ductwork to allow the RIA's to be prestaged near the vent stack. This procedure ensures that fuel movement not take place while the SFP ductwork is out of service. |
| MP/0/A/1100/016<br>Change 5 | Major rewrite, this procedure is for the Reactor Building cooling units- coils- rodding, back flushing, chemical cleaning, and visual inspection. During the implementation of the procedure the Tech Specs 4.5.2 requires the LPSW flow through the RBCU cooler must be 1400 gpm. No changes are needed to the FSAR. Performance of the procedure does not in any way alter the function of the coils from their design as originally evaluated in the FSAR. |

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| MP/0/A/1100/018<br>Change 3 | Major rewrite, this procedure is for the Reactor Building cooling units- coils- cleaning air side only. Performance of the procedure does not in any way alter the function of the coils from their design as originally evaluated in the FSAR. Neither the Tech Specs or the FSAR were affected by this change. |
| MP/0/A/3009/011<br>Change 3 | Major rewrite, this procedure is for the Reactor Building cooling unit- motor - disassembly inspection and reassembly. This work is done after the motor has been removed from service and relocated into the machine shop. |
| TN/2/A/2805/0<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the replacement of the existing carbon steel piping to and from the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump oil cooler with stainless steel piping. The work will be implemented while the affected unit's RCS temperature is less than 250 degrees Fahrenheit. This procedure ensures that prior to system operability, all functional test requirement are satisfied. |
| TN/2/A/2245/2/BK1<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instruction for the replacement of existing instrumentations to main steam and emergency feedwater valves. The implementation of this procedure will be done while the affected unit is at cold shut down. The FSAR and the Tech specs 4.9 will not be affected by the implementation of this procedure. |
| TN/2/A/2422/1/AL1<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the replacement of reactor building monitors (RIAs-47, 48, 49 and 49A) and unit vent monitors (RIAs 43, 44, 45 and 46). The implementation of this procedure will be done while the affected unit is at cold shut down. Necessary monitors will be functional during fuel movement and grab samples will be obtained as required by Tech Specs. |
| TN/1/A/2484/0/BK1<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the replacement of manual valve operator with a new Rotork motor operator on valve 1CCW-268, installation of a flow transmitter and installation of a pump suction pressure switch in the SSF pump room. The SSF will be in a scheduled outage while the operator for valve 1CCW-268 is being installed and the SSF Aux. Service Water System will be out of service. The SSF ASW will be returned to service within 7 days or the affected units will be in hot shutdown within 12 hours per TS 3.18.5. |

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| TN/2/A/2422/0/AK1<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the replacement of a isokinetic sampler,and the removal and reinstallation of 2RIA-56, inside the vent stack. Also the replacement of 2RIA-43 thru 49. Temporary sample lines are installed while the RIAs and the sampler are installed. The procedure ensures that Operations is notified prior to removing equipment from service so that appropriate measures for TS 3.5.5-2 are taken. |
| TN/3/A/2484/0/BK1<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the replacement of manual valve operator with a new Rotork motor operator on valves 3CCW-287 and 3CCW-268, installation of a flow transmitter and installation of a pump suction pressure switch in the SSF pump room. The SSF will be in a scheduled outage while the operator for valves 3CCW-268 and 3CCW-287 are being installed and the SSF Aux. Service Water System will be out of service. The SSF ASW will be returned to service within 7 days or the affected units will be in hot shutdown within 12 hours per TS 3.18.5. |
| TN/2/A/2484/0/AK1<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the replacement of manual valve operator with a new Rotork motor operator on valves 2CCW-287 and 2CCW-268, installation of a flow transmitter and installation of a pump suction pressure switch in the SSF pump room. The SSF will be in a scheduled outage while the operator for valve 2CCW-268 is being installed and the SSF Aux. Service Water System will be out of service. The SSF ASW will be returned to service within 7 days or the affected units will be in hot shutdown within 12 hours per TS 3.18.5. Replacement of valve operator for valve 2CCW-287 will be preformed during the unit 2 outage. Since Unit 2 will be in cold shut down, the operability concerns of TS 3.18 are not applicable. |
| IP/3/A/0301/003G<br>Change 39 | NI-7 Power Range calibration, this procedure change rewrites the procedure to conform with Appendix F of the NPD procedure development guide and to meet the APM requirement for 2 year review of safety related procedures. Technical changes made to the procedure were to enhance the manner in which it is preformed. This procedure no longer removes from service nor returns to service RPS channels. This action has been assigned to other procedures. |

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| IP/2/A/0301/003H<br>Change 44 | NI-8 Power Range calibration, this procedure change rewrites the procedure to conform with Appendix F of the NPD procedure development guide and to meet the APM requirement for 2 year review of safety related procedures. Technical changes made to the procedure were to enhance the manner in which it is preformed. This procedure no longer removes from service nor returns to service RPS channels. This action has been assigned to other procedures. |
| IP/3/A/0301/003H<br>Change 40 | NI-8 Power Range calibration, this procedure change rewrites the procedure to conform with Appendix F of the NPD procedure development guide and to meet the APM requirement for 2 year review of safety related procedures. Technical changes made to the procedure were to enhance the manner in which it is preformed. This procedure no longer removes from service nor returns to service RPS channels. This action has been assigned to other procedures. |
| TN/2/A/2858/0<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the installation of a full flow test loop for each Motor Driven Emergency Pump. The work under this TN will be preformed when Unit 2 RCS has reached a temperature less than or equal to 250 degrees Fahrenheit, so that the affected equipment will not be required respond to any accident. |
| TN/2/A/2858/0<br>Change 1 | This procedure change delete the step to install a pressure gauge that was to measure the Motor Driven Emergency Pump full flow test pressure. This gauge was deleted because other means were available to obtain this measurement. Steps were added to remove support/restraints to allow for hydro testing. These changes did not affect the Tech Specs nor the FSAR. |
| MP/0/A/1130/036<br>Change 2 | OTSG - TUBE - MECHANICAL PLUGGING/SLEEVING, this procedure rewrite, coordinates activities to allow steam generator maintenance. No physical work is done by this procedure, all activities coordinated by this procedure are done while unit is at cold shutdown. |
| MP/0/3009/007<br>Change 8 | Reactor Building cooling fan motor removal and replacement this change deleted steps for setting up cool work area around RBCUs. Requirement of TS 3.3.5 and 4.5.2 must be met prior to removing motor from service with unit at power. |
| OP/0/A/1104/11<br>Change 28 | High pressure service water, this change adds the new HPSW valves that were installed under NSM-2114. Valves to the backup IA compressor have been closed and instructions provided to operations to advise them of system restraints. |

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| AP/1/A/1700/22<br>Change 3 | Loss of instrument air, this change required due to NSM-2114 addition of new IA compressor. The change added the new compressor to the procedure and does not affect safety concerns. |
| TN/1/A/2422/0/AK1<br>Change 1 | This procedure change provides instructions to reduce air flow through the unit 1 vent stack to allow personnel access. TS 3.1, 3.8.4, and table 4.1-3 will be met and the unit will be at cold shut down. |
| TN/1/A/2422/0/AK1<br>Change 2 | This modification procedure change moved steps within the procedure to ensure temporary sample lines are in place to allow samples to be taken while RIAs- 43, 44, 45 and 46 are out of service and to remove the temporary sample lines after the new RIA have been placed in service. |
| OP/0/A/1106/27<br>Change 13 | Compressed air system, this change was require as a result of modifications to the instrument air system per NSM-2114. The change provides the operator with direction to startup and remove from service the new equipment. The addition of the new instrument air compressors and dryers provides addition protection against the lost of the instrument air system. |
| TN/5/A/2855/00/AL1<br>Change 1 | This change used jumper on switchyard isolate relays to trip PCB 9 to prevent violation of tech. spec. by isolating Keowee emergency start channel with PCB 9 out of service. Keowee emergency start isolation was performed prior to taking the over head out of service. No new safety concerns created by this change. |
| IP/0/B/0391/02<br>Change 5 | Radwaste Facility Resin Sluice Pump Pressure and Flow, this procedure performs string checks on flow instrumentation. This change deleted time delay relays and their data sheets sense they are no longer used; deleted instruction sheet and data sheet for E/P converter and added them to another procedure; changed selector station out put reading; changed controller program polarity. These changes were the result of NSM-1794. FSAR does not address this procedure and no TS were affected by this changed. |

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| TN/3/A/2806/AM1<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the following: 1) isolation of the reactor building cooling units 3A, 3B and 3C including the four auxiliary cooling units. 2) Replacement of containment isolation valves 3LPSW-18, 3LPSW-21, 3LPSW-24 and DMV-618. 3) Replacement of the existing valve operators with limitorque electric motor operators. This work will be done while the RCS pressure is less than 250 degrees F and the unit is subcritial. Containment isolation is maintained during refueling activities. |
| TN/2/A/2805/0<br>Change 1 | This procedure was revised to include step to preform a freeze plug on the CCW piping in order to replace valve 2CCW-88 and to use demineralized water to flush pipes instead of system water. The original safety evaluation will not change due to this procedure change. |
| TN/5/A/2855/00/AL1<br>Change 2 | Changed the duration of the LCO from 72 hours to 24 hours. This was the result of an interpretation of the Tech. Spec. . No new safety concerns created by this change. |
| TN/5/A/2855/00/AL1<br>Change 3 | Changed relay to be jumpered from 94/F2B to 94/V2B and changed contacts from 3 & 4 to 3 & 5. No new safety concerns created by this change. |
| TN/5/A/2855/00/AL1<br>Change 4 | Added step to move wire from 9L to 9L1. Added step to terminate spared conductors in SYTC5 and install jumper. Added note to clarify the ending of LCO. No new safety concerns created by this change. |
| TN/5/A/2855/00/AL1<br>Change 5 | Added step to remove spared internal wires. No new safety concerns created by this change. |
| TN/5/A/2855/00/AL1<br>Change 6 | Remove step that verifies that PCB 9 is tripped because PCB has already been tripped. No new safety concerns created by this change. |
| TN/5/A/2855/00/AL1<br>Change 7 | Added enclosure 9.1 and added step to refer to enclosure 9.1. Enclosure 9.1 provides for circuit testing. No new safety concerns created by this change. |
| TN/5/A/2855/00/AL1<br>Change 8 | Remounted a relay due to vibration problems. No new safety concerns created by this change. |
| TN/5/A/2855/00/AL1<br>Change 9 | Added enclosure to replace timer that was damaged during functional verification. No new safety concerns created by this change. |

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| TN/5/A/2855/00/0<br>Change 1 | This modification implementation procedure modifies the 230 KV switchyard grid separation logic circuits and PCB 9 control circuit. This is to allow the Reactor coolant pumps time to trip prior to the closing of Keowee generator breakers ACB 1 and 2, thus preventing possible load sheds of essential equipment during loss of the external grid. Change 1 performs Keowee Emergency start isolation before taking the overhead line out of service as allowed by Tech. Spec 3.7. |
| TN/1/A/2849/0<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the isolation, disconnection and replacement of an existing 6 in. flex hose (with carbon steel) in the Auxiliary Service Water System. This procedure adequately address the system/unit status and notifies Operations before isolation and corrective actions will be implemented prior to the removing from service any part of the Auxiliary Service Water System. |
| TN/2/A/2849/0<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the isolation, disconnection and replacement of an existing 6 in. flex hose (with carbon steel) in the Auxiliary Service Water System. This procedure adequately addresses the system/unit status and notifies Operations before isolation and corrective actions will be implemented prior to the removing from service any part of the Auxiliary Service Water System. |
| TN/3/A/2849/0<br>Original | This modification implementation procedure provides instructions for the isolation, disconnection and replacement of an existing 6 in. flex hose (with carbon steel) in the Auxiliary Service Water System. This procedure adequately address the system/unit status and notifies Operations before isolation and corrective actions will be implemented prior to the removing from service any part of the Auxiliary Service Water System. |
| IP/2/A/0301/003F<br>Change 45 | Nuclear Instrumentation I-6 Power Range Calibration - This procedure has been written to conform with Appendix F of the NPD Procedure Development Guide. In addition, this procedure has also been written to meet the APM requirement.<br><br>This procedure was reviewed and rewritten as required by the Master Plan Item on Procedure Improvement. Also, technical changes have been incorporated to bring the procedure many up to date so that Tech. Spec. and NRC requirements are met. |

IP/2/A/305/03D
Change 67

1) A Caution statement is added to Data Sheet 7 to ensure that both trains of MDEFWP's and flow paths are operable. The Caution statement is to ensure that the MDEFW's are operable so that a situation will not occur where too many components are out of service which could result in a Tech. Spec. violation.

2) Instructions are revised for placing a channel in Manual Bypass and removing the channel from Manual Bypass.

3) Instructions are revised for testing a channel when another channel contains a Dummy Bistable or is being maintained in Manual Bypass.

These changes are designed to provide more stringent administrative controls on the manipulation of RPS channels during testing to minimize the occurrence of Tech. Spec. violations or channel/unit trips and therefore these changes pose no safety concerns.

4) Prerequisite for blocking the RB Evacuation Horn while testing the Source Range channel is deleted.

The RB Evacuation Horn is actuated by the Source Range instruments. Channel D of the RPS is not associated with a Source Range instrument therefore this prerequisite should not be listed in this procedure.

5) The Contact Monitor test for the RC Pump Power Monitors is revised to incorporate new method of operation whereby the RPS channels will trip anytime that two RC Pumps are detected not operating.

Tech. Specs. have been revised so that unit operation with two RC Pumps inoperable is not allowed at any power level or in any pump configuration. This action takes the unit to a known safe state which has been analyzed, therefore no unreviewed safety question is involved and the margin of nuclear safety is not reduced.

6) Clarify status of Manual Bypass indications.

IP/2/A/305/03B
Change 65

1) Instructions are revised for placing a channel Manual Bypass and removing the channel from Manual Bypass.

IP/2/A/305/03B
Change 65 (cont.)

2) Instructions are revised for testing a channel when another channel contains a Dummy Bistable or is being maintained in Manual Bypass.

These changes are designed to provide more stringent administrative controls on the manipulation of RPS channels during testing to minimize the occurrence of Tech. Spec. violations or channel/unit trips and therefore these changes pose no safety concerns.

3) Prerequisite for blocking the RB Evacuation Horn while testing the Source Range channel is deleted.

The RB Evacuation Horn is actuated by the Source Range instruments. Channel B of the RPS is not associated with a Source Range instrument therefore this prerequisite should not be listed in this procedure. Deleting an unnecessary prerequisite poses no safety concerns.

4) The Contact Monitor test for the RC Pump Power Monitors is revised to incorporate new method of operation whereby the RPS channels will trip anytime that two RC Pumps are detected not operating.

The change to trip the RPS channels and consequently the unit whenever two RC Pumps are not operating is more conservative than all previous requirements and is in compliance with the new Tech. Specs. This action takes the unit to a known safe state which has been analyzed, therefore no unreviewed safety question is involved and the margin of nuclear safety is not reduced.

IP/2/A/305/03
Change 69

1) A Caution statement is added to ensure that both trains of MDEFWP's and flow paths are operable.

The Caution statement is to ensure that the MDEFWP's are operable so that a situation will not occur where too many components are out of service which could result in a Tech. Spec. violation.

2) Instructions are revised for placing a channel in Manual Bypass and removing the channel from Manual Bypass.

3) Instructions are revised for testing a channel when another channel contains a Dummy Bistable or is being maintained in Manual Bypass.

IP/2/A/305/03
Change 69 (cont.)

These changes are designed to provide more stringent administrative controls on the manipulation of RPS channels during testing to minimize the occurrence of Tech. Spec. violations or channel/unit trips and therefore these changes pose no safety concerns.

4) Instructions are revised for manipulation of the SASS.

Since the changes are to format of the instructions only, this change poses no safety concerns.

5) The Contact Monitor test for the RC Pump Power Monitors is revised to incorporate new method of operation whereby the RPS channels will trip anytime that two RC Pumps are detected no operating.

The change to trip the RPS channels and consequently the unit whenever two RC Pumps are not operating is more conservative than all previous requirements and is in compliance with the new Tech. Specs. This action takes the unit to a known safe state which has been analyzed, therefore no unreviewed safety question is involved and the margin of nuclear safety is not reduced.

IP/2/A/305/03A
Change 61

1) Some of the Limits and Precautions are deleted from the procedure.

Limits and Precautions for the performance of this procedure are listed in IP/2/A/305/03 which is the instruction package which must accompany this procedure when it is used. There is no need therefore to list all of the Limits and Precautions in both procedures.

2) Instructions are revised for placing a channel in Manual Bypass and removing the channel from Manual Bypass. Also the instructions for performing the procedure when a channel contains a Dummy Bistable are revised.

These changes are designed to provide more stringent administrative controls on the manipulation of RPS channels during testing to minimize the occurrence of Tech. Spec. violations or channel/unit trips and therefore these changes pose no safety concerns.

IP/2/A/305/03A
Change 61 (cont.)

3) The Contact Monitor test for the RC Pump Power Monitors is revised to incorporate new method of operation whereby the RPS channels will trip anytime that two RC Pumps are detected not operating.

The change to trip the RPS channels and consequently the unit whenever two RC Pumps are not operating is more conservative than all previous requirements and is in compliance with the new Tech. Specs. This action takes the unit to a known safe state which has been analyzed, therefore no unreviewed safety question is involved and the margin of nuclear safety is not reduced.

IP/2/A/305/03C
Change 65

1) Instructions are revised for placing a channel in Manual Bypass and removing the channel from Manual Bypass.

2) Instructions are revised for testing a channel when another channel contains a Dummy Bistable or is being maintained in Manual Bypass.

These changes are designed to provide more stringent administrative controls on the manipulation of RPS channels during testing to minimize the occurrence of Tech. Spec. violations or channel/unit trips and therefore these changes pose no safety concerns.

3) The Contact Monitor test for the RC Pump Power Monitors is revised to incorporate new method of operation whereby the RPS channels will trip anytime that two RC Pumps are detected not operating.

The change to trip the RPS channels and consequently the unit whenever two RC Pumps are not operating is more conservative than all previous requirements and is in compliance with the new Tech. Specs. This action takes the unit to a known safe state which has been analyzed, therefore no unreviewed safety question is involved and the margin of nuclear safety is not reduced.

IP/1/A/305/03
Change 64

1) A Caution statement is added to Section 10.11 to ensure that both trains of MDEFWP's and flow paths are operable.

The Caution statement is to ensure that the MDEFWP's are operable so that a situation will not occur where too many components are out of service which could result in a Tech. Spec. violation.

IP/1/A/305/03
Change 64 (cont.)

2) Instructions are revised for placing a channel in Manual Bypass and removing the channel from Manual Bypass.

3) Instructions are revised for testing a channel when another channel contains a Dummy Bistable or is being maintained in Manual Bypass.

These changes are designed to provide more stringent administrative controls on the manipulation of RPS channels during testing to minimize the occurrence of Tech. Spec. violations or channel/unit trips and therefore these changes pose no safety concerns.

4) Instructions are revised for manipulation of the SASS.

Since the changes are to format of the instructions only, this change poses no safety concerns.

5) The Contact Monitor test for the RC Pump Power Monitors is revised to incorporate new method of operation whereby the RPS channels will trip anytime that two RC Pumps are detected not operating.

The changes to trip the RPS channels and consequently the unit whenever two RC Pumps are not operating is more conservative than all previous requirements and is in compliance with the new Tech. Specs. This action takes the unit to a known safe state which has been analyzed, therefore no reviewed safety question is involved and the margin of nuclear safety is not reduced.

IP/1/A/305/03A
Change 60

1) The Limits and Precautions are deleted from this procedure.

Limits and Precautions for the performance of this procedure are listed in IP/1/A/305/03 which is the instruction package which must accompany this procedure when it is used. There is no need therefore to list the Limits and Precautions in both procedures.

2) Instructions are revised for placing a channel in Manual Bypass and removing the channel from Manual Bypass.

IP/1/A/305/03A
Change 60 (cont.)

These changes are designed to provide more stringent administrative controls on the manipulation of RPS channels during testing to minimize the occurrence of Tech. Spec. violations or channel/unit trips and therefore these changes pose no safety concerns.

3) The Contact Monitor test for the RC Pump Power Monitors is revised to incorporate new method of operation whereby the RPS channels will trip anytime that two RC Pumps are detected not operating.

The change to trip the RPS channels and consequently the unit whenever two RC Pumps are not operating is more conservative than all previous requirements and is in compliance with the new Tech. Specs. This action takes the unit to a known safe state which has been analyzed, therefore no unreviewed safety question is involved and the margin of nuclear safety is not reduced.

IP/1/A/305/03B
Change 59

1) Instructions are revised for placing a channel in Manual Bypass and removing the channel from Manual Bypass.

2) Instructions are revised for testing a channel when another channels contains a Dummy Bistable or is being maintained in Manual Bypass.

These changes are designed to provide more stringent administrative controls on the manipulation of RPS channels during testing to minimize the occurrence of Tech. Spec. violations or channel/unit trips and therefore these changes pose no safety concerns.

3) Prerequisite for blocking the RB Evacuation Horn while testing the Source Range channel is deleted.

The RB Evacuation Horn is actuated by the Source Range instruments. Channel B of the RPS is not associated with a Source Range instrument therefore this prerequisite should not be listed in this procedure. Deleting an unnecessary prerequisite poses no safety concerns.

4) The Contact Monitor test for the RC Pump Power Monitors is revised to incorporate new method of operation whereby the RPS channels will trip anytime that two RC Pumps are detected not operating.

IP/1/A/305/03B
Change 59 (cont.)

The change to trip the RPS channels and consequently the unit whenever two RC Pumps are not operating is more conservative than all previous requirements and is in compliance with the new Tech. Specs. This action takes the unit to a known safe state which has been analyzed, therefore no unreviewed safety question is involved and the margin of nuclear safety is not reduced.

IP/1/A/305/03C
Change 62

1) Instructions are revised for placing a channel in Manual Bypass and removing the channel from Manual Bypass.

2) Instructions are revised for testing a channel when another channel contains a Dummy Bistable or is being maintained in Manual Bypass.

These changes are designed to provide more stringent administrative controls on the manipulation of RPS channels during testing to minimize the occurrence of Tech. Spec. violations or channel/unit trips and therefore these changes pose no safety concerns.

3) The Contact Monitor test for the RC Pump Power Monitors is revised to incorporate new method of operation whereby the RPS channels will trip anytime that two RC Pumps are detected not operating.

The change to trip the RPS channels and consequently the unit whenever two RC Pumps are not operating is more conservative than all previous requirements and is in compliance with the new Tech. Specs. This action takes the unit to a known safe state which has been analyzed, therefore no unreviewed safety question is involved and the margin of nuclear safety is not reduced.

IP/1/A/305/03D
Change 66

1) A Caution statement is added to Data Sheet 7 to ensure that both trains of MDEFWP's and flow paths are operable.

The Caution statement is to ensure that the MDEFWP's are operable so that a situation will not occur where too many components are out of service which could result in a Tech. Spec. violation.

IP/1/A/305/03D
Change 66 (cont.)

2) Instructions are revised for placing a channel in Manual Bypass and removing the channel from Manual Bypass.

3) Instructions are revised for testing a channel when another channel contains a Dummy Bistable or is being maintained in Manual Bypass.

These changes are designed to provide more stringent administrative controls on the manipulation of RPS channels during testing to minimize the occurrence of Tech. Spec. violations or channel/unit trips and therefore these changes pose no safety concerns.

4) Prerequisite for blocking the RB Evacuation Horn while testing the Source Range channel is deleted.

The RB Evacuation Horn is actuated by the Source Range instruments. Channel D of the RPS is not associated with a Source Range instrument therefore this prerequisite should not be listed in this procedure. Deleting an unnecessary prerequisite poses no safety concerns.

5) The Contact Monitor test for the RC Pump Power Monitors is revised to incorporate new method of operation whereby the RPS channels will trip anytime that two RC Pumps are detected not operating.

The change to trip the RPS channels and consequently the unit whenever two RC Pumps are not operating is more conservative than all previous requirements and is in compliance with the New Tech. Specs. This action takes the unit to a known safe state which has been analyzed, therefore no unreviewed safety question is involved and the margin of nuclear safety is not reduced.

OP/2/A/1104/01
Change 30

During the performance of OP/2/A/1104/01 (Core Change Flooding System), 2CF-3 (Tank A Sample and Drain) failed to fully close from the control room switch. This procedure change requires that, during the time that 2CF-3 is open, I&E will be stationed at the breaker for 2CF-3 to read motor amps and to close the valve from the breaker should it not close from the control room switch. I&E will perform these actions per approved procedure IP/0/A/3006/01 (Troubleshooting Procedure for Motor Operated Valves).

OP/2/A/1104/01
Change 30 (cont.)

Since this procedure change requires the I&E personnel to be in constant communication with the control room, the time difference between closing the valve from the control room switch or notifying the I&E personnel to close the valve from the breaker is negligible. Thus, being required to close 2CF-3 from the breaker will not adversely affect the operation of the Core Flooding System from performing its design function.

This procedure change will not affect operability, boron concentration, or level of the Core Flood Tanks. The Margin of Safety as defined in the bases to Technical Specifications, therefore, will not be reduced.

MP/O/A/1100/012
Change 4

COOLER - OIL - EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE - REFUELING PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

Reason for Change - APM Review

Section 3.4 of the Oconee Technical Specifications deals with secondary system decay heat removal. The Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine is part of this decay heat removal system, and the oil cooler addressed by this procedure is a component associated with the pump. The subject procedure deals with the inspection and cleaning of the oil cooler. This procedure review and resultant changes do not in any way affect Tech. Specs. nor should they cause the use of the procedure to affect Tech. Specs.

The performance of this procedure will not affect the possibility, probability, or consequences of equipment malfunction.

MP/O/A/1100/015
Change 5

COOLER - LPI (DECAY HEAT) - CHEMICAL CLEANING

Reason for Change - APM Review

This procedure deals with the chemical cleaning of the shell side (LPSW) of the Decay Heat Removal (LPI) Cooler.

This procedure change involved a review and upgrade of the existing procedure. The amount of detail provided for cleaning system valve line-ups was increased in this revision, but otherwise the procedure remains basically unchanged.

MP/O/A/1100/015
Change 5 (cont.)

For chemical cleaning the subject cooler will be isolated and removed from service under the guidelines of Tech. Spec. 3.3.2. The isolating and draining of the cooler to remove it from service is covered by Operation's procedures. The Maintenance activities of setting up equipment, adding and recirculating the cleaning solution through the cooler, and removing the equipment is covered by this procedure, do not affect any accident possibilities, probabilities, or consequences.

OP/1/B/1502/08
Original

OP/1/B/1502/08 (BLOCK TAGOUT PROCEDURE) is a new procedure. This procedure describes the philosophy for standardize Block Tagouts. It gives isolations for major blocks of mechanical work. Electrical work on components should be tagged for specific W.O.'s.

This procedure affects many systems and components that are addressed in the FSAR. These systems and components are not required to be operable by TECH. SPECS. or FSAR when the BTO's are in effect. Consequently the probability or consequences of an accident and the possibility of an accident already described in the FSAR are not increased. Since the systems are not required to be operable, malfunctions of equipment will not affect safety. The margins of safety defined in the basis of TECH. SPEC.'s are not reduced.

MP/O/A/1100/018
Change 2

REACTOR BUILDING COOLING UNITS - COILS - CLEANING AIR SIDE ONLY

This procedure change simply adds a new step to verify that all scaffold boards are removed from inside the duct (both the top and bottom duct opening) prior to reassembly.

In Section 4.5.2 there is a surveillance requirement that the LPSW flow through an RBCU cooler must be 1400 gpm. This procedure for the cleaning of the RBCU cooling coils does not adversely affect this requirement.

The change to this procedure is made to ensure that objects which could impede air flow are not left in the duct following cleaning. Therefore, upon returning this equipment to service, the probability and consequences of equipment malfunction should not be increased and no new possibilities should be created.

OP/1/A/1102/04
Change 49

A revised B&W study has shown that the present Rx/MT (Reactor/Main Turbine) trip setpoint (set at 50% FP) will not prevent a Rx trip upon trip of MT due to ICS control limitations. The new trip setpoint (set at 30% FP) is expected to be able to prevent a Rx trip due solely to a MT trip while at the same time providing a greater RCS pressure margin before reaching activation pressure of the PORV.

The ART signal was not part of the original design basis and therefore, no credit was ever taken for such a function in any of the FSAR accident analyses. Since the ART signal itself results in the tripping of the reactor, the failure of the device would result in the same conditions presently analyzed in the FSAR.

The change in the ART setpoint is designed to reduce the number of reactor trips below 30% power. The failure of the device, as stated above would not adversely affect the course of any accident previously evaluated, or create any new accidents.

The proposed decrease to the arming threshold for the ART signal seeks to avoid reactor trips between 50% and 30%, due to the limits of the ICS.

ART is allowed to trip the reactor thus reducing the number of challenges to important safety systems. Furthermore, the ART signal setpoint is not currently a technical specification and therefore does not affect the margin of safety as defined in the bases.

OP/2/A/1102/04
Change 16

A revised B&W study has shown that the present Rx/MT trip setpoint (set at 50% FP) will not prevent a Rx trip upon trip of MT due to ICS control limitations. The new trip setpoint (set at 30% FP) is expected to be able to prevent a Rx trip due solely to a MT trip while at the same time providing a greater RCS pressure margin before reaching activation pressure of the PORV.

The ART signal was not part of the original design basis and therefore, no credit was ever taken for such a function in any of the FSAR accident analyses. Since the ART signal itself results in the tripping of the reactor, the failure of the device would result in the same conditions presently analyzed to the FSAR.

OP/2/A/1102/04
Change 16 (cont.)

The change in the ART setpoint is designed to reduce the number of reactor trips below 30% power. The failure of the device, as stated above would not adversely affect the course of any accident previously evaluated, or create any new accidents.

The proposed decrease to the arming threshold for the ART signal seeks to avoid reactor trips between 50% and 30%, due to the limits of the ICS.

ART is allowed to trip the reactor thus reducing the number of challenges to important safety systems. Furthermore, the ART signal setpoint is not currently a technical specification and therefore does not affect the margin of safety as defined in the bases.

OP/3/A/1102/04
Change 14

A revised B&W study has shown that the present Rx/MT trip setpoint (set at 50% FP) will not prevent a Rx trip upon trip of MT due to ICS control limitations. The new trip setpoint (set at 30% FP) is expected to be able to prevent a Rx trip due solely to a MT trip while at the same time providing a greater RCS pressure margin before reaching activation pressure of the PORV.

The ART signal was not part of the original design basis and therefore, no credit was ever taken for such a function in any of the FSAR accident analyses. Since the ART signal itself results in the tripping of the reactor, the failure of the device would result in the same conditions presently analyzed in the FSAR.

The change in the ART setpoint is designed to reduce the number of reactor trips below 30% power. The failure of the device, as stated above would not adversely affect the course of any accident previously evaluated, or create any new accidents.

The proposed decrease to the arming threshold for the ART signal seeks to avoid reactor trips between 50% and 30%, due to the limits of the ICS.

ART is allowed to trip the reactor thus reducing the number of challenges to important safety systems. Furthermore, the ART signal setpoint is not currently a technical specification and therefore does not affect the margin of safety as defined in the bases.

PT/1/A/600/01
Change 102

PERIODIC INSTRUMENT SURVEILLANCE

Added new pages to give guidance for 230 KV yellow bus switchyard requirements.

When unit(s) are equal to or greater than 200 degrees F., switchyard voltage must be maintained sufficient to supply startup transformers required voltage demands to safely shutdown the units and supply emergency power as described in Tech. Specs. 3.7.

Change #102 of PT/1/A/600/01 will not change the margin of safety as defined in the ONS FSAR or Technical Specifications. Establishing a minimum voltage on the 230 KV switchyard, in which the Startup Transformer can be considered operable, will ensure that existing equipment functions satisfactorily for accidents which are evaluated in the FSAR. The reliability of equipment important to safety will be increased as a result of this change.

If the 230KV switchyard voltage decreases to a point below the analyzed minimum value (219KV) but remains above the setpoint of the External Grid Protection undervoltage relays, the Keowee overhead source would not be automatically available. For this reason, the start-up source, for each Oconee unit, is considered operable based on the condition that operators monitor the 230 KV switchyard voltage and take appropriate action if it decreases below 225.2KV. The 225.2KV is a conservative value and is based on a study performed by System Planning Department which considered the impact of a unit trip on the 230 KV switchyard voltage stability. If 230KV switchyard voltage decreases below 225.2KV, applicable Tech. Spec. action statement should be entered.

Plant operation at a minimum switchyard voltage of 225.2KV involves no USQs. No change to the FSAR or any technical specifications is required.

IP/1/A/0301/003F
Change 45

This procedure change rewrites the procedure to conform with Appendix F of the NPD Procedure Development Guide and to meet the APM requirement for 2 year review of safety related procedures. In addition, some technical changes have been made.

IP/1/A/0301/003F
Change 45 (cont.)

Changes to the procedure per the Procedure Development Guide and the APM are administrative changes which have no effect on the technical content of the procedure or the manner in which it is performed. The technical changes enhance the manner in which the procedure is performed. No compromises to the requirements of Tech. Specs. or deviations from the descriptions in the FSAR have been made. The manner in which the equipment is removed from service and returned to service has been changed, but these changes are designed to clarify the performance of the procedure under such abnormal conditions as performance of the procedure with a channel in Manual Bypass or with a Dummy Bistable installed. The statements for removing the equipment from service and returning to service are standard statements which are being added to all RPS procedures. The probability of adversely affecting any equipment while performing this procedure has not been increased. On the contrary, the changes to clarify the statements for removal from and return to service of equipment are designed to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent channel trips or Tech. Spec. violations.

IP/1/A/0301/003E
Change 51

This procedure change rewrites the procedure to conform with Appendix F of the NPD Procedure Development Guide and to meet the APM requirement for 2 year review of safety related procedures. In addition, some technical changes have been made.

Changes to the procedure per the Procedure Development Guide and the APM are administrative changes which have no effect on the technical content of the procedure or the manner in which it is performed. The technical changes enhance the manner in which the procedure is performed. No compromises to the requirements of Tech. Specs. or deviations from the descriptions in the FSAR have been made. The manner in which the equipment is removed from service and returned to service has been changed but these changes are designed to clarify the performance of the procedure under such abnormal conditions as performance of the procedure with a channel in Manual Bypass or with a Dummy Bistable installed. The statements for removing the equipment from service and returning to service are standard statements which are being added to all RPS procedures. The probability of adversely affecting any equipment while performing this procedure has not been increased. On the contrary, the changes to clarify the statements for removal from and return to service of equipment are designed to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent channel trips or Tech. Specs. violations.

IP/3/A/0301/003F
Change 39

This procedure change rewrites the procedure to conform with Appendix F of the NPD Procedure Development Guide and to meet the APM requirement for 2 year review of safety related procedures. In addition, some technical changes have been made.

Changes to the procedure per the Procedure Development Guide and the APM are administrative changes which have no effect on the technical content of the procedure or the manner in which it is performed. No compromises to the requirements of Tech. Specs. or deviations from the descriptions in the FSAR have been made. The manner in which the equipment is removed from service and returned to service has been changed, but these changes are designed to clarify the performance of the procedure under such abnormal conditions as performance of the procedure with a channel in Manual Bypass or with a Dummy Bistable installed. The statements for removing the equipment from service and returning to service are standard statements which are being added to all RPS procedures. The probability of adversely affecting any equipment while performing this procedure has not been increased. On the contrary, the changes to clarify the statements for removal from and return to service of equipment are designed to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent channel trips or Tech. Spec. violations.

IP/2/A/0301/003F
Change 45

This procedure change rewrites the procedure to conform with Appendix F of the NPD Procedure Development Guide and to meet the APM requirement for 2 year review of safety related procedures. In addition, some technical changes have been made.

Changes to the procedure per the Procedure Development Guide and the APM are administrative changes which have no effect on the technical content of the procedure or the manner in which it is performed. The tehnical changes enhance the manner in which the procedure is performed. No compromises to the requirements of Tech. Specs. or deviations from the descriptions in the FSAR have been made. The manner in which the equipment is removed from service and returned to service has been changed, but these changes are designed to clarify the performance of the procedure under such abnormal conditions as performance of the procedure with a channel in Manual Bypass or with a Dummy Bistable installed. The

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| IP/2/A/0301/003F<br>Change 45 (cont.) | statements which are being added to all RPS procedures. The probability of adversely affecting any equipment while performing this procedure has not been increased. On the contrary, the changes to clarify the statements for removal from and return to service of equipment are designed to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent channel trips or Tech. Spec. violations. |
| IP/2/A/0301/003G<br>Change 42 | This procedure change rewrites the procedure to conform with Appendix F of the NPD Procedure Development Guide and to meet the APM requirement for 2 year review of safety related procedures. In addition, some technical changes have been made.<br><br>Changes to the procedure per the Procedure Development Guide and the APM are administrative changes which have no effect on the technical content of the procedure or the manner in which it is performed. The technical changes enhance the manner in which the procedure is performed. No compromises to the requirements of Tech. Specs. or deviations from the descriptions in the FSAR have been made. The manner in which the equipment is removed from service and returned to service has been changed, but these changes are designed to clarify the performance of the procedure under such abnormal conditions as performance of the procedure with a channel in Manual Bypass or with a Dummy Bistable installed. The statements for removing the equipment from service and returning to service are standard statements which are being added to all RPS procedures. The probability of adversely affecting any equipment while performing this procedure has not been increased. On the contrary, the changes to clarify the statements for removal from and return to service of equipment are designed to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent channel trips or Tech. Spec. violations. |
| IP/1/A/0301/003G<br>Change 44 | This procedure change rewrites the procedure to conform with Appendix F of the NPD Procedure Development Guide and to meet the APM requirement for 2 year review of safety related procedures. In addition, some technical changes have been made. |

IP/1/A/0301/003G
Change 44 (cont.)

Changes to the procedure per the Procedure Development Guide and the APM are administrative changes which have no effect on the technical content of the procedure or the manner in which it is performed. The technical changes enhance the manner in which the procedure is performed. No compromises to the requirements of Tech. Specs. or deviations from the descriptions in the FSAR have been made. The manner in which the equipment is removed from service and returned to service has been changed, but these changes are designed to clarify the performance of the procedure under such abnormal conditions as performance of the procedure with a channel in Manual Bypass or with a Dummy Bistable installed. The statements for removing the equipment from service and returning to service are standard statements which are being added to all RPS procedures. The probability of adversely affecting any equipment while performing this procedure has not been increased. On the contrary, the changes to clarify the statements for removal from and return to service of equipment are designed to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent channel trips or Tech. Spec. violations.

IP/1/A/0301/003H
Change 43

This procedure change rewrites the procedure to conform with Appendix F of the NPD Procedure Development Guide and to meet the APM requirement for 2 year review of safety related procedures. In addition, some technical changes have been made.

Changes to the procedure per the Procedure Development Guide and the APM are administrative changes which have no effect on the technical content of the procedure or the manner in which it is performed. The technical changes enhance the manner in which the procedure is performed. No compromises to the requirements of Tech. Specs. or deviations from the descriptions in the FSAR have been made. The manner in which the equipment is removed from service and returned to service has been changed, but these changes are designed to clarify the performance of the procedure under such abnormal conditions as performance of the procedure with a channel in Manual Bypass or with a Dummy Bistable installed. The statements for removing the equipment from service and returning to service are standard statements which are being added to all RPS procedures. The probability of adversely affecting any equipment while performing this procedure has not been increased. On the contrary, the changes to clarify the statements for removal from and return to service of equipment are designed to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent channel trips or Tech. Spec. violations.

TI/1/B/0340/002
Original

This procedure provides instructions for the installation and functional verification of the proper operation of solid state programmers installed in the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system by exempt change OE-2727. This equipment is evaluated in the FSAR. The safety evaluation for the exempt change evaluated the replacement of the presently installed electro-mechanical programmers with the solid state devices and covers the necessary changes to the FSAR.

The procedure is written to ensure that the solid state programmers are installed as designed by OE-2727. The procedure is performed with the unit at cold shutdown and with the CRD system out of service. There is no possibility of actuating any equipment in the CRD system during the performance of the procedure which would have any adverse effect on the unit. Once the equipment is installed, the procedure provides instructions to verify that the equipment responds correctly to all commands applied both locally and from the control room. Therefore, the procedure ensures that the equipment will perform its intended function.

IP/O/A/0305/015
Original

This is a new procedure "RPS Removal From and Return To Service." It provides the instructions for removal/return to service and ensures adherence to the Technical Specification and FSAR requirements associated with system operability. This includes minimum operable channels, dummy bistable and manual bypass conditions. The purpose is to provide consistent instructions to perform the task(s) properly. This procedure is a continuing response to PIR-4-089-0168 to improve the method for handling dummy bistables and the I&E/Operations interface.

This procedure does not alter the intent or function of the RPS system nor depart from actions required by procedures now in use for remove/return to service. This does not require a change to either the FSAR or Technical Specifications nor does it result in any new or unresolved safety question.

IP/0/A/305/14
Change 3

RPS Control Rod Drive Breaker Trip and Timing Test

Exempt change OE-2731 installed test jacks on Unit 1 for the purpose of connecting test equipment to test CRD breakers and RPS coincidence logic. This procedure change reflects the installation of these test jacks.

Using the test jacks to connect test equipment is an improved method of performing the required surveillances. This change was previously made on Unit 3. This change for Unit 1 is the same as that change, therefore the previous 10CFR50.59 evaluation is valid for this change also and no unreviewed safety question is involved.

IP/1/A/305/1L
Change 32

RPS CH "D" RC Flow Installation Calibration

NSM 12727 replaces the Bailey BY transmitters used for monitoring RC Flow with Rosemount transmitters and also makes the necessary changes so that the new current loop transmitters are compatible with the rest of the instrument string since the Bailey BY transmitters had a 0 to 10 VDC output. This procedure change reflects the implementation of that modification.

The removal from and return to normal methods for the new equipment is the same as for the Bailey BY's. The equipment is calibrated per the manufacturer's recommendations. No deviations from the description in the FSAR or the requirements of Tech. Specs. are made.

IP/1/A/305/1K
Change 33

RPS CH "C" RC Flow Installation Calibration

NSM 12727 replaces the Bailey BY transmitters used for monitoring RC Flow with Rosemount transmitters and also makes the necessary changes so that the new current loop transmitters are compatible with the rest of the instrument string since the Bailey BY transmitters had a 0 to 10 VDC output. This Change procedure change reflects the implementation of that modification.

The removal from and return to normal methods for the new equipment is the same as for the Bailey BY's. The equipment is calibrated per the manufacturer's recommendations. No deviations from the description in the FSAR or the requirements of Tech. Specs. are made.

IP/1/A/305/1J
Change 32

RPS CH "B" RC Flow Installation Calibration

NSM 12727 replaces the Bailey BY transmitters used for monitoring RC Flow with Rosemount transmitters and also makes the necessary changes so that the new current loop transmitters are compatible with the rest of the instrument string since the Bailey BY transmitters had a 0 to 10 VDC output. This procedure change reflects the implementation of that modification.

The removal from and return to normal methods for the new equipment is the same as for the Bailey BY's. The equipment is calibrated per the manufacturer's recommendations. No deviations from the description in the FSAR or the requirements of Tech. Specs. are made.

IP/1/A/305/1I
Change 34

RPS CH "A" RC Flow Installation Calibration

NSM 12727 replaces the Bailey BY transmitters used for monitoring RC Flow with Rosemount transmitters and also makes the necessary changes so that the new current loop transmitters are compatible with the rest of the instrument string since the Bailey BY transmitters had a 0 to 10 VDC output. This procedure change reflects the implementation of that modification.

The removal from and return to normal methods for the new equipment is the same as for the Bailey BY's. The equipment is calibrated per the manufacturer's recommendations. No deviations from the description in the FSAR or the requirements of Tech. Specs. are made.

MP/O/A/1100/007
Change 6

Cooler - Decay Heat - Flange Leak Repair - Stud Removal - Cleaning and Replacement

This procedure deals with the repair of a leaking flange on a Decay Heat Removal (LPI) Cooler. These coolers are addressed in the FSAR in a significant manner.

MP/O/A/1100/007
Change 6 (cont.)

This procedure change involved a review and upgrade of the existing procedure. The procedure involves stopping a flange leak without taking compression off of the flange gasket. The cooler will not be required to be isolated, as only four studs from the flange will be removed at a time.

The Maintenance activities of removing, cleaning and reinstalling flange studs/nuts covered by this procedure, do not affect any accident possibilities, probabilities, or consequences. The cooler does not need to be removed from service for these activities.

This procedure is used for guidance to ensure that it will function as designed, without leaks, following maintenance. Therefore, activities covered by this procedure should have no adverse affects on the probability, possibility, or consequences of equipment malfunction.

IP/3/B/0275/008
Change 1

Temporary maintenance procedure IP/O/B/0275/008 allows for the installation of temporary nozzle dam failure alarms which are to be used while a unit is at cold shutdown. This procedure disconnects existing cables from instruments not required during cold shutdown and uses them for nozzle dam failure alarms that are connected to statalarms in the Unit control room. These alarms are connected during installation of the nozzle dams. When the refueling outage is complete, the nozzle dams are removed and the instruments are then reconnected as they were. After reconnection, they are tested per IP/2&3/B/202/1C to assure that they function the same as before this temporary modification. This change adapts IP/3/B/0275/008 into a 'zero' procedure so that it can be performed on all three units in the same manner.

MP/O/A/3007/38
Change 3

Sections 3.3.5 and 4.5.2 of the Oconee Technical Specifications deal with the limiting condition of operation and the surveillance requirements for the Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU) system. Addressed are the RBCU fans and coolers. This procedure for the PM activities of the RBCU's and Auxiliary Coolers does not affect Tech. Specs.

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| MP/O/A/3007/38<br>Change 3 (cont.) | This procedure provides guidelines for the lubrication of the Reactor Building Cooling fan motors and inspection of the units for proper operation. These activities are to ensure that the units operate properly. Therefore, the procedure does not affect the possibility, probability or increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. |
| IP/2/A/0305/003<br>Change 70 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |
| IP/1/A/0305/003<br>Change 65 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |

IP/2/A/0305/011
Change 6

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition.

IP/1/A/0305/003A
Change 61

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition.

IP/1/A/0305/003B
Change 60

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is

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| IP/1/A/0305/003B<br>Change 60 (cont.) | discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |
| IP/1/A/0305/003C<br>Change 63 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |
| IP/1/A/0305/003D<br>Change 67 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |
| IP/1/A/0305/009<br>Change 9 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at |

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| IP/1/A/0305/009<br>Change 9 (cont.) | a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |
| IP/1/A/0305/010<br>Change 7 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |
| IP/1/A/0305/011<br>Change 8 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |

IP/1/A/0305/012
Change 7

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition.

IP/3/A/0305/012
Change 7

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition.

IP/2/A/0305/012
Change 5

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

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| IP/2/A/0305/012<br>Change 5 (cont.) | The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |
| IP/3/A/0305/003A<br>Change 64 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |
| IP/3/A/0305/003B<br>Change 60 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |

IP/3/A/0305/003C
Change 64

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition.

IP/3/A/0305/003D
Change 71

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition.

IP/3/A/0305/009
Change 10

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

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| IP/3/A/0305/009<br>Change 10 (cont.) | The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |
| IP/3/A/0305/010<br>Change 7 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |
| IP/3/A/0305/011<br>Change 7 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |

IP/3/A/0305/003
Change 66

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition.

IP/2/A/0305/003A
Change 62

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition.

IP/2/A/0305/003B
Change 66

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

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| IP/2/A/0305/003B Change 66 (cont.) | The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |
| IP/2/A/0305/003C Change 66 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |
| IP/2/A/0305/003D Change 68 | The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.<br><br>The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition. |

IP/2/A/0305/009
Change 10

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition.

IP/2/A/0305/010
Change 6

The set point for the RPS Anticipatory Trip Turbine Trip Bistable is changed from reset at 50%, trip at 48%, full power, to reset at 30%, trip at 28% full power. This change is in response to a B&W set point revision document in conjunction with the investigation of Station Problem Report ONPR-2570, PIR 3-088-242. The new bistable set point is set at a power level from which the plant should survive a turbine trip.

The set point change does not alter the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation for the ART set point documented in OSC-2711. The change does not alter the intent or function of the procedure. The RPS is discussed in detail in both the FSAR and Tech. Spec., however, no change is required to either document. The change does not raise any new or unanalyzed safety question or condition.